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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Arbitrage strategies which may be employed to enable a 
trader to profit from price differences for the 
same or similar goods in different markets. 
Historically arbitrage has implied profit at 
little or no risk. 
Assignment the sale of a swap or loan contract by one 
party to another, usually for a total up-front 
payment. Assignments can be cumbersome because 
they require the approval of the original 
party. 
Basis point one one-hundredth of a percentage point. The 
term is most often employed to describe the 
margin attached to a specific financial 
instrument or to compare differences in margins 
attached to various financial instruments. 
Certificate of deposit 
(CD) a negotiable bearer certificate issued by a 
bank as evidence of an interest-bearing time 
deposit. 
Commercial paper a short-term negotiable unsecured promissory 
note issued for a specific amount and maturity. 
Continuous tender panel 
(CTP) a tender panel of banks established to issue a 
borrower's paper at a price predetermined by 
the 1 ead manager of the CTP. A feature of this 
type of tender panel is that members are 
allowed a specific amount of time within which 
to decide whether or not they wish to purchase 
paper at the specified price. This system 
therefore avoids the embarrassment often 
associated with the tender panel system of not 
being able to obtain paper or being left with 
paper that cannot be sold at a particular 
price. 
Convertible euronote 
facility this structure provides euronote underwriters 
with the opportunity, after a specified period 
of time, to buy FRNs (see floating rate notes) 
at par, so terminating their commitment to the 
euronote facility. 
Country risk the risk that economic agents (including the 
government) within a particular country wi ll 
prove unwil 1 ing or unable to meet their 
international financial commitments. 
(xiv) 
Credit rating a credit rating is an independent agency's 
opinion of the creditworthiness of a particular 
borrower. The credit rating itself is usually 
denoted by a letter and symbol indicating the 
agency's belief in the creditworthiness of the 
borrower. 
Credit risk the risk that a counterparty to a financial 
transaction will fail to meet its obligations 
accordi n to the terms and conditions of the 
contract 
? 
default) for whatever reasons, thus 
causing the asset ho 1 der to incur a financial 
loss. 
Disaster myopia a systematic tendency to underestimate shock 
probabilities, usually associated with the 
field of international banking. 
Disintermediation the process by which borrowers and lenders deal 
directly with each other, by-passing the 
banking system. 
Eurobond bonds placed simultaneously on the markets of 
at least two countries and denominated in a 
currency that need not be the currency of 
either, usually by international financial 
syndicates with the participation of financial 
institutions of several countries. 
Euro-commercial paper 
facility a facility established to issue short-term 
bearer negotiable certificates outside the 
United States without an underwriting 
commitment to purchase unsold notes. 
Euro-medium term notes medium-term bearer negotiable certificates 
issued outside the United States for maturities 
ranging between one to five years. 
Euro-note facility a facility established to issue short-term 
bearer negotiable certificates outside the 
United States with an underwriting commitment 
to purchase unsold notes. 
Facility fee in respect of a euronote facility this fee is 
payable by the issuer on the full amount of its 
underwritten facility. The facility fee is due 
irrespective of the use made of the facility 
and irrespective of whether the underwriters 
are required to purchase short-term paper or 
make advances. 
(xv) 
Financial crisis a disturbance to financial markets, associated 
typically with falling asset prices and 
insolvency among debtors and intermediaries, 
which spreads through the financial system, 
disrupting the market's capacity to allocate 
capital. 
Flip-flop an FRN with a six-month interest rate 
structure, with the option to convert into a 
three-month structure, so giving the FRN added 
flexibility. 
Floating rate note 
(FRN) a medium-to-long-term bond, with most 
maturities being between five and fifteen 
years. An FRN is evidenced by negotiable 
bearer certificates, in denominations of at 
least US $1,000 and with a coupon consisting of 
a margin over an appropriate short-term 
reference rate, usually LIBOR (see later). 
Gatekeeper the person with the authority to permit access 
to a particular research site. 
Global note facility a facility which enables borrowers to raise 
funds by accessing various commercial paper 
markets simultaneously. 
Interest rate swap 'a transaction in which two counterparties 
exchange interest payment streams of differing 
character based on an underlying notional 
principal amount' (BIS, 1986, p 261). There 
are three main types of interest rate swap: 
coupon swaps (fixed rate to floating rate in 
the same currency); basis swaps (one floating 
rate index to another floating rate index in 
the same currency), and cross-currency interest 
rate swaps (fixed rate in one currency to 
floating rate in another). 
Invitation telex in regard to euronote facilities this is the 
telex to potential underwriters which provides 
a comprehensive outline of the borrower. 
Issuer set margin ( ISM) a pricing method associated with a tender 
panel, by which the issuer sets the price to be 
paid on its paper. Paper issued through this 
type of tender panel structure is price led 
rather than supply driven. A principal pricing 
agent will place paper on behalf of junior 
underwriters, with senior underwriters placing 
paper themselves at the issuer set margin. 
(xvi) 
Lead manager the bank that arranges and, if necessary, 
syndicates the facility. The 1 ead manager acts 
as a central organiser to co-ordinate the 
syndicate's dealings with the borrower. 
Letter of credit generally an obl igation on the part of a bank 
to a third party to redeem a customer's 
maturing debt if that customer cannot meet, its 
commitment. 
London InterBank Bid 
Rate (LIBID) 
London InterBank Offer 
Rate (LIBOR) 
Liquidity risk 
London InterBank Mean 
Rate (LIhEAN) 
the rate which banks will bid to purchase funds 
in the interbank market. 
the rate at which most banks can obtain funds 
in the interbank market. 
the risk that a negotiable financial instrument 
cannot be sold quickly to realise an amount 
close to its full market value. 
the mean of LIBID and LIBOR. 
Loan sale 'the sale, transfer or assignment of a loan or 
a loan participation to a third party wi th or 
without the knowledge of the borrower' (BIS, 
1986, p 263). 
Marking to market the process by which the exposure in a 
trading position in securities or option/future 
contracts is recalculated. 
Mean the average of the total of all observations, 
i. e. the sum of all observations divided by the 
number of observations 
Multi-option facility 
(MOF) a facility which provides the borrower with 
several options regarding the means by which 
the borrower may raise funds. 
Multiple placing agency 
(MPA) a type of tender panel structure which enables 
underwriters to participate in the placement of 
euronotes. 
Note issuance facility 
(NIF) see euro-commercial paper facility. 
Novation a process which involves the discharge of one 
financial commitment and the creation of an 
entirely new one, rather than simply the 
transfer of an existing obligation. 
(xvii) 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. 
Perpetual floating rate 
note an irredeemable floating rate note. 
Risk asset ratio 
system this system reconstitutes the asset side of a 
bank's balance sheet, dividing assets into 
categories and applying weights to those assets 
according to their perceived riskiness. The 
ratio is arrived at by comparing the bank's 
capital to its recalculated assets. 
Recourse this legal term describes the claim that the 
purchaser of a financial asset has (under 
certain circumstances) on the original debtor 
(or its bank) should the debtor default. 
Revolving acceptance 
facility by tender an acceptance credit faci 1 ity which 
incorporates the competitive features of a 
tender panel whilst retaining the high 
liquidity features of acceptance credits. 
Revolving credit 
agreement a commitment given by a bank to provide funds 
up to a specified amount against predetermined 
conditions. 
Revolving underwriting 
facility (RUF) see euronote facility 
Secondary market a market in which financial instruments are 
traded subsequent to their issuance in the 
primary market. 
Securitisation the term can be narrowly defined as the process 
by which debt is made marketable. On a wi der 
interpretation securi ti sation can be divided 
into two forms. In its most extreme form it 
involves the unbundling and repackaging of 
already existing loan portfolios into 
securities. These securities are then sold, 
thereby removing the asset from the 
originator's balance sheet. The second form of 
securitisation involves the raising of debt 
through the issue of securities in the capital 
markets to replace bank loans. 
Settlement risk the risk that operational difficulties may 
affect the delivery of funds despite the 
possibility that the counterparty may be able 
to perform. 
(xviii) 
Sole placing agency 
(SPA) a single dealership structure whereby 
responsibility for placing a borrower's paper 
is given to one bank or securities house. 
Strike offer yield the yield at which underwriters will be forced 
to purchase any notes not sold in the market. 
Sub-participation a method of transferring all or part of a 
financial obligation. Under this method the 
sub-participant makes a payment to the original 
lender in consideration of a right to receive a 
stream of payments in return, measured by the 
amounts of principal and interest received by 
the original lender from the borrower. 
Swap 'a financial transaction in which two counter- 
parties agree to exchange streams of payments 
over time according to a predetermined rule' 
(BIS, 1986, p 268). See, for example, 
'interest rate swap'. 
Swingling a facility which allows short-term funds to be 
drawn to bridge the gap between the offer of 
notes under a euronote facility and the receipt 
of funds. 
Syndicated loan usually a large loan provided by a group of 
international banks. 
Systemic risk the risk of a financial crisis (see 'Financial 
crisis') 
Tender panel a method of distributing notes issued under 
note issuance facilities or revolving 
underwriting fac11 1ti es. A group of banks 
and/or securities houses have the right to bid 
for notes up to a predetermined level. 
Transferable loan 
facility a facility by which loans can be transferred by 
either assignment or novation. The former 
route involves a form of loan securi ti sati on, 
transferable loan instruments (TLIs), a fully- 
f1 edged debt instrument ref 1 ecti ng the terms of 
the original agreement. The 1 atter involves 
transferable loan certificates, differing in 
that they are not actually securities. 
Transferable revolving 
underwriting facility a method by which each underwriter to a 
euronote facility, with prior approval from the 
borrower, may assign its commitment to another 
nstitution. 
(xix) 
AIMS AND PLAN OF STUDY 
The central aim of this study is to determine whether the growth of 
euronote facilities has contributed to an increase in systemic risk. 
Systemic risk refers to the likelihood, or possible incidence, of a 
financial crisis. A financial crisis is defined by Eichengreen and 
Portes (1986, p 1) as: 
'a disturbance to financial markets, associated typically 
with falling asset prices and insolvency among debtors and 
intermediaries, which spreads through the financial system, 
disrupting the market's capacity to allocate capital'. 
The hypothesis that is explored in this study is that markets in 
new financial instruments may underprice risks during the development 
stage of the market because market participants hope to maximise profits 
in the long-term by gaining early market share. 
The BIS (Bank for International Settlements, 1986b, p 201) warns 
that: 
'Systemic risk may arise if considerable exposure is 
accumulated during the underpricing phase. ' 
If this could be shown to be the case, any contribution to systemic risk 
caused by the underpricing of euronotes in the short term should be 
reduced as margins widen in the longer-term. 
The relationship between the euronote market and systemic risk is a 
crucial one, not just for market participants and bank regulators but 
also for students of the banking firm. There is much debate and 
confusion over the relationships between securitisation, the trend 
towards off-balance sheet (OBS) business, and the overall risks involved 
for the financial system. If the relationship between euronote 
facilities (one of the newest and least understood of all OBS 
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innovations) and systemic risk can be identified, this would provide a 
valuable insight into the relationships between other OBS innovations 
and systemic risk. The relevance of applying (or not applying as the 
case may be) capital adequacy controls on these instruments, and indeed 
the ways in which capital may be applied for risk (prudential) purposes, 
might also be analysed in a more informed manner. 
This study is divided into two main parts. The first part contains 
five chapters; it is concerned primarily with identifying areas of the 
euronote market which may affect systemic risk, either to increase it or 
to reduce it. The first part will also serve to document and clarify 
various operational aspects of the euronote market that are crucial for 
understanding and exploring the main thesis of this study. 
Chapter 1 documents the relationship between the phenomenon of 
securitisation and financial innovation. The link between the 
underpricing of new financial innovations and systemic risk will be 
established and the risks inherent in new financial innovations 
examined. The latter part of Chapter 1 will examine some of the funding 
instruments that have developed in the euromarkets, starting with the 
development of the eurobond market in 1963. The euronote facility 
incorporates key aspects of all the instruments documented in this 
latter part of the chapter. 
Chapter 2 examines the development of the euronote market as well 
as the different segments of the main market (ie sovereigns, 
supranationals, corporations and banks). The analysis moves on to 
explore the structure of a euronote facility, and its related 
implications for systemic risk. The latter part of this chapter 
documents the various pricing components and pricing processes that 
feature in a euronote facility. The theoretical and practical pricing 
2 
processes of a euronote facility are compared to those of a revolving 
credit agreement. It is argued that - in theory at least - the process 
of pricing a euronote f aci 1 ity is no more likely to contribute to an 
increase in systemic risk than the corresponding process of pricing a 
revolving credit agreement. 
Chapter 3 undertakes an analysis of the premiums charged by the 
euronote market for country risk compared with the premiums charged by 
the euroloan market for the same borrowers. The implications of the 
results of this analysis for systemic risk are examined. If it could be 
shown that the euronote market charges lower risk premiums than does the 
eurocredit market, a basis would exist for an analysis of systemic risk 
in the euronote market. Presumably, if the euronote market is willing 
to accept lower risk premiums, risk should be lower in this market. If 
it is not, systemic risk is increased. 
Chapter 4 begins by analysing and distinguishing between the 
various placement methods available in the euronote market. An attempt 
is made to discover whether lower pricing in the market may be partially 
the result of the placement method used. If so this may suggest that 
one type of placement method is more likely to increase systemic risk 
than other placement methods. 
The purpose of Chapter 5 is to examine those features of the 
eurocommercial paper market which may affect systemic risk. The 
eurocommercial paper market is simply the non-underwritten sector of the 
euronote market. Underpricing in this sector of the market may also 
contribute to an increase in systemic risk. It is, therefore, also 
important to examine factors that may affect pricing levels (and 
possibly systemic risk) in this sector of the market. The chapter 
begins by documenting the factors which have led to the dramatic growth 
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of the eurocommerci al paper market. A survey is undertaken of the 
various domestic commercial paper markets across the world. By 
providing this analysis, an insight is provided into the pace of 
development of the eurocommercial paper market and the relative 
importance of commercial paper markets in different domestic economies. 
The analysis will reveal that in certain cases commercial paper markets 
may not be a very significant component of the country's financial 
system. Financial crises in such markets may have less systemic 
implications than crises in other large commercial paper markets. It is 
argued that the growth of these markets presents a fundamental change in 
the funding patterns of large international borrowers. 
In the second section of Chapter 5 the effect that regulation has 
had on the pricing levels of euronote facilities is explored. 
Theoretically, the application of regulation in the form of capital 
controls should increase pricing levels as banks pass on the 'tax' to 
their customers. Failure to put such theory into practice has been a 
criticism of Japanese banks in the securities markets. If practice 
relates to theory, then any increase in systemic risk which the growth 
of euronote facilities may have initially contributed to should be - at 
least partially - offset by the application of regulation. This 
hypothesis assumes that the capital regulations are risk-reducing. If 
they are risk-producing (ie, if the banks are forced to incur even 
greater risks in order to achieve competitive profit targets) systemic 
risk may actually be increased. This section of the chapter examines 
whether this has been the case. 
Section 3 of this chapter analyses the role of trading in the 
euronote market; the implications of trading for systemic risk are 
examined. The fourth section of the chapter examines the different 
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systems currently involved in the clearing of euronotes and 
eurocommercial paper. The section concludes with a brief discussion of 
the implications of a large settlement failure for systemic risk. 
The final section of Chapter 5 analyses the effect that credit 
ratings have had on note pricing levels in the markets. The assessment 
of Credit risk has traditionally been a prime commercial bank activity. 
In the euronote and eurocommercial paper markets, credit risk is 
assessed by investors - usually large corporations. To the extent that 
investors in eurocommercial paper are ill-equipped to analyse credit 
risk, systemic risk might be increased. One way of containing any 
increase in systemic risk - resulting from an inability on the part of 
investors to assess adequately credit risk - may be to rate euronotes 
and eurocommerci al paper. If the market has assessed correctly the 
creditworthiness of the borrower in the first place, the borrower's 
average trading level should not change because of the application of a 
credit rating. If the market has incorrectly assessed the 
creditworthiness of the borrower, trading spreads should alter. It is 
the aim of this section of the chapter to determine which of these two 
explanations is the case. By doing so we seek to determine whether 
credit ratings in the euronote and eurocommercial paper market may be 
one way of, at least partially, containing any increase in systemic risk 
which the growth of this market may have stimulated. 
The second main part of this study (Part 2) is concerned, not so 
much with clarifying those areas of the euronote market which may affect 
systemic risk - either to increase it or to reduce it - but rather to 
determine whether returns in the euronote market justify the risks 
incurred. If returns do not justify the risks incurred, systemic risk 
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is increased. If they do justify the risks concerned, systemic risk may 
even be reduced. 
The first five chapters serve in one sense as exploratory data 
analysis chapters, although they go beyond this by analysing and 
documenting a new market. In this context they serve to highlight the 
main area of concern as far as systemic risk is concerned, that of 
underwriting euronotes. Underwriters in the euronote market must base 
their pricing decisions on uncertain information about future events. 
There is no experience of default so far in the euronote market on which 
probabilities of future default could be based. From this point onwards 
the study concentrates on the underwriting of euronotes and its 
implications for systemic risk. 
Chapter 6 discusses the use of semi-structured interviews to convey 
our concern about pricing of underwriting facilities to the market. The 
interviews are also used to gather qualitative and quantitative data on 
underwriting practices and pricing determinants. The methodological 
debate of using fieldwork methods to formulate and test hypotheses in 
the field of finance is addressed at the beginning of the chapter. This 
provides the empirical enquiry that follows with an informed and clear 
methodological position. 
Chapters 7 and 8 use the quantitative data collected through the 
semi-structured interviews to determine, on a simulation basis, whether 
underwriters are receiving an adequate return for the risks incurred 
through underwriting euronotes. The facilities are viewed on a 'stand 
alone' basis, ie outside of any customer relationship and, hence, 
returns are also calculated on the same basis. The standards of 
adequacy of underwriter remuneration used in Chapters 7 and 8 are those 
suggested by market practitioners during the semi-structured interviews. 
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Similarly, the two methodologies used to calculate the return to an 
underwriter are those found to be employed in the market: return on 
assets (ROA) and return on exposure (ROX) are explained and analysed in 
Chapters 7 and 8, respectively. 
The funding scenarios employed in Chapters 7 and 8 are chosen not 
only to represent a feasible range of funding possibilities, but also to 
highlight the systemic risk properties inherent in such funding 
scenarios and, indeed, in the application of the return methodologies 
themselves. It is concluded that the ROA methodology is so severely 
flawed that it may provide underwriters with grossly misleading 
information on which to base their underwriting decisions. Underwriters 
employing the ROA methodology may therefore underwrite at prices that 
are inadequate to compensate them for the risks they incur under the 
belief that potential returns will actually be higher than they will. 
In this sense systemic risk may be increased. 
Under the ROX methodology returns to underwriters are found to be 
inadequate in every scenario as measured by the market's own standard of 
adequacy. On a stand alone basis, then, it is concluded that returns to 
underwriters are inadequate to compensate them for the risk they incur, 
and hence systemic risk may be increased. There is, however, a problem 
even with the ROX methodology. Both ROA and ROX are methodologies for 
calculating returns to underwriting banks in the euronote market; they 
provide no measure as to the probability of a scenario occurring. In a 
market where no probabilistic information exists on which to base 
decisions about future draw-down, default or market conditions, the 
market is said to be governed by uncertainty about future events (see 
Guttentag and Herring, 1986). For these reasons it would be hazardous 
to view ROA or ROX in the same light as internal rate of return (IRR). 
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IRR provides decision makers with information from which they can 
'choose' certain projects or events in preference to others. The 
euronote underwriter has absolutely no choice over his funding strategy. 
This will be determined by uncertain future customer and market 
conditions. The only assumption made(under the ROX methodology) is 
that risk is 1 ikely to increase the more the underwriter is asked to 
fund, and so returns should also increase. This is consistent with 
financial economic theory (see, for example, Modi gl i ani, 1959). On the 
basis of the ROX simulations, a 'systemic gap' is found to exist in the 
euronote market (the gap between which actual returns fall below 
required adequate returns). 
Chapter 9 reviews the bank and financial pricing literature in 
order to formulate hypotheses to explain the existence of this 'systemic 
gap'. Evidence is drawn from the qualitative findings of the semi- 
structured interviews and the quantitative results of the simulation 
exercises to support the formulation of these hypotheses. 
The hypotheses formulated in Chapter 9 are then tested through 
naturalistic research methods (participant observational fieldwork) in 
Chapter 10. The period of observation was conducted within the euronote 
team at County NatWest which is used as a case study for the l arge 
commercial bank owned investment bank environment. Sometime was also 
spent observing the euronote operations of Dean Witter Capital Markets 
which is used as a case study for the smaller securities house operating 
in the market. This case study approach (a widely accepted 
methodological approach in business research) complements the other 
research methodologies employed in this thesis. 
A variety of research methodologies are, therefore, employed to 
collect data, formulate hypotheses and test hypotheses. The study is 
a 
thus conducted on a triangular basis: where data are collected and 
analysed through exploratory data analysis and preliminary fieldwork; 
hypotheses formulated and then tested through semi-structured fieldwork 
and simulation exercises, and the results analysed and presented to the 
market using naturalistic and case study techniques. It is concluded 
that if the systemic gap identified in Chapter 8 is to be bridged, then 
profitability systems must be established to assess the value of 
customer relationships. Only then can an informed decision be made as 
to whether low pricing of underwriting commitments can be justified on a 
customer relationship basis. 
Chapter 11 also employs the case study approach to examine the 
profitability systems in place throughout the National Westminster Bank 
p1 c, Group and attempts to determine whether a relationship pricing 
strategy can be feasibly employed in the euronote market. The 
development of these systems and their impact on organisational 
structure are discussed. If these systems are capable of determining 
the value of customer relationships to the bank, then an informed 
decision can be made as to whether it is justifiable or not to 
underwrite euronotes at such low prices. The ability to cross- 
subsidise returns from the euronote market with returns from other areas 
of the customer relationship may make the inclusion of euronote 
underwriting facilities within the portfolio justifiable on a 
relationship basis. In this sense, systemic risk may not be increased. 
Chapter 12 concludes and highlights the limitations of the study. 
The structure of the thesis and its methodological links are 
displayed overleaf by the use of a flow chart. 
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Flow diagram of structure of thesis and methodological connections 
Central Question 
Aims Does the growth of the euronote 
market contribute to an increase 
in systemic risk? 
The problem Synopsis of study 
and its 
setting Establish link between systemic 
risk and the introduction of 
1 new financial innovations - both 
product (eg euronote) and process 
(eg securitisation) 
Document structural components and 
2 pricing processes of a euronote 
facility in order to determine 
whether a euronote facility may be 
more likely to lead to an increase 
in systemic risk (as a result of 
these components and processes) 
than bank revolving loan commitments 
1 Exploratory Comparison of actual costs of 
data borrowing in the euronote market 
analysis/ 3 with costs of borrowing in the euro- 
market credit market. Does the euronote 
analysis market charge lower risk premiums 
than the eurocredit market? 
Determine whether lower borrowing 
4 costs in the euronote market are 
partially the result of the placement 
method used 
Determine whether evidence exists to 
show that features associated with the 
5 eurocommercial paper market may affect 
pricing levels and systemic risk 
Conclusion to Part 1: Underwriting of 
euronotes identified as main area of 
concern in relation to systemic risk 
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Methodological research debate and 
presentation of construction and 
6 results of semi-structured interviews 
to gather data on underwriting 
practices and pricing determinants 
Collection 
1 
and analysis Analysis of quantitative data 
of data collected through semi-structured 
interviews. Returns are calculated to 
underwriters on a RDA and ROX basis 
(the two methods found to be employed 
in the market) in Chapters 7 and 8 
7+8 respectively. Returns are found to be 
, 
inadequate to compensate for the risks 
incurred on a stand-alone basis. A 
systemic gap is id ntified 
Disaster myopia and relationship pricing 
Formulation hypotheses are formulated to explain 
of hypothesis 9 underpricing and the existence of a 
systemic gap in the euronote market 
Hypotheses tested hrough naturalistic 
10 research. The results are presented to 
the market. 
11 Case study to examine whether the 
Test of profitability systems established within 
hypotheses and the National Westminster Bank plc are 
presentation sufficiently sophisticated to allow a 
of the results relationship pricing strategy to be 
of the market employed within th euronote market 
12 Conclusions and limitations 
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PART ONE 
CHAPTER 1 
THE TREND TOWARDS SECURITISATION 
1.1 Definition and Environmental Factors 
A major trend in international financial markets during recent 
years has been the shift of credit flows from the banking system to the 
money and capital markets. This increased marketability of debt 
represents what is often referred to as securitisation: the process by 
which debt is made marketable. Guth (1986, p 36) defines the concept 
as, 
'the replacement or substitution of loans (in other words 
book claims) by tradeable securities but frequently supported 
by credit lines in the event of the issue becoming 
unplaceable'. 
Taylor (1986, p 27) defines securi ti satt on more broadly (and 
subjectively) as: 
'the process of creating financial instruments which act to 
increase the efficiency with which the capital markets 
function as a financial intermediary'. 
Securitisation can be divided into two forms. In its most extreme 
form it involves the unbundling and repackaging of already existing 
loans into securities. These securities are then sold to market 
investors, thereby removing the asset from the originator's or holder's 
balance sheet, to be replaced in the first instance by cash. One of the 
best examples of this type of securi ti sati on can be seen in the 
securitisation of mortgages in the US secondary mortgage market, 
although many other types of assets, including car loans, have also been 
securi ti sed in this way. 
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The second form of securitisation involves the raising of debt 
through the issue of securities in the capital markets. By this method 
a borrower will raise funds directly from market investors as opposed to 
seeking finance from the banking system in the form of a bank loan or 
overdraft. This type of securitisation must ultimately breed 
disintermediation: the process by which borrowers and lenders deal 
directly with each other by by-passing the banking system. It is this 
latter type of securitisation which is now determining the present 
structure of financial instruments for borrowers and investors. 
Although the means for borrowers to raise debt in the form of 
securities have been available for many years in the form of corporate 
bonds and eurobonds, the 1982 Third World Debt Crisis may be seen as the 
turning point for the massive increase in securitised debt. With it the 
spontaneous growth of sovereign syndicated lending to a number of less 
developed countries came to a virtual halt. At the same time those 
sovereign borrowers whose credit standing was good moved their 
portfolios away from bank loans and into securities. Furthermore, 
because of reschedul ings, banks found themselves holding long term, 
highly illiquid assets for which they had to find longer term funding. 
Thus, they began to rely less on the interbank market for their funding 
requirements, issuing instead medium and long term floating rate notes 
(FRNs) in the capital markets. 
The process of securitisation has also been stimulated by certain 
international macro-economic developments, such as the disappearance of 
the OPEC surplus and the emergence of large financial surpluses in 
Europe and Japan. Japan, with its massive savings rate, is now the 
largest capital exporter in the world. However, the financial flows 
created by Japanese savers are different from those created by the oil 
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producers. Japanese savers general 1y do not place their money in bank 
deposits, they invest in i ife assurance companies and pension funds (as 
a result of the long-term savings preferences of the Japanese people), 
which in turn creates a massive demand for securities. 
The trend towards the growth of securities markets and the decline 
in the traditional syndicated loan market is evident from Tables 1.1 and 
1.2. 
Table 1.1 The international credit and capital markets 
US$ billion 
Items 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
International bonds and notes 44.0 71.7 72.1 108.1 162.8 
of which: floating rate notes 7.8 12.6 15.3 34.1 55.4 
convertible bonds 4.1 2.7 6.8 8.5 7.3 
Syndicated eurobank loans(1) 
of which: managed loans(2) 
Note issuance facilities (3) 
Total 
96.5 100.5 51.8 3 6.6 21.6 
- 11.2 13.7 6.5 2.4 
1.0 2.3 3.3 18.9 49.4 
141.5 174.5 127.2 163.6 233.8 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (1986b, Table 5.1, p 130) 
Notes :1 Excludes US takeover-related standbys 
2 New money element of rescue packages 
3 Includes revolving underwriting facilities, multiple- 
component facilities (if they include a note issuance 
option) and other euronote facilities 
Financial markets are therefore beginning to witness a change in 
investor and borrower preferences, away from bank assets and liabilities 
(ie loans and deposits), towards the issue and purchase of securities. 
Banks are beginning to experience di si ntermedi ati on on both sides of the 
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Table 1.2 Securities issued by banks* 
US$ billion 
Items 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
FRNs 2.3 3.0 4.9 3.8 14.6 29.2 
Other bonds 3.1 3.6 6.1 8.1 8.5 13.8 
Total 5.4 6.6 11.0 11.9 23.1 43.0 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (1986b, Table 5.5, p 139) 
Note: * excluding CDs 
balance sheet and have, thus, begun to lose some of their traditional 
advantages in managing risk. Indeed, it is now widely recognised that 
for many banks the policy of rapid balance sheet growth has ended, 
supplanted by a greater emphasis on balance sheet management. Despite 
this fact, banks are still looking for ways to increase, or at least 
maintain, their earnings without placing further pressure on their 
capital bases. They have looked increasingly towards off-balance sheet 
(OBS) business to accomplish this, moving from a primary insurance role 
(ie the provision of funds on demand) to a secondary insurance role (ie 
the provision of funds only after an initial attempt at raising funds by 
the borrower (possibly through securitisation) has failed). 
1.2 Securitisation and Innovation 
Securi ti satt on has been both the cause and effect of financial 
i nnovation. A ful 1 appreciation of securi tisation and its impl i cations 
for the development and success of financial innovation - like the 
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euronote facility - requires some knowledge of the place of 
securitisation within the general framework of financial innovation. As 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (1986b, p 169) points out: 
'An ideal theory of the process (of financial innovation) 
should explain how changes in general economic conditions 
created specific profit opportunities for new instruments to 
emerge'. 
There is - as the BIS recognises - no generally accepted theory of 
innovations that meets all of these criteria. 
An analysis of financial innovation, then, must examine several 
aspects of the concept in order to assemble an informative framework 
within which the development of new securi ti sed innovations can be 
analysed. We will begin with a brief examination of the concept of 
innovation. 
Technical progress is generally accepted as being one of the major 
causes of economic growth. As a tool of economic analysis it derives 
from the need to explain shifts in a production function (Hahn and 
Matthews, 1964). The term 'technical progress' is often used as a 
residual to explain all increases in output which cannot be traced to 
quantitative increases in the inputs of labour and capital (Johnston, 
1966). The difficulty of breaking down further the various factors of 
aggregate technical progress, however, has directed attention to the 
microeconomic level which Johnston (1966) defines as innovation. More 
clearly, he defines innovation as: 
'the introduction of new and improved processes and products 
into the economy' (1966, p 160). 
Johnston applies the term 'inno vation' to the introduction of such 
change in its first application and also when the innovation or an 
alteration spreads into other firms, industries or countries. His 
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picture of innovation is a departure from the more traditional approach 
of Schumpeter (1936), who divided the process of technical change into 
three parts: invention, innovation and imitation. Invention for 
Schumpeter is simply the act of finding new ways to do useful or 
profitable things. Innovation is the economic application of 
inventions. Invention, thus, requires innovation on the part of both 
producers and consumers before technical progress can occur. Imitation 
is simply the replication of already existing innovations. 
Johnston (1981) argues, however, that by segregating invention, 
innovation and imitation, Schumpeter fails to emphasise the 
interdependent nature of all the steps of a time sequence. Innovation, 
he contends, should be regarded not only as an initial happening but 
also as a subsequent diffusion through the economy. Innovation, 
emphasised by students like Blaug (1965), Mansfield (1968) and Scherer 
(1973), can be both a product and a process, although in practice the 
two are so interwoven that any distinction between them is often 
arbitrary. 
When dealing with innovation in the real sector it is possible to 
1 imit to a certain extent the scope of the analysis through the 
application of an objective criterion, ie a new product or process that 
qual ifies for patent protection. There is no such counterpart in the 
financial sector. When analysing financial innovation we have little 
option but to develop our own criteria based on the characteristics of 
newly developed financial instruments. This point will be taken up 
later. 
A major empirical problem associated with financial innovation is 
its cause-effect relationship with real economic growth. Gurley and 
Shaw (1955) criticise the traditional theories of economic development 
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which are discussed in terms of wealth, the labour force, output and 
income. They argue that these real or 'goods' aspects of development 
have been the centre of attention in the economic literature to the 
comparative neglect of financial aspects, yet: 
'financial development is incomprehensible apart from its 
context of real development' (1960, p 122). 
Nevertheless, there is no clear empirical evidence to prove or disprove 
the hypothesis that financial development effects economic growth (see 
Goldsmith, 1969, p 391). As Gardener (1986, p 11) points out, in 
practice we must rely on a collection of empirical facts, observations, 
history and theory. 
It is a basic tenet of financial development theory that each new 
stage of development of the financial system is characterised by finan- 
cial innovation (see Revell, 1973, pp 24-28). Rybczynski (1985) argues 
that the evolution of the financial system which occurs as the economy 
expands involves three stages. The character of the financial system in 
this model is initially a bank-orientated one; banks are the main 
channel for collecting and investing savings. The financial system 
develops towards a market-orientated state, where capital markets 
channel a large proportion of savings directly, and later to a strongly 
market-orientated phase. In this latter phase, financial institutions 
increasingly dispose of and trade in their assets. It is suggested by 
Rybczynski, (1985) that the United Kingdom and the United States are 
currently in the third (most advanced) phase of development, while 
countries 1 Ike Japan and West Germany are approaching it. This third 
stage of development - the strongly market-orientated phase - is also 
characterised by the appearance of risk hedging instruments, like 
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financial futures, options and swaps and increasing securitisation. 
This development process is depicted in Figure 1.1 below. 
Figure 1.1 The evolution of the financial system - Rybczynski's model 
Bank-orientated Banks channel funds between 
phase savers and investors 
Market-orientated Capital markets develop to 
phase channel funds directly from 
savers to investors. 
Di si ntermedi ati on occurs. 
Strongly market- Financial institutions 
orientated phase increasingly dispose of and 
trade in their assets. 
Disi ntermedi ati on is taken to 
a more advanced stage: that 
of securitisatton of assets. 
Innovation - argues Rybczynski (1985, p 39) in the context of the 
evolution of the financial system - enhances the ability and willingness 
of an economy to assume and carry risk. This abi 1 ity is dependent on 
the stage to which the economy has evolved. The implication of these 
conclusions is that the process of securitisation provides an impetus to 
the development of financial innovations which enables the economy to 
assume and bear risk more safely. 
This brings us to the question of what determines financial 
innovation. Or to put it another way, why does financial innovation 
occur? Two strands of thought can be identified in the literature on 
financial innovation: those who view financial innovation as demand- 
driven, and those who view it as being supply-driven. 
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The BIS (1986b, p 171) argues that to develop an economics of the 
innovation process, it is necessary first to create a taxonomy, or 
classification system. The taxonomy would then establish the important 
characteristics or functions of innovations: the demand for new 
instruments could then be analysed as a demand (a kind of derived 
demand) for these characteristics or functions. The BIS (1986b, p 171) 
proposes a classification scheme for financial innovations based on the 
type of financial intermediation function performed. This leads to the 
following classification system: 
- risk-transferring innovations 
- liquidity-enhancing innovations 
- credit-generating (or debt-generating) innovations 
- equity-generating innovations 
The first classification - risk-transferring innovations - encompasses 
the new instruments or techniques that allow economic agents to transfer 
among themselves the price or credit risks inherent in financial 
positions. Liquidity-enhancing innovations are those financial 
innovations which either increase the negotiability (or transferability) 
of existing financial instruments or represent new financial instruments 
with greater liquidity characteristics. Credit-generating innovations 
provide economic agents with greater access to credit supplies, while 
equity-generating innovations provide economic agents with greater 
access to equity supplies. 
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Table 1.3 provides a list of selected innovations classified by 
this suggested scheme. It is interesting to note from Table 1.3 that 
the only financial innovation which is characterised by three inter- 
mediation functions (price-risk transferrring, credit-risk transferring 
and liquidity-enhancing) is note issuance facilities (NIFs), one of the 
main instruments analysed in this study. This classification implies 
multi-faceted and complex characteristics for such instruments. 
On the supply side the BIS (1986b, chapter 9) concentrates on four 
broad factors or forces that have increased the willingness to supply 
the financial innovations that have emerged in recent years. These are 
technology, regulatory factors, greater competition in the financial 
sector and the historical dynamics of the financial innovation process 
itself. The latter point refers to the fact that new innovations are 
modelled on old ones. However, the BIS (1986b, p 186) goes on to argue 
that future financial innovation may be generated by a dynamic that 
works independently of the developments that previously generated 
innovation. New instruments may be developed to exploit a large number 
of minor profit opportunities, rather than just a few major ones. 
Gardener (1986, p 13) refers to the BIS approach to financial innovation 
as the eclectic or 'European view' of the economics of financial 
innovation. 
A more specific supply-driven theory of financial innovation in the 
United States has been forwarded by Kane (1981) and Eisenbeis (1986). 
The theory has come to be known as the regu 1 atory dial ecti c. Thi s 
treats the political process of regulation and the economic process of 
regulatee avoidance as opposing forces that adapt continually to each 
other. It emphasises the tensions and ambiguities inherent in efforts 
for regulators either to impose restraints on persons and institutions 
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that function in what is otherwise a free society or to let markets 
impose economic hardships on groups that are politically strong (Kane, 
1981, p 355). 
Kane (1981, p 358) likens the struggle between innovating firms and 
regulatory activity to a struggle between a visible and invisible hand 
to form the shape of a clay structure. Instead of acting in concert, 
the two hands work almost completely at cross purposes. The vi si bl e 
hand is the market place in which firms innovate; the invisible hand is 
that of regulatory activity. For Kane, then, innovation is often a 
response to regulation, and innovation in turn provides an impetus to 
re-regulation. Kane (1981, pp 359-360) argues further that the 
incentive to innovate around regulations is increased in times of 
accelerating inflation. Accelerating inflation raises the opportunity 
cost burdens associated with pre-existing regulations, such as the 
holding of reserves. At the same time exogeneous technological change 
lowers the marginal cost of avoiding regulatory burdens. 
One tentative conclusion that can be drawn from the work of the BIS 
and the Kane/Eisenbeis regulatory dialectic is that regulation may have 
been one of the major economic forces behind the securitisation 
phenomenon. It should be noted here that taxation has also played its 
part in stimulating innovation, and indeed securitisation. As Miller 
(1986, p 36) states: 
'... securities can be used to transmute one form ... of income into another - in particular from higher taxed forms to lower taxed ones'. 
Governments will attempt to change legislation to close such loopholes. 
Again, this sequence of action and reaction is part of the regulatory 
dialectic. 
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Although there is little doubt that regulation has played an 
important part in the development of financial innovations - and 
recent 1y'securitised innovations - it is too narrow a perspective to 
explain the entire process. A more general model has been developed by 
Silber (1982) emphasising the mi croeconomi c framework of financial 
innovation. The main hypothesis is that new financial instruments are 
innovated to lessen the financial constraints imposed on firms (Silber, 
1982, p 5). According to Silber, firms maximise utility subject to a 
number of internal and external constraints. Internal constraints may 
include self-imposed liquidity or growth rates, while external 
constraints may encompass market pressures and regulations. Silber 
argues that innovation results when the costs of adhering to existing 
constraints become too high. Silber's theory of financial innovation is 
similar to Kane's but it is wider in its scope. It allows for the fact 
that firms may innovate to by-pass internal as well as external 
constraints . 
Most views on financial innovation, then, whether they stress 
demand or supply side factors, tend to regard innovation as resulting in 
large part from changes in the environment in which financial firms 
operate. 
According to Dufey and Giddy (1981, p 2) the incentives to innovate 
will decline a priori when patent protection is less effective, when the 
industry is potentially more competitive, and when product imitation is 
easy. Because of the technical ease of imitation, and because of the 
difficulty in proving any financial contract to be unique rather than a 
variant of some existing combinations, there can be no patent system in 
financial instruments or techniques. One might thus suppose that the 
rate of innovation in financial markets would be relatively low. Yet 
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the experience of the past twenty five years in world financial markets 
indicates that new instruments and techniques have appeared with a high 
frequency. This apparent paradox is understood by examining the 
temporary monopolistic situation which results from financial 
innovation. 
Dufey and Giddy (1981, p 4) point out that customers will tend to 
purchase new financial instruments and services only from firms that 
have a reputation for providing such products with 'sound legality and 
predictable riskiness'. In practice, then, an economic rationale exists 
for particular financial institutions to specialise in the repeated 
development, marketing and support of new financial contracts. In other 
words, reputable banks and other financial institutions will have a 
temporary monopoly advantage that enables them to appropriate returns 
from investment in the development of financial innovations, even when 
imitation is immediately possible (Dufey and Giddy, 1981, p 4). 
Accepting that an institutional mechanism exists for the continued 
generation of financial innovations, it remains for theory to predict 
what kinds of innovations will occur and under what circumstances. 
Dufey and Giddy (1981, p 5) classify innovations under two headings: 
'aggressive' innovations, which are the result of investment in research 
by firms specialising in the development of new financial products; and 
'defensive' innovations, which result from changes in customer needs or 
in relative costs. They classify the latter further into two 
categories: those aimed at circumventing government regulation, and 
those resulting from relative price or risk changes in the economic 
environment. 
The first point has already been made by students like Kane (1981), 
Eisenbeis (1986) and Silber (1982). The second point is more specific. 
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It emphasises how many financial innovations arise, not from 
constraints, but from newly emerged gaps in the range and combination of 
financial services offered. 
All the models and theories of financial innovation discussed so 
far provide us with a greater understanding of the processes, causes and 
effects of financial innovation. This knowledge is vital for a fuller 
understanding of the phenomenon of securitisation. Securitisation must 
be viewed within a broader framework of financial innovation. It 
appears to be the result not just of constraining factors such as 
regulation, but also of emerging profit opportunities in financial 
markets. 
1.3 How Securitisation Transforms Various Risks 
1.3.1 Credit risk 
The BIS (1986b, p 194) argues that new financial instruments 
(securitised or otherwise) may be divided into two groups with respect 
to credit risk: those which extend credit, and those which do not. 
Eurobonds, floating rate notes (FRNs), asset sales, euronotes, and in 
fact all other securitised instruments involve credit extension. The 
BIS (1986b, p 194) states that credit extension involves: 
'... bearing credit risk, equal to the full principal amount, 
and extending to the maturity of the credit obligation'. 
Euronote facilities are interesting in this respect insofar as 
their primary function is to provide liquidity to the borrower rather 
than a straightforward extension of credit. Yet the eventual result of 
a borrower drawing on the facility would necessarily require a form of 
credit extension of the part of the underwriting bank. 
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1.3.2 Market liquidity risk 
The new financial instruments must trade or sell in new markets 
where liquidity has not yet been tested. Up until mid-1987 most 
international securities markets experienced a bull market environment 
(rising prices and fal ling interest rates). Bull markets naturally 
encourage the trading of securities, and indeed, most of the new 
securitised instruments have developed in this type of environment. The 
liquidity which has been provided by rising securities prices may 
disappear if interest rates (real and nominal) begin a long-term climb 
again. It should also be emphasised that because an asset is marketable 
or negotiable, this does not necessarily mean that it is 11 quid (as 
recent experiences in the FRN market confirm: see Cohen, 1987 and the 
stock market crash of 1987/88). Liquidity implies the ability to sell 
an asset at or close to its face value under most market conditions. 
One of the basic functions of securitisation is that liquidity is 
provided not by relationship banking or straight loan commitments but by 
standby commitments and the ability to sell assets in the capital and 
money markets. 
1.3.3 Settlement risk 
The integration and deregulation of financial markets has 
dramatically increased the transactions volume in financial markets (see 
BIS, 1986b, p 195). Large securities clearing systems have developed 
such as Cedel and Eurocl ear (see Feeney, 1986, pp 51-52) to clear these 
transactions. A computer failure at one of these major clearing centres 
could cause major financial losses. 
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1.3.4 Funding risk 
The BIS (1986a, p 3) defines funding risk as: 
'the risk that a bank will be unable to purchase or otherwise 
obtain the necessary funds to meet its obi i gati ons as they 
fall due'. 
A bank may experience funding difficulties if, in order to meet an 
unexpected large withdrawal of funds, it has to rely on less stable 
purchased deposits or the issuance of securities. The BIS (1986a, p 4) 
has concluded that: 
'The rapid growth of commitments represents a significant 
additional risk to banks' funding strategies. Many 
commitments are callable entirely at the borrower's option 
and many are most 1 ikel y to be cal 1 ed when the markets ... are reluctant to meet the borrower's needs. It is therefore 
possible that a bank might be faced with large and perhaps 
unexpected call s under commitments at a time when markets are 
unreceptive to its needs for additional funds'. 
For these reasons the BIS warns that the banks will have to be 
particularly cautious in their funding management, arguing (1986a, p 4) 
that: 
'Banks may wish to assess (and set limits on) their total 
volume of commitments in terms of their perceived funding 
capacity, perhaps assessing this on a worst case basis'. 
The advent of securitisation and the trend for banks to move 
business off the balance sheet has radically transformed the various 
risks usually associated with financial markets. 
1.4 Pricing Securitised Instruments 
The vulnerability of financial markets to financial crises is 
generally considered to be lessened if economic agents, in particular 
financial institutions, have greater capital in reserve as compared to 
their risk exposures. This issue, argues the BIS (1986b, p 199): 
28 
'... gives rise to concern about the 'pricing' of credit 
transactions, that is, ensuring that the gross amounts earned 
on financial transactions permit accumulation of reserves 
sufficient to protect all parties to transactions ... Thus the question of whether new financial instruments contribute 
to an increase in systemic risk depends in part on whether 
they produce sufficient profit margins on average to cover 
potential losses from market, credit or other risks, both 
in the short and the long-run'. 
In periods of rapid innovation, markets for new instruments grow 
quickly. It is possible that market makers and their customers may not 
have time to accumulate experience in a variety of economic 
circumstances before managing large exposures. The BIS (1986b, p 200) 
argues that there are learning costs with new instruments and markets 
that may manifest themselves in the form of underpricing of 
transactions, which may generate either short-term or long-term losses: 
'Some market participants believe that there is a general 
tendency for new instrument markets systematically to 
underprice specific risks during a phase of development of a 
new market ... This pattern may in part be exp 1 ai ned by the tendency of major financial institutions to seek to maximise 
profits in the long-term, and thus to compete aggressively in 
the short-run to maintain market share. It is frequently 
argued that the extremely thin margin characteristics of some 
of the most competitive new instrument markets are 
insufficient to justify the range of risks involved, and that 
margins will widen as markets mature'. 
However, the BIS (1986b, p 201) goes on to warn that: 
'Systemic risk may arise if considerable exposure is 
accumulated during the 'underpricing phase". 
The BIS (1986b, p 201) also puts forward the hypothesis, in contrast to 
that of the learning phase theory, that: 
'the pricing of risks ... may go through extended phases of 
underpricing because of an inability to foresee long-run 
events, combined with pressures to compete in the short-run'. 
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This latter hypothesis is similar to Guttentag and Herring's (1986) 
Disaster Myopia hypothesis. They define Disaster Myopia (1986, p 2) as: 
'a systematic tendency to underestimate shock probabilities'. This 
important hypothesis will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 9 of 
the study. 
It has been necessary to quote at length from the BIS work because 
it has an essential bearing on the objective of this study: to discover 
whether the development of euronote facilities has increased systemic 
risk. The BIS study is also an important theoretical and empirical work 
in itself. It has been emphasised that one of the features of new 
financial markets is often an 'initial' underpricing of risk to gain 
market share. The BIS have argued that the initial underpricing of risk 
does lead, at least in part, to an increase in systemic risk. A number 
of hypotheses has been briefly stated for the possible underpricing of 
risk in new financial markets. The BIS proposes two main hypotheses for 
present purposes that may be defined a little more formally as the 
Learning Phase' hypothesis and the 'Disaster Myopia' hypothesis. Both 
of these wi 11 be examined in relation to euronote faci 1 iti es in Chapters 
8 and 9 of the study. 
It may be possible to prove the underpricing of new instruments in 
isolated cases. It is far more difficult to determine 'market 
underpricing', and it is this latter type of underpricing which the BIS 
argues increases systemic risk. 
1.5 Underpricing and Systemic Risk 
We have defined systemic risk as the risk of a financial crisis -a 
sudden and unexpected disequi 1 ibri um in a financial market. The link 
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between the underpricing of new financial innovations and systemic risk 
has also been established. Systemic risk may, however, arise in two 
different forms according to Van Horne (1985, p 627) - as a 'bubble' or 
a 'balloon'. As Van Horne (1985, p 627) states: 
'A bubble, of course, implies an eventual bursting. If the 
time and magnitude of the burst were known in advance, all 
participants would be guided. With completely rational 
expectations, bubbles simply would not occur. A bubble 
depends on irrational behaviour at least part of the time'. 
If market underpricing could be proven, and if it could also be shown 
that such underpricing was in fact economically unjustifiable then there 
would be room to argue that the growth of the euronote market could 
contribute to an increase in systemic risk of the 'bubble' kind. A 
financial crisis may be imminent. 
If, however, market underpricing could be shown to be economically 
justifiable (possibly because stability is being provided for through 
profit from other parts of the customer relationship) then we might 
argue that a balloon may be a better metaphor for any increase in 
systemic risk contributed through the growth of the euronote market. It 
expands, but not to the extent that it bursts. The eventual deflation 
is less abrupt. 
1.6 Selected Trends 
It was mentioned previously that new financial innovations are 
usually variants on other financial innovations. Securitised 
innovations are no different. In order to gain a fuller understanding 
of the practical process of innovation which has taken place in 
international financial markets during recent years - culminating so 
far in the development of the euronote - an historical perspective is 
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required. This section of the chapter will trace some of the major 
developments which have occurred in the euromarkets up to the emergence 
of the euronote. 
1.6.1 The growth of the eurobond market 
Innovation has often been described as merely the ability to 
continue to do what you have always done, when you have been told not to 
do it. And so, just as the eurocurrency market was born in 1957 
because of the British government's restrictions on the use of sterling 
to finance trade credits, so the main impetus to the development of the 
eurobond market came in 1963 with the imposition of the Interest 
Equal isation Tax (IET) in the United States. This tax was aimed at 
discouraging foreign borrowers from making bond issues in the US market. 
However, as the demand for funds by international borrowers was greater 
than the capacity of any other national capital market to accommodate 
it, the eurobond market was created whereby international borrowers 
could float long-term bond issues on a worldwide scale. 
'Eurobonds' are those bonds placed simultaneously on the markets of 
at least two countries, and denominated in a currency that need not be 
the currency of either, usually by international financial syndicates 
with the participation of financial institutions of several countries. 
They are thus distinguished from 'foreign bonds', which can be defined 
as those issued on behalf of non-residents on a capital market of a 
single country by a syndicate that is generally national. Foreign bonds 
are denominated in that country's currency. 
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Because of the tendency of national authorities to regul ate 
strictly the access of foreign borrowers to their domestic capital 
markets, the eurobond market has developed as the most accessible market 
for raising long-term capital in the world. It grew from the first 
eurobond issue of $15 million for the Italian motorway operator, Auto- 
strade, in 1963 to a market size of nearly $50 billion in 1982. 
With the lifting of the IET in 1974, some investors feared for the 
future of the eurobond market, predicting that it would be replaced as a 
source of long-term funds for international borrowers by the more 
efficient US capital market. Time has proved this prediction wrong. As 
Table 1.4 shows, the market has gone from strength to strength. With the 
development of its institutional framework, underwriting commissions 
have fallen through competition, and the secondary market has improved. 
However, during 1968 and 1969 the market's growth nearly proved its 
downfall; it threatened to choke the market with the resultant paperwork 
generated. Bond deliveries at that time were usually made through banks 
in the United States. The back offices of the clearing banks were 
already overloaded with domestic trades, and eurobond deliveries were 
delayed and mishandled. With the increasing volume of new issues, these 
problems worsened. They were eventually solved by self-help. A 
European clearing system, Euroclear, was set up in December 1968 
(initially by Morgan Guaranty) and a competing European system, Cede l, 
in January 1971. Co-operation and competition between the two systems 
have enabled clearings between them to be carried out efficiently. 
A second crisis for the market came in 1974. New issue volume 
slumped to under $2 billion in the wake of the first oil shock, with 
many analysts once more predicting the end of the eurobond market. 
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Table 1.4 Eurobond issues, 1974-76 and 1982-83 
Borrowing Years Eurobond issues (US$ million) 
countries 
or areas 
Total US dollars Deutschemark 
Western 1974 1,430 430 370 
Europe 1975 4,570 1,350 1,770 
1976 5,440 3,750 1,200 
1982 16,550 12,690 1,930 
1983 22,770 16,630 29,410 
Canada 1974 440 380 - 1975 1,150 610 - 1976 31010 1,570 40 
1982 6,920 5,600 100 
1983 3,840 2,660 360 
United _ 1974 110 100 - States 1975 310 220 - 1976 410 400 - 1982 13,020 14,340 530 
1983 6,070 5,680 220 
Other 1974 330 220 110 
developed 
1 
1975 2,220 1,340 700 
countries 1976 2,070 1,510 510 
1982 3,860 3,050 480 
1983 6,060 4,760 830 
Rest 1974 140 120 - of the 1975 740 230 80 
world 2 1976 1,040 450 300 
1982 2,820 2,510 210 
1983 1,680 1,510 160 
International 1974 2,070 1,830 160 
institutions 1975 1,480 1,060 340 
1976 2,960 2,050 730 
1982 3,280 2,490 - 1983 6,070 4,500 60 
Total 1974 4,520 3,080 640 
issues 1975 10,200 40810 2,890 
1976 14,930 9,730 2,780 
1982 46,450 38,680 3,250 
1983 46,490 35,740 4,040 
Source: BIS, Annual Reports, 1977-1984 (based on OECD sources) Notes: 1 Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Africa 2 Including Eastern European countries 
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Indeed, there was good reason for this pessimism: the markets wanted 
anything but fixed-rate dollars, the eurobond market's main product, and 
this situation led to the emergence of a syndicated floating rate loan 
market. However, as the market attracted its share of recycled oil 
dollars in 1975, volume began to recover rapidly, with total volume and 
the average size of each issue increasing. This added further liquidity 
to the market, whilst attracting more institutional investors. These 
developments spurred growth to the point that, after the US government 
and UK gilts markets, it is now the third largest fixed rate market in 
the world. 
1.6.2 The development of the syndicated loan market 
Faced with worsening inflation in the late 1960s, coupled with the 
world oil price shocks of the early 1970s, banks became increasingly 
unwilling to lend fixed-rate funds over a medium-to-long period at the 
very time when international borrowers were looking to the euromarkets 
for medium-to-long-term funds to finance their capital investment 
projects. Indeed, many investors sought funds on a scale so large that 
it was impossible for one bank to handle alone these transactions. 
Clearly a way had to be found to minimise a bank's exposure to credit 
risk over the medium-to-long period whilst, at the same time, allowing 
international borrowers access to these funds on the scale they 
required. The result was the floating-rate syndicated loan, the 
euroloan or the revolving syndicated credit. 
The floating rate concept virtually eliminated for banks the risk 
of future fluctuations in the funding cost of medium-term loans. 
Interest is usually computed by adding a spread to the London Interbank 
Offer Rate (LIBOR), the rate at which banks may obtain funds from other 
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banks operating in the euromarkets. Often, however, a loan may be 
priced at a spread over any one of twenty or so different reference 
rates. The spread, be it over LIBOR or some other rate, is negotiated 
with the borrower at the outset, and either remains constant over the 
life of the loan or changes after a number of years. For example, a 15- 
year loan may be syndicated at a spread of 3/8 percent over LIBOR for 
the first five years, 1/2 percent for the next five years, and 5/8 
percent for the last five years. 
Although LIBOR is changing constantly, the rate on any particular 
loan is readjusted only every three or six months. This is known as 
pricing on a rollover basis, with the readjustment period usually being 
determined by either three- or six-month LIBOR. Under this agreement 
lenders promise to advance non-negotiable funds to the borrower on his 
satisfying certain requirements. The commitment of the lending banks to 
provide this facility cannot be transferred easily, and only with the 
prior approval of the borrower by means of assignment. Funds are 
advanced direct by lenders (see Figure 1.2). 
Figure 1.2 Parties to a revolving credit agreement 
Lending Facility Arranger Facility Borrower 
banks agreement of facility --, agreements 
10 
Syndicated Facility Payment of 
revolving agreement principal & 
crgdits interest 
Trustee 
bank 
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The spread over the index is determined by the quality of the 
borrower. However, as spreads rarely reach 2ý per cent for any bor- 
rower, it is not necessarily a good indicator of the borrower's credit 
standing. In addition to the interest spread on a euro l oan there are 
also commitment fees, front-end fees, and occasionally an annual agent's 
fee. Commitment fees are charged to the borrower on a percentage of the 
undrawn portion of the credit. They have been typical ly 1/2 per cent 
annually, imposed on both term loans and revolving credits. Front-end 
fees, on the other hand, are one-time charges negotiated in advance and 
imposed when the loan agreement is signed, with the agent's fee (if 
applicable) usually being a small yearly charge. 
The other feature of such a loan is its syndicated nature, whereby 
a large loan can be made available to a borrower by syndicating it by 
distributing portions of the loan commitment between several different 
banks and thereby reducing the credit exposure of any one bank. The 
syndicated euroloan has thus helped to bridge the gap between short-term 
bank loans and long-term eurobonds, whilst providing adequate funding 
through the process of syndication. These developments opened up the 
market for lesser quality borrowers, which had previously been unable to 
tap the more elitist eurobond market. Hence, as Table 1.5 shows, the 
market grew from a total of $4.7 bil lion in 1970 to $82.8 bil lion in 
1979. 
There are weaknesses in the syndication process. In times of 
crisis each syndicate member will obviously try to look after its own 
interests, with some wishing to call in their debt. This situation may 
be hard to rectify when there are many lenders, few of which have a 
direct relationship with the borrower. 
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The syndi cation process can also gi ve a false sense of security to 
participating banks, which may thus rely on the judgement of the 1 ead 
bank rather than conduct their own credit assessment of the borrower. 
The hazards of this type of lending became all too clear in the early 
1980s, when many less developed countries (LDCs) had to reschedule and 
refinance their existing commitments. The portfolios of many banks 
suffered, and new syndi cated loans fell from $82.8 billion in 1979 to 
only $18.4 billion in 1980. 
The great weakness of the traditional syndicated loan was thus 
apparent - it was unmarketable. Tradability was seen as essential if 
borrowers were to continue to gain access to funds in the euromarkets. 
As a result, there was again a massive surge in the growth of the 
eurobond market after 1980 (see Figure 1.3). Although the classic 
eurobond did provide essential liquidity and hence an acceptable means 
of asset tradability in banks' portfolios, the problem of fixed interest 
rates still remained. 
.. Figure 1.3 New issue volume on eurobond and credit markets 
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Source: OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly 
Note: 1985 figures are for January-May at annual rate. 
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1.6.3 Floating rate notes 
1.6.3.1 The emergence of floating rate notes 
The international debt crisis of the early 1980s significantly 
affected future patterns of international lending. Banks were forced to 
re-assess the risks involved in syndicated lending, and this assessment 
led to a drastic curtailment in the volume of new lending in a market 
which took twelve years to build up and virtually twelve months to 
destroy. As a result, banks were left with surplus funds for which they 
began to seek other lending opportunities in industrialised countries 
and in those LDCs that enjoy a high credit standing. Furthermore, banks 
sought assets which were more liquid and hence more transferable than 
the traditional syndicated loan. At the same time, it appears that 
(especially since the failures of Tierstatt and Franklin Mational) 
investors have begun to regard bank liabilities as riskier investments 
than had previously been the case. They favoured more direct relation- 
ships with certain high quality borrowers. 
Balance of payments developments after 1982 - the erosion of the 
OPEC surplus and increasing surpluses in Europe - increased the supply 
of funds from investors with a greater preference for securities. This 
was a development which reduced bond issuing costs for the most-favoured 
borrowers, precisely the type of borrower which banks were now looking 
towards. With the problem of fixed rates remaining, the floating rate 
bond or, more commonly, the floating rate note (FRN) was a natural 
development. 
An FRN is a medium-to- long-term bond, with most maturities being 
between five and fifteen years, and it is evidenced by negotiable bearer 
notes, in denominations of at least $1,000, and with a coupon consisting 
of a margin over an appropriate short-term reference rate, usually 
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three- or six-month LIBOR. The coupon is paid at the end of each inter- 
est period, and it is then adjusted in line with current rates for the 
next interest period. As with fixed-rate eurobonds, most FRNs are 
nominally listed on a stock exchange, although they are traded (almost 
entirely) by telephone or telex. 
The FRN is a hybrid between fixed-rate but marketable eurobonds, 
and floating rate but non-negotiable eurocredits. It is a classic 
example of the adaptability of free financial markets to changing cir- 
cumstances. The aim of the FRN was to bridge the gap between the demand 
for and supply of medium- and long-term funds by paying investors an 
interest rate which changed in line with short-term money market 
interest rates. It was the logical capital market counterpart to the 
development of 'rol 1-over' bank credits, and was thus an alternative to 
fixed-rate bonds at times when rising or volatile interest rates dis- 
couraged lenders from committing their funds long term at fixed rates. 
At the time the first FRN was issued in 1970, rising interest rates had 
made it virtually impossible for borrowers to raise more than $25 
million in one issue with, at times, an inverse yield curve (with 
short-term rates higher than long-term rates) emerging, thereby 
encouraging investors to switch to short-term assets (see Figure 1.4). 
Although banks initially aimed to invest in prime name FRNs, they 
soon learned that the interest structure on these notes made it possible 
for them to match what is essentially a medium-term asset against short- 
term liabilities. To the extent that banks became buyers of FRNs, it 
thus became possible for less than prime quality borrowers to issue FRNs 
and so tap the bond market. This was partially the result of most 
eurobanks' established credit appraisal systems, which allowed them to 
assess the creditworthiness of lesser known names, something which 
41 
private individuals and non-bank institutions (the main buyers of bonds) 
are largely unable to do. Nevertheless, the international debt crisis 
has ensured that the vast majority of issuers on these markets are high 
quality borrowers. 
Figure 1.4 Yields on eurocurrency instruments, 1969-83 
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Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, September 1984, p. 338 
1.6.3.2 Swaps 
One of the main incentives to the growth of the FRN (and fixed-rate 
eurobond) market in recent years has been the parallel growth of the 
swap market. There are four basic swap structures: 
1 the interest rate swap 
2 the fixed-rate currency swap 
3 the currency coupon swap 
4 the basis rate swap 
Although all these structures have been used,, it is the first type of 
swap structure, the interest rate swap, which has provided the great- 
est impetus to the growth of the FRN market. The analysis of the 
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contribution of swaps to the growth of the FRN market will therefore be 
confined to an examination of this type of swap. 
The interest rate swap is the commonest type of swap, with a total 
market size at end-year 1985 of over $50 billion. In its simplest form 
it involves the exchange of floating-rate interest for fixed-rate inter- 
est in the same currency, calculated in relation to an agreed principal 
amount. Counterparties to such an agreement are therefore able to 
convert a floating-rate asset or liability into a fixed-rate asset or 
liability (or vice versa). 
Interest rate swaps result from the differentials between the 
counterparties' credit standing in the fixed and floating rate markets. 
As fixed-rate investors appear to be more sensitive to credit quality 
than floating-rate bank lenders, a greater premium is demanded of lesser 
quality issuers in the fixed-rate debt market than in the floating-rate 
market. Swaps work to allow counterparties to use the market in which 
they have the greatest relative cost advantage and then to swap the 
funds obtained into fixed/floating rate debt. This process allows for a 
credit arbitrage between the two markets. A simplified example of the 
borrower attributes necessary for such arbitrage is given in Table 1.6. 
The example shows how a swap can arbitrage between the fixed rate bond 
market and the floating rate section of the market. Although this is 
only one example of how borrowers can access different markets or 
segments of the same market it does serve to illustrate how the swap 
market has provided an impetus to the growth of the eurobond and FRN 
market. 
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Table 1.6 Minimum borrowing costs for borrowers X and Y in the 
fixed and floating rate markets 
Borrower X Borrower Y Relative cost 
advantage 
Credit quality of borrower AAA 
Cost of raising fixed- 
rate debt on capital 10.65% 
markets 
Cost of raising floating- 3-month 
rate debt on capital LIBOR 
markets plus 
BBB 
11.50% 0.85% 
3-month 0.25% 
LIBOR 
plus 
From Table 1.6 1tis cl ear that borrower X can raise funds more 
cheaply than borrower Y in both the fixed and floating rate markets. 
However, the relative cost advantage of borrower X over borrower Y is 
less in the floating-rate market than it is in the fixed-rate market. 
By tapping the markets in which they have the greatest relative cost 
advantage (the fixed-rate market for borrower X and the floating-rate 
market for borrower Y) and entering into an interest rate swap, both 
borrowers can reduce their minimum cost of funds. This process is shown 
in Table 1.7. 
Table 1.7 depicts a very simple interest rate swap transaction, by 
which both parties are able to reduce their cost of funds by 30 basis 
points. The process is shown di agramati ca lly in Figure 1.5. 
In Figure 1.5, borrower X raises funds from the market at a fixed 
rate of 10.65 per cent. Borrower Y raises funds at a floating rate of 
LIBOR + 1/2 per cent. Borrower X then pays LIBOR to borrower Y who in 
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turn pays 10.70 per cent to borrower X. Through this process both 
borrowers save 30 basis points (see Tables 1.6 and 1.7). 
Table 1.7 Lowering the cost of funds through an interest rate swap 
Borrower X Borrower Y 
Raises funds at 10.65% LIBOR +ý 
Pays 
Total cost of funds 
LIBOR 
(10.65%+L IBOR-10.70%) 
LIBOR - 1/20 
10.70% 
(LIBOR+ +10.70%-LIBOR) 
11.20% 
Cost saving (basis points) 30 30 
Figure 1.5 An interest rate swap transaction 
Borrower X I, 
10. 
10.65% 
Fixed-rate 
debt 
Borrower Y 
LIBOR +a 
Floating-rate 
debt 
This process emphasises the benefits of interest rate swaps for 
borrowers in the fixed and floating rate markets. There are also many 
benefits to be gained by investors, as wel 1 as borrowers, in the swap 
markets. The potential for investors to secure benefits from a swap 
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transaction was provided by Italy's $500 million FRN issued in November 
1985. This note is non-callable for seven years. Call options prevent 
investors from swapping their investment because there is the chance 
that the borrower will redeem the issue, thereby ruining the swap. With 
the Italian FRN, a company which has issued a fixed rate bond and 
swapped it for a floating rate of interest below LIBOR can gain yield by 
reinvesting in the Italian deal. 
Swaps can, therefore, be advantageous to both borrowers and 
investors. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine and assess 
the different types of swap structures and their risk implications. 
Suffice it to say that the growth of the swap market has provided a 
major impetus to the growth of both the fixed-rate eurobond and FRN 
markets. The swap market has not only enabled borrowers to swap funds 
between these two markets, but also to swap different currencies in the 
same market. 
1.6.3.3 Bank FRNs 
Possibly an even more significant factor contributing to the growth 
of the FRN market has been the use made of it by banks as borrowers: 
since 1975 banks have accounted for over half the funds raised in the 
FRN market. This development was brought about by the failure of 
Herstatt and Franklin National, which emphasised the need for long-term 
funding, particularly for banks which lacked a natural dollar deposit 
base. Although the FRN is rather expensive as an alternative source of 
funding for banks (the cost of obtaining long-term funds through FRNs 
before 1983 being typically 0.25 per cent over LIBOR, plus front-end 
fees of up to 2.5 per cent), there has been no shortage of bank 
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regulations in some countries, particularly France and Japan, which 
require banks to match a proportion of their lending with long-term 
1i abi 1i ti es. Indeed, as credit controls in France do not apply to 
lending funded by bond issues, it is not surprising that French banks 
have become the most prominent single group of borrowers. 
Figure 1.6 Floating rate notes: types of borrower 
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Notes: (1) includes EEC borrowing on behalf of France 
(2) includes World Bank 
In several countries FRNs issued by banks in subordinated form are 
counted as capital, thereby allowing banks to gear up rather than merely 
fund capital. This has caused double leveraging dangers, with banks 
funding other banks' debt capital. Supervisory authorities, including 
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the Bank of England, have reacted to the potential risks involved in 
this activity. 
Following from this, one of the most interesting features of the 
market at the moment is the extent to which banks buy and sel 1 FRNs 
between each other. Estimates of banks as representing 80 per cent of 
the total market are often quoted, although a move away from LIBOR 
pricing for non-bank borrowers has seen a growth in this sector of the 
market (see Figure 1.6). The FRN market has thus supplemented the 
interbank market. 
Investor demand for high quality assets, the improved current 
account position of certain sovereign OECD borrowers (such as Sweden) 
and greater competition among intermediaries have produced better terms 
for those borrowers with access to the market. They have achieved lower 
costs and longer maturities (see Figure 1.7). The overall cost over 
LIBOR of a FRN (including front-end fees) for an OECD sovereign borrower 
in 1982 was around 0.6 per cent; by the start of 1984 this had halved 
to around 0.3 per cent. Maturities have lengthened, first to forty 
years and then to perpetual s. 
The problem with perpetual FRNs is that, as unredeemable notes, 
they are not eligible for inclusion in primary capital under Bank of 
Engl and regulations. The banks, therefore, had to devise a formula 
whereby an FRN would be both attractive to the market and at the same 
time satisfy the Bank of England's criteria for inclusion in primary 
capital. Lloyds Bank provided the solution. It argued that, in the 
(perhaps unlikely) situation of its experiencing credit problems, the 
notes could be converted into equity in the form of preference shares; 
this was an acceptable compromise solution to the Bank of England's 
original supervisory proposals. By converting to equity in times of 
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crisis for the bank, the loan would become subordinate to other debts, 
ranking with equity. As such, it could be counted as equity. The 
formula proved a success and was followed by perpetual issues for 
Midland, National Westminster and Standard Chartered, thereby improving 
the free capital ratios of all these banks quite considerably (see Table 
1.8). 
Figure 1.7 Average terms on dollar FRNs for all borrowers 
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Source: Bank ofEngland Quarterly Bulletin, March 1985, p. 60 
Note: Perpetual issues are excluded. 
The irony in this market is that it is conducted in risk capital at 
prices more or less equal to those of riskless interbank capital. The 
argument for these risk-free prices is that the Bank of England would 
prevent a UK clearing bank failure, thus making clearing bank perpetual s 
equivalent to gilt-edged stocks. Whether or not FRN investors should be 
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protected as well as depositors in the banking system is a matter of 
opinion. The provision of LLR (Lender of Last Resort) support in this 
respect could lead to the collection of abnormal profits on the part of 
the banks, where returns to investors do not justify the risk of the 
particular investment. In such situations systemic risk could be 
increased. 
Table 1.8 Perpetual floaters 
Bank Amount Interest Free capital ratio (%) 
($ million) rate 
(%) 
End-1984 After issue 
Lloyds 750 6-month 5.0 6.6 
LIBOR +ý 
Midland 750 6-month 4.4 5.4 
LIBOR + 141 
National 1,000 6-month 4.5 6.0 
Westminster mean + 
Standard 400 6-month 4.9 5.9 
Chartered LIBOR + 1/8% 
Source: The Banker, June 1985 
Note: The effects of the deconsol idati on of South African interests 
by Standard Chartered are reflect ed in the after-issue free 
capital ratio. 
Until 1982 the rationale for issuing an FRN rathe r than arranging a 
syndicated loan was not so much the cost or maturity structure of the 
notes as the diversification of funding sources which could be achieved 
by selling paper to non-banks or to other banks that might otherwise not 
have participated in international lending. Paradoxically, it is the 
availability of funding sources which gives the FRN its high liquidity, 
and it is this liquidity that is the main reason for the growth of the 
market (see Figure 1.8). Any reduction in the liquidity of these notes 
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will scare off the new FRN investors, such as corporate treasurers and 
money managers, who believe that the FRN is a money market instrument, a 
position that it has not yet reached. The FRN still represents medium- 
term unsecured risk, but because it is a security, bankers appear to 
believe that they have more security than if the money was lent as a 
credit. Only time can tell. 
Figure 1.8 Gross volume of new international bonds and bank lending 
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Source: Salomon Brothers 
For the corporate issuer FRNs have one great weakness: they do not 
enable the borrower to plan cash flow since interest payment periods are 
fixed. When a project is built around fixed price contracts, this is a 
major defect. It is this lack of flexibility that is the great weakness 
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of FRNs, a weakness that has led to the development of one of the most 
innovative forms of lending in the euromarkets since the development of 
the eurobond in the 1960's - euronote facilities. 
1.7 Summary 
In this chapter we have explored the relationship between the 
phenomenon of securitisation and financial innovation. A link between 
the alleged underpricing of new financial innovations and systemic risk 
has been established. The latter part of the chapter examined some of 
the funding instruments that have developed in the euromarkets since the 
beginning of the eurobond market in 1963. From the following chapters 
it should be clear that the euronote facility incorporates aspects of 
all the instruments documented in this latter part of Chapter 1. In 
this sense, the forgoing survey has provided the necessary background 
for a more complete understanding of the emergence and nature of 
euronote facilities. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EURONOTES: STRUCTURE AND PRICING 
2.1 Introduction to Euronote Facilities 
The euronote facility is a financial innovation in the traditional 
sense. It was developed for two reasons: firstly, to by-pass the 
government regulations imposed on banks' balance-sheet totals (footings) 
in the form of capital adequacy requirements; and secondly, to fill the 
gap left by the development of previous instruments, in particular 
revolving syndicated credits and floating rate notes. The euronote 
facility offers the borrower the flexibility of a revolving syndicated 
credit at the low cost of a bond. 
Under a euronote facility a medium-term loan is funded by selling 
short-term paper, typically with a maturity of three or six months. A 
group of underwriting banks guarantee the availability of funds to the 
borrower by purchasing any unsold notes at each interest rate rollover 
date or by providing a stand-by credit. When the borrower is a bank, 
the paper is in the form of short-term certificates of deposit; when the 
borrower is not a bank, the paper form is promissory notes. This 
technique allows conventional instruments to be unbundled and 
reassembled in a novel form. 
For the borrower the facility offers essentially the same features 
as a revolving credit, but the component functions can be carried out by 
several institutions rather than one: the first to arrange the loan, a 
second to provide the funds, and a third to be responsible for the 
maturity transformation whereby the borrower is assured of medium-term 
funds from a sequence of short-term borrowings. As the technique has 
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developed, it has been possible to offer borrowers increased 
flexibility, and this is precisely what the FRN lacks. 
2.2 The Difference between NIFs and RUFS 
The facility just described is known as a euronote facility. When 
the facility is underwritten, as in this case, it is known as a 
revolving underwriting facility (RUF), and when it is not underwritten 
it is known as a note issuance facility (NIF). Hence a RUF is merely an 
underwritten NIF. Whereas the obligations of the facility 
arranger/pl acing agent in a NIF may simply be to use his best endeavours 
to place the notes or to activate a tender panel procedure (see 
'Placement methods'), a RUF contains a legal obligation on the part of 
the underwriters to take up any notes not otherwise subscribed. This is 
a fundamental difference, as we shall see when we consider the 
regulation of euronotes. In this sense a NIF is not strictly a 
contingent liability because it is conducted on a 'best efforts' basis 
only. 
Under the process of loan securi ti satt on, debt is made negotiable 
in order that it may be sold direct to investors. As a result of this 
new phenomenon, the banks' traditional role as intermediary between the 
borrower and the lender is being eroded, a process known as disinter-. 
medi ati on. Consequently, commercial banks are turning their attention 
to the investment banking field and acting less as principals (taking 
risks directly on to their own balance sheet) but more as 
underwriters/agents in the case of RUFs and agents in the case of NIFs. 
By this means they earn commitment fees and placing fees as an 
alternative to lending. Thus, there has been a blurring of the 
distinctions not only between traditional commercial banking and the 
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functions undertaken by securities houses and merchant or investment 
banks, but also between the money and capital markets themselves. 
2.3 Overview of the Market 
It must be stated from the start that the future of the euronote 
market does not hinge on the continued existence of financing techniques 
such as NIFs and RUFs; these are merely hybrid techniques, which may 
only be a passing phase in the development of a market that will 
continue long after these acronyms have been forgotten. Its future lies 
in its ability to compete with, rather than merely provide an 
alternative to, other funding instruments available in the euromarkets: 
notably FRNs. For prime-name non-bank borrowers, this may mean 
developing along the lines of the US commercial paper market. It was 
often thought that the development of a eurocommercial paper market was 
unlikely. This is no longer the case. 
With a RUF and, to a certain extent a NIF, the borrower is sure of 
the money if he needs it, knowing his maximum cost of funds but borrow- 
ing more cheaply according to the success of the notes in the market. 
This has been the underlying principle guiding the euronote market since 
the first issue arranged by Citicorp for the Shipping Corporation of New 
Zealand in 1978. The Shipping Corporation of New Zealand was a prime 
name in the international markets, and it was looking for floating-rate, 
revolving syndicated finance. At that time all the major international 
banks submitted proposals within the same price band. Admittedly they 
were the best rates for a prime name at the time, but what eventually 
won the day was not the finest terms bid but an entirely new structure, 
a committed note purchase facility (later known as a revolving 
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underwriting facility). The facility developed by Citicorp was cheaper 
than a syndicated loan and with more flexibility than an FRN. 
The development of this instrument was thus based on two 
observations of current market features. The first was that there 
already existed an active short-term debt market in certificates of 
deposit (CDs) covering a period of typically one, three and six month 
maturities. Why then should investors not also be interested in 
purchasing paper from other high quality investors such as governments 
and prime name corporations, many of which enjoyed an even higher credit 
standing than those banks already issuing CDs? The second observation 
was that, if banks were prepared to lend to these borrowers over a 
period of, say, five years, then why should they not also be prepared to 
underwrite a commitment for the issuing of their paper for the same 
period? The answer to these two questions was yes, and so the first RUF 
was born. 
Two other important factors should be recognised in the Citicorp 
transaction. In the first place Citicorp acted as sole placing agent 
(SPA) in the transaction. The tensions which such a role can cause with 
underwriting banks will become apparent in our discussion of placement 
methods. Second, by selling the notes purchased from the issuer, 
Citicorp succeeded in removing the notes from its own balance sheet. As 
margins on lending continued to decline, return on assets (ROA) became 
probably the most important profitability measure for banks. Attention 
began to focus more on fee income than interest income. Both these 
points will be expanded in later chapters, but we should recognise in 
them themes which had an important influence on the development of a 
eurocommercial paper market a few years later. 
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2.4 The Market Players 
2.4.1 Investors 
With the onset of the international debt crisis and pressures on 
banks' capital ratios, euronotes were a particularly tempting investment 
for banks seeking short-term liquidity. As a result, the euronote 
market owes its existence to an initially large interest by commercial 
banks in the purchase of these notes. Notes were thus purchased at 
spreads over LIBOR. The bank investors were mainly those that had 
previously participated in the syndicated loan market. However, as the 
advantages of euronotes became clear, many smaller commercial banks and 
merchant banks not previously involved in syndicated lending began to 
participate in the market, with a move towards greater mismatching of 
funds. This increase in market participation heralded an inevitable 
increase in competition to the extent that spreads, although still over 
LIBOR, fell significantly. Banks no longer looked for a high yield on 
notes but were satisfied with a lower spread for a good name. 
Coinciding with this development was the emergence of prime name 
corporate buyers. For those investors LIBOR was irrelevant, because 
their cost of funds was tied more accurately to the rate that they could 
obtain in a bank deposit of similar term to the respective investment. 
The euronote market has developed to the point where there are now two 
distinct types of investor: 
1 banks and near-banks 
2 prime name corporate and high quality sovereign states 
Banks are bound to be the main buyers of LIBOR-plus paper for the 
simple reason that no investor will be over-enthusiastic about investing 
in an instrument which yields less than his cost of funds unless the 
possibility of a mismatch position is overwhelmingly attractive. Banks, 
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therefore, tend to invest in higher yielding, riskier paper. Prime name 
corporations, on the other hand, are far more risk-averse than commer- 
cial banks, and they seek an investment for which they are virtually 
guaranteed repayment. This type of investor has readily available 
short-term funds to invest, but will not place them in LIBOR-plus paper 
because of the higher risk of non-payment. They will seek sovereign or 
prime corporate paper, based on the criteria of other short-term invest- 
ments open to them at the time, such as certificates of deposit, 
treasury bills and US commercial paper. 
2.4.2 Borrowers 
The yield at which euronotes are issued is dependent upon the 
credit quality of the issuer and on the investor base at which the notes 
are aimed. The highest quality issuers will be able to issue paper at 
rates below LIBID (London interbank bid rate), whereas for poorer 
quality names the LIBOR-plus category will be relevant. It is in 
between these two categories, LIBOR-plus to LIBID-minus, that the 
fiercest battles will be fought. It is precisely this middle pricing 
category that is most likely to disappear, because successful placing 
agents will fight to place lesser price paper in the LIBOR-minus 
category, with their failures ultimately descending to the LIBOR-plus 
category. 
From an issuer base with three yield bands there may thus develop a 
two-tier market, in which the world's highest quality borrowers will be 
able to issue paper below LIBID. This paper is aimed at the higher 
quality investor market of prime bank names and non-bank investors. 
Lesser quality sovereign or corporate names will have to issue at rates 
identical to, or in excess of, LIBOR, and these notes will therefore be 
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aimed at investors tied to such an index, namely banks. As a result of 
this 'adverse selection' against them, banks will face a deterioration 
in the overall quality of their credit portfolios. 
2.4.3 Summary 
From the preceeding, it seems likely that in coming years the share 
of notes held by banks will fall as higher quality names enter the 
market. Banks, unable to purchase such paper because of its low yield, 
will either be forced completely out of the market or will have to serve 
as agents bringing together sources of funds (investors) and users of 
funds (borrowers). The trend towards loan securitisation is therefore 
one that must inevitably go hand in hand with the trend towards 
disintermediation and the deterioration in on-balance sheet lending. As 
a result, the attraction for banks in the near future may be not so much 
the issue or purchase of euronotes as the arrangement of the facility. 
Indeed a definite decline in the issue of bank euronotes is already 
perceivable (see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 Volume and number of euronote transactions by type of 
borrower (1976-86) 
$ million 
1978-83 1984 1985 1986 
Sovereign 1750 (6) 7225 (6) 3035 (7) 8868 (25) 
Supranational 250 (3) 500 (2) 850 (2) 200 (1) 
Corporate 2119 (22) 6676 (43) 28769 (157) 9132 (60) 
Bank 4743 (53) 2719 (32) 7269 (69) 4909 (51) 
8862 (84) 17120 (83) 39950 (235) 23109 (137) 
Source: Euromoney Capital Markets Guide, 1986 
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As more prime name borrowers and investors enter the market, LIBOR 
will start to become more irrelevant as a feasible reference rate. The 
fact that most prime name borrowers can now issue euronotes at LIBID 
minus or even at some other absolute rate bears this out. LIBOR could 
well go the same route as the US prime rate, which is now widely recog- 
nised as irrelevant to the funding schemes of the world's highest 
quality borrowers. This swing indirectly signals the comparatively 
diminished creditworthiness of the banks as measured by their own 
interbank system. 
2.5 The Structure of a Revolving Underwriting Facility 
Although a RUF is only one type of euronote facility, it is 
certainly the most fundamental. For this reason it is practical to 
highlight the structure and pricing of this instrument (noting that the 
main difference between a RUF and a NIF Is merely the absence of an 
underwriting commitment in the latter) in order to be able to evaluate 
the structure of other instruments available in the euronote markets, 
all of which are essentially developments, or variants, of this 
particular instrument. 
In a RUF the arrangers bring together a group of medium-term com- 
mercial bank underwriters and the issuer or potential issuer: these 
parties enter into a RUF agreement. The process is outlined 
schematically in Figure 2.1 Under this arrangement, the commercial bank 
underwriters agree to underwrite for a medium-term period the issue of 
negotiable short-term euronotes by the issuer. If the issuer decides to 
use the facility, notice of issuance is given to the commercial bank 
underwriters and, prior to the interest rate setting date, a selling 
period occurs, during which the negotiable short-term euronotes are 
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Figure 2.1 Parties to a RUF 
Arranger 
Issuer RUF 
1 agreement 
Negotiable ; Reference 
short-term --ý Agent 
e uronot es 
Bank Non-bank -, 
underwriters ; and interbank' 
depositors 
Medium-term 
underwriting 
commitment 
unsold 
notes 
Issuing and ý, IPlacing agent(s) 
paying agents ýý or manager(s) 
Open market investors 
(e. g. non-bank depositors) 
I 
I 
1 
Source: Dean Witter Capital Markets International Ltd 
k 
offered direct to open market investors. A variety of methods can be 
used for the placement of these euronotes during the selling period 
before unsold euronotes, if any, are allocated to the bank underwriters. 
Allocation takes place before the interest rate setting date in order to 
give the investors and underwriters the option of match-funding their 
investments. Under the RUF agreement it is usually the intention to sell 
the negotiable short-term euronotes to non-bank investors, who would 
otherwise be investing their liquid funds in bank deposits. Meanwhile, 
the commercial bank underwriters expect to receive an annual underwrit- 
ing fee as compensation for their medium-term underwriting commitment. 
In the event of their being allocated unsold euronotes, they would 
continue to receive the underwriting fee and, in addition, would receive 
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the full contracted yield on the negotiable short-term euronotes invol- 
untarily purchased. 
A RUF may be of two types. Firstly, it may be used as a source of 
funding, in which case notes will be issued and hence the facility will 
be drawn. Secondly, it may be held in reserve, when the facility is not 
drawn but used to back up other types of financing such as a US commer- 
cial paper programme; or it may simply be left undrawn as a type of 
insurance policy, to be used only if required. The different ways in 
which these two types of the same facility are priced will be discussed 
in the next main section, 'The Pricing of a RUF'. 
Theoretically, the structure of a RUF dictates that its cost must 
be lower than that of a traditional syndicated loan because it separates 
sources . of 
funding from sources of medium-term credit. As the notes 
usual ly mature within three or six months, with no obligation on the 
investor to purchase any further notes, the investor requires only a 
short-term return on his money. Furthermore, as the underwriters 
provide medium-term credit at low cost, the issuer pays a short-term 
rate for what is essential 1ya medium-term commitment. So how is it 
that underwriters are prepared to provide a medium-term back-up for a 
fee which more accurately reflects a short-term liability? The answer 
1i es, once again, in the unique structure of a RUF, which provides the 
underwriter with remoteness from funding risk, increased return on 
assets, and a marketable short-term liability. 
2.5.1 Remoteness from funding risk 
An underwriter to a RUF is less likely to be called upon to honour 
his commitment than in a conventional revolving credit. The reason is 
that in a revolving credit the underwriter must provide funds on demand 
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by the borrower, whereas in a RUF the execution of an underwriter's 
commitment depends not only on the borrower's decision to issue paper 
but also on the agent's inabi 1 ity to pl ace that paper with investors. 
As the structure of a RUF is such that placing agents generally earn no 
fee if they fail to place the paper, underwriters may take comfort in 
the f act that placing agents will undoubtedly try their utmost to place 
the paper. As a result, the underwriter is two steps removed from 
funding, rather than one. Indeed, if a RUF is specifically designed as 
a stand-by, there may be a disincentive clause which penalises the 
borrower for using the facility, and so further reduces the likelihood 
that the underwriter will be asked to fund the borrower. 
The very structure of a RUF may, therefore, contribute to a 
reduction in systemic risk. As the BIS (1986, p 204) point out: 
'Many observers believe that unbundling (new instruments) 
permits better allocation of risks systematically. That is, 
price risk can be separated to a substantial degree from 
credit risk, and the market risk transferred to another 
economic agent who has an offsetting exposure on his balance 
sheet. To the degree that markets function in this fashion, 
total systemic risk is reduced, since the creation of new 
instruments by definition cannot create net new price risk, 
but instead is used to 'match' offsetting real exposures of 
economic agents. Some gain in reducing systemic risk may 
also derive from the lowering of credit risk for those 
economic agents able to lay off unwanted exposure to market 
risk'. 
To the extent that RUFs can unbundle risks and lay off unwanted 
exposures to market risk in this way, systemic risk may be reduced. The 
BIS goes on to emphasise again, however, that it is important that the 
risks inherent in these new instruments are priced to provide an 
adequate return. At this stage it would be more correct to say that the 
structure of a RUF provides the 'potential' for a reduction in systemic 
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risk. Whether this potential is realised will depend also on the 
pricing of the facility. 
A second feature of a RUF which reduces the underwriter's risk of 
having to fund the issue is the fact that, as soon as paper is placed 
with the investors, the underwriters are assured of repayment of princi- 
pal and interest and are in essence freed from that funding risk for the 
length of the maturity of the notes. As a result of this they may have 
capacity on their books to take on short-term advances until the date at 
which the notes mature. The danger has been noted, however, that under- 
writers may be called upon to fund an issue, possibly even in its 
entirety, if the conditions of the borrower deteriorate to the state 
that the placing agent(s) are unable to sell the paper in the market. 
However, as most RUFs contain an adverse changes clause (whereby the 
underwriters are released from their obligation to fund if the borrow- 
er's financial condition deteriorates), the underwriter's risk of being 
left with unsold paper is once more reduced. This clause thus prevents 
the issuer from drawing under the facility when a deterioration in his 
financial condition makes it likely that his agent(s) will be unable to 
place the paper. It is important to emphasise, however, that these 
clauses have never been tested in law. 
2.5.2 Multi-option facilities 
Multi-option facilities (see Glossary of Terms) have been developed 
whereby the borrower has several options on how he may raise funds, only 
one of which may be through the issue of short-term euronotes. Another 
option may be through direct borrowing from the underwriter. If the 
issuer decides on this route, the underwriters have been put back in the 
position of being only one step removed from funding. This obviously 
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increases the underwriters' risk and tends to undermine their return on 
assets. 
2.5.3 Return on assets 
This is one way in which one may determine the financial return to 
an underwriter. The increase in the underwriter's return on assets 
(RDA) results from the continuous stream of underwriting fees, 
irrespective of whether the facility has been drawn or whether the 
underwriter has had to purchase unsold notes. According to Dungan 
(1985, p 12), for notes that have already been placed with end investors 
the underwriting fee is not applicable as the risk has been removed. As 
a result, the fee may apply only to those notes actually funded by 
underwriters and, hence, actually at risk. Similarly, the underwriter's 
front-end fees (received for participation in the facility) may be 
amortised over the life of the facility and applied only to the average 
amount actually funded, so providing an increased return on assets. In 
addition, although it is possible that underwriters may be forced to 
purchase notes because there is no market for them, it is much more 
likely that they will be forced to purchase because the margin on these 
notes has risen. If this is the case, it may still be possible to sell 
the notes in the market within the combination of the margin and the 
underwriting fee, therefore minimising the loss on the notes (if any) 
carried by the underwriter. When an underwriter is required to provide 
funds in the form of a bank loan, such transferability was not possible 
until recently. 
Although ROA provides us with a method for assessing the financial 
return to an underwriter, the actual return is by no means certain. The 
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return to the underwriter will be determined by a number of factors such 
as: 
- how many notes the underwriters are forced to purchase 
- the time at which they purchase notes 
- whether or not the notes can be resold 
- any tax or capital requirement attached to the facility 
By calculating a ROA under different funding scenarios, it may be 
possible to consider more accurately whether the return to the 
underwriters provides adequate compensation for the exposure incurred. 
If this could be done on a market basis, one could obtain an indication 
of whether euronotes contribute to an increase in systemic risk, at 
least in the short-run. This analysis will be attempted in Chapter 7. 
There are, however, flaws in the ROA methodology as a means of 
calculating the return to underwriting banks. These flaws will be 
identified in Chapter 7 and an alternative method for calculating the 
return to underwriting banks will be proposed. 
2.6 Pricing of a Revolving Underwriting Facility 
The purpose of this section of the chapter is not to review pricing 
theory er se as it relates to RUFs (this is covered in Chapter 6). 
Rather this section will examine the main pricing components of a RUF. 
The theoretical and practical pricing processes of a RUF will be 
compared to that of a simple revolving credit agreement. It wi 11 be 
argued that, theoretically, the pricing process of a RUF is no more 
likely to lead to an increase in systemic risk than that of a revolving 
credit agreement. The practice, however, may be different. From a 
practical stance there has been no experience of default in the euronote 
market to guide pricing. Pricing may be based more on heuristics than 
formulae. To the extent that heuristics used may be poor surrogates for 
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measures of risk (default probabilities, etc) systemic risk may be 
increased. The section concludes with a brief exposition of how the 
discounted issue price and maximum yield to maturity are actually 
calculated on euronotes. 
2.6.1 Pricing components 
The pricing components of a RUF can vary significantly, depending 
upon the specific funding requirements of the borrower. However, the 
following represent the three most common components of such a facility: 
2.6.1.1 Annual underwriting fee (or facility fee) 
This is payable by the issuer and is usually settled semi-annually 
or quarterly in arrears on the full amount of its underwriting 
commitments. This fee is due irrespective of the use made of the 
facility and irrespective of whether the underwriters are required to 
purchase short-term paper or make advances. It is thus simi 1 ar to the 
commitment fee of a traditional revolving credit except that it is paid 
irrespective of use. 
2.6.1.2 Arrangement fee (or front-end fee) 
This is payable by the issuer to the arranger(s) of the facility at 
closing, and a portion of it will be shared with the underwriters in the 
form of front-end management or participation fees. 
2.6.1.3 Yield 
The yield on the notes when sold to the placing agent, tender panel 
or underwriters wi 11 vary with market conditions, the maximum yield 
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being nearly always equal to the yield at which the notes have to be 
taken up by the underwriters. The spread on the notes, relative to a 
particular interest rate benchmark, will vary according to the quality 
of the borrower and the type of investor at which the notes are aimed; 
LIBOR, LIBID and US prime have all been used. Since investors prefer to 
purchase securities at par or at a discount (rather than at a premium 
involving a capital loss at maturity), notes are normally priced carry- 
ing a low nominal interest rate, and they are issued at a discount. If 
the borrower's credit standing improves or the market for his notes 
expands, this method enables the yield to be lowered simply by an 
increase in the price or a lowering of the re-allowed discount. A 
placement commission may also be payable. 
In pricing RUFs lead managers set the fixed margin or the 'cap 
rate' at a level which they believe can be sustained for the entire 
medium-term life of the facility. If there is any future protection 
required, the facility will include provisions for higher returns to the 
underwriters in the event of increased levels of funding. 
2.6.2 Revolving loan commitments 
Over the last fifteen to twenty years loan commitment contracts 
have increasingly replaced alternative credit instruments in the 
commercial loan markets. By 1986 these contracts accounted for about 
three-quarters of bank business loans in the United States (Melnik and 
Plant, 1986, p 267). A similar proportion is found in other industrial 
countries. Previous papers on loan commitment contracts have emphasised 
the problem of credit availability on the supply side. Examples of this 
approach may be found in Blackwell and Santomero (1982), Deshmukh, 
Greenbaum and Kanatas (1983). Other work in the area of loan commitment 
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contracts has concentrated on the specific issue of pricing of these 
contracts. Papers here include Thakor, Hong and Greenbaum (1981), 
Hawkins (1982), Berlin (1986) and Melnik and Plant (1986). 
The following section will examine how loan commitment contracts 
became the dominant commercial credit instrument. This will be followed 
by a brief analysis of the pricing of loan commitment contracts (or 
revolving credit agreements) compared to the pricing of revolving 
underwriting facilities (RUFs), in theory and practice. 
2.6.3 An overview of institutional changes in the loan market 
One of the most important changes in the nature of banking in 
modern economic history was the transformation of banks from 
institutions which granted mainly short-term self-liquidating loans to 
intermediaries operating mainly through long-term customer 
relationships. This transformation from transaction-based loans to 
enduring customer relationships began in the early twentieth century. 
Since this transformation is so important, it is useful to recount its 
historical development. 
Classic banking procedure strove to base all bank earnings on 
short-term, self-liquidating commercial loans. This approach, referred 
to 'as the 'real bills doctrine', may be traced back to Adam Smith 
(1776). Smith contended that a bank could ensure adequate liquidity and 
profitability by adhering to four principles: the bank should hold an 
adequate level of reserves; the bank should also maintain correspondent 
relationships and secondary reserves in order to be able to compensate 
for lost reserves; the loan portfolio should comprise only self- 
liquidating loans; and loans should be advanced only to industrial and 
69 
commercial customers. The last two guidelines have become known as the 
'real bi 11 s doctrine'. 
In terms of banking practice, commercial banks on both sides of the 
Atlantic adopted the real bills component of Smith's theory. From the 
start of the nineteenth century banks generally lent short-term funds 
backed by promissory notes. In some cases the doctrine became legally 
binding through legislation (see Kl ebaner, 1974, for a detailed review 
of banking legislation). 
Although banks still followed the doctrine at the turn of the 
century, customer-specific risk premiums were becoming increasingly 
common. This was followed by a gradual shift towards term loans. The 
shift to longer-term business was accompanied by a diversification of 
bank portfolios (Laughlin, 1910). It was also accompanied by a gradual 
shift in basic loan screening techniques. As far as longer-term loans 
were concerned bankers began to use borrower financial characteristics 
as primary criteria for the granting of loans rather than specific 
transaction parameters. 
Although official policy in the 1920s and 1930s continued, to 
endorse the real bills doctrine, in practice banks were, by this time, 
moving further away from strict adherence to the doctrine. By the 
1960s, term loans were the largest category in bank loan portfolios. 
These were followed by long-term revolving credit agreements in the 
1970s. Over 80 per cent of long-term commercial and industrial loans in 
the United States are now made under revolving loan commitments (Brady, 
1985). 
The pricing of transaction-specific loans is well known. 
Essentially it is based on discounting promissory notes. In contrast, 
the pricing of enduring customer-specific credit facilities has 
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attracted relatively little analysis. The contracts involve two pricing 
variables, the interest for take-downs and the commitment fees. As 
Melnik and Plant (1986, p 270) point out: 
'One of the major differences between transaction-based 
lending and enduring customer relationships is the method of 
pricing risk. Under transaction-specific lending the 
borrower is charged an increasing risk premium that varies 
directly with the amount of funds borrowed. Therefore the 
risk premium by which lenders are compensated is built into 
the marginal pricing formula of credit. Under the loan 
commitment contract the borrower generally compensates the 
lender (for risk) through a lump sum front-end payment'. 
Melnik and Plant go on to argue that this key difference helps to 
explain the historical trend towards enduring customer relations. They 
argue (1986, p 279) that commitment contracts now dominate because their 
pricing formula leads to a more efficient utilisation of credit. They 
show that, whenever default risk is independent of utilisation, the 
pricing of 'insurance' against default risk as a fixed front-end fee is 
preferable. However, when default risks increase with draw-down, a 
rising marginal risk premium could be more appropriate. 
2.6.4 Pricing revolving loan commitments and RUFs in theory 
Although all commitments involve a contractual promise to lend up 
to some maximum amount over a given period, revolving credit agreements 
(or loan commitments) also contain a loan formula. The loan formula 
contains a benchmark or reference rate (eg prime, LIBOR, LIBID, etc) and 
a contractually fixed markup. The size of the markup is determined by 
the customer's creditworthiness. Revolving credit agreements therefore 
protect the customer against both funding/availability risk (the risk 
that funds may be unavailable at a future date) and markup risk (the 
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risk that funds may only be available at a substantial 1y increased 
cost) . 
As Berlin (1986, p 7) emphasises: 
'The provision of insurance, however, is not costless for the 
bank. While the fixed markup provided by a revolving loan 
commitment is a definite advantage to the customer, it 
increases bank risk'. 
In order to compensate the bank for this risk, customers with 
revolving credit agreements are usually required to pay a commitment 
fee. The fact that commitment fees are seldom required on confirmed 
credit lines indicates that it is the combination of the promise to lend 
and the fixed markup that poses special risks for which the bank 
requires added compensation. 
In the following paragraphs we will examine the theoretical pricing 
process of a revolving credit agreement compared to that of a RUF. In 
theory, the pricing of a RUF is very simi 1 ar to the pricing of a 
revolving credit agreement or 'line commitment'. 
A line commitment is a promise from a bank to lend up to $L until 
the maturity date T. Between now and date T the firm, at its 
discretion, can borrow all or part of the line at r(t)+ per cent per 
period (the interest rate benchmark plus a given risk premium), where 
the risk premium may be a function of the interest rate benchmark 
(Hawkins, 1981, p 60). The gross dollar amount of the line being used 
at any time is denoted by B. This represents the face value of current 
borrowings. All outstanding borrowings must be repaid at time T. 
In addition to paying interest on the amount of borrowing on the 
line commitment, the company may often agree to keep a certain level of 
deposits with the bank, although this may not always be the case. These 
deposits are known as compensating balances. The amount of compensating 
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balances required is a proportion of both the size of the line 
commitment, L, and the current borrowings or 'draw-down', B. The 
analysis can be simplified by using one proportion, x. Required 
compensatory balances are x(L+B). If compensatory balances fall below 
this level, a penalty must be paid. This penalty is of the form of p 
per cent for every dollar the actual compensating balances, CB, are 
below the required balances (ie, p(x(L+B) - CB) dollars). A line fee of 
p per cent is paid on the amount of unused line borrowing. 
The nature and form of compensating balances can differ greatly 
among loans. Our example presents a simple, traditional form of 
compensatory balances, and is sufficient for our purposes. For a more 
comprehensive discussion of compensatory balances, see for example, 
Bartter and Pendleman, 1979. 
In our example, when the firm borrows $B of the line, after taking 
account of compensating balances, net borrowing is only B-CB -N 
dollars. From the above description Hawkins (1981, p 61) explains that 
the per-period payment of the firm due to the line C is 
C= µ(L-B) + p(x(L+B) - CB) + (r+6 )B 
(N+px) + ((r+E) -p+ px)B - pCB 
If we were to devise a formula to determine the yield to bank 
underwriters in a RUF, it would be very similar. It could be written 
as follows: 
where: 
Ca+ N(L) + (r+S )B 
C= committed amount 
a= front-end fee (a fixed constant) 
µ= the facility fee 
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L= line commitment 
(r+ä)B = an interest rate benchmark plus a risk premium on the 
borrowed amount. In the case of a RUF this is referred 
to as the maximum margin 
There are certain differences between a RUF and a revolving credit 
agreement. A RUF requires no compensatory balances. With a RUF, 
however, the faci 1 ity fee (1 ine fee in the case of a revol ving credit 
agreement) is paid on the total committed amount, not just the line 
outstanding. Apart from these differences the theoretical pricing 
structures of a RUF and a revolving credit agreement are very similar. 
They differ most in structure as section 1 has emphasised. 
Theoretically, both formulae should be calculated to provide what may be 
viewed as an 'adequate' return. If the risk premium charged in either 
case is insufficient for this purpose, systemic risk could be increased. 
There is, however, little 'theoretical' pricing evidence to suggest that 
this is more likely to be the case with a RUF than with a revolving 
credit agreement. 
2.6.5 Pricing in practice 
In practice there is no set procedure or formula for setting the 
pricing levels of the separate components of a RUF. Unlike revolving 
credit agreements, RUFs are new, complex and largely untested as far as 
bad debt experience is concerned. Much of the assessment is based on 
what the arranger(s) of the facility perceives to be the correct market 
price for the issuer's paper. In order to assess this 'correct market 
price', however, the arranger(s) Will try to compile a profile of the 
issuer by looking not only at his present financial position but also 
his past transactions (if any) in this market, as well as past issues of 
FRNs, fixed-rate bonds, bank credits, and so on. The arranger(s) wi ll 
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also examine any US commercial paper programme that this issuer may 
have, or have had, and the rating which this paper was given. Having 
examined all these factors and assessed the 'current feel' of the 
market, the arranger(s) must fix a price aggressive enough to gain the 
issuer's mandate but with a yield high enough to attract short-term 
investors and underwriters. If this yield is insufficient, systemic 
risk could be increased. To the extent that it may be based on 
'heuristics' this may well be the case. This area will be examined in 
Chapter 9. 
The actual pricing of the facility will depend on whether it is 
meant to be used or whether it is designed merely as a stand-by 
facility, in which case the underwriting fee would be lower than on a 
used facility because of the underwriter's lower perception of ever 
being called upon to purchase notes. However, there would also be a 
higher usage cost for this facility in order to compensate the 
underwriters for their lower commitment fee if the facility was used, 
and indeed to dissuade the borrower from using the facility at all. 
In the case in which the facility is meant to be used, the under- 
writing fee would be higher, with a lower usage cost. A maximum yield 
would be set on the notes in relation to the average market level at 
which the borrower could obtain short-term funds. This is the con- 
tracted yield (or strike yield) at which euronotes will be allocated to 
the underwriters in the event that the placing agent(s) have been unable 
to place the entire tranche with market investors. In order to create 
this maximum yield, given the low interest rates attached to euronotes, 
it is necessary for the notes to be issued at a discount. The maximum 
yield is thus the value of the interest, payable at maturity, plus the 
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discount on the notes, expressed as a percentage of the price originally 
paid or the discounted issue price. Under this method the issuer never 
receives the full nominal principal amount of the RUF as the notes are 
issued at a discount to their face value. 
2.6.6 Determining the discounted issue price and maximum yield 
The discounted issue price set on euronotes is simply determined by 
the following formula: the principal sum (i. e. face value of notes to be 
issued) plus the principal sum multiplied by (the spread relative to 
LIBOR, multiplied by the maturity of the notes) all over 1 plus (the 
full contracted yield rate multiplied by the maturity of the notes). 
This can be written: 
principal + (princi al x spread relative to LIBOR 
x maturity of notes) 
Issue price 
1+ full contracted yield rate x maturity of 
notes 
Example 1 
Assume: 
Principal 
Spread relative to LIBOR 
Maturity of notes 
Full contracted yield rate 
6-month LIBOR 
Thus: 
= $10,000,000 
= LIBOR less 0.125% p. a. 
=6 months (182 days) 
= LIBOR plus 0.25% p. a. 
= 10% p. a. 
Discounted issue price a 
10,000,000 + (10.000,000 x 9.875/100 x 182/360) 
1+ 10.25/100 x 182/360 
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10,499,236 
1.0518194 
= US$ 9,981,975.9 
To find the maximum amount payable at maturity and hence the 
maximum yield we simply take the sum of the top half of the equation: 
Maximum amount = principal + (principal x spread relative to LIBOR 
payable at x maturity of notes) 
maturity 
= 10,000,000 + (10,000,000 (9.875/100 x 182/360)) 
= US$ 10,499,236 
Another way of calculating the maximum amount payable on the notes 
is by using the discounted issue price and full contracted yield in 
place of principal and spread over LIBOR respectively: 
Maximum amount 
payable at = issue price + (issue price x full contracted yield 
maturity x maturity of notes) 
= 9,981,975.9 + (9,981,975.9 (10.25/100 x 182/360)) 
= US$ 10,499,236 
The maximum yield is thus the difference between the issue price and the 
price payable at maturity, in this case $517,261. 
The method of setting this maximum yield on the discounted issue 
price is explained in the diagram below (adapted from Dean Witter 
Capital Markets International Ltd): 
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interest maximum 
amount yield 
fiiscount i-T---r 
discounted principal 
issue 
price 
amount 
payable at 
maturity 
F--time maturity 
d ate 
If we were to insert the figures used in our arithmetical Example 1 into 
this diagram, the following would be the case: 
499,236 
-_____, ---- -_517 
261 
18,025 
-__---ý---- 
9,981,975.9 10,000,000 10,499,236 
maturity date 
(notes redeemed at par plus interest) 
This shows how notes are issued at a discount, which in this case is 
$18,025 ($10,000,000 - $9,981,975). The maximum yield on the notes is 
thus equal to the discount plus the interest sum payable on maturity, 
which is $517,261; this plus the discounted issue price gives the total 
amount payable to the underwriters on the maturity of the notes. 
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However, the maximum full contracted yield is only the yield given 
to the underwriters in the event that they have to purchase unsold 
paper. The paper is offered to market investors at a lower yield. 
This is achieved by selling the paper closer to its face value 
(principal amount), thereby reducing the discount and so raising the 
issue price. This results in a higher amount being paid initially 
(because of the lower discount) with the same nominal amount being 
received at the maturity of the notes issued (with interest remaining 
unaffected). This process of lowering the yield on euronotes from the 
maximum yield is shown arithmetically in Example 2. 
Example 2 
Using the same figures as in Example 1 but with a lower contracted 
yield of only LIBOR flat (10% p. a. ), we can write: 
Higher 10,000,000 + (10,000,000 (9.875/100 x 182/360)) 
discounted = 
issue price 
(1 + 10/100 x 182/360) 
10,499,236 
1.0505555 
= 9,993,985 
Higher US$ 9,993,985 
discounted 
issue price 
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The discounted issue price has been increased by lowering the yield 
percentage. However, as the interest rate sum is fixed, the notes will 
be redeemed for the same amount as before: 
Maximum amount 
payable at = 100,000,000 + (100,000,000 (9.875/100 x 182/360)) 
maturity 
= US$ 10,499,236 
The reduced yield on these notes is only $505,251 compared with a 
previous total of $517,261. Even though the investor will receive the 
same principal amount back at maturity as before, he wi 11 have had to 
pay more for the notes in the first place, and therefore his return is 
reduced. The process of lowering the yield on euronotes from the maxi- 
mum yield can also be shown diagrammatically: 
interest interest 
amount amount (same) 
-- -- - eu 
1 ower 
yield yield --- 
amount amount 
discount J amount (lower) 
",, 
/ payable 
at 
TO wer ----- -higher 
wtui ty. 
discounted discounted 
issue Price issue price 
time maturity date 
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If we were to insert the figures used in Example 2, the fol lowing 
would be the case: 
499,236 
118,025 
9,981,975.9 
499,236 
517,261 
6,01 
505,251 
--`-_--ý_ý- __ 
10,449,236 
9,993,985 
Time maturity date 
(notes redeemed 
at par plus 
interest) 
It is clear from the above example that increasing the discounted 
issue price (and hence reducing the discount) does not affect the amount 
payable at maturity, but that making the notes more expensive initially 
lowers the yield (discount plus interest amount) at maturity. 
2.7 Summary 
In this chapter we have examined, firstly, the structure of RUF and 
assessed its implications for systemic risk, and secondly the processes 
(both theoretical and practical) of pricing a RUF, and compared them to 
the process of pricing a revolving credit agreement. We would conclude 
that to the degree that the structure of a RUF allows different risks to 
be unbundled and transferred to economic agents with offsetting 
exposure, systemic risk may be reduced. Further, the pricing process of 
a RUF, at least theoretically, would appear to be no more likely to 
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contribute to an increase in systemic risk than that of a revolving 
credit agreement. In practice, however, this may not be so. The 
euronote market is still in its infancy. There has been little, if any, 
bad debt experience to date. In practice, pricing is based on 
perception. The lack of a tried and tested pricing process for RUFs 
may, therefore, contribute to an increase in systemic risk where RUFs 
replace revolving credit agreements. 
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CHAPTER 3 
COMPARISON OF EURONOTES AND ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENTS 
3.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to compare the costs of 
euronote facilities with the costs of syndicated loans (eurocredits), 
and to examine the implications for systemic risk. Euronote facilities 
have largely replaced eurocredits (euro-bank loans). They have done so 
for a variety of reasons, the main one being cost. It will be shown in 
this chapter, building on previous evidence, that a borrower's cost of 
funds in the euronote market (so 1 ong as the market is open to him) is 
considerably below his cost of funds in the eurocredit market. 
Significantly, it will be shown that the euronote market charges lower 
premiums for differences in country risk than does the eurocredit 
market. If these contentions are supportable we will have a rationale 
on which to build our study of systemic risk in the euronote market. 
That is: if it is cheaper to borrow in the euronote market than the 
eurocredit market this implies that investors are prepared to accept a 
lower return in the euronote market. Risk should, theoretically, be 
less in the euronote market than in the eurocredit market to compensate 
for these lower returns. 
Before embarking on our analysis of euronote costs versus 
eurocredit costs, it will be necessary to examine briefly the advantages 
and disadvantages of euronotes compared to other funding possibilities. 
By doing so it will be shown that euronote facilities compete with more 
than just bank credit facilities. The chapter will conclude with a 
comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of euronotes compared to 
alternative investments. 
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3.2 The Borrower's Perspective 
3.2.1 Comparative costs of euronotes and FRNs 
In a euronote facility the cost to the borrower is stated on a 
'probable cost' basis, the probability being that notes will be placed 
with market investors at either a pre-fixed yield or a competitive 
yield, rather than being 1 eft with the underwriters at the f ul 1 
contracted yield. The borrower can never be absolutely certain of the 
price he will eventually have to pay for the facility, although he will 
know the maximum price that may be payable. This is a criticism that is 
also valid when comparing euronotes with syndicated credits. 
With an FRN the cost to the borrower is certain: the price is 
predetermined, and the note is sold at that price. On this basis the 
FRN would appear to be more favourable to the prime name borrower than a 
euronote facility. Indeed, it is no longer certain that a prime name 
borrower will even be able to achieve a lower probable cost on a 
euronote faci 1 ity than the certain cost of an FRN, because prime name 
FRNs can now be issued at sub-LIBOR pricing; the Kingdom of Sweden US 
dollar FRN priced at LIB ID less 1/16 per cent p. a. (1986) is an example. 
Although Sweden is receiving bids of under LIBID on its outstanding $4 
billion euronote facility, when the 1/8 per cent p. a. commitment fee for 
this facility is taken into account the margin on the notes increases 
to nearly LIBOR-flat. 
For a euronote facility to be competitive with a high quality 
sovereign FRN such as Sweden, the market must first develop well below 
its present yield barriers to be able to absorb high credit notes at 
discounts below available FRN spreads. Only then will the probable cost 
of a euronote (for high quality borrowers) be competitive with the 
certain cost of an FRN. For lesser quality borrowers without access to 
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the FRN market or with access at unfavourable rates, the euronote market 
will be the more attractive of the two alternatives. 
3.2.2 Fluctuations in the costs of funds 
Under an FRN, a fixed-rate bond or a syndicated loan, the 
borrower's cost of funds is unaffected by shifts in his creditworthiness 
or a deterioration in the market's perception of his creditworthiness 
once the paper has been placed or loan advanced. Although such a 
situation may affect the price at which an FRN or fixed-rate bond is 
traded in the secondary market, it will have no effect on the issuer's 
immediate cost of funds. With a NIF or RUF, however, as notes are 
issued in proportionate amounts over the life of the facility to make up 
the full credit, a shift in the market's perception of a borrower's 
financial position can adversely affect the price at which it can place 
(if at all) the next tranche of notes under the facility. 
3.2.3 Maturities 
Table 3.1 shows the maturities achieved on euronote facilities 
since 1982 by some of the most creditworthy borrowers (noticeably 
sovereign or quasi-sovereign), with the longest being ten years, 
although the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation has achieved a 
maturity of 15 years. These maturities are considerably shorter than 
those available in the FRN market, where 40-year maturities and 
perpetual notes are quite common. On the other hand, euronote maturities 
appear to be longer than those achieved on most syndicated loans, even 
at a time of credit market expansion (see Figure 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 Maturities gained on selected euronote facilities, April 
1982 - Apri 1 1985 
Country Date Amount Maturity 
(US$ million) (years) 
Australian Industry 
Development Corporation July 1984 100 10 
Australian Wheat Board Jan. 1984 300 2 
Denmark July 1984 1,000 10 
Credit National June 1984 160 (ECU) 7 
Ireland Mar. 1982 100 7 
Ireland Apr. 1982 150 7 
State Bank of India June 1984 1 00 7 
Korea Exchange Bank Sept. 1984 75 5 
New Zealand Nov. 1984 1,500 7 
New Zealand Meat 
Producers Board Jan. 1985 200 5 
Petroleos Mexicanos Oct. 1981 200 6 
Portugal Mar. 1985 500 5 
Red Nacional de los 
Ferrocarriles Espanoles Apr. 1982 100 8 
Spain July 1984 500 10 
Sweden Sept. 1983 4,000 10 
Source: Euromoney Capital Markets Guide 
: Figure 3.1 Maturities on syndicated loans, 1972-79 
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Source: World Bank, Borrowing in International Capital Markets 
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Nevertheless, the maturities on euronotes, whilst being competitive 
with those on syndicated loans, are uncompetitive with those achievable 
on FRNs. A trend towards longer maturities in the euronote market is 
perceivable and this development may provide for a wider investor base, 
thereby giving the euronote a more competitive position when compared 
with the FRN. This trend was discernible with the introduction of euro- 
medium term notes (EMTNs) during 1986 with maturities between one to 
five years although the growth of this segment of the euronote market 
has not been maintained during 1987. 
3.2.4 Diversification of funds 
The possibility of tapping a growing and diverse group of investors 
is one of the main attractions of the euronote facility to the borrower, 
especially for high quality borrowers who can price their issues below 
LIBID, thereby attracting mainly non-bank investors. For these borrow- 
ers there wi 11 be a readi 1y avai 1 abl e non-bank investor market. Even for 
lesser rated borrowers, whose paper will be most likely to end up with 
banks, these banks may contribute a source of funds different from the 
one to which the investor is usually limited. These banks are most 
likely to be looking for a low-risk, advantageously priced, short-term 
asset rather than a medium-term commitment. 
3.2.5 Flexibility 
A euronote facility, like a syndicated loan, is not locked into any 
one interest rate fixing period; note maturities, although short, are 
very f1 exi bl e, and the borrower has the abi 1 ity to expand or contract 
lending as required, unlike the position with a syndicated loan. This 
flexibility is probably the main incentive, especially for sovereign 
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borrowers, to tap the euronote market. The borrower has the opportunity 
to play the yield curve by choosing, for instance, three-month LIBID 
rather than six-month LIBID. 
FRNs do not have this flexibility, with the borrower constantly 
committed to the three-month or six-month rate chosen at the beginning 
of the facility. Although from 1970 to 1985 short-term rates have 
occasionally been higher than long-term rates, hence encouraging borrow- 
ers to switch to FRNs (which have a short-term interest rate structure), 
FRN issuers do not have the option to switch from, say, three-month to 
six-month LIBID at each rollover date. 
Where the euronote is inflexible, however, is in the currencies in 
which it may be denominated. The absence of a multi-currency option 
(although there may be the option, in a euronote facility, for the 
issuer to switch to a straight syndicated loan with a mul ti-currency 
facility) is obviously a severe defect of the faci1 ity when compared 
with syndicated loans and even with FRNs. Although FRNs do not carry a 
multi-option facility, they can be denominated in a single non-dollar 
currency such as sterling or ECUs. 
As concerns sterling, the Bank of England's philosophy until 1986 
appeared to be that only notes with maturities of five years or more are 
acceptable, with the short-term market being amply served by the 
banker's acceptance credit market, in which the Bank itself is a major 
dealer. Not surprisingly, most European central banks appear reluctant 
to allow a flood of short-term paper to loosen their hold on their 
respective money supplies. However, in March 1985 the Bank of England 
announced that it will allow non-bank borrowers, under certain 
circumstances, to make regular issues of sterling bonds with a maturity 
of between one and five years. This was followed in April 1986 by the 
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announcement that issues of sterling commercial paper were to be 
all owed. 
3.2.6 Comparative costs of euronotes and syndicated eurocredits for 
different country borrowers: implications for systemic risk 
Although it is commonly stated that euronotes have significant cost 
advantages over syndicated credits because of their unique structure, it 
is very difficult to put these advantages into quantitative terms. One 
level of analysis would entail a comparison between spreads which 
borrowers have achieved on syndicated eurocredits and the spreads which 
the 'same' borrowers have achieved on euronotes, as well as a comparison 
of other associated fees. The difficulty is that many euronote issuers 
have never borrowed in the eurocredit markets; those that have may not 
have paid spreads relative to LIBOR or have done so such a long time ago 
that the terms they achieved may not be indicative of those they might 
achieve today. However, a study carried out for Euromoney by Mills 
(1985) - who is senior economist, division of international finance, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington - has shown 
that in mid-1985 borrowers using the euronote market achieved spreads of 
between 15 and 55 basis points lower than those achieved on previous 
syndicated loans for the same borrowers. 
Spreads over LIBOR, or in some cases under LIBOR, on the bid side 
of the secondary market, as supplied by Merrill Lynch, are shown in 
Table 3.2 for selected euronote facilities. Where the published spread 
was quoted relative to L IB ID, Mills converted it to a LIBOR equivalent 
by assuming the usual 1/8 per cent spread between LIBOR and LIBID. 
Mills uses the secondary market bid rates for euronotes as proxies for 
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Table 3.2 Spreads relative to LIBOR for borrowers in the euronote and 
eurocredit markets between February 1984 and June 1985 
Difference 
between 
Eurocredits Euronote spread 
Euronotes Actual Estimated and estimated 
bid rate (on date if made Eurocredits 
Borrower 28.6.85 arranged)(1) today(2) spread (3) 
Basis Points 
Australia 
State Electricity 
Commission of 
Victoria 3 - - 47 
Vi ctori a Transport 
Borrowing 
Agency(4) - 62.6 (5/84) 50 
Elders Capital 
Corp(5) 6 - - 44 
Elders IXL Ltd - 62.5 (2/84) 50 
France 
Credit National 3 37.5(6) (10/84) 25 22 
Elf Aquitaine 8 - - 
Central Government - 24(7) (7/85) 24(8) 16 
Ireland 
Central Government 2 47(7) (5/84) 40 38 
Italy 
IMI - 22 (6/85) 22(8) 13 
Korea 
Korea Exchange 
Bank 14 70 (2/85) 69(9) 55 
Norway 
Statoi l -12.5(10) 37.5 (4/84) 30 42.5 
Portugal 
Central 
Government 15 62.5 (2/85) 55 40 
Spain 
National Railways 5 50 (5/84) 35 30 
Official Credit 
Institute 10 37.5(7) (4/85) 35 25 
United Kingdom 
Britoil -7.5(10) - - 
National Electricity 
Council - 25(8) (8/84) 20 27.5 
Source: Rodney Mills, 'The ni fty way to beat euroloans', Euromoney, 
October 1985, p 241 
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Notes: 
1 Some spreads are averages of different spread 1 eve 1s over the life of 
the loan. The date is the date when the mandate was given, except 
that the date of signing is used for the Australian 1 oans and the 
renegotiations 
2 Author's estimate of spread of eurocredit that borrower would have to 
pay in mid-1985 
3 Difference between euronote spread and adjusted spread on eurocredit 
4 Guaranteed by State of Victoria 
5 Guaranteed by Elders 1% Limited 
6 Assumes full utilisation. The spread is at several different levels 
that rise with the degree of utilisation. The annual facility fee is 
not included in the cost shown. 
7 Renegotiation of remaining maturities of earlier loan 
8 Same spread as in second column 
9 Actual average spread on Korean Development Bank loan mandated in May 
1985 
10 Actual quotations are relative to LIBID, and have been converted to a 
LIBOR basis by assuming LIBOR at 1/8 per cent above LIBID 
rates paid by borrowers. His rationale for using such proxies is 
enshrined in the following statement (Mills, 1985, p 241): 
'Market sources assert that secondary market bid rates at a 
given moment have generally been somewhat above, if not equal 
to, the rates provided by borrowers. Discrepancies sometimes 
emerge because rates bid at tenders may be depressed by over- 
zealous bidding of panel members with an eye to future 
business. But the discrepancies between tender ranges and 
secondary market rates are said to be generally not more than 
a few basis points. ' 
Mills selects the twelve euronote rates shown in Table 3.2 because they 
appear to be comparable with spreads over LIBOR on syndicated credits 
raised by the same borrower. The 1 ist is short because at the date of 
publication the other euronote issuers (39 in total) had not arranged 
eurocredits on disclosed terms. 
Comparisons of the spreads on euronotes and eurocredits show 
substantial cost savings with euronote facilities compared to 
eurocredits. As Mills (1985, p 214) acknowledges, however, any 
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quantification of savings is made difficult by the fact that the 
eurocredits shown in Table 3.2 were arranged, often, before mid-1985, 
and some as long ago as 1984. Mills has, therefore, estimated the 
eurocredit spread if signed in mid-1985. He takes into account the fact 
that since early 1984 eurocredit spreads have been declining. 
There are gaps in the data because of the paucity of loans. Two 
developed countries, Italy and Spain, have, however, continued to borrow 
actively in the eurocredit market. For several years the Federal 
Reserve staff has, for internal purposes, maintained a series of 
weighted average spreads over LIBOR on eurocredits arranged for public 
sector borrowers in a number of countries. Mills averaged together the 
movements in the spreads for Italy and Spain in the Federal Reserve 
series during 1984 and the first half of 1985. He then used these data 
to obtain the adjusted eurocredit spreads in Table 3.2 where necessary. 
The adjusted spreads are shown to the nearest five basis points. 
Although they are not completely accurate they are a better indicator of 
mid-1985 hypothetical borrowing costs than the unadjusted spreads which 
take no account of falling (real and nominal) interest rates in the 
market. 
Even when compared with the adjusted eurocredit spreads, the euronote 
spreads indicate lower interest cost for euronote facilities than for 
eurocredits. The cost savings differ significantly from thirteen basis 
points for the Italian borrower to 55 basis points for the Korean 
borrower. Mills (1986, p 242) explains this by saying: 
'This wide range does not reflect imperfect adjustments; the 
eurocredit spreads shown for France, Italy and Korea are 
actual spreads on very recent credits. The wide country-to- 
country variation in the savings from NIFs reflects the fact 
that the euronote market makes smaller differences for 
country risk than does the eurocredit market. ' 
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Once the facility fee (underwriting fee) on euronotes is taken into 
account, however, the cost saving on euronotes is significantly reduced 
(see Table 3.3): for example, a facility fee of 25 basis points for 
Portugal wipes out approximately two-thirds of Portugal's cost saving 
from its euronote facility arranged in February 1985. On the other hand 
the lower level of front-end fees on euronotes, estimated at about 3 
basis points below those on eurocredits, partially offsets the reduction 
in cost savings brought about by the higher facility fees on the former. 
All in all Mills estimates that euronotes save the borrower between 10 
and 50 basis points over a syndicated eurocredit. 
Table 3.3 Fee data for NIFs arranged January 1984 to June 1985 
Annual Annualised 
facility fee front-end fee 
Basis Points 
Sample average 12 (108 NIFs) 3 (37 NIFs) 
NIFs of euronote issuers shown in 
Table 1: 
State Electricity Commission of 
Victoria 15 na 
Elders Capital Corporation 10 3 
Credit National 10 2.5 
Elf Aquitain None(1) na 
Government of Ireland(3) 12.5-25(2) 3-9(2) 
Italy: IRI(3) na na 
Korea Exchange Bank 25 na 
Statoil na na 
Government of Portugal 25 6.25 
Spanish National Railways(3) na na 
Spain: Official Credit Institute na na 
Britoil 12.5 na 
Source: Rodney Mills, 'The nifty way to beat euroIoans', Euromoney, 
October 1985, p 241 
Notes: 1 The issue is 'eurocommerci al paper' and is not 
underwritten by banks 
2 The data refer to three separate issues 
3 These NIFs were arranged in 1982 
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There are, however, a number of flaws in Mills' methodology. To 
begin with Mills uses secondary market bid rates on 28.6.85 as proxies 
for the issuer's funding cost in the euronote market. Mills is 
incorrect to record simply the bids all on the same date. As we wil 1 
see in later chapters, the bid rate on a euronote may move for various 
reasons. The 'initial' bid rate of the tranche is, therefore, a better 
proxy for the issuer's actual cost of funds. As spreads in the market 
range between four and five basis points, the initial bid w1 11 be, 
almost certainly, within this range. 
Secondly, when attempting to standardise his eurocredit data for 
June 1985, he uses the change in the weighted average spreads for Italy 
and Spain. These two weighted average spreads represent only the 
decline in spreads for top quality Italian and Spanish borrowers. It is 
doubtful how representative they are for borrowers such as the Korean 
Exchange Bank or even Credit National or Britoil. 
It is our contention that a more accurate way of comparing euronote 
spreads with eurocredit spreads is to compare borrowers that have 
entered both markets at very close intervals. Using this methodology, 
credit risk in both markets is identical. In fairness, this was not 
possible in 1985 because of the paucity of traded euronotes. The 
specific contribution towards improving Mills' results in the context of 
our research objectives is to update Mills' study for the second half of 
1986 and the first half of 1987, with the aforementioned amendments. 
Since the study by Mills more borrowers have entered both the 
euronote and eurocredit markets, and some of those that were present in 
the markets in 1985 have since exited. Many of the borrowers in our 
study are, therefore, different from those in Mills' study. Following 
Mills' guidelines, only top quality borrowers in each country are 
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compared. Taken purely on credit quality, therefore, each country 
should be able to borrow at very similar terms in the eurocredit 
market. The same should be true of the euronote market. Any 
discrepancies can, therefore, be attributed to country risk. 
In our study the initial euronote tranche bid rate is compared with 
the eurocredit spread for the same borrower. Because the facilites are 
so close to each other in time period (the longest period being 4 
months) no adjustment proxy - as in Mills' study - is necessary. 
Table 3.4 displays the initial euronote bid rates and eurocredit 
spreads for all borrowers who entered both markets for LIBOR based funds 
between June 1986 and May 1987. From Table 3.4 it is clear that spreads 
in both markets have declined substantially since 1985. One significant 
feature of the euronote market in 1986/87 (which was absent in 1985) is 
the remarkably low rates at which sovereign or sovereign-backed 
borrowers can raise funds; sometimes as low as 37 basis points below 
LIBOR. This development is partly a result of the move towards pricing 
sovereign, and sovereign-backed paper off the US treasury bill rate 
rather than LIBOR or LIBID. Sovereign euronotes, thus, compete with 
government paper rather than other money market products. 
It would appear from the results of Table 3.4 that the euronote 
market still seems to charge smaller premiums for country risk than does 
the eurocredit market. The difference between the lowest euronote 
spreads of -37 basis points (for Credit National, CNT, RENFE and the 
Kingdom of Sweden) and the highest of 10 basis points (for the Korea 
Exchange Bank) is only 47 basis points. 
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Tab1e'3.4 Spreads relative to LIBOR for borrowers in the euronote and 
eurocredit markets between June 1986 and May 1987 
Euronotes Eurocredits Difference 
Borrower initial Date spread Date between euro- 
tranche note spread 
bid rate and euro- 
credit spread 
Basis points 
Australia 
Australian Wheat 
Board -10.5 12.86 25 12.86 35.5 
BHP -5.5 11.86 15 11.86 20.5 Elders 1% 3 37.5 1.87 34.5 
France 
Credit National -371 6.87 LIBOR 6.87 37 
CNT -32 7.86 LIBOR 8.86 32 
EdF -37 3.87 LIBOR 4.87 37 
Iceland 
Landsbankki Islands 5 5.87 18.5 5.87 13.75 
Ireland 
Central Government -34 1.87 10 1.87 44 
Italy 
CI R 5 11.86 10 7.86 5 
Banco di Napoli 7 4.87 10 4.87 3 
Korea 
Daewoo Corp - 50 5.87 50 
Korea Exchange Bank 10 1.87 62.5 3.87 42.5 
New Zealand 
Fletcher Challenge 7 1.87 18.75 1.87 11.75 
Norway 
Det Norske Veritas 8 8.86 18.75 8.86 10.75 
Statoil -12.52 6.86 20 6.86 32.5 
Oman 
Sultanate of Oman 9 7.86 37.5 7.86 28.5 
Portugal 
Central Government -32 12.86 37.5 12.86 69.5 
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Table 3.4 (contd) Spreads relative to LIBOR for borrowers in the 
euronote and eurocredit markets between June 1986 
and May 1987 continued 
Euronotes Eurocredits Difference 
Borrower initial Date spread Date between euro- 
tranche note spread 
bid rate and euro- 
credit spread 
Basis points 
Spai n 
Hydroe 1 ectr i ca 
Iberduero 5 3.87 7.5 1.87 2.5 
Sweden 
Electrolux -2.5 7.86 10 7.86 12.5 
Kingdom of Sweden -37 3.87 12.5 3.87 49.5 
Volvo -12.5 3.87 6.25 3.87 18.75 
United Kingdom 
Allied Lyons -0.5 5.87 15 5.87 20 Britoil -10.5 3.87 22.5 3.87 31 
Jaguar -9.5 12.86 10 7.86 19.5 
National Mutual -2.5 4.87 20 4.87 22.5 
Whitbread -1.5 3.87 12.5 3.87 14 
Notes: 1 Where bid rates are given against US Treasury bills the 
usual percentage point is added to give a rate relative 
to LIBOR 
2 Where bid rates are given against LIBID the usual 1/8 per 
cent is added to give a rate relative to LIBOR 
The difference between the lowest eurocredit spreads of LIBOR-flat (for 
Credit National, CNT and EdF) and the highest eurocredit spread of 62.5 
basis points (again for the Korea Exchange Bank) is 62.5 basis points. 
A perhaps more surprising result is that of the Government of 
Portugal. As a sovereign borrower Portugal can raise funds very cheaply 
97 
in the euronote market, yet pays a high premium in the eurocredit 
market. This again is a result not so much of a widening of spreads in 
the eurocredit market, but of the euronote market's desire for sovereign 
credits. The market appears to be willing to accept such low returns 
for even poorer sovereign credits such as Portugal because of the short- 
term nature of the notes (generally of a three-month maturity). If we 
examine the fee levels charged for Portugal's underwriting commitment 
(see Table 3.5) we can see that - as in Mills' study - Portugal's cost 
of funds over the longer-term is considerably increased. 
The results of our study would seem to support Mills' finding that 
borrowers (especially sovereign borrowers) can make significant interest 
cost savings by using the euronote market as opposed to the eurocredit 
market. The 26 differences shown in Table 3.4 average 27 basis points 
(compared to 30 basis points in Mills' study). Again, however, cost 
savings are reduced once fees are taken into account (see Table 3.5). 
Of the 387 euronote facilities arranged between 1985 and 1987 the 
average facility fee was eleven basis points (compared to twelve basis 
points in Mills' study). At this average level of eleven basis points, 
the facility fee would wipe out approximately 42 per cent of the cost 
advantage of euronote facilities - the 26 basis points of spread 
obtained from the comparisons in Table 3.4 How much is therefore 
offset may vary considerably from one euronote facility to another. 
As Mills (p 242) pointed out, however, 
'... the impact of the annual facility fee on the relative 
costs of NIFs and eurocredits is tempered by the apparently 
lower level of front-end fees on NIFs as compared with 
eurocredits. ' 
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Table 3.5 Fee data for euronote facilities arranged from June 1986 to 
May 1987 
Annual Annualised 
facility fee front-end fee 
Basis points 
Sample average 11 (387 NIFs) 2 (387 NIFs) 
NIFs of euronote issuers 
shown in Table 3.5 
Australian Wheat Board 10 0 
BHP 5 0 
Elders 1XL 7.5 1 
Credit National 4.5 2 
CNT 6.25 1 
EdF 6.25 2 
Landsbankki Islands 10 2 
Government of Ireland 4.5 0.5 
CIR 7.5 1 
Banco di Napoli' na na 
Daewoo Corp 22.5 0 
Korea Exchange Bank 15 3 
Fletcher Challenge 10 1 
Det norske Veritasl na na 
Statoi l 5 0 
Sultanate of Oman 12.5 4 
Government of Portugal 25 0.5 
Hydroelectrica Iberduero 5 0 
Electrolux na na 
Kingdom of Sweden 6.25 0 
Volvo 6.25 1 
Allied Iyons 6.25 1 
Britoil" na na 
Jaguar 6.25 0 
National Mutuall na na 
Whitbreadl na na 
Notes: 1 ECP programmes 
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Mills was unable to obtain front-end fee data for the euronote facilites 
in his study but referred to a study of front-end fees between 1981 and 
1983. This study found that on 74 credits to developed countries the 
front-end fee . 
(on an annualised basis) averaged 8 basis points. 
We have been able to obtain front-end fee information for only a 
few of the borrowers examined in our study. This information is shown 
in Table 3.6 below. The average front-end fee of the facilities shown 
in Table 3.6 is 10.8 basis points. This difference, if applied to the 
rest of the facilities examined, offsets over half the burden of the 
average annual facility fee plus front-end fee payable on euronotes. 
Table 3.6 Front-end fee data for eurocredits in Table 3.5 
Basis points 
Borrower Annualised front-end fee 
Government of Ireland 10 
Government of Portugal 15 
Kingdom of Sweden 12.5 
Volvo 5 
Statoil 12.5 
Korea Exchange Bank 10 
Source: Merryll Lynch 
But what does this mean for systemic risk? To say that the 
euronote market charges insufficient premiums to account for differences 
in country risk would be to say that euronote facilities may well 
contribute to an increase in systemic risk. What we have done is to 
update Mills' data, and this has led us to conclude that euronote 
facilities appear to charge lower premiums to account for country risk 
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differences than do the eurocredit facilities. To the extent that these 
lower premiums may be insufficient, euronote facilities may well 
contribute to an increase in systemic risk if banks provide them in 
place of traditional eurocredits. The sufficiency of the returns in 
euronote facilities will be examined more rigorously in Chapters 5,7 
and 8. 
Again, in order to understand fully the reasons for the rapid 
growth of the euronote market, we now turn our attention briefly to the 
investor. Some of the comparative features of syndicated loans, NIFs, 
RUFs and FRNs are set out in Table 3.7. These should set the scene for 
the next stage of the present investigation. 
3.3 Comparison of Euronotes and Alternative Instruments: the 
Investor's Perspective 
Having compared the features of euronotes with those of other 
funding instruments from the borrower's perspective, we must now turn to 
the types of instrument that compete with euronotes as an investment. 
Three instruments will be examined: bank deposits, which give yields at 
approximately LIBID; euro-COs which typically trade at 1/16 or 1/8 under 
LIBID; and treasury bills which might trade at a full percentage point 
(100 basis points) below LIBID. 
3.3.1 Bank deposits 
The most actively traded eurorotes in the market are usually those 
at or just above LIBID; investors in this market are looking for a 
higher yield than they are used to getting on other instruments. LIBID- 
plus notes therefore appear to be competing with bank deposits for 
investors' funds. 
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Table 3.7 Comparative features of syndicated credits, FRNs, RUFs 
and NIFs 
Syndicated FRNs Euronotes 
credits 
RUFs NIFs 
Cost: used High Low Low V. 1ow 
unused High ... Low V. low Flexibility (e. g. Yes No Yes Yes 
interest period/ 
usage 
Diversification No Yes Yes Yes 
Amounts Large Large Large Large 
Maturity and Shorter V. long Long Long 
average life 
Issuer quality Broad More Broad More 
restrictive 
Multi-currency 
Syndication risk 
Yes No, but 
single non- 
$ currency, 
e. g. I and 
ECU 
Low Low 
Standard 
documents 
Ease of legal 
transferability 
Secondary market 
liquidity 
Importance to 
issuer of 
tenderer/under- 
writer quality 
Value as bridge 
to capital 
markets 
No Yes 
No, but Yes 
possi bl e 
Mow V. high 
Important Not so 
important 
No, but 
ECU (and 
future poss- 
ibility of 
sterling) 
Low 
No 
Yes on 
short-term 
notes 
Low to date 
but high 
potential if 
supply forth- 
coming 
Important 
restrictive 
(but broader with 
letter of credit) 
No, but ECU (and 
future possibility 
of sterling) 
Low where 
applicable 
No 
Yes where 
applicable 
Low to date but 
high potential if 
supply forthcoming 
000 
Zero High High particu- High particularly 
larly if if used 
used 
Source: adapted from Dean Witter Capital Markets - International ltd. 
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These investors realise that some high quality (or even medium quality) 
notes are just as secure as bank deposits, yet they achieve a premium on 
these notes over what they could obtain from a bank deposit. This 
situation cannot continue: there is no reason why euronotes issued by 
prime name borrowers should carry such a premium. 
When funds are placed in a bank deposit a credit risk is assumed on 
that bank, for which one usually obtains LIBID. Yet higher quality 
borrowers, such as Spain and the New Zealand Meat Board, are having to 
pay out LIBID-plus on their notes. The bank-deposit investor 
essentially requires a premium over his deposit before he will move out 
of that investment into euronotes. In market parlance, he is looking 
for yield. As Figure 3.2 shows any premium over deposit rates (as 
represented by three month LIBOR) had all but disappeared by the end of 
1985. This would seem to indicate a growing efficiency of the market. 
3.3.2 Euro-CDs 
The euro-CD investor is different from the bank deposit investor by 
being more concerned with liquidity than yield. Euro-CDs are highly 
liquid money market investments. Investors in this instrument will only 
move into an alternative instrument if it can provide the same liquidity 
at either better rates or less risk. The fact that euronotes appear to 
have had a greater impact on the bank deposit base than the euro-CD 
market would seem to imply that euro-CD investors are not yet convinced 
of the liquidity of euronotes. 
Since the liquidity of euronotes increases as more borrowers and 
investors enter the market, the ability to diversify away from bank risk 
will entice the euro-CD investor to the market. Consequently, the 
euronote market will move away from a bank depositor investor base to a 
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Figure 3.2 Three-month euro-CP versus three-month LIBOR 
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euro-CD investor base for top-quality names. Figure 3.3 reveals the 
premium paid on euronotes over euro-CD rates up to 1986. 
A 
Xi 
V 
711 
Figure 3.3 Three-month euro-CP versus three-month euro-COs 
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3.3.3 Treasury bills 
Treasury bills are the ultimate cash alternative. Investors in 
these instruments have a substantially lower yield benchmark than those 
in bank deposits and euro-CDs. Treasury bills are uniquely safe liquid 
investments in that they can be sold for little, if any, loss of value 
under most market conditions. Trading at often 100 basis points below 
LIBID it seems unlikely that euronotes (at least in the foreseeable 
future) will become a viable alternative to such an instrument. 
3.3.4 Sumiary 
The main competitor of the euronote in the money markets (from an 
investor's perspective) at the present time is the euro-CD. However, as 
liquidity increases in the euronote market, there is no reason why 
yields on euronotes should not go through euro-CD yields. As a result, 
good quality euronotes will cease to be a viable alternative investment 
to bank deposit investors because the premium over bank deposits will 
disappear. Consequently, before 1990 banks may very well start to 
regain some of their traditional short-term depositors, whilst losing a 
greater proportion of their euro-CD investors. 
3.4 Conclusions 
The flexibility and diversification aspects of the euronote 
facility are strong inducements for the borrowers to enter the market. 
This applies particularly to high quality sovereign and corporate 
borrowers. In terms of flexibility it outscores the FRN, and in terms 
of diversification possibilities it outscores the syndicated loan (and 
possibly also the FRN). However, although beating the syndicated loan 
on most counts, in terms of probable cost it is likely to be uneconomic 
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for most highly rated sovereign borrowers when compared with the certain 
cost of an FRN. Where the euronote fails drastically against the FRN is 
in its maturity structure: for those borrowers requiring long-term 
funds the euronote market is still not a viable alternative to the FRN. 
In this chapter we have compared the advantages and disadvantages 
of euronote facilities with other funding options available to the 
borrower and the investor. This analysis is essential if we are to 
understand fully the reasons for the dynamic growth of the euronote 
market. It is this growth configuration that has been one possibly 
important factor in systematic risk build-up in the market. Despite 
cost advantages with euronotes, borrowers may decide to enter other 
markets as well. The reasons for doing so may be ones of funding and 
currency diversification and/or relationship banking. In keeping with 
the central problem of this study, however, we have also added at least 
partial support to the hypothesis that euronote facilities may 
contribute to an increase in systemic risk. Our method for doing this 
has been to compare the differences which the euronote market makes for 
country risk with the differences made by the eurocredit market for the 
same sample of borrowers. We have shown, building on previous evidence 
and within the limitations of our sample, that the country-to-country 
variations in the savings from euronote facilities reflect the fact that 
these euronote fact l ites appear to make smaller differences for country 
risk than does the eurocredit market. In other words, the size of the 
risk premi a charged between different country borrowers is lower in the 
euronote market than in the eurocredit market. This naturally means 
lower returns to investors. If lower returns equate to insufficient 
returns, we may conclude that the euronote market does, at least 
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partially, contribute to an increase in systemic risk. This latter 
question will be addressed more formal 1y in Part II of our study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PLACEMENT METHODS AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is, firstly, to describe and 
distinguish between the different placement methods available in the 
euronote market. Numerical examples will be provided to show how the 
costs to the issuer and returns to placing banks can be calculated under 
different funding scenarios. A comparison will be made between the 
calculation of ROA applied to a RUF and the calculation of ROA applied 
to a simple revolving credit. 
Secondly, an attempt wi 11 be made to discover whether any empirical 
evidence exists to suggest that one type of placement method is more 
likely to lead to the purchase of notes at their 'perceived' correct 
price. If empirical evidence could be found to determine this it might, 
tentatively, be argued that the systemic risk properties of euronotes 
depends partly on the placement method used for distributing the notes. 
Placement capability is the main requirement of any note issuance 
facility, and the one which attracts most reverential respect from 
fellow market participants. Many different placement methods have been 
used for distributing euronotes since the first deal for New Zeal and 
Shipping Corporation in 1978; each has its own particular features, 
although it is noticeable that a few standard structures have prevailed. 
PART A 
4.2 Sole Placing Agency (SPA) 
By this method of placement the issuer appoints a sole placing 
agent, whose job it is to place the issuer's paper with market investors 
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each time a new tranche is issued. It is in the SPA's interest to place 
the paper at as low a yield as possible because it receives the 
difference between the contracted yield on the notes and the yield at 
which it is able to place the notes with market investors. Furthermore, 
the underwriters may take solace in the knowledge that the SPA will do 
its utmost to place these notes, because failure to do so usually means 
no fees. 
This method of pl acement ensures that paper will be pl aced at a 
uniform price and in an orderly and controlled manner. Underwriters, 
however, forced to guarantee the SPA's ability to place paper in the 
market, have become increasingly frustrated by the fact that their 
i nvo 1 vement in the facility ist imi ted to their underwriting commitment, 
with no possibility of purchasing paper in their own right (other than 
being allocated unsold paper). Many underwriters wish to use short-term 
paper to develop their own securities placement capacity, a necessity 
made more urgent by this very process of loan securi ti satt on in the 
international credit markets. 
The main difference, as far as the underwriting banks are 
concerned, between the SPA method and a straightforward revolving credit 
faci 1 ity is that unlike the commitment fee in a revolving credit 
facility - which is paid on the undrawn amount of the commitment - the 
facility fee is paid irrespective of the utilisation of the facility. 
For example, if a revolving credit facility is priced at: 
Drawn down rate LIBOR + 0.125 per cent per annum 
Commitment fee 0.0625 per cent per annum 
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The undewriter's ROA if the facility is fully drawn is LIBOR + 
0.125 per cent per annum. If the f aci 1 ity remains undrawn the return is 
0.0625 per cent per annum. 
Similarly if a RUF is priced at: 
Maximum margin LIBOR + 0.0625 per cent per annum 
Facility fee 0.0625 per cent per annum 
The underwriter's ROA if the facility is fully drawn is LIBOR + 0.125 
per cent per annum (maximum margin + faci1 ity fee). If the facility 
remains undrawn the return is 0.0625 per cent per annum. 
In our expositional example, the two facilities produce the same 
returns whether drawn or undrawn. Each faci1 ity, however, prices its 
relative asset (loan or euronote) differently. 
Let us now examine how euronotes are actually issued under the SPA 
method. 
Ex agp le1 
Issuer 
Amount 
Maturity of facility 
Facility fee 
Maximum margin 
Funding request 
Underwriting banks 
AAA Corporation 
US $200 million 
10 years 
0.125 per cent per annum 
LIBOR + 0.125 per cent per annum 
US $50 million of three month euronotes 
10 each with US $20 million commitment 
Under normal conditions AAA Corporation will give its SPA four to 
five business days notice to issue, in our example, US $50 mill ion of 
three month euronotes. In other words, AAA Corporation requires value 
in its account f our to five days from now. This gives the SPA two to 
three days to find investors for the tranche at or below the maximum 
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margin of LIBOR + 0.125 per cent per annum. Underwriters are also 
informed of the possi bi 1 ity that they may have to purchase notes at thi s 
level. If the SPA only manages to place all the notes at the maximum 
margin, it will have made no return on the deal. If, however, the SPA 
manages to place al 1 the notes at LIBOR + 0.10 per cent per annum, it 
will have earned a profit (sal es turn) of 0.25 per cent per annum. It 
can be shown thus: 
US $50,000,000 x 0.025% X 90/360 
= US $12,5000 x 0.25 
= US $3,125 
When interest rates fal 1 the prices of negotiable investments rise. The 
above example captures this simple relationship. If, however, the SPA 
is able to place only US $20 million of euronotes at LIBOR + 0.10 per 
cent per annum, it will notify the underwriting banks that they wil 1 
have to purchase the other US $30 million. Under the SPA method the US 
$30 million of euronotes will be allocated equally among the 
underwriting banks. In our example there are ten underwriting banks so 
each would receive a US $3 million tranche of euronotes at the maximum 
margin of LIBOR + 0.125 per cent per annum. The SPA has still earned a 
sales turn of 0.025 per cent on the US $20 million of euronotes it 
managed to place at LIBOR + 0.10 per cent per annum. This provides the 
SPA with a profit of US $1,250. 
Although the underwriting banks can attempt to sell any notes they 
have been allocated by the SPA, it is unlikely they will find many 
opportunities to do so if a skilled SPA has been unable to do so 
previously. The SPA method, therefore, effectively prevents 
underwriting banks from sharing in any placement profits. 
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4.3 Multiple Placing Agency (SPA) 
This method overcomes the problem associated with SPA: that 
underwriters are unable to participate in the placement of the issuer's 
paper. Under MPA each underwriter has the right to call his quota of 
the tranche at any time within the selling period, thereby providing 
certainty of allotment, and a fee for placing the notes. However, one 
of the great weaknesses of this system is that the bank with a broad 
range of investor clients, and therefore strong placement capacity, may 
not be a very strong medium-term underwriter. The situation may thus 
arise in which prime name issuers are being underwritten by lesser 
quality institutions. 
A second problem with MPA is that under this system paper may be 
placed with market investors at differing yields, with agents competing 
amongst each other and thereby driving up the yield to market investors. 
Although this would seem to hurt only the MPAs - as the investors get a 
higher yield on the paper and the issuer has to pay the contracted yield 
anyway - it may also have an adverse affect on the issuer in so far as 
the placing of his paper at high yields may affect the pricing of his 
next issue, forcing prices above what might otherwise be expected for 
that type of borrower. 
4.4 Tender Panel (TP) 
The tender panel system was devised as a means of overcoming the 
criticisms of SPA and MPA. Under this system a group of banks (or 
securities houses) bids direct to the issuer (or through a facility 
arranger) for the right to place his paper. The underwriting banks may 
or may not be members of the TP. This system ensures that the banks 
with the strongest placement capacity get the paper as they will be the 
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banks most able to bid lower yields. As the issuer also takes some 
benefit from the lower yields (unlike the position with SPA or MPA), the 
competitive bidding structure of a TP is an added advantage to him. 
Although the TP structure allows for competitive bidding, no one TP 
manager is accountable to the issuer for the placement of, or yield 
gained on, the paper. This apart, the main disadvantage of the TP 
system derives from the fact that no one panel member is at any time 
assured of gaining funds because of the bidding mechanism. As a result, 
a TP member will be unable to make a firm offer to an investor client on 
his ability to obtain paper, let alone the price at which the paper may 
be offered. 
We can show how the TP system operates through constructing a 
typical example. 
Example 2 
Issuer BBB Corporation 
Amount US $400 million 
Maximum margin LIB OR + 0.125 per cent per annum 
Funding request US $100 million of three month euronotes 
Underwriting banks 10 with US $40 miillion commitment each 
TP banks 15 (Bank A to Bank 0) 
Let us assume that in Example 2 the tender agent has received by 
the 1 ast day of the sel 1 ing period (day three if vat ue is required on 
day five) the following tenders (bids) from the TP banks: 
TP banks Amount tendered for Bid yield 
Bank E 5 LIBOR - 0.10 per cent per annum Bank F 1 LIBOR - 0.0625 per cent per annum Bank A 8 LIBOR - 0.0625 per cent per annum Bank C 8 LIBOR - flat Bank 0 4 LIBOR - flat Bank A 10 LIBOR - flat Bank F 10 LIBOR + 0.01 per cent per annum 
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TP banks Amount tendered for Bid yield 
Bank G 15 LIBOR + 0.02 per cent per annum 
Bank H 8 LIBOR + 0.02 per cent per annum 
Bank N 20 LIBOR + 0.04 per cent per annum 
Bank A 14 LIBOR + 0.05 per cent per annum 
Bank K 12 LIBOR + 0.06 per cent per annum 
Bank F 10 LIBOR + 0.625 per cent per annum 
Bank L 8 LIBOR + 0.08 per cent per annum 
Bank N 7 LIBOR + 0.10 per cent per annum 
Bank J 7 LIBOR + 0.125 per cent per annum 
Bank D 10 LIBOR + 0.125 per cent per annum 
No bids received from banks B, I and 0. 
The bids received total US $157,000,000 whereas the issuer has only 
requested US $100,000,000. Tenders are awarded, of course, on a yield 
basis beginning with the lowest offered yield. In our example the cut- 
off point at which the issuer can raise his US $100 million is LIBOR + 
0.05 per cent (bid by Bank A). Up to and including Bank N's bid of US 
$20 million at LIBOR + 0.04 per cent per annum the issuer could only 
obtain US $91 mill ion. However, if the issuer accepts Bank A's bid of 
US $14 mi111 on at LIBOR + 0.05 per cent per annum in total then he would 
receive US $105 mill ion. What would happen is that the issuer would 
accept only US $9 mil 1 ion of Bank A's bid at LIBOR + 0.05 per cent per 
annum. Three banks did not bid, which is a common occurrence in TP 
arrangements. 
A number of points should be made about our example. Firstly, a 
bank may make more than one bid. This is referred to as 'scatter 
bidding'. This method may be more effective in determining the level at 
which the notes will be sold, as TP banks are only told of their 
successful bids and not the average accepted bid yield. Bank E's single 
bid at LI BOR - 0.10 per cent per annum will not be effective in 
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establishing the issuer's average accepted bid yield. Bank A's approach 
is far more effective. By scattering its bids from LIBOR - 0.0625 per 
cent per annum to LIBOR-fl at to LIBOR + 0.05 per cent per annum it gains 
important yield information. Since its highest bid is only partially 
accepted it must be at the highest accepted yield. By scattering its 
bids Bank A has managed to purchase US $27 mil 1 ion of euronotes at an 
average cost of LIBOR - 0.004 per cent per annum. Bank E has purchased 
US $5 mi 11 ion at LIBOR - 0.10 per cent per annum. Bank A has, 
therefore, also been more profitable by scattering its bids in this way. 
One weakness of the TP system, however, is that it tends to lead to 
opportunistic behaviour. An investor may approach a TP member only if 
he has liquidity of the right maturity and if the investment which the 
TP member is offering bears a yield above other, more easily 
administered instruments in the market. A TP member, therefore, has to 
compete not only for the right to place the paper, but also again after 
the paper has been gained in order to secure investor interest. Indeed, 
as this system is (almost by definition) tied to some method of index 
bidding - be it LIBOR, LIBID or some other interest rate index - its 
applicability for prime name corporations, whose cost of funds is not 
linked to any such index, is questionable. 
The TP method is thus an unwieldy method of distributing paper, and 
although it is one which virtually guarantees low yields, it does not 
guarantee a uniform yield. As a result, it has been argued that if the 
paper wer e to be priced before issue and then issued at a volume which 
the market took at that price, a low and yet more uniform yield might be 
obtained. Such an argument has led to the development of what might be 
described as a hybrid TP system, the continuous tender panel (CTP). 
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4.5 Continuous Tender Panel (CTP) 
Under this system the issuer will appoint a continuous tender panel 
manager, who will set up a CTP of managing underwriters. Each tranche 
of notes will be issued at a strike offering yield, predetermined by the 
CTP manager. The CTP manager wi 11 then offer the notes to the CTP 
members at this yield, of ter which any notes unsold by this al 1 ocati on 
wi 11 be sold to the CTP manager's investor clients also at the strike 
offering yield. Any notes still unsold will be allocated to CTP members 
at the full contracted yield. 
This strike offering yield thus provides for a standard offering 
basis and a uniform yield on the notes offered to market investors. CTP 
members may be given 15 minutes or so to make a firm offer to investors 
without obligation on the part of the CTP members to purchase the notes 
and without risk to its investors. This system therefore avoids the 
embarrassment often associated with the tender panel system of a panel 
member's not being able to fulfil an offer to supply notes. It is 
unlikely that the CTP manager will keep the strike offering yield arti- 
ficially low (in order to try and sell notes to its own investor 
clients) as the underwriters will be angered by the allocation of any 
unsold paper which they themselves had previously bid upon. 
We can now examine how euronotes are issued through the Cl? method 
by constructing our own expository example: 
Example 3 
Issuer CCC Corporation 
Amount US $400 million 
Maximum margin LIBOR + 0.125 per cent per annum 
Funding requirement US $200 million of three month euronotes 
Underwriting banks Ten banks each with US $40 million commitment 
( Bank A to Bank J) 
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In our example the CTP manager would offer the US $200 million 
tranche to the ten underwriting banks as members of the CTP at an 
initial strike offering yield of LIBOR + 0.0625 per cent per annum. 
Each bank now has the right to purchase US $20 million of euronotes. 
Let us assume that Banks D, E, G and H immediately subscribe for 
their full US $20 million each at the strike offering yield of LIBOR + 
0.0625 per cent per annum. 
The CTP manager protects banks A, B and C on day two for fifteen 
minutes at the same strike offering yield for US $20 million each. 
Within this time Bank A informs the CTP manager that it can take US $15 
million at this yield. Bank B confirms a subscription of US $5 million, 
and Bank C of nothing. 
The CTP manger sells US $38 million total, US $20 million of which 
is at the original strike offering yield of LIBOR + 0.0625 per cent per 
annum, and US $20 million of which is at a later established strike 
offering yield of LIBOR + 0.10 per cent per annum. The total amount of 
euronotes sold is, therefore, as follows: 
Bank Amount subscribed Strike offering yield 
Bank 0 US $20 mill ion LIBOR + 0.0625 per cent per annum 
Bank E US $20 million LIBOR + 0.0625 per cent per annum 
Bank G US $20 million LIBOR + 0.0625 per cent per annum 
Bank H US $20 million LIBOR + 0.0625 per cent per annum 
Bank A US $15 mill ion LIBOR + 0.0625 per cent per annum 
Bank B US $5 million LIBOR + 0.0625 per cent per annum 
Banks C, F, IJ Zero 
CTP Manager US $20 million LIBOR + 0.0625 per cent per annum 
CTP Manager US $20 million LIBOR + 0.10 per cent per annum 
Total US $140 million 
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With US $140 million subscribed the issuer is still US $60 million 
short of his request for US $200 mill ion. This shortfall is made up by 
allocating the other US $60 million to the underwriters at the maximum 
margin of LIBOR + 0.125 per cent per annum, after deducting euronotes 
purchased at the strike offering yield. In our example the US $60 
million is allocated equally to those banks which did not previously 
subscribe: that is, Banks C, F, I and J each receive US $15 million of 
euronotes. 
Since the CTP offering period extends to the interest rate fixing 
date, non-bank investors may be more inclined to purchase notes because 
(unlike banks) they are not likely to be match funding their investments 
and therefore may wish to see in which direction interest rates are 
moving before they commit themselves. If euronote facilities are to 
survive, it is essential that this type of investor base be captured. 
The CTP method depends so much on the manager's judgement in the 
setting of the strike offering yield that it is unlikely to develop as 
the standard placement method. Hence the development of a placement 
method very similar to CTP but taking the onus off the CTP manager in 
the setting of the offer yield, issuer set margin (ISM), is of consider- 
able interest. 
4.6 Issuer Set Margin (ISM) 
Under this method the issuer sets the price on his paper (notes) 
prior to offering it to the issuing/underwriting banks. This is 
basically a two-tier modification of SPA, in which the principal placing 
agent (who is not an underwriter) places paper on behalf of junior 
underwriters, with senior underwriters pl acing paper themselves at a 
rate predetermined by the issuer. ISM therefore al 1 ows underwriters 
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with strong placing capacity to place paper (if they so wish), while 
those with weak placing capacity have their allocation placed for them 
by the principal placing agent. These junior underwriters are therefore 
not at the mercy of the tender panel members to bid for paper since, for 
them as for the issuer, the principal placing agent is also placing 
agent of last resort. The underwriters who choose to place paper 
themselves are referred to as special placing agents. Whereas under the 
CTP method underwriters may only be guaranteed a price for a short 
period of time, the ISM method gives a firmer commitment to the 
underwriters, although the price is correspondingly less flexible. 
Any euronotes purchased by an underwriter at the ISM will be 
deducted from his commitment so that if he is later allocated unsold 
notes, he will not be forced to purchase notes above his initial 
commitment. This can be illustrated with an example: 
Example 4 
Issuer DDD Corporation 
Amount US $400 million 
Maximum margin LIBOR + 0.125 per cent per annum 
Issuer set margin LIBOR + 0.0625 per cent per annum 
Funding request US $200 million of three month euronotes 
Underwriting banks Ten banks each with US $40 million commitment 
(Bank A to Bank J) 
Placing banks Each underwriter can purchase up to 50 per cent 
of its commitment 
Since the issuer requires US $200 million and the underwriters can 
subscribe for 50 per cent of their commitment, this means that each 
underwriting bank has the right to subscribe for US $10 million of 
euronotes at the ISM of LIBOR + 0.0625 per cent per annum. Let us 
assume that the underwriters subscribe in the following manner: 
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Bank A US $2 million 
Bank B US $2 million 
Bank C US $3 million 
Bank D Zero 
Bank E Zero 
Bank F US $5 million 
Bank G US $6 million 
Bank H Zero 
Bank I US $6 million 
Bank J US $6 million 
Total US $30 million 
The principal placing agent will now be required to place the remaining 
US $170 million by itself. Assuming that the principal placing agent is 
unable to pl ace any notes at the ISM of LIBOR + 0.0625 per cent per 
annum, the remaining US $170 million will be placed with the 
underwriting banks at the maximum margi n of LIBOR + 0.125 per cent per 
annum, subtracting any notes already purchased at the ISM. The 
allocation will, therefore, be as follows: 
Bank A US $18 million 
Bank B US $18 million 
Bank C US $17 million 
Bank D US $20 million 
Bank E US $20 million 
Bank F US $15 million 
Bank G US $14 million 
Bank H US $20 million 
Bank I US $14 million 
Bank J US $14 million 
Total US $170 million 
The issuer has obtained his US $200 mill ion at an average cost of 
US $30 million x LIBOR + 0.0625 per cent per annum and US $170 million x 
LIBOR + 0.125 per cent per annum. 
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In our example the underwriting banks can purchase 50 per cent of 
their commitment at the ISM. This proportion is, of course, flexible 
in practice. 
4.7 Assessment of Placing Methods 
While itis easy to assume that one structure has di spl aced its 
predecessor, most bankers would agree that this is far from the case. 
The suitability of any individual structure depends to a considerable 
extent on the particular needs of the borrower. 
Sole placing still makes sense when credit analysis is required, 
and when the credit has to be explained in order to build up a strong 
investor clientele base. It may also make sense for the smaller deals, 
in which more than one distributor could cause ridiculous pricing. 
No one house could possibly hope to corner the entire market, and 
the tender panel system will continue to be more relevant when very wide 
distribution is necessary. An obvious example is the $4 billion RUF 
established for the Kingdom of Sweden in 1984: bids for the paper ranged 
from the now infamous LIB ID less 0.35 per cent to LIBOR-flat. The 
tender panel will continue to be useful for established investors for 
whom it is necessary to market neither the instrument nor the name: 
that is, for a market where price is the only relevant factor for 
investors. However, unlike the US government securities market, the 
eurocommercial paper and, indeed, US commercial paper markets do not fit 
this criterion. 
Alternatively, the tender panel may be useful if the paper is being 
targeted at investors with daily excess liquidity who want to put that 
liquidity to use. These will be investors who are largely indifferent 
to maturity, seeking only a margin; the only investors that 
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continuously fit this description are banks. Indeed, the decline in the 
bank investor share of the market recently (1987) is indicative of an 
increase in the use of different distribution mechanisms which have 
attracted greater non-bank investor interest. The tender panel system 
perpetuates a system where paper is priced relative to an index and sold 
to the banking system as a short-term asset. For this purpose it is an 
effective distribution mechanism, but not for those corporations and 
sovereign borrowers for which LIBOR or LIBID is irrelevant as a measure 
of their cost of funds. The tender panel, although it has played a 
vital role in the development of the euronote market, must ultimately be 
superseded by distribution methods tailor-made for these target 
investors if the market is to proceed to its natural conclusion, that of 
a fully fledged eurocommercial paper market. In this context the stage 
seems to be ready for issuer set margin (ISM) methods, priced relative 
to the borrower's true cost of funds (which may be irrespective of 
LIBOR), to take over from sole placing and tender panels as the standard 
placement method for top quality borrowers. 
Having examined the different placement methods, we are now able to 
move on to the second main part of this chapter. 
PART 8 
4.8 The Impact of Placement Methods on the Price of Notes 
Our aim in the second part of this chapter is to determine whether 
any evidence exists to suggest that one placement method consistently 
places notes in the market at 'perceived' inadequate rates of return. 
The key word here is 'perceived'. It is not our aim to determine the 
actual creditworthiness of any notes placed in the market; the aim is to 
determine whether the market itself 'perceives' the rates of return on 
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certain notes to be insufficient or inadequate. In Chapter 5 we will 
examine more explicitly how credit quality - measured by credit ratings 
- affects the price of notes traded. The market's 'perception' of the 
notes can be measured by monitoring the spread relationship attained 
between a benchmark, usually LIBOR or LIBID, when notes were 
successfully auctioned or initially bid for, and where subsequently they 
traded over the life of the note in relation to that same benchmark. 
If note yields rise in the secondary market, it can be assumed 
(certainly in a bull market environment as experienced by the euronote 
market since its inception) that the market perceived the initial return 
on the note to be inadequate. If note yields consistently fall or stay 
the same in the secondary market, we can assume that the market 
perceives the notes to have either a more than adequate return or the 
correct return, respectively. 
For expositional purposes, placement methods have been broken down 
into 'dealerships' and 'tender panels'. 
Tender panel auction statistics are generally unavailable. Regan 
(1985, p 20) notes that the number of borrowers issuing through the 
tender panel system in 1985 (ranging from triple-A to triple-B issues 
and beyond) was 56. The number of issues that performed consistently 
better (yi el ds fel 1) in the secondary market was zero. This suggests 
that on every occasion that notes placed through the tender panel method 
were traded, the market perceived the yield on the notes to be 
insufficient, and so yields rose. 
Much tender panel data is unavailable to us, but Regan's conclusion 
does seem to suggest that the tender panel method of distributing notes 
may place notes in the market at yields which initially do not reflect 
the perceived risk of that issuer. 
124 
We have been fortunate enough to gain tender panel winning bid 
rates for a number of major borrowers in the euronote market at the end 
of 1985 and beginning of 1986. The data were obtained mainly from 
Merril 1 Lynch and NatWest Investment Bank through a series of data 
collection visits to relevant banks in London, documented in Chapter 6. 
These bid rates were compared with the average bid levels at which the 
notes traded over their lifetime. The bid rates represent the prices 
which the market are prepared to pay (demand) for that supply of notes. 
Table 4.1 compares tender panel data with the average bid level at which 
the notes traded over their lifetime. If the notes traded at a premium 
over the average winning tender pane 1 bid rate then a+ sign preceeds 
the bid rate. A+ sign impl i es that the market perceived the average 
winning tender pane 1 bid rate to be ins uff i ci ent for the risk of the 
notes. A- sign implies that the market perceived the average winning 
tender pane 1 bid rate to be more than sufficient for the risk of the 
notes. 
The final column of Table 4.1 shows that the bid levels at which 
notes traded were almost always above the average winning tender panel 
bid rates (and mainly above the highest winning tender panel bid rates). 
Only two borrowers (Credit Nationale and National Nederlanden) saw their 
notes trade at levels below the average winning tender panel bid rates 
for those notes. These results would seem to add support to Regan's 
(1985) conclusion that tender panel paper performs badly in the 
secondary market. The reason appears to be (as suggested in section 
4.4 of this chapter) that tender panels may lead to over-aggressive 
pricing of notes. There may be no market for the notes at or below 
these prices and so the notes are 'dumped' In the market at above tender 
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bid rates. In this scenario it may not be investors who lose out, but 
the tender panel banks themselves. 
The tender panel banks must, on our results, be taking a loss on 
the sale of the notes. It is not the purpose of this chapter to explain 
why they may do this. This will be discussed in Part Two of this 
thesis. We may tentatively conclude at this point that, on our data, 
the price which the borrower will pay on the maturity of his notes 
appears to be 'perceived' by the market (in most cases) as inadequate to 
compensate for the risk of the notes. It is unlikely that these 
discrepancies are caused by supply and demand factors as there is no 
economic reason why notes supplied through the tender panel system 
should always meet with lower demand. A more feasible conclusion is 
that the notes have been incorrectly priced. To the extent that this is 
true, systemic risk may be increased by the issue of notes through 
tender panels that price notes below their perceived risk levels. 
We have not yet, however, discovered whether the dealership method 
of placing notes does so closer to their perceived correct value. It is 
impossible to obtain prices agreed between dealers and their clients. 
Such information is zealously guarded by the dealing banks. We have, 
therefore, no option but to use a proxy for the initial agreed price. 
The closest proxy for this price is the initial tranche bid rate. Table 
4.2 compares the initial tranche bid rate with the average bid rate over 
the life of the notes for all the borrowers who issued through 
dealership from November 1985 to July 1986. These issuers plus the 
issuers examined in Table 4.1 account for nearly 50 per cent of the 
issuers in the euronote market over this time period, and more than 70 
per cent in terms of notes outstanding over the same time period. 
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The final column of Table 4.2 shows that the bid levels at which 
dealer-placed notes traded were almost always at or below the initial 
tranche bid rate. Only two borrowers (BHP and Citicorp) saw their notes 
trade at 1 eve 1s above the initial tranche bid rate. The var i abi 1i ty of 
the average bid level around the initial bid level is also very low. 
Disregarding for the moment the state-backed ENEL, the average 
variability of the average bid rate around the initial bid rate was only 
0.89 basis points compared to 6.29 basis points for tender panel 
issuers. Even including the ENEL notes, the average variability of the 
average bid rate around the initial bid rate for dealer-placed notes was 
only 1.68 basis points. 
Our results for dealer-placed notes would seem to suggest that the 
market (generally) perceived the initial yields on the notes to be at 
least, if not more than, sufficient to compensate for the risk of the 
notes . 
What conclusions can we draw from these findings? We stated at the 
beginning of this section that if evidence could be found to show that 
one type of placement method consistently placed notes at perceived 
insufficient yields then we might tentatively conclude that this type of 
placement method is more likely to lead euronote facilities to 
contribute to an increase in systemic risk than a placement method which 
places notes at perceived sufficient yields. This conclusion is based 
on the BIS (1986, p 201) contention that systemic risk may be increased 
if new instruments are not priced in relation to their risk 
characteristics - that is to say, if the return on new instruments is 
insufficient in relation to the risks incurred. 
It is important to remember that the price of a euronote is not the 
same as the price of equity. Euronotes are debt instruments and so 
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their actual prices vary inversely with yield. The yields on euronotes 
placed through the TP system, however, appear to be inadequate. 
Since yields are inadequate, investors are effectively being asked 
to pay a premium on these securities - this is the opposite, in 
terminology if not economically, to what Davis and Poi nton (1985, p 249) 
call 'market pricing' in reference to new equity issues. With many new 
equity issues the issue may be underpriced in order to induce potential 
investors to take it up in its entirety. In the context of TP issues in 
the euronote market, these issues appear to be overpriced in the sense 
that yields are insufficient (from the market's point of view) to 
compensate for the risks incurred. Yields must rise and prices fall 
before investors are induced to purchase the notes. Investment banks 
are, therefore, taking a loss in the market. If this loss is not 
justified by returns from other parts of the relationship then systemic 
risk may arise. 
However, all this analysis has shown is that, for the end of 1985 
to the early part of 1986, the euronote market appeared to 'percei ve' 
that notes placed through the tender panel system carried an 
insufficient return, whereas the market generally appeared to 'percei ve' 
notes which were placed thorugh dealership methods to carry an 
acceptable rate of return. 
Although supply and demand factors will have played their part it 
seems unlikely that on almost every occasion supply exceeded demand for 
TP paper, whereas demand exceeded supply for dealer paper. The notes 
themselves are the same, irrespective of placement method. Although not 
all issues were rated in the euronote market, they all carried first 
prime ratings in the United States. 
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4.9 Summary and Conclusions 
It appears, then, that for notes placed through the tender panel 
system, end investors 'may' be getting a lower return than the market 
perceives to be sufficient. Since the secondary market has, of course, 
no influence over the final yield on the notes (as this is simply the 
yield the issuer pays) this again suggests that whoever holds the notes 
on their maturity date may gain a perceived inadequate return. If 
market perception is a good indicator of actual risk, we would conclude 
that whether euronotes contribute to an increase in systemic risk does 
depend, at least partly, on the placement method used to distribute the 
notes. Since no analysis has been undertaken of the actual credit 
quality of the notes this must remain a tentative conclusion. In 
Chapter 5 an analysis will be undertaken of the affect of credit ratings 
(which measure credit quality) on the price of notes traded. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROCOMrERCIAL PAPER 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine features of the 
eurocommercial paper market which may affect systemic risk. All the 
features examined in this chapter are also relevant for the 
eurocommerci al paper market's underwritten counterpart, the euronote 
market. They are, however, either associated more directly with the 
eurocommercial paper market (such as trading and credit ratings) or have 
fuelled the development of the eurocommerci al paper market (such as 
regulation and clearing houses). For these reasons they are combined 
within the one chapter. Four features are discussed in relation to 
systemic risk: these are, regulation, trading versus placement, clearing 
procedures and credit ratings. To begin with, however, the first 
section of the chapter will examine the reasons for the emergence and 
growth of the eurocommercial paper market. A survey is undertaken of 
the extent to which commercial paper is now a feature of domestic 
financial markets. 
5.2 Emergence and Growth 
The early 1970s certainly seemed to provide little impetus to the 
development of a eurocommercial paper market. The syndicated loan 
market was booming with spreads on short-term credits well above 1/2 per 
cent, and above 1 per cent on medium-term loans. The US commercial 
paper market provided a competitive outlet for US corporate funds. Risk 
diversification was achieved by either adding more banks to the 
syndicate list or by selling paper to a broader investment base in the 
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United States. With the financial climate as it was, some external 
stimulus was required for a eurocommercial paper market to develop. 
Such stimulus came in 1968 with the establishment in the United States 
of the Office of Foreign Direct Investments (OFDI). The OFDI 
promulgated regulations which affected how US companies could finance 
their overseas subsidiaries and affiliates. US companies which had a 
10 per cent or more investment in a foreign company were designated as 
direct investors and subject to capital restrictions. The amount of 
direct investment that a company could make was set at a percentage of 
the average positive direct investment made by the company during the 
base years 1965 and 1966. The percentage was then related to the 
geographic area receiving the investment, but for Europe it was either 
65 per cent or 35 per cent depending on the country. 
The OFDI did permit US companies to raise long-term finance which 
could be used to offset direct investment. For example, a US company 
might use the proceeds of a long-term foreign borrowing to invest funds 
in a foreign subsidiary. The capital transferred could be deducted, the 
effect being a zero net transfer of capital. To count as long-term 
borrowing, the debt could not be repaid with twelve months of its 
origination. 
The capital restrictions imposed on US companies by the OFDI were 
penal. Borrowing rates in the euromarkets, which were generally higher 
than borrowing rates in the US commercial paper markets, were made even 
more onerous by the OFDI restrictions. 
It was in response to these difficulties that in 1971 a number of 
US companies established what were known as eurocommercial paper 
programmes, based on the US model. The real advantage of setting up a 
eurocommercial paper programme was the fact that it could be classified 
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as long-term borrowing under the OFDI regulations so long as paper was 
'rolled-over' on maturity for at least twelve months. 
In February 1974 the OFDI regulations were repealed. US companies 
were now able to fund their overseas operations as before, by freely 
using their own domestic markets. The market was founded on 100 per 
cent US company involvement, which soon disappeared once the regulatory 
climate changed. 
It was to be over six years until the next eurocommercial paper 
programme was to appear. This was a eurocommercial paper programme 
established by Merrill Lynch in 1980 for Associates Corporation of North 
America ('Associates'). At the time Associates was expanding its 
operations in Japan and wished to diversify its funding base. 
Associates really required sterling funds. It used the US dollar funds 
generated by the programme to swap into sterling through the foreign 
exchange markets. Although the Associates' programme was successful , 
there were only two more eurocommercial paper programmes established 
prior to 1984: the Republic of South Africa (October 1981) and the 
Australian Resources Development Bank Ltd (ARDB) (October 1983). It was 
from 1984 onwards that the eurocommercial paper market really took off 
fuelled by the trend towards secur i ti sat i on. Some indication of the 
size and growth rate of the eurocommerci al paper market compared with 
its underwritten counterpart, the RUF market, is shown in Figure 5.1. 
The move towards eurocommercial paper has been accompanied by an 
increase in the amount of fully discounted notes as opposed to interest- 
bearing notes, which have generally been the norm with underwritten 
faci1ites. This switch to full discount notes is primarily the result 
of the following factors: 
134 
Figure s. 1 The Growth Of The Euronote Market 
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1 The investor base in euronotes/eurocommercial paper, as well 
as in other euromarket instruments, is gradually becoming more 
aware of the attributes of ful 1 discount notes. Such notes 
should be particularly attractive to those investors that 
already have a US commercial paper programme. US commercial 
paper is issued at a full discount, and so the issue of euro- 
commercial paper on the same basis would allow for a better 
comparison of the yields on the two facilities. This method 
therefore increases the opportunities for arbitrage between 
the US and euromarkets. 
2 Some investors are, quite simply, unable to buy interest- 
bearing securities. 
3 In a bull market some investors are averse to buying notes in 
the secondary market at a premium to the coupon. This situ- 
ation could never arise with full discount securities. 
The formula for calculating the purchase price of a full discount 
euronote is as follows: 
face value of note 
1+ (maturity of note x purchase yield) 
Purchase price = 
36,000 
0 .. 
(5.1) 
There is still much confusion over the differences between RUFS, 
NIFs, and eurocommercial paper. It is important to note that, apart from 
the fact that the notes may be either interest-bearing or full discount 
under each programme, the note itself is in most cases identical. 
Irrespective of the name of the facility, the actual Instrument which is 
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offered to investors is much the same in each case. The difference 
between euronotes and eurocommercial paper lies not so much in the 
structure of the notes as in the way the facilities are arranged. It is 
sometimes suggested that the term eurocommercial paper implies a pure 
dealership mechanism, with direct bidding as opposed to a tender panel 
acting through an agent. This is by no means true. Eurocommercial 
paper tends to be issued through a dealer mechanism, but it need not be. 
The main concern of any eurocommercial paper issuer must be the ability 
to issue as much paper as required at a certain time, at the most 
competitive rates. The type of placement method for eurocommercial 
paper, as for euronotes, must be determined on economic grounds by 
reference to the particular attributes and requirements of the issuer. 
Although the notes issued under a euronote or eurocommercial paper 
facility are fundamentally the same, there has been a very different 
impetus to the growth of these markets. Under a euronote facility, an 
issuer will make a request for paper: the facility is issuer-driven. 
It is the issuer that will approach the bank and ask for a quote on its 
paper. The impetus to the growth of the eurocommercial paper market has 
been quite the reverse: eurocommercial paper is investor-driven. In 
this situation a potential investor will contact a bank seeking paper of 
a certain price and maturity. The bank (probably an investment bank) 
will check its stocks to see if it has such paper on its books. More 
often than not this exercise proves to be fruitless. The bank will then 
telephone around other banks to see if they have paper of the type 
required by the potential investor. This exercise, too, will often be 
to no avail. The bank will then approach one (or more) of its issuer 
clients and will ask it to issue paper of the type and maturity 
required. In return for the issue of this paper the bank will guarantee 
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a certain price for a given quantity. The eurocommercial paper market, 
as opposed to the euronote market, is market-driven. It is driven 
basically by investment banks, which make offers to note-issuers as a 
result of investor demand. 
5.3 Domestic Commercial Paper Issues 
According to the Bank of England statistics (1987, pp 47-48), the 
$359 billion of commercial paper outstandings in national markets, with 
the perhaps $35 billion of euronotes and eurocommercial paper in issue, 
brings the total of worldwide commercial paper issues to $394 billion 
(see Table 5.1). A large proportion of this total, however, represents 
domestic rather than cross-border lending. Only the United States and 
the euromarket have had large issues made by foreign borrowers. 
Although the US commercial paper market stands as a model for the 
development of other domestic commercial paper markets, local conditions 
have helped to shape many of these markets along slightly different 
lines. 
In this section of our study we wi 11 examine, brief 1 y, the growth 
of various domestic commercial paper markets around the world. What 
should, hopefully, be clear at the end of this examination is that 
commercial paper represents not just another innovation in the financial 
system which may disappear as conditions change. It represents a 
fundamental change in the structure of worldwide financial markets, 
brought about by the structural process of disintermediation and 
securi ti s ati on . 
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Table 5.1 Worldwide coemercial paper issues 
late 1986 outstandings: $ billion 
Market 
United States 322.7 
of which foreign borrowers 37.8 
Canada 11.4 
Sweden 7.4 
Spain 5.4 
Australia 4.3 
France 4.0 
Hong Kong 1.2 
United Kingdom 1.0 
Norway(a) 0.9 
Singapore(a) 0.3 
Netherlands 0.3 
Sub-total 358.9 
Euronotes and eurocommercial paper 35.0 
Total 393.9 
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, vo l 27, no 1, February 
1987, p 48 
Note: (a) estimate based on the value of facilities arranged 
5.3.1 United States 
There is a considerable volume of literature on developments in the 
US commercial paper market: see, for example, Steiner, 1921; Greef, 
1938; Myers, 1932; Beckhart, 1932; Foulke, 1931; Jacobs, 1957; Bloch, 
1961; Sel don, 1963; Baxter, 1964; Johnston, 1968. 
As with other aspects of society, credit markets change with the 
passage of time. The US commercial paper market 1s no different. Up to 
the end of the nineteenth century, commercial paper consisted mainly of 
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trade notes received by manufacturers, wholesalers or jobbers in payment 
for the shipment of goods to other firms. The recipients of the notes 
endorsed them over to banks to their own creditors, or to brokers who in 
turn sold them to banks. Commercial paper was, thus, almost exclusively 
two-name paper. The buyer of goods was known as the 'maker', and the 
seller was known as the 'payee'. Denominations were in odd amounts, 
which reflected the value of particular shipments of goods. Today US 
commercial paper consists of single-name notes issued in round 
denominations (from $100,000 upwards) and unrelated to the shipment of 
goods. 
The main issuers are finance companies. Issuers do not have to 
register their issues with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC); nor 
do they have to publish a prospectus as long as the proceeds are used to 
finance current transactions and the paper has a maturity of no more 
than 270 days. Most issuers sell their paper through commercial paper 
dealers, who buy the paper and then resell it to institutional 
investors. Many of the 1 arger finance companies and US bank holding 
companies dispense with dealing services and place their paper direct. 
Settlement is same day, and almost all issues are rated by one of the US 
rating agencies. The major investors in US commercial paper are 
corporations, money market funds, and banks. Secondary market trading 
is uncommon, as paper is nearly always held to maturity. 
The volume of paper outstanding in the US commercial paper market 
has increased rapidly in the last few years. As Figure 5.2 shows 
outstandings grew from $111 billion in 1979 to $162 billion in 1982, and 
$323 billion in August 1 986 (Bank of England, 19877, p 49). The 
greatest rate of increase has been in issues for foreign borrowers 
located outside the United States. 
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Figure 5.2 Issues in the US commercial paper market 
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Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, vol 27, no 1, February 
1987, chart 3, p 49 
There have been suggestions that the US and eurocommercial paper 
markets may eventually merge into one global market as rates in these 
markets converge as a result of arbitrage between the two. Many 
facilities are offering the borrower the opportunity to tap both 
markets, either by switching from one to the other as rates change or by 
raising funds from both markets at the same time. This latter method is 
i ncreas i rig in popularity as borrowers begin to real i se the arbitrage 
possibilities between the two markets. These have become known as 
global note facilities, although Bank of America prefers the term 
'BONUS' (borrower's option for notes and underwritten stand-by). 
141 
IV7U 75 80 Ms 
Fundamental differences remain, however, between the US and euro- 
commercial paper markets. The average maturity of euronotes and euro- 
commercial paper is longer than that of US commercial paper: maturities 
in the euronote and eurocommercial paper market are generally of three 
months, six months and one year, whereas maturities in the US market are 
generally much shorter (22 days on average), with a wider range of 
maturities available. Euronotes and eurocommercial paper are far more 
liquid than US commercial paper: there is a growing secondary market, 
whereas no such market exists in the United States. In the United 
States investors are able to purchase paper of the type and maturity 
they require because of the massive depth of the market (over $300 
billion outstanding). It is, therefore, a placement market, with paper 
staying with investors until its maturity. It is not yet possible to 
purchase such a variety of paper in the euronote and eurocommercial 
paper market. 
The question often arises, therefore, whether the euronote and 
eurocommerci al paper market is a placement market or a trading market. 
The answer is that it is both. Because of the relatively shallow depth 
of the market (euronotes and eurocommercial paper are actual 1y only 
separate segments of the same market), it is not always possible to 
place notes with investors at issue. It is becoming increasingly 
necessary to trade these notes, not only to go out actively and seek 
issuers that are prepared to issue notes to meet investor demand, but 
also to create synthetically odd maturities in the secondary market. 
The comparative features of euronotes, eurocommerci al paper and US 
commercial paper are set out in Table 5.2. 
142 
Table 5.2 Comparative features of euronotes, eurocommerci al paper 
and US commercial paper 
Euronotes Eurocommercial US commercial 
paper paper 
Cost Low Very low Lower still 
(usually) 
Flexibility Yes Yes Yes 
Average maturity on Short Short Very short 
notes 
Range of note 
maturities available Narrow Narrow Wide 
Issuer quality Broad More More 
restricted restricted 
Secondary market Low to date but Low to date Non-existent 
liquidity increasing but increasing 
with supply with supply 
Standardised fee 
structure No No Yes 
Market awareness of 
investor needs Less aware Very aware Very aware 
Importance of trading Very important Very important Not important 
5.3.2 Canada 
Canada's commercial paper market began in 1952. Its development, 
therefore, closely paralleled the post World War II resurgence of the US 
commercial paper market. (In March 1951, total US commercial paper 
outstandings passed US $1 bil lion, almost the peak level attained in 
1920 after reaching a low of US $94 mi 111 on in 1932. ) In Canada, unlike 
the US commercial paper market, issues by industrial and financial 
borrowers were preceded by issues by the finance subsidiaries of US 
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automobile companies (the 1 argest being General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation) and the large retail department stores (for further details 
on this point see Sarpkaya, 1980). In November 1986 outstandings of 
sales finance and consumer loan company paper totalled Can $ 5.7 bill ion 
(US $4.1 billion). Outstandings of other commercial paper issued by 
industrial and financial compani es reached Can $10.0 billion (US $7.2 
billion), including Can $3.9 billion (US $2.8 billion) of issues by non- 
financial corporations (Bank of England, 1987, p 50). 
Commercial paper in Canada may be issued for maturities between 30 
and 365 days. Its average maturity (44 days) is twice that of the US 
market (Smith, 1986, p 25). Finance companies generally place their 
paper directly. This paper is then usually held to maturity, Most 
other paper is placed through dealers. Unlike in the US commercial 
paper market, many issues of commercial paper by Canadian companies are 
secured against company assets (usually accounts receivable). 
It is not required that borrowers publish a prospectus when issuing 
commercial paper in Canada. Nevertheless, most issues are rated and 
there are considerable disclosure requirements. Although Canadian 
commercial paper does not have to be related to a specific transaction, 
Canadian companies tend to make more use of the bankers' acceptance 
market to raise short-term funds. Outstandings in the banker's 
acceptance market in November 1986 totalled Can $25.7 billion (US $18.6 
billion) compared with outstandings in the commercial paper market of 
Can $15.7 billion (US $11.4 billion) (Bank of England, 1987, p 51). 
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5.3.3 Australia 
The Australian promissory note market began in 1972 when GMAC 
ý,, 
7 issued a small amount of bearer notes guaranteed by its parent. Until 
1979 no other issuer entered the market. The Australian commercial 
paper market (known local ly as the promissory note market) has grown 
rapidly in the last few years. There are now some 125 issuers of 
promissory notes including 70 corporations, 30 financial institutions 
and 25 quasi-sovereign authorities (Arthur, 1986, p 47). 
The promissory note market received a boost in 1979 when the 
Australian Federal Government required the Australian Wheat Board to 
finance its crops on a commercial basis. This move on the part of the 
Federal Government was an attempt to tighten control over the money 
supply in the wake of the 1978 bumper wheat crop, which they had to fund 
through mutual credit facilities. The Australian Wheat Board chose to 
use the promissory note market as a large part of its commercial funding 
strategy. Today, nearly 90 per cent of the Australian Wheat Board's 
short-term domestic funding requirements are met through the issue of 
promissory notes. 
Development past this stage was, however, rather slow due to stamp 
duty costs which added approximately 0.50 per cent to 90 day issues and 
0.25 per cent to 180 day issues (Respinger and Turner, 1986, p 42). 
This effectively removed the cost advantage over cash advances. The 
market received afillip in 1983 when stamp duty was abolished on all 
negotiable money market instruments. This led to a resurgence of 
interest in domestic short-term securities. 
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Austraclear was established in September 1984 as a central clearing 
house, similar to Cede l and Euroc l ear in Europe. This - coupled with 
the rating of issues by a ratings agency, Australian Ratings - further 
encouraged the development of the market. 
By mid-1986, approximately Aus $14 billion (US $9.3 billion) of 
facilities had been signed, with notes outstanding estimated at Aus $6.5 
billion (US $4.3 billion) (Bank of England, 1987, p 52). 
5.3.4 Netherlands 
The Dutch capital market was 1 iberal 1sed with effect from 1st 
January 1986. Among the new developments was the establishment of a 
guilder-denominated commercial paper market. The guilder commercial 
paper market has made a relatively slow start. This is due mainly to 
the high level of liquidity of Dutch corporations and the small number 
of foreign borrrowers who have issued in the market. Nevertheless, in a 
country where there is no acceptance market, commercial paper could make 
a valuable contribution to the short-term funding requirements of Dutch 
corporations. Gui 1 der commercial paper can be issued for maturities 
between 14 days and two years (Rose, 1986, p 27). During 1986 nine 
programmes were signed and in October 1986 DF 750 mil ion (US $0.3 
billion) was outstanding (Bank of England, 1987, p 52). Since October 
1986, the Dutch central bank has provided a clearing service, which may 
encourage the growth of the market. 
5.3.5 Spain 
The Spanish commercial paper market first began in October 1982 
with an issue for a state-owned borrower. The market has flourished 
despite the imposition of reserve requirements to bank supported paper 
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in early 1984. Outstandings in 1 ate 1986 were in excess of US $5 
billion (Bank of Engl and, 1987, p 52). These outstandings were 
comprised of issues by companies, banks, and subsidiaries of foreign 
companies. Spanish commercial paper, or 'pagares de empres a' as it is 
known, is traded on the Spanish stock exchange. Many of the issues are 
supported by standby facilities, which gives them the guarantee of 
medium-term funds if short-term notes cannot be sold. The programmes 
then assume the essential characteristics of a RUF. 
5.3.6 Norway 
In December 1984 the Norwegian Ministry of Finance authorised the 
issue of short-term negotiable paper, termed certificates. These 
certificates are classified into four categories: treasury certificates, 
bank certificates, finance certificates (issued by private finance 
companies) and loan certificates (issued by state banks and other 
enterprises). The certificates all carry a maximum maturity of twelve 
months. There is a mi nimum issue size of NKr 25 mill ion and a minimum 
denomination of NKr 1 million. Only Norwegian institutions and 
enterprises are allowed to issue and purchase certificates. 
Throughout 1985 twenty-five issues of loan certificates with a 
gross value of NKr 3.5 billion (US $0.5 bi l1 ion) were made. In the 
period January to October 1986 seventy-five issues with a gross value of 
NKr 6.6 billion (US $0.9 bi 11 ion) were made (Bank of Engl and, 1987, p 
52). 
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5.3.7 Sweden 
The Swedish commercial paper market began in the early 1980s. By 
late 1986, with SKr 50 billion (US $7.4 billion) outstanding, the 
Swedish commercial paper market was the third largest domestic 
commercial paper market in the world after the United States and Canada. 
There is no secondary market and there is no regulatory requirement for 
a back-up line of credit. Average paper maturities in this market are 
generally shorter than in the United States. At the end of 1986, there 
were over a hundred issuers in the market, including Swedish companies, 
municipalities, and the local subsidiaries of several multinational 
corporations. 
5.3.8 Hong Kong 
The Hong Kong dollar commercial paper market opened in 1982. It 
was not until 1984, however, that the market really began to grow, when 
issues totalling HK $2.6 billion (US $0.3 billion) were arranged. 
Nineteen programmes were announced in 1985 totalling HK $8.4 billion (US 
$1.0 billion) followed by six programmes in the first ten months of 1986 
to the value of HK $3.8 billion (US $0.5 billion). By mid-1986 
estimated outstandings had reached US $1.2 billion (Bank of Englands 
1987, p 53). 
5.3.9 Singapore 
The Singapore commercial paper market (or promissory note market as 
it is known) opened in 1984 as an adjunct to the euronote and 
eurocommercial paper markets. Five facilities were signed in 1985 with 
a total value of S $0.3 bi 1 ion (US $0.1 billion). This was followed by 
the announcement of six further facilities in the first ten months of 
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1986, total 1 ing S $0.4 billion (US $0.2 billion) (Bank of Engl and, 
1987, p 53). 
5.3.10 France 
Launched in December 1985, the market for commercial paper in 
France, or 'billets de tresoreri e', has grown rapidly. The market was 
authorised as part of the government's policy of liberalising French 
capital markets and giving borrowers a wider choice of financial 
instruments. Although the French commercial paper market was built on 
the US model, it has a number of unique features. Commercial paper may 
be issued only by non-bank French comapnies and subsidiaries of foreign 
companies. A US-style liquidity line must be established for at least 
75 per cent of commercial paper outstanding (prior to March 1987 this 
figure was 95 per cent). Issuing companies are obliged to report 
current liabilities and assets quarterly and submit profit and loss 
accounts semi-annually. Settlement in this market is usually next day. 
As in other commercial paper markets, notes are in bearer form and 
can be either placed directly or through dealers. The minimum 
denomination for billets de tresorerie is Ffr 5 million. Maturities can 
range from 10 days to seven years (prior to March 1987 the maximum 
maturity was two years). To date, however, most issues have been in the 
20 to 40 day range. By the end of November 1986, outstandings were 
valued at Ffr 25.8 billion (US $4.0 billion), with over 100 issuers in 
the market (Bank of England, 1987, p 53). The main investors have been 
sicavs (investment companies), pension funds, insurance companies and 
commercial companies. 
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5.3.11 United Kingdom 
5.3.11.1 Development of the market 
The UK government gave the go-ahead on 29th April 1986 to the 
creation of a sterling commercial paper market in the United Kingdom. 
Prime quality borrowers and investors now trade short-term money direct 
with each other in the form of unsecured paper. It has been an anomaly 
of the UK financial system that no means existed that allowed companies 
to borrow direct from market investors on a short-term basis. This 
anomaly has now been removed. 
To assess the demand for a sterling commercial paper market one has 
only to 1 ook at the 1i st of UK industrial companies that have issued 
commercial paper in the United States. The following list is taken from 
Standard & Poor's Commercial Paper Ratings Guide (1986): 
Allied-Lyons 
Babcock International 
BAT Industries 
Beecham Group 
BICC 
Boots 
Bowater 
British Gas 
Britoil 
Cadbury Schweppes 
Consolidated Gold Fields 
English China Clays 
GKN 
Heron International 
ICI 
Marks and Spencer 
Metal Box 
Plessey 
Reckitt & Colman 
Redl and 
Rolls Royce 
South of Scotland Electricity Board 
Thorn EMI 
Uni gate 
United Biscuits 
With the growth of the eurocommercial paper market, firms are 
beginning to tap both US and eurocommercial paper markets, often swapp- 
ing the proceeds into sterling. Such an operation is referred to as 
multi-currency commercial paper. The example below shows how a company 
could raise 60-day sterling by using the US commercial paper market (the 
example is an adaptation of one provided by Merrill Lynch in October 
1985 referring to the use of the US commercial market to raise Deutsche- 
marks): 
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Stage 1 Borrower asks US broker for a bid on 60-day sterling 
Stage 2 Dealer will determine: 
1 relevant commercial paper rate for dollar equivalent 
of amount of sterling required 
2a sterling spot rate 
3a sterling interbank swap rate for 60 days forward 
4a eurodol 1 ar time deposit rate for the number of 
days between the day on which dollars are available 
in the US commercial paper market and the settlement 
of a sterling spot purchase transaction 
Stage 3 An all-inclusive sterling borrowing rate is conveyed to 
the borrower along with the prevailing eurosterling rate 
for comparison 
Stage 4 If rate is acceptable, the borrower issues US commercial 
paper to the equivalent amount of sterling funds 
required 
Stage 5 Broker pre-calculates the interest to be earned on the 
commercial paper proceeds for the period prior to 
settlement in the spot forex market 
Stage 6 The interest to be earned is added in advance to the net 
commercial paper proceeds and applied towards a spot 
market purchase of sterling required 
Stage 7 At the same time as the spot market transaction, the 
broker repurchases the same amount of sterling forward 
from the issuer to give va 1 ue on the maturity date of the 
commercial paper 
Stage 8 The sterling funds are delivered to the borrower in 
accordance with his instructions 
This process is obviously time-consuming and expensive for the borrower. 
It is far easier for a company to raise funds through a sterling 
commercial paper market and dispense with this process. It is also 
easier for the government to monitor notes denominated in sterling from 
the start than those swapped from dollars into sterling. 
There was also a monetary rationale for establishing a sterling 
commercial paper market, the objective being to reduce the growing 
dependence of the UK corporate sector on bank borrowing. From 1981 
until October 1985 the government issued more gilt-edged stock than was 
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necessary to meet its public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR). A 
massive rise in borrowing by corporates from the banks inflated money 
supply figures. Contractionary open market operations (in gilts) were 
therefore necessary to achieve (or attempt to achieve) the monetary 
targets. Shortages in the money markets were the result. The govern- 
ment also kept treasury bill issues low and offset money market 
shortages by purchasing bank acceptances. As a result of this overfund- 
ing the bill mountain grew from f2 billion in 1981 to nearly £15 billion 
in 1985. The Bank of England's massive appetite for acceptances drove 
yields on these instruments down to sometimes 100 basis points below 
bank CDs and interbank deposits (see Figure 5.3). Acceptances thus 
became an extremely cheap source of funds for corporate borrowers. 
As a result of this discrepancy in yields a situation arose in 
which bills were issued by the private sector merely to relend the funds 
obtained through such issues at a higher yield in the market. This was 
been a contributing factor to the increase in large term deposits 
towards the end of 1985 and beginning of 1986. This form of bill, 
arbitrage, or 'round tripping' as it was known, had the effect of 
offsetting the initial reduction in the money supply brought about by 
overfunding. Although the government's policy is now merely to fund to 
meet the PSBR, this does not, in itself, imply an immediate reduction in 
the bill mountain. Indeed, figures compiled by County Bank, National 
Westminster's merchant banking subsidiary, show that the yield spread 
between bank acceptances and bank CD and interbank deposit rates had 
still not declined by early 1986 (see Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.3 Yields on 3-month sterling bank bi 11s, interbank 
deposits, and bank certificates of deposit 
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One way to narrow the yields between these instruments (and hence 
to increase the yield on bank acceptances) would be to introduce a 
viable alternative to bank acceptances; this instrument was sterling 
commercial paper. Sterling commercial paper consists of short-term 
(seven days to one year) unsecured promissory notes issued by 
corporations wanting large amounts of cash. The purchasers are 
financial institutions or other corporations with temporary cash sur- 
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pl uses. The notes do not carry an interest coupon but are sold at 
discounts below face value to provide a return to investors. Unlike 
acceptances, commercial paper does not require an underlying trade 
transaction. It is priced off LIBID (London Interbank Bid Rate). As 
long as LIBID does not rise too far above the eligible bill rate (the 
acceptance rate) -8 to 10 basis points above the eligible bill rate 
would probably be enough to hinder the growth of the sterling commercial 
paper market - sterling commercial paper will prove to be a viable 
short-term funding alternative to acceptances. 
Figure 5.4 Short-term sterling interest rates 
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5.3.11.2 Obstacles removed 
The pri nci pal constraint on the deve 1 opment of sterling commercial 
paper was that the issuer could have been seen as carrying out a 
'deposit taking' role in contravention of the 1979 Banking Act. The 
Chancellor (Mr Nigel Lawson) has amended the Act to exempt from the 
prohibition on deposit taking in Section 1 issues by companies of ster- 
ling debt securities with a maturity of less than one year, which meet 
with the specific requirements governing the issue of such debt. 
One of the main problems for the Bank of England in allowing 
issuers of sterling commercial paper to be exempt from the Banking Act 
was the problem of investor protection. This has been overcome by 
restricting access to the market to large high quality companies. Paper 
issuers' ordinary or preferred stock has to be listed on the London 
Stock Exchanges, and these issuers will be required to have net assets 
of at least 150 million. These restrictions will ensure that issuers 
will already have been analysed by the investment community and complied 
by United Kingdom disclosure requirements. On this criterion 
approximately 300 UK companies could be potential sterling commercial 
paper issuers, and as many as 50 foreign ones. As the paper will almost 
certainly end up with professional investors it wi11 be exempt from 
stamp duty and withholding tax. 
5.3.12 Implications of commercial paper markets 
Commercial banks will obviously hope to gain a large section of 
these markets through buying commercial paper for their own books. This 
is to be expected from the outset as these markets will be very shallow 
and so even top quality names should not be able to issue paper much (if 
at al 1) below the bank CD rates. This should allow banks to purchase 
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paper at reasonable yields. Indeed, it seems likely that the banks will 
be the major players in the commercial paper markets in the short run as 
they are amongst the few players in the money markets skilled in credit 
analysis. Eventually banks will be looking to trade this paper rather 
than keep it on their own books. Because of the lack of initial 
liquidity in most of these markets this may not be immediately possible. 
The banks may thus have to warehouse paper and tap it into the markets 
as the demand arises. This trading function will become particularly 
important for the banks, especially if rating agencies enter the 
markets, thereby providing for a more efficient market mechanism. As 
the markets mature, rates will fall, with some prime name issuers 
actually being able to raise funds below the banks' cost of funds. 
The investors in this type of paper will not be the banks so much 
as those investors not tied to any interest rate index, like pension 
funds, life i nsurance companies and large corporations. The attraction 
for these investors would be the opportunity to diversify their asset 
portfolios away from bank paper and bank deposits. 
In the long term it is the commercial banks yet again that stand to 
lose out from the development of commercial paper markets. The purpose 
of these markets is to raise cheap funds by by-passing the traditional 
intermediary role of the banking system. Banks will be di si ntermedi ated 
on both sides of the balance sheet. They will lose both deposit taking 
and lending business, as investors move out of bank assets into 
commercial paper, and as those companies that can issue paper below the 
rate at which they could obtain bank funds do so. This 'double 
disintermediation' will result from the fact that corporate borrowers, 
unlike banks, do not have to hold reserves against short-term debt. As 
they can, therefore, take full use of the borrowed funds, they are, in 
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effect, paying less for their money even when the nominal return to 
investors corresponds with that offered by the banks. In practice, this 
means that commercial paper issuers may be able to offer slightly higher 
rates than the banks, and still benefit from issuing paper rather than 
seeking finance from the banking system, thereby benefiting both 
borrowers and investors. 
In the United States the bank prime lending rate has tended to be 
used as a benchmark in the substitution of paper for bank loans. As 
this spread is often quite large, most paper-issuing corporations prefer 
not to use the banks at all for short-term financing other than when the 
commercial paper market is tight or closed to them. Indeed, it is 
debatable whether most prime name corporations should pay a large bank 
lending rate for an intangible intermediary service from which they may 
receive relatively little value. What should be clear from our 
examination of worldwide commercial paper markets is that they represent 
a fundamental change in the funding patterns of large corporations. 
A further impetus was given to the growth of commercial paper 
markets in 1986 when a number of regulatory authorities applied specific 
risk asset ratios to underwriting commitments attached to euronote 
facilities. The various regulatory authorities applied capital 
weightings in the hope that their banks would pass-on the 'tax' in 
higher fees. This would provide underwriting banks with a higher rate 
of return on assets. If this could be shown to have occurred then it 
might be argued, on the one hand, that any increase in systemic risk 
which may have occurred through an initial underpricing of euronote 
facilities may have been, at least partially, rectified in the long-run 
through the transfer of capital 'taxes'. On the other hand, it might be 
that capital ratios are themselves exacerbating the problem of systemic 
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risk by forcing banks to accept higher risks to earn the implied profit 
target. It is to this question that we now turn our attention. 
5.4 Regulation and Pricing 
April 1985 saw the circulation of a discussion paper by the Bank of 
England indicating the introduction of a risk-assets ratio weighting of 
50 per cent on all underwriting commitments attached to euronote 
facilities. This was followed, in May 1985, by the introduction of a 
similar 30 per cent weighting by the Japanese Ministry of Finance, and 
the introduction of the same 30 per cent weighting by the US Federal 
Reserve in January 1986. British banks have argued that regulatory 
asymmetries in the application of capital ratios may hinder their own 
competitive position. Since this time, other countries' bank regulatory 
agencies have followed suit in applying capital against euronote 
facilities (see Appendix 5.1). 
More significant, however, may be the paper released jointly by the 
Bank of England and the US Federal Banking Regulatory Authorities in 
January 1987. The paper outlines proposals for a common measure of 
capital adequacy. It is worthwhile quoting the position of both 
regulatory bodies on the application of a risk assets ratio to 
underwriting commitments attached to RUFs. The paper states (1987, 
p 86) : 
'Undrawn commitments will have conversion factors which vary 
with the original maturity of the facility. The supervisory 
authorities believe that the longer-term obligations, like 
Revolving Underwriting Facilities, involve a particularly 
significant credit risk. Therefore, facilities with an 
original maturity of over 5 years will have a conversion 
factor of 50 per cent; facilities of an original maturity of 
between 1 and 5 years will be converted at 25 per cent; and 
those formally reviewable annually, including overdrafts, 
will have a conversion factor of 10 per cent. ' 
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Following on from the proposals laid down by the Bank of England and the 
US Federal Reserve, the BIS issued proposals in December 1987 for common 
minimum capital requirements for banks across the industrialised world. 
In accordance with the earlier proposals of the Bank of England and 
the US Federal Reserve, capital requirements are to be calculated by 
assigning risk weightings both to assets and to off-balance sheet 
exposures. From the end of 1990 banks will be expected to maintain a 
standard ratio of capital to weighted risk assets of 7.25 per cent. 
This will be increased to 8 per cent in 1992. 
The risk asset ratio system reconstitutes the asset side of a 
bank's balance sheet, dividing assets into categories and applying 
weights to those assets according to their perceived riskiness. The 
ratio is arrived at by comparing the bank's capital to its recalculated 
assets. Osborn (1987) has stated that the application of these ratios 
implies not so much that banks are unable to assess the risks of these 
instruments, but that they may not be able to provide adequately for 
these risks on an individual basis, unless all other market participants 
are forced to do the same. 
The application of such capital ratios should, in theory, lead to 
higher fee prices for RUFs either as the banks pass on part of the cost 
to their customers or take on higher risks. Lomax (1987, p. 19) 
supports this contention saying: 
'These ratios thus get built into pricing policy, since a 
bank would need to obtain a sufficient margin on a particular 
form of business to be able to cover the costs of the capital 
held against that business. If the ratio is 10 per cent, 
then sufficient profit will need to be made on a commercial 
loan to support twice as much capital as when the ratio is 
only 5 per cent ... In due course these ratios wi 11 have 
powerful 'effects upon the development of business, because of 
the interaction of capital requirements, the cost of capital, 
and prices in the market place. ' 
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We would also expect to see a reduction in the rate of growth of 
committed facilities and an increase in the rate of growth of 
eurocommerci al paper facilities. From Figure 5.1 a slight reduction in 
the rate of growth of euronote facilities is noticeable since mid-1985. 
It is also noticeable that in 1985 the eurocommerci al paper market began 
its rapid growth. It seems, then, that regulation may have played some 
part in the growth of the eurocommercial paper market. What is 
certainly not clear, however, is that the application of risk assets 
ratios to underwriting commitments attached to RUFs has increased the 
levels of fees for these facilities. It may, of course, be that there 
is an element of cross-subsidisation from other parts of the bank. This 
is beyond the scope of this exploratory analysis, but does not detract 
from the fact that if fee levels are falling despite the application of 
capital ratios then the banks must be taking the shortfall themselves. 
One way of attempting to discover whether the application of 
regulation (in the form of capital controls) has increased fee levels 
for euronote facilities is to chart the levels of fees for the market 
before and after the application of regulations. The data used in this 
section of the chapter are not publicly available, and they have been 
kindly provided by NatWest Investment Bank Ltd and Bank of America 
Capital Markets Ltd. By exploring the data (in this case trends in fee 
levels) we should be able to provide some evidence to support the main 
research hypotheses - to be formulated in the following chapters. 
As emphasised in Chapter 2, there are two relevant fee levels for 
euronote facilities: undrawn costs and drawn costs. Undrawn costs 
represent the return gained by the underwriting banks if they are 
never asked to fund the facility. Drawn costs represent the return to 
the underwriting banks if they are asked to fund the facility. 
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Naturally, drawn costs are higher than undrawn costs (which simply 
include a front-end fee and a facility fee) because the underwriter 
receives the maximum margin on any notes purchased. 
Due to the fact that euronote facilities have developed in a bear 
market environment (rising prices/falling interest rates) an average 
interest rate for the period under observation has been used to smooth 
any trend which may have been attributable to falling interest rates. 
Figure 5.5 presents all mean monthly drawn and undrawn costs for 
the whole euronote market between January 1985 and January 1987 (see 
Appendix 5.2 for the presentation of the data). If a tendency across 
this period of time is observable it would appear to be one of 
variability around a mean cost of approximately 32 basis points, and a 
undrawn cost of approximately 13 basis points. The market appears to 
have remained around these levels over the time period. There is little 
evidence to suggest that the application of regulation during 1985 and 
1986 has increased fee levels in the market. It may even be that a 
slight decline is noticeable in both drawn and undrawn costs. Although 
the graph may appear to be somewhat variable, it must be remembered that 
the y axis represents basis points - in other words, each point on the 
scale represents 1/100 of 1 per cent. Even so, the upward peaks in 
months 7,9,18 and 20 (July 1985, September 1985, June 1986 and August 
1986) seem difficult to explain. Closer examination is, therefore, 
necessary. 
Figures 5.6,5.7 and 5.8 divide the market into sovereign, 
corporate and bank borrowers respectively. From Figure 5.6 a decline in 
the mean monthly drawn and undrawn costs for sovereign borrowers over 
the time period is noticeable (see Appendix 5.3 for the presentation of 
the data used). The application of regulations appears to have made 
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little if any impact on the fee levels in this segment of the euronote 
market. Again there are variations in the market fee levels at certain 
points in time, noticeably months 2 and 4 (February 1985 and April 
1985). This is explained by large borrowings in the market by Portugal 
in those months. Portugal is recognised as a less than prime credit in 
the euronote market and the high fee levels charged for Portugal 
(undrawn cost of 20 basis points and a drawn cost of 51 basis points) 
are captured in these months' fee data. 
Figure 5.7 presents the mean monthly drawn and undrawn costs for 
corporates (see Appendix 5.4 for the respective data). Again there is 
little or no evidence to suggest from these data that regulation has 
affected fee levels in this segment of the market. Although only an 
optimist would suggest that there is any clearly observable decline in 
drawn or undrawn costs in this segment of the market, neither is there 
any observable rise in fee l eve ls over the time period. Drawn costs 
fluctuate within a low 15 basis points band and undrawn cost within an 
even lower 10 basis points band. 
Figure 5.8 shows a different picture. It presents the mean monthly 
drawn and undrawn costs for banks (see Appendix 5.5 for the respective 
data). Both fee levels in this segment of the market are very volatile, 
particularly in months 7,9,18 and 20 (July 1985, September 1985, June 
1986 and August 1986), precisely the months at which the who le of the 
euronote market reaches its highest peaks in terms of fee levels. 
Apparently, it is the volatility of the bank segment of the euronote 
market in these months which is showing up in Figure 5.5. The 
vo 1 ati 1 ity of the 1 eve 1s of the bank segment of the euronote market isa 
result of the heterogeneity of this segment of the market compared with 
other sectors. A far wider range of credits borrow in this segment of 
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the euronote market, ranging from the high quality conglomerates such as 
Citicorp and Bank of Tokyo to poor, less well-known names such as Korea 
Export Import Bank, which borrowed extensively in June and August of 
1986. 
It is virtually impossible to assess the affect of regulation on 
the fee levels achieved in this sector of the market. Although this 
segment of the market is highly volatile, there is certainly no 
observable upward trend in fee levels, which 'might' be attributable to 
the application of regulations. 
To add support to this cl aim the mean drawn and undrawn costs in 
the euronote market and its respective sectors were calculated for 1985 
(before the actual application of ri sk-assets ratios) and for 1986 
(after the application of the risk-assets ratios). The results of this 
analysis are presented in Table 5.3. In the euronote market, the 
sovereign sector and corporate sector, the mean drawn and undrawn costs 
were actua 11 y1 ower in 1986 than 1985. In the bank sector there was a 
slight increase. This is due to the substantial borrowings in the 
market in June and August of that year by the Korea Export Import Bank. 
If this borrower is ignored when calculating drawn and undrawn costs for 
the bank sector in 1986 then both undrawn costs and drawn costs for 1986 
fal 1 bel ow the respecti ve levels for 1985: the mean undrawn cost becomes 
11.6066 instead of 18.235, and the drawn cost falls from 36.253 to 
33.056. 
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5.4.1 Summary 
There is little, if any, evidence to suggest that, from our data, 
regulation has affected the trend in fee levels for the euronote market, 
or the different segments of the market. Fee levels (on a drawn and 
undrawn basis) have continued on a steady, if somewhat downward trend. 
The decline in fee levels is particularly noticeable in the high quality 
segments of the euronote market, in particular in the sovereign sector. 
In this sector (and perhaps the corporate sector also) the market 
appears to have moved through the regulations, which suggests that the 
regulated banks are absorbing the capital ratios in their own books. 
This will, naturally, damage further the returns to underwriting banks. 
We would conclude that regulation, in the form of specific risk assets 
ratios, does not appear to have increased the fee levels attached to 
euronote facilities. Any possible reduction in systemic risk which may 
have resulted from the transferal of capital requirements to higher fee 
levels does not appear to have materialised. 
This is not to say that the application of a risk asset ratio to 
bank underwriting commitments has increased systemic risk. We are 
trying to show that the application of the ratio does not appear to have 
checked the downward trend in fee levels in this market. If the risk 
asset ratio is simply linked to the perceived riskiness of individual 
assets then in this parti cu 1 ar case there may be room to argue that it 
has had a negative effect on returns in the market. The capital cost 
appears to have been absorbed rather than passed on. However, as Lomax 
(1987, p. 17) argues, if the new system is seen as a step towards a 
portfolio assessment of the banks, then the concept may prove to be 
rigorous. 
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A well-managed bank will aim to build a well-diversified portfolio 
with 1 ittl e covariance between assets. In other words, banks wi 11 seek 
to develop a balanced portfolio that is not unduly exposed to any 
parti cu 1 ar industry or market. The function of capital is not to guard 
against expected losses: that is the function of profits. Capital 
adequacy guards against peak losses and an unusually high covariance of 
loss. As such it could be argued that capital should be linked to the 
portfolio structure of assets rather than the perceived riskiness of 
individual assets as the present risk asset ratio system is. For 
example, two banks may carry similar underwriting commitments but have 
different asset portfolio mixes. In Bank A's portfolio underwriting 
commitments may account for 20 per cent of the asset base. In bank B's 
portfolio underwriting commitments may account for only 2 per cent of 
the asset base and may have a greater negative correlation with the rest 
of the portfolio. To apply the same risk asset weighting to both banks 
simply in accordance with the type of asset held does not reflect the 
true risk of the portfolio. 
As shown in this section, applying a risk asset ratio to an 
individual asset, without consideration of how that asset fits in to the 
structure of the portfolio, can reduce returns in that market (assuming 
the capital cost is allocated directly). A risk asset ratio system 
linked to the structure of a bank's assets allows for greater 
flexibility in the allocation of capital in accordance with the unique 
composition of that bank's asset portfolio. This point becomes 
particularly important if banks are pricing assets on a relationship or 
'customer portfolio' basis as risk and return are both calculated in 
accordance with their relationship with other assets in the customer 
portfolio. 
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If risk asset ratios are to be applied to a bank's portfolio of 
assets, rather than individual asssets, then it is important that 
systems exist within the bank to be able to analyse the profitability of 
different sections of the asset portfolio. A bank can then allocate 
capital itself to each asset section in accordance with the exposure of 
the portfolio to that particular section and, of course, in accordance 
with the minimum level of capital required to be held against the 
portfolio for Bank of England purposes. 
A recent survey in London by Coopers & Lybrand - reported by Hislop 
(1987) - reveals that most of the British banks are basing their capital 
allocation systems on the minimum regulatory requirements of the Bank of 
En gl and with apparent little regard to their own internal portfolio 
management. This may be 1 arge ly due to the f act that sophisticated 
profitability systems do not exist in many banks. As such it is 
difficult to make strategic planning decisions about the structure of 
the asset portfolio. In the absence of these systems the Bank of 
England guidelines provide a ready-made capital allocation system, but 
without any regard to the (correlation) composition of a bank's assets. 
In the case of RUFS, however, the application of specific risk 
asset ratios does not appear to have combatted systemic risk by 
increasing fee levels. 
5.5 Trading Versus Placement 
The ro 1e of placement in the euronote market ho 1 ds re 1 ati ve 1y 
little risk. The placement of notes is carried out on a 'best efforts' 
basis only (unless, of course, the placing bank is also an underwriter). 
Any notes which cannot be placed below the maximum margin are returned 
to the underwriters. Notes need not be taken on to the placement bank's 
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books. With trading the situation is different. Let us take an 
example. 
Example 1 
Assume Bank X obtains US $10 mi 11 ion of 3 month euronotes at LIBOR 
1 ess 0.10 per cent per annum. At the time of rate-fixing LIBOR was set at 
7 per cent per annum. Bank X thus owns the paper at 6.9 per cent per 
annum. The notes run from 3rd March to 1st June. We can determine the 
amount Bank X paid to the issuer on 3rd March by using the discount note 
formula. Using this formula we find Bank X paid: 
6.9x 90 
us $10,000,000 ;1+ 
36,000 
= US $9,830,425.1 
This figure represents an asset on Bank X's books and must be funded. 
Bank X does not intend to hold the notes but to sel 1 them as soon as 
possible. It therefore funds in the overnight market at a rate of 7 per 
cent per annum. This amounts to a cost of: 
US $9,830,425.1 x7 
36,000 
= US $1,911.47 
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Bank X has now incurred a negative carry as it has paid more in the 
overnight market than it is receiving on its euronotes for one night. 
Its overnight yield on its euronote holding is: 
US $9,830,425.1 x 6.9 
36,000 
= US $1,884.16 
The negative carry is not just US $1,911.47 - US $1,884.14 = US $27.31 
because if interest rates increase, it will increase when Bank X renews 
its borrowing. If Bank X cannot sell its euronotes the next day it will 
have to renew its borrowings. The number of times it is forced to do 
this will determine the eventual compounded interest it will have to 
pay. It is not the purpose of this thesis to examine in detail the 
trading and funding mechanics of money market instruments. Suffice to 
say that the length, level and rate of funding will affect the eventual 
return to any trader. In what is still an immature market an incorrect 
funding decision can eliminate any profit on a trade. Such a loss 
making situation can be depicted by taking our example one step further: 
Assume interest rates rise on the day Bank X wishes to realise its 
euronote holding. LIBOR now stands at 7.0625 per cent per annum. To 
seil its euronotes Bank X must at least meet LIBOR: 
7.0625 x 89 
return on sale US $10,000,000 
36,000 
173 
= US $9,828,396.2 
less purchase price = US $9,830,425.1 
less funding cost = US $1,911.47 
loss on trade = (US $3,940.37) 
If banks bid aggressively in tender panels to the point of maximum 
value for particular euronotes, the only way such banks can make a turn 
(a profit) is if interest rates fall or the yield curve remains 
positive. If interest rates stay the same or rise, as in our example, 
the trading bank will lose money. A particularly worrying point for the 
euronote market is that liquidity has invariably been provided by a 
secondary market with a falling rate (bull) environment. 
The Bank of Engl and (1985, p 402) has expressed concern over the 
supposed liquidity of euronotes, pointing to the fact that, if a 
borrower was to get into financial difficulty, any notes held by banks 
on the borrower would certainly move to a discount, with the margin 
possibly becoming so wide that the notes might become unsaleable. We 
would emphasise once more that marketability is not the same as 
liquidity. The fact that an asset may still be sold at a discount does 
not imply that the asset is liquid. Liquidity impl ies the abil ity to 
sel 1 an asset at, or very close to, face value under most market 
conditions. It is doubtful whether euronotes and eurocommercial paper 
will ever achieve this liquidity. 
As the Bank has also pointed out, the fact that an asset is 
tradeable does not mean that capital to provide against potential losses 
can be reduced. Indeed, prime quality assets may by-pass the banking 
system entirely, ending up with other prime name corporations and so 
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leaving the banking system with reduced asset quality. Furthermore, 
with a security like a euronote, a downgrading of a borrower's credit 
rating would mean a discount on its securitised debt, thereby requiring 
the bank to write down the asset earlier than would otherwise have been 
the case. As far as this may be true the entire process of 
securi ti sati on, whereby bank loans and deposits are replaced by 
securities, may contribute to an increase in systemic risk. 
5.5.1 Summary 
It is not sufficient that capital is just placed against 
underwriting commitments attached to RUFs. In this section we have 
tried to show that trading activities can result in substantial losses. 
As stated, the euronote market has grown in a bull market environment. 
What is more itis still an immature market that has depended l arge ly on 
secondary market trading for liquidity. If insufficient capital is 
placed against trading positions then a bear market could result in 
substantial trading losses which are under-provisioned. The effect of a 
bear market with trading spreads widening could, however, be more 
disastrous for underwriting banks. The hypothesis is that as rates 
begin to rise, placing banks will find it increasingly difficult to 
place paper with investors below the maximum margin on the notes. The 
notes will therefore be returned to the underwriters who will be asked 
to f und precisely at the time when they will be shortest of funds. In 
this scenario systemic risk might be increased significantly. 
5.6 The Clearance of Euronotes and Eurocommercial Paper 
In this section we will examine briefly the different systems 
currently involved in the clearing of euronotes and eurocommerci al 
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paper. We will then examine briefly the possibility of same day 
sett 1 ement. This section will be concluded with an examination of the 
implications of a clearing system failure for systemic risk. 
Euronotes and eurocommercial paper can currently be cleared through 
one of four major clearing systems. The first of these, Euroclear, is 
based in Brussels; the second, Cede l, is based in Luxembourg, with the 
other two, First Chicago Clearing Centre and Chase Manhattan Bank NA, in 
London. 
Euroclear and Cedel are mainly clearing centres for long-term 
bonds. They have both adapated their systems to handle the shorter 
maturity paper predominant in the money markets. First Chicago and 
Chase Manhattan, on the other hand, are both specialists in the 
clearance of eurocommercial paper. They were both established initially 
to compete for the clearance of bank CDs. It was a natural evolution 
for both systems to incorporate euronotes and eurocommercial paper into 
their business activities. 
The fragmentation between the various clearing systems has been a 
source of concern among market practitioners. In response to this 
concern, certain links have been established between the various 
systems. For instance, Chase Manhattan and Cedel operate a system which 
provides for same day settlement of notes. 
Under this system the borrower issues notes of a specific amount 
and maturity with an absolute (as opposed to LIBOR-related) rate. The 
placing agents then place the notes with investors or traders. All this 
takes place usually before 11.00 a. m. (New York time), but is possible 
up to 5 p. m. for same-day settlement. Instructions to issue and pay out 
on the notes will then be given to the issuing/paying agent by the 
issuer, in this case through Chase's securities settlement system. The 
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placing agents also send their settlement instructions to the clearing 
centre through this system. Investors then communicate settlement 
instructions to Cedel through Cedcom. Prime paper is then sent from the 
issuing/paying agent to the placing agent's account in the Chase clear- 
ing system. After receiving the paper from the placing agents on behalf 
of investors, the Chase clearing system verifies these against placing 
agents' instructions, and the paper is transferred to Cede l's account 
with Chase. The process can be accommodated under a book entry or grid 
note facility. In this all parties to the transaction must be members 
of the Chase clearing centre. Chase's same-day settlement process is 
shown in Figure 5.9. 
k 
Figure 5.9 Chase Manhattan's same-day settlement process 
II ssuer Placing agent(s) i Investors! 
Issuing/placing rChase Clearing' Cedel 
agent House 
This system allows for physical delivery in London to investors 
that are not members of the Chase clearing centre. Where a grid system 
is used, a11 parti ci pants must be members. This is true of another 
same-day settlement system now in operation, the First Chicago Clearing 
System. Although grid note systems remove the need to move paper physi- 
cally, they create a monopoly, as well as raising the question whether 
the notes are subject to stamp duty. Indeed, one of the main features 
177 
of these clearing systems (whether they be physical deli very or book 
entry systems) is that they are issuer-driven despite the fact that the 
eurocommercial paper market is developing as investor-driven. It 
remains to be seen whether investors will follow where the issuers and 
clearing centres are leading. 
As far as the clearance of euronotes and eurocommerci al paper is 
concerned, the main risk facing participants is that of settlement risk. 
The BIS (1986, p 195) argue that: 
'The key question is whether ... overall transactions volumes have become so huge that, even with low error rates, the 
inevitable breakdown at a major concentration point in the 
funds transfer system can involve very large amounts. ' 
They go on to argue (1986, p 196) that: 
' Much attention has been devoted to developing mechanisms to 
control risks, including means to resolve disputes as a 
result of processing errors. Nevertheless, major disruptions 
of the transaction process have occurred, as yet without 
systemic damage, and central bankers remain concerned that 
competitive pressures to cut transactions costs may make it 
difficult for financial institutions to retain even the 
present degree of control and protection. ' 
The BIS are, of course, not just referring here to the euronote and 
eurocommercial paper markets. But their concern is also relevant to 
those markets. A major clearing failure in a market of US $30 billion 
of notes outstanding could indeed cause systemic damage. However, to 
the extent that euronotes are replacing other bearer securities (such as 
euro-CDs and FRNs) which are also subject to the same settlement risk, 
it is doubtful whether the growth of the euronote market has contributed 
significantly to systemic risk from this aspect. 
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5.7 Credit Risk and Ratings in the Euronote Market 
5.7.1 Introduction 
Financial innovation theory tells us that if new financial 
instruments are underpriced systemic risk may arise (see, for example, 
BIS, 1986b, p. 199). If investors are purchasing investments below an 
adequate return for the risk of those investments (because of a lack of 
knowledge of that risk) then the risk of a financial crisis increases. 
Credit ratings may be one way of reducing this possibility through 
increasing the communication of information to the market. 
This section examines the effect of credit ratings on trading 
levels of borrowers' notes in the euronote market. Results show that 
although differently rated issues trade at different levels, the 
application of a credit rating makes virtually no difference to the 
trading level of a borrower's notes if that borrower has already been 
issuing in the market. The implication is that credit ratings appear to 
be merely confirming the market's own 'perceived' rating of the 
borrower. Some evidence is found, however, to indicate that credit 
ratings may be more significant in the lower quality categories of the 
market. 
The effect of the 1987/88 stock market crash on ratings in the 
euronote market is also examined. 
5.7.2 Credit risk and ratings 
Credit risk has traditionally been assessed by commercial banks. 
In the euronote and eurocommercial paper market credit risk is assessed 
by investors, usually large corporations. Indeed, perhaps the most 
important feature of the euronote and eurocommercial paper market is 
that it removes banks from the role of analysing and assuming the credit 
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risk of the issuer. In this market investors have to accept credit risk 
at an interest rate acceptable to the borrower. Because of the very 
short-term nature of the notes issued in this market, both interest and 
principal are paid on the maturity date of the notes. With such short- 
term notes the investor, in effect, takes a double repayment risk in 
that he cannot even rely on repayment of interest to offset partially 
any default on the principal sum, because both fall due simultaneously. 
To the extent that investors in euronotes (generally large 
corporations) are il l-equipped to analyse credit risk, systemic risk 
might be increased. One way of containing any increase in systemic 
risk, due to an inability on the part of investors to assess adequately 
credit risk, may be to rate euronotes and eurocommercial paper. Lower 
rated issues would carry higher yields than highly rated issues. The 
question to ask is whether ratings have altered trading spreads between 
creditworthy and less creditworthy borrowers. It is important to note 
that the implicit creditworthiness of a borrower should not change 
because of a rating. A rating simply communicates the creditworthiness 
of a particular borrower to a market. If the market has correctly 
assessed the creditworthiness of the borrower in the first place, the 
issuer's average trading level should not change because of the 
application of a credit rating. If the market has incorrectly assessed 
the creditworthiness of the borrower, trading spreads should alter. 
By examining the bid yield (trading level) we are effectively 
examining the demand for the notes. A credit rating does not affect the 
supply of notes al ready in the market: the supply of these notes is 
fixed until their maturity date. A credit rating may, however, affect 
demand if the market has incorrectly assessed the credit risk of the 
borrower. 
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Before embarking upon this analysis it will be useful to point out 
some discrepancies which can arise in the rating process. A brief 
breakdown of the way the rating agencies apply credit ratings will also 
be given to provide the reader with a kn owledge of the symbols used in 
this section of the chapter. 
To begin with, a distinction must be made between a paper programme 
with an irrevocable bank letter of credit, which is a guarantee to the 
investor of repayment of his investment, and a note programme that 
carries a bank underwriting guarantee. The latter is a guarantee not to 
the investor but to the issuer that notes left unplaced at each interest 
rate rollover date will be purchased by the underwriters. 
There is no problem for the rating agencies in rating underwritten 
euronotes, because the committed bank stand-bys provide a visible 
liquidity source. For eurocommercial paper, however, there is no 
immediately visible liquidity source. With such programmes issuers 
have to prove that sufficient liquidity (possibly in the form of bank 
stand-by lines) exists in the event of the issuer's experiencing 
difficulties. 
A distinction must also be made between the rating of paper with an 
irrevocable letter of credit and the rating of paper based on an assess- 
ment of the Issuer's own credit standing. Because of the lack of 
ratings in the euronote and eurocommercial paper market, issuers have 
started to refer (where applicable) to their US commercial paper rating. 
For companies issuing in the United States without a bank letter of 
credit, this is a fairly good surrogate. But of the 50 euronote and 
eurocommercial paper issuers that have US commercial paper programmes, 
ten are backed by a bank letter of credit. This is a guarantee to the 
investor as opposed to merely a liquidity source. It is wholly 
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incorrect to apply such ratings to euronote and eurocommercial paper 
programmes to which the letter of credit does not apply. 
There are presently three main rating agencies for euronotes and 
eurocommerci al paper. These are Standard and Poor's, Moody's investors 
service and the recently formed EuroRatings Limited. The last is based 
in London, and is hoping to use European rather than US accounting 
standards. 
Table 5.4 gives a breakdown of the various rating symbols used by 
each agency in the rating of euronotes and eurocommercial paper, with an 
explanation of each rating. To provide some indication of the 
quantitative information required to perform a rating, a Standard & 
Poor's rating worksheet for industrial companies is provided in 
Appendix 5.6. 
One interesting observation about ratings in the euronote market is 
that the distributions are highly skewed towards high quality. 
Examination of Appendix 5.7 reveals that of the 170 rated borrowers in 
the market at April 1987, only 50 had actually issued any notes. 
Further examination reveals that of these 170 rated borrowers 133 (78 
per cent) had at least one 'First prime' rating. A 'First prime' rating 
is defined as a rating of A-1(+), P-1 or E-1(+). If ratings are shown 
by number of issuers who have actually issued notes, we find that over 
80 per cent of al 1 ratings are 'First prime'. This is not a surprising 
observation. It is up to the issuer whether he chooses to use the 
rating assigned by one or more of the rating agencies. Since many 
issuers may not wish to appear less than 'First prime', a less than 
'First prime' rating may not be used when raising funds. The issuer may 
prefer to use name recognition only. 
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Table 5.4 Euronote and eurocoamercial paper ratings by each rating 
agency(1) 
Standard 
& Poor' s Moody's EuroRatings Explanation of rating 
A-1 P-1 E-1 Highest grade. Paper assigned this 
rating is regarded as having the 
strongest degree of assurance for 
timely payment 
A-2 P-2 E-2 Very good grade. Issues assigned 
this rating reflect an assurance of 
timely payment slightly less in 
degree than the strongest issues 
A-3 P-3 E-3 Good grade. Commercial paper 
assigned this rating has a 
satisfactory degree of assurance for 
timely payment but the margin of 
safety is not as great as in the 
case of the two higher categories 
B Not prime - Issues rated 'B' on Standard & Poor's 
system are regarded as having only an 
adequate capacity for timely payment. 
Such capacity, however, may be 
damaged by changing conditions or 
short-term advertisites. 
Issues rated 'not prime' on Moody's 
system are simply those which do not 
f al 1 within the prime rating 
categories 
C E-4 This rating is assigned to short-term 
debt obligations with a doubtful 
capacity for payment 
D This rating indicates that the issuer 
is either in default or is expected 
to be in default upon maturity. 
Source: Compiled from Standard & Poor's Credit Overview International; 
Moody's Short-term Market Record, and uroRat ng's 
Eurorating i empört 
Note: 1+ sign denotes the top range of the specific rating 
category 
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Before attempting to determine whether credit ratings affect the 
trading levels of an issue (which implies that the market's perceived 
rating of the issue was in fact different to the actual rating) it is 
necessary to determine the respective levels at which different rated 
issues trade. 
In order to conduct this analysis the following tables have been 
compiled from data provided by Merrill Lynch, Standard & Poor's, Moody's 
Investors Service, EuroRatings, and International Financing Review. 
Tables 5.5 to 5.8 show the average trading levels (defined as the 
average monthly bid levels) relative to the market for first time 
issuers with different quality and combinations of ratings. The 
'market' in each table is not the entire euronote issuance market, which 
includes sovereigns, banks and corporates. Rather, the 'market' is 
defined as the issuer's own sector of the entire market, ie the 'market' 
for a bank issuer is the bank sector of the euronote market, and the 
market for a corporate issuer is the corporate sector of the euronote 
market. Yields in the euronote market have been declining. To take 
account of this trend all issuer's trading levels are given relative to 
the 'market' average for the same time period. 
From Table 5.5 we can see that on average issuers entering the 
market with a 'First prime' rating saw their notes trade at 12.57 basis 
points below their respective market averages. From Table 5.6 we can 
see that gaining a second 'First prime' rating appears to have made 
little difference to this trading level; the average trading levels here 
being 12.51 basis points below their respective market averages. No 
issuers came to the market with three 'First prime' ratings. 
Table 5.7 shows, more significantly, that on average those issuers 
entering the market with one or more 'second prime' ratings (A2, P2, E2) 
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Table 5.5 AV trading level relative to the market for first time 
issuers with one 'first prime' rating (ie Al, PI or EI) 
Issuer Rating 
AV issue bid of 
month after issue 
AV market bid of 
month after issue Difference 
Bergen Bank P-1 LIBID + . 02 LIBOR + 0.0471 -0.1521 
Citicorp P-1 LIBID LIBOR - 0.0127 -0.1123 
Compagnie P-1 LIBID + 0.08 LIBOR + 0.0570 -0.1020 
Bancaire 
Exportfinans P-1 LIBID - 0.04 LIBOR - 0.0698 -0.0952 
Fleet fin P-1 LIBID + 0.08 LIBOR + 0.0564 -0.1014 Group 
Household P-1 LIBID + 0.03 LIBOR + 0.0570 -0.1520 Fin Corp 
ICI P-1 LIBID LIBOR + 0.0766 -0.2016 
Landesbank P-1 LIBID + 0.02 LIBOR - 0.0310 -0.0740 
Schleswig- 
holstein 
Nat- P-1 LIBOR - 0.04 LIBOR + 0.0609 -0.1010 Nederlanden 
Security P-1 LIBOR + 0.05 LIBOR + 0.14 -0.09 Pacific Corp 
Unilever P-1 LIBID - 0.01 LIBOR + 0.0721 -0.2070 
United P-1 LIBID + 0.05 LIBOR + 0.0225 -0.0975 Technologies 
Corporation 
Volvo AB P-1 LIBID LIBOR + 0.0560 -0.1810 
MEAN P-1 LIBID + 0.186 LIBOR + 0.0409 -0.1257 
Note: LIBID is 1/8 per cent below LIBOR 
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Table 5.6 AV trading level relative to the market for first time 
issuers with two 'first prime' ratings (A1/P1, Al/El or 
P1/E1) 
AV issue bid of AV market bid of 
Issuer Rating month after issue month after issue Difference 
BP A-1+/P-1 LIBID LIBOR + 0.0535 -0.1785 
Christiania A-1+/P-1 LIBID + 0.02 LIBOR - 0.0198 -0.0802 Bank 
Commonwealth A-1+/P-1 LIBID LIBOR + 0.0193 -0.1443 Bank of 
Australia 
Den Norske A-1+/P-1 LIBID + 0.03 LIBOR + 0.0307 -0.1257 Creditbank 
EBS Finance A-1+/P-1 LIBID + 0.05 LIBOR + 0.0511 -0.1261 Corp 
GMAC A-1+/P-1 LIBID + 0.01 LIBOR + 0.0217 -0.1367 
Merrill A-1+/P-1 LIBID + 0.05 LIBOR + 0.0557 -0.1307 Lynch 
National A-1+/P-1 LIBID + 0.11 LIBOR + 0.0340 -0.05 Mutual Group 
Finance Ltd 
Svenska A-1+/P-1 LIBID + 0.04 LIBOR + 0.069 -0.154 Handelsbanken 
MEAN A-1+/P-1 LIBID + 0.0344 LIBOR + 0.0350 -0.1251 
Note: No issuers came to the market with three 'first prime' ratings 
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Table 5.7 AV trading level relative to the market for first-time 
issuers with one or more 'second prime' ratings (A2, P2, 
or E2) 
AV issue bid AV market bid 
Issuer Rating month after issue month after issue Difference 
Bowater P-2 LIBOR + 0.06 LIBOR + 0.0489 +0.0111 
Deere & Co P-2 
Kansas City P-2 
Power & Light 
Piedmont P-2 
Aviation Inc 
Tenneco Inc P-2 
Calfed A-2/P-2 
LIBOR + 0.07 LIBOR + 0.0536 +0.0164 
LIBOR + 0.15 LIBOR + 0.0885 +0.0615 
LIBOR + 0.15 LIBOR + 0.05532 +0.0947 
LIBOR + 0.08 LIBOR + 0.0557 +0.0243 
LIBOR + 0.15 LIBOR + 0.28 +0.122 
Mean LIBOR + 0.11 LIBOR + 0.0550 +0.055 
saw their notes trade at 5.5 basis points above their respective market 
averages. 
The premium above the market is even more significant for those 
issuers entering the market with one or more 'third prime' rating (see 
Table 5.8) (A3, P3, E3): on average 13.45 basis points above the average 
market level. This figure must be tempered by the fact that only two 
issuers initially entered the market with 'third prime' ratings. 
With the results from Tables 5.5 to 5.8 we can compile a table of 
the levels at which these rated issuers' notes have traded. These 
figures are presented in Table 5.9. They also give an indication of 
where (using our data) different rated issues might be expected to 
trade. Again yields are presented against average market yields as 
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Table 5.8 AV trading level relative to the market for first-time 
issuers with one or more 'third prime' ratings (A3, P3, 
E3) 
AV issue bid of AV market bid of 
Issuer Rating month after issue month after issue Difference 
General P-3 LIBOR + 0.22 LIBOR + 0.0379 +0.1820 
Instrument 
Corp 
Northern P-3 LIBOR + 0.15 LIBOR + 0.063 +0.087 
Indiana 
Public 
Service Co 
Mean P-3 LIBOR + 0.185 LIBOR + 0.0505 +0.1345 
Table 5.9 Average issue yields relative to average market yields for 
different rated issuers 
Rating Average yield relative to average market yield 
Basis points 
A1(+) or P1 or E1(+) -12.57 
A-1(+)/P-1, A-1(+)/E-1(+) -12.51 
or P-1/E-1(+) 
A-2 and/or P2 and/or E2 +5.5 
A3 and/or P3 and/or E3 +13.45 
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opposed to a pricing benchmark in order to take account of the trend of 
declining yields in the euronote market. 
It is important to note at this juncture, however, that overall 
levels of interest rates also play an important role in determining the 
risk premium an issuer will have to pay. To take the US commercial 
paper market as an example, in periods of relative stability and low 
interest rates, the spread in the commercial paper market for issuers 
with the highest credit ratings (ie A-1(+) and P1) and lesser credits 
(i e A2/P2 or lower) are relatively narrow (eg 0.10 to 0.20 per cent or 
10 to 20 basis points). In periods of high rates and volatility (eg the 
early 1980s) these spreads were in excess of 100 basis points (Oricoli 
and Farrow, 1987, p 10). Figure 5.10 provides an historical sumnary of 
Al/P1 versus A2/P2 spreads in the US commercial paper market. 
Figure 5.10 Interest rate spreads on Al/P1 rated finance companies 
versus A2/P2 rated finance companies on a discount basis 
12-T I., 
lo 
O 
J 
uK 
6 
4 
200- 
IIKi 
2 
N 
H 
m0 
-iro 
1982 1983 1984 1995 
1 
190 
Mas. Min. Avg Std. Last IM 19 -5.20 48.29 33.93 9.99 
Source: Data Resources Inc. 
10 
B 
6 
4 
: 00 
IOU 
0 
- 100 
189 
One interesting point which arises from Figure 5.10 is that in 
periods of falling interest rates (particularly 1984 and 1987, precisely 
when the euronote market was growing rapidly) the spreads between Al/P1 
and A2/P2 rated paper in the United States varied between ten to twenty 
basis points. Our own analysis of the euronote market provides us with 
a mean spread of eighteen basis points between A1/P1 issuers and A2/P2 
issuers, not dissimilar to the situation in the United States between 
1984 and 1987. The euronote market, however, has never experienced a 
rising interest rate environment (bear market). It is quite possible 
that the premiums charged between A1/P1 paper and A2/P2 paper in such an 
environment may widen substantially. 
To return to our own analysis, Table 5.9 shows quite clearly that 
different rated issuers sell their notes at different yields. The 
premium is most obvious between 'first prime' and 'second prime' rated 
issues -a difference of over eighteen basis points on average. The 
premium between 'second prime' and 'third prime' rated issuers is less 
obvious, but still significant, eight basis points on average. 
Interestingly, an application of a second 'first prime' rating 
appears to make little difference to the average trading level of 
issuers' notes. 
These results are interesting, but they tell us little about 
whether ratings affect the trading levels of different issues. We still 
do not know whether these ratings have altered trading levels by 
communicating to the market that the previously 'perceived' credit 
quality of certain issues was incorrectly assessed. Nor do we have any 
indication that ratings may have merely evidenced or confirmed the 
previously 'perceived' credit quality of certain issues, in which case 
trading levels will have remained unaltered. If the first could be 
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shown to have happened, there would be room for argument that credit 
ratings may make it easier for investors to assess correctly the credit 
quality of certain issues. In this scenario credit ratings may help to 
contain any increase in systemic risk which the growth of the euronote 
market may have contributed towards. If the second scenario could be 
shown to have happened, there would be little grounds for arriving at 
such a conclusion (at least not on this basis). 
It is to this question that we now turn. Table 5.10 shows the 
effect that a 'first prime' rating has on the bid yield of a previously 
unrated issuer (already issuing in the market) relative to the market 
bid yield. Before the application of the rating the bid yield at which 
the issues traded would have been determined mainly by the 'perceived' 
credit quality of that issuer: in other words, by the issuer's 
'perceived rating'. What is clear from Table 5.10 is that the 
application of a'first prime' rating made virtually no difference to 
the bid yields at which the issues traded. This suggests that credit 
ratings here merely confirmed what the market already believed and so no 
adjustment was necessary. This conclusion is supported by the results 
of Tables 5.11 and 5.12. These tables show respectively that the 
application of a second and then third 'first prime' rating make 
virtually no difference to the average bid yields at which the issues 
traded. 
Only two isuers who came to the market initially without a rating 
then received one or more 'second prime' ratings or less. These issuers 
are MCORP, who received a rating of P-2, and Northern Indiana Public 
Service Company, who received a rating of P-3. Prior to the ratings 
both issuers were trading at levels different to those at which, on our 
data, those ratings would suggest. 
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On application of the ratings both issuers average bid yields moved 
closer to the average bid yields for those ratings: from 14 basis points 
above the average market yield to 9 basis points above the average 
market yield for MCORP (the average trading level for P-2 issuers being 
5.5 basis points above the market on our data), and from 15 basis points 
above the average market yield to 13 basis points above the average 
market yield for Northern Indiana Public Services Corporation (the 
average trading level for P-3 issuers being 13.45 basis points above the 
market on our data). 
Only two issuers trading with two 'first prime' ratings have then 
received a third 'first prime' rating. The effect of receiving a third 
'first prime' rating on the movement in their average bid yields 
relative to the market average bid yield is shown in Table 5.12. 
Our data for previously unrated issuers who then received 'second' 
or 'third prime' ratings is obviously sparce - only two issuers. We may 
tentatively argue that credit ratings in the euronote makret, as a means 
of communicating credit risk effectively and so containing any possible 
increase in systemic risk, may be more significant at the lower quality 
end of the market. If we 1 ook back at Tables 5.4 and 5.6 we must 
conclude that, on our data, credit ratings appear to have had little 
effect on the first two categories of ratings. In these higher quality 
categories credit ratings appear to be merely confirming the market's 
'perceived rating'. It may be in the latter two categories that credit 
ratings may help to contain any possible increase in systemic risk 
brought about by the growth of the euronote market. We do not claim to 
have proven this point, merely to have used all the existing data, part 
of which tends to support it. 
195 
5.7.3 The effect of the 1987 stock market crash on the eurocommercial 
paper market 
Since our analysis of the effect of credit ratings in the 
eurocommerci al paper market the world's equity markets have experienced 
a severe bear market climate. It will be necessary for us to analyse 
briefly the effect of the bear market in equities on the eurocommercial 
paper market to determine whether our results to date need now to be 
amended. 
On 11th October 1987 the world's major stock markets experienced a 
severe decline: the beginning of the 1987/88 bear market in equities. 
This decline in the equity markets led to a 'flight into quality'. 
Investors pulled out of the falling equity markets and placed their 
money into high quality, short-term paper. The best sovereign issuers 
such as Sweden and the French state names, obtained rates as low as 35 
basis points below LIBID immediately after the crash compared to rates 
of between fifteen and eighteen basis points before the crash. Table 
5.13 presents the average price levels at which sovereign paper traded 
in the three months prior to 22nd October 1987, the average price in the 
week following 22nd October 1987 and the average price in the three 
month period since 22nd October 1987. 
As can be seen from Table 5.13, bid yields in the sovereign sector 
of the eurocommercial paper market fell sharply following the October 
crash, indicating a sharp rise in demand for sovereign paper. One 
reason for this increase in demand was that, at the time, central banks 
(which are prominent buyers of sovereign paper) had large reserves of 
dol 1 ar funds to invest as a result of heavy intervention to support the 
dollar on the foreign exchange markets. 
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Interestingly, however, the funds that rushed into this sector of the 
market as the equity markets fel 1 do not appear to have returned once 
the equity markets eased in early 1988. Although Table 5.13 shows some 
increase in yields (fall in prices) in this sector of the market since 
the initial steep fall in yields (rise in prices), the market has still 
remained well below its pre-crash levels. This seems to indicate that 
much of the 'panic money' which flowed into the sovereign sector of the 
eurocommercial paper market after the October equity crash has remained 
in that market. 
The corporate and bank sectors of the eurocommercial paper market 
also strengthened following the equity crash, although to a lesser 
extent than did the sovereign sector of the market. Interestingly, as 
Table 5.14 shows, the spread between top quality (ie A-1+/P-1/E-1+) 
paper and lesser rated paper has not widened substantially because of 
the crash, although absolute levels have fallen in line with the market. 
This indicates that all sectors of the eurocommercial paper market have 
benefited from the bear market in equities. 
Table 5.14 The effect of the stock market crash of 1987 on the spread 
between top rated and lesser rated eurocomnercial paper 
Rating category 
Av trading level 
of 3 month period 
prior to the crash 
Av trrading level 
of 3 month period 
after the crash 
A-1+ and/or P1 and/or E-1+ LIBOR-12 LIBOR-15 
A-2 and/or P2 and/or E-2 LIBOR+5 LIBOR+2 
A-3 and/or P3 and/or E-3 LIBOR+14 LIBOR+12 
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As can be seen from Table 5.14 the spread between first prime rated 
and second prime rated paper has remained the same at 17 basis points 
before and after the crash. The spread between second prime rated and 
third prime rated paper has widened slightly from 9 basis points before 
the crash to 10 basis points after. It would appear, therefore, that 
although third prime rated paper has suffered slightly because of the 
flight out of equi ties and in to quality short-term paper, al 1 other 
sectors have benefited from the crash. 
5.7.4 Sunnary 
It was stated at the beginning of this section of the chapter that 
to the extent that investors in euronotes are ill-equipped to analyse 
credit risk, systemic risk could be increased. We stated that one 
possible way of containing any increase in systemic risk from this 
cause, may be to rate euronotes and eurocommercial paper. Ratings would 
communicate to the market whether its initital (perceived rating) credit 
assessment of the borrower (as determined by the bid yield) was in fact 
correct. If the actual credit rating was different to the market's 
'perceived' credit rating, spreads on the bid yield should change. If 
the actual credit rating coincided with the market's perceived rating, 
spreads should not alter. 
Our analysis has shown that credit ratings in the eurocommercial 
paper and euronote market, to date, appear to make little, if any, 
difference to the bid levels at which a borrower's notes trade. This 
would seem to imply that credit ratings in the market coincide closely 
with the market's perceived rating, at least in the high quality 
categories. There is, however, some indication that ratings may be more 
effective in the lower quality categories. On our data, ratings of 
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A2/P2 (or E2) or below, moved the issuers' bid yields significantly. 
This seems to indicate that in these lower rated categories the 
market's 'perceived' rating was different to the actual creditworthiness 
of the borrower. Ratings, here, may be more effective in containing any 
increase in systemic risk which the growth of the euronote market may 
have contributed towards. This conclusion is made tentatively because 
of the paucity of data in these lower rated categories. 
Although the stock market crash of 1987 appears to have made little 
difference to the spread between top rated and lower rated borrowers, it 
is not insignificant that the eurocommerci al paper market, on the whole, 
benefited from the crash. Traditionally, funds have flowed into gold 
and gilt-edged stocks in times of market recession, thereby restricting 
demand for corporate debt. The eurocommerci al paper market appears to 
have provided an alternative home for this 'panic money': so keeping 
funds within the financial system. It could, therefore, be argued that 
the eurocommerci al paper market has helped to contain any increase in 
systemic risk which the collapse of the equity markets may have caused. 
5.8 Su=ary and Conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to examine features of the 
eurocommercial paper market that may affect systemic risk. The features 
examined were those of regulation, trading versus placement, clearing 
procedures, and credit ratings. Several conclusions may be drawn from 
this chapter. 
It is clear that the growth of commercial paper world-wide 
represents a fundamental change in the funding patterns of large 
corporations . 
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The application of regulation (in the form of specific risk-assets 
ratios) does not appear to have increased fee levels for the euronote 
market or the different sectors of the market. Fee levels have 
continued on a steady, if somewhat downward, trend. Any possible 
reduction in systemic risk that may have resulted from the transferral 
of capital requirements to higher fee levels does not appear to have 
materialised. A case has subsequently been made for the introduction of 
a portfolio-based risk asset ratio system in relation to the portfolio 
structure of a bank's assets. This point will be returned to in 
Chapters 9 to 11. 
The supposed liquidity of euronotes is questionable. The fact that 
an asset is marketable does not imply that it is liquid. Further, the 
fact that an asset is tradeable does not mean that capital to provide 
against potential losses can be reduced. The effect of a bear market 
with trading spreads widening could be disasterous for underwriting 
banks. As rates begin to rise, placing banks may find it increasingly 
difficult to place paper with investors. Notes will, therefore, be 
returned to underwriting banks just when they are shortest of funds. 
Under such a scenario systemic risk could be increased. 
The euronote/eurocommercial paepr market has over US$ 60 bil lion of 
notes outstanding at any time. However there are over US$ 150 billion 
of facilities signed. If most of these facilities were to be drawn down 
then the clearance of even a proportion of the successful issuers could 
cause a major settlement failure as the clearing houses may be unable to 
handle such high capacity. Funds required immediately may be delayed 
for weeks, possibly causing systemic damage. 
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Credit ratings in the eurocommercial paper and euronote market 
appear to make little, if any, difference to the bid levels at which 
borrowers' notes trade. Ratings may, however, be more effective in the 
lower quality categories. Ratings here may be more effective in 
containing any increase in systemic risk which the growth of the 
euronote market may have contributed towards. 
Furthermore, although the stock market crash of 1987 did not appear 
to affect the spread between first prime-rated and lower-rated paper, 
the eurocommercial paper market did provide a haven for 'panic money' in 
times of equity market crisis. To this extent the existence of a mature 
eurocommercial paper market may contribute to the stability of the 
financial system and so reduce systemic risk. 
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Appendix 5.1 Regulatory approaches to NIF underwriting commitments* 
Belgium: No capital adequacy requirements for underwriting 
commitments or off-balance-sheet business of this 
kind. Changes to the requirements are under 
consideration by the Commission Bancaire. 
Canada: Included in capital requirements in principle. 
Changes are under consideration by the Inspector 
General of Banks. 
France: Included among off-balance-sheet items subject to 
the solvency ratio with a wei ght of 5 per cent. If 
the facility is for a bank and 25 per cent if it is 
for a non-bank. 
Germany: The supervisory authorities have proposed that 
underwriting commitments should be made subject to 
capital adequacy requirements with a weight of 50 
per cent. Hearings on this proposal will be held 
shortly. 
Italy: There are no capital adequacy requirements in Italy. 
Banks are subject to a rule that 'credi ti di firma' 
in 1 ire and foreign currency should not exceed 15 
per cent of total deposits (excluding interbank). 
Although the issuance of NIFs does not come under 
these ceilings, banks in practice consider NIFs as 
'crediti di firma'. 
Japan: At present claims on non-residents must not exceed 
14 times capital. As from the beginning of May 1985 
the authorities asked the Japanese banks to report, 
on a trial basis, their calculated risk asset ratio 
with the intention of introducing certain capital 
adequacy requirements in the future. Commitments 
under NIFs have a weighting of 30 per cent in this 
calculation. This compares with a weighting of 100 
per cent for medium and long-term loans. 
Luxembourg: No capital requirements for off-balance-sheet 
business. 
Netherl ands: Underwriting commitments attract a weight of 50 per 
cent in the computation of solvency ratios. 
Sweden: No capital adequacy requirements for underwriting 
commitments on off-balance-sheet business of this 
kind. Changes are under consideration. 
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Appendix 5.1 Regulatory approaches to NIF underwriting commitments* 
(continued) 
Switzerland: Guarantees are generally included within capital 
adequacy tests but commitments to lend may not be. 
Banks regard NIF underwriting commitments as 
commitments to lend 
United Kingdom: Holdings of notes are subject to capital 
requirements on the same basis as other loans. 
Commitments are subject to a risk asset weighting of 
50 per cent. 
United States: Proposals for the inclusion of some off-balance- 
sheet items in risk asset ratio calcul ations were 
disclosed in January 1986. Commitments under NIFs 
would attract a weighting of 30 per cent. 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (1986b, p 36) 
Note: * In the absence of precise guidelines from regulatory 
authorities the treatment of NIFs in measurement of 
capital adequacy may depend in some courºtries on whether 
they are reported to the supervisory authorities as 
guarantees or commitments to lend 
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Appendix 5.2 Mean monthly drawn and undrawn costs for the euronote 
market for January 1985 to December 1986 
Months Undrawn cost Drawn cost 
basis points basis points 
1 12.8533 31.8333 
2 13.9067 36.9067 
3 12.7767 30.1833 
4 12.5500 32.2967 
5 10.9533 30.3400 
6 14.6233 36.5800 
7 14.7533 41.9100 
8 13.6100 33.8600 
9 17.1333 43.7533 
10 12.5867 35.0467 
11 13.5000 32.0233 
12 13.5867 30.0967 
13 11.6167 26.7300 
14 12.5433 32.2033 
15 14.3733 35.9200 
16 10.5700 30.1233 
17 11.3933 32.0967 
18 21.5000 43.1333 
19 10.0500 34.2833 
20 20.2200 41.1967 
21 11.5367 26.0600 
22 9.4433 28.0433 
23 9.2700 23.9867 
24 10.2833 27.8133 
Source: compiled from County NatWest Capital Markets' and Bank of 
America's Euronote pricing data bases 
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Appendix 5.3 Mean monthly drawn and undrawn costs for the sovereign 
sector of the euronote market for January 1985 to 
December 1986 
Months Undrawn cost 
basis points 
Drawn cost 
basis points 
1 10.67 23.67 
2 19.14 50.39 
3 8.25 21.75 
4 19.07 46.57 
5 9.75 26.75 
6 9.23 29.94 
7 8.25 27.00 
8 9.23 29.94 
9 13.95 40.62 
10 6.80 29.93 
11 9.78 29.16 
12 9.23 29.94 
13 7.66 23.08 
14 11.28 30.40 
15 8.07 30.57 
16 9.23 29.94 
17 5.91 17.47 
18 9.23 29.94 
19 7.00 39.50 
20 9.23 29.94 
21 4.97 16.22 
22 5.89 16.89 
23 5.50 15.50 
24 3.42 15.92 
Source: compiled for County NatWest Capital Markets' and Bank of 
America's euronote pricing data bases 
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Appendix 5.4 Mean monthly drawn and undrawn costs for the corporate 
sector of the euronote market for January 1985 to 
December 1986 
Months Undrawn cost 
basis points 
Drawn cost 
basis points 
1 14.00 33.69 
2 11.32 34.32 
3 13.16 33.35 
4 11.45 31.94 
5 12.86 35.27 
6 16.21 41.37 
7 14.00 46.72 
8 14.68 36.19 
9 13.49 36.68 
10 14.11 37.53 
11 12.60 33.27 
12 19.83 42.40 
13 13.76 33.68 
14 17.78 40.14 
15 12.87 30.01 
16 11.10 31.55 
17 13.60 37.59 
18 13.81 37.00 
19 10.65 33.35 
20 13.35 33.68 
21 13.64 35.96 
22 10.91 35.91 
23 10.21 33.42 
24 10.51 32.07 
Source: compiled from County NatWest Capital Markets' and Bank of 
America's euronote pricing data bases 
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Appendix 5.5 Mean monthly drawn and undrawn costs for the bank sector 
of the euronote market for January 1985 to December 1986 
Months Undrawn cost 
basis points 
Drawn cost 
basis points 
1 13.89 38.14 
2 11.26 26.01 
3 16.92 35.45 
4 7.13 18.38 
5 10.25 29.00 
6 18.43 38.43 
7 22.01 52.01 
8 16.92 35.45 
9 23.96 53.96 
10 16.85 37.68 
11 18.12 33.64 
12 11.70 17.95 
13 13.43 23.43 
14 8.57 26.07 
15 22.18 47.18 
16 11.38 28.88 
17 14.67 41.23 
18 41.46 62.46 
19 12.50 30.00 
20 38.08 59.97 
21 16.00 26.00 
22 11.53 31.33 
23 12.10 23.04 
24 16.92 35.45 
Source: compiled from County NatWest Capital Markets' and Bank of 
America's euronote pricing data bases 
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Appendix 5.6 
WMJSTR, AI S 
Rating worksheets 
Illustrated on these pages are the financial analysis work- 
sheets used by Standard & Poor's in the rating process 
for industrial companies. 
COMPANY: 
Date 
Net Sales 
Pretax Income 
Tax Rau 
Net Income 
FIXED CHARGE COVERAGE: 
Afttr Income Tar 
Before Income Tax 
Before Inct. Rents 
Net Income 
Adlustmente: 
Minority Interest 
Unremitted Equity Income 
N 0 
f 
Adjusted Net Income 
W 
u 
tc Interest Char s Available 
v Taxes 
Pretax Avtdeble 
Rentals 
Interest Cher l 
Gross Charges 
Adjusted Net Income 
Taxes 
Available 
OPERATING ANALYSIS- 
Oper. Income/Nat Sales 
N 
Return on Permanent Capital 
2 
u z 
Receivable Turnover 
O 
Inventory Turnover ". 
Finished Goods/Net Sales 
OPERATING 
ANALYSIS 
Appendix 5.6 continued 
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ANALYSIS 
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pITALIZATIOI 
*"NALVSIS 
Dole 
LfOUIDITY ANALYSIS 
x x x S S S 
Acid Test 
Current Polio 
Cash Ftcw1LTD 
O 
I- 
Cash Flo-/T010 Debt 
a 
o 
Cash Flow/Net Debt 
_ 
r 
CASH FLOW DATA: 
ed utted Net Income 
De Meaetmn 
Nnn, Cvrrem Debrred Teses 
Cash Flow 
C&%h Flow 
M, nus: Repleement Degee. 
_ 
Minus: Other Freed Outlays 
F rN Ca+h Flow 
Data 
CAPITALIZATION: 
STD/Total Debt a Equity 
>r A A " U U 
LTD/LTD a Equity 
p Total Debt/Toul Debt " Equity 
.F .< 
Nit Dobt Adlueled 
Capdaluahon 
Total Limb, /Tang Net Worth 
LONG-TERM DEBT: 
Mo. r a -S. eured LTD 
Unsecured LTD 
CeP-telieed Aenl1 
Subordrroted LTD 
V 
N 
Z To il Lon . Term Debt 
F LTD MAIURI V STRU UR 
.d Year 1 
Veer 2 
Vest 7 
Vest 4 
Pen 5 
OFF BAL. SHEET IAB.: 
E  ternH Debt of Captive Fm. Subs. 
Guuentnt 
Teºs or Pay Contreetr 
J Thiou h ut d Dthcmncy 
= Unfunded Pennon Benefit, 
< ClO? Iht? d Rent1 
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Appendix 5.7 Credit ratings in the euronote market to April 1987 
Company 
1st 
rating Date Notes issued 
2nd 3rd 
rating Date rating Date 
Allied Signal P-1 30.9.85 No issue ---- 
Inc 
Arizona Public P-2 26.1.82 No issue ---- 
Services Co 
Associates P-1 21.7.72 No issue A-1+ 27.6.86 -- 
Corp of 
N America 
Atlantic P-1 4.2.72 No issue ---- 
Richfield Co 
Australia & NZ P-1 25.11.86 No issue A-1+ 5.12.86 -- 
Bank Group 
Australia Ind P-1 12.5.81 No issue ---- 
Devpt Corp 
Australian P-1 12.5.84 No data ---- 
Wheat Board available 
Avon Capital P-1 1.9.83 No issue ---- 
Corp 
BP Capital BV P-1 21.2.86 - A-1+ 28.2.86 E-1+ 9.3.87 
Baker Inter- P-2 1.4.86 No issue ---- 
national Corp 
Bank of New P-1 15.12.86 No issue ---- 
Zealand 
Bankers Trust P-1 14.7.72 No issue ---- 
New York Corp 
Banque Indosuez P-1 7.10.83 No issue ---- 
Bergen Bank P-1 27.2.85 - A-1+ 5.9.86 -- 
Black & Decker P-2 26.1.83 No issue ---- 
Corp 
Borden Inc P-1 8.3.74 No issue ---- 
Bowater P-2 3.12.84 - ---- 
Incorporated 
CBS Inc P-2 3.7.85 No issue ---- 
C IT Group P-1 21.1.72 No issue ---- 
Holdings Inc 
CSR Finance Ltd P-1 20.3.85 - A-1 3.5.85 -- 
Cadbury P-1 19.8.86 No issue A-1 19.9.86 -- 
Schweppes plc 
Caisse Nation- P-1 11.4.77 No issue ---- 
ale de Tele 
Christiania 
Bank P-1 3.10.83 No issue A-1+ 7.3.86 -- 
Chrysler Fin- P-2 4.1.85 No issue A-2 26.9.86 -- 
cial Corp 
Cigna Corp P-1 27.8.82 No issue ---- 
Citicorp P-1 8.9.72 - ---- 
Citizens & P-1 30.4.85 No issue ---- 
Southern 
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Appendix 5.7 Credit ratings in the euronote market to April 1987 
Company 
1st 
rating Date Notes issued 
2nd 
rating 
3rd 
Date rating Date 
Colgate-Palm- P-1 17.11.80 No issue - --- 
ol i ve Co 
Commercial P-2 14.11.86 No issue 
Credit Co 
Commerzbank AG P-1 22.12.86 No issue - --- Commonwealth P-1 21.1.83 - A-1+ 15.3.85 -- Bank of 
Australia 
Comsat P-1 31.8.83 No issue - --- Compagnie P-1 3.4.86 - A-1+ 24.10.86 -- Bancaire 
Cooper Inds Inc P-2 24.4.85 No issue - --- Copenhagen P-1 19.12.86 No issue - - Handelsbanken 
Corestates P-1 23.4.84 No issue - --- Capital Corp 
Credit National P-1 28.10.83 No data - --- 
available 
Deere & Co P-2 22.1.85 - - --- Deere (John) P-2 22.1.85 - - --- Credit Co 
Den Norske P-1 17.9.81 - A-1+ 26.7.85 -- Creditbank 
Kingdom of P-1 13.8.85 No issue E-1 9.3.87 -- Denmark 
Dominion P-1 14.12.83 No issue - --- Resources Inc 
EBS Finance P-1 23.8.85 - A-1+ 23.8.85 -- Corp (Coca 
Cola) 
Eastman Kodak P-1 23.7.84 No issue E-1 9.3.87 -- Co 
Eksportfinans P-1 11.3.80 - A-1+ 20.2.87 -- A /S 
Electricite de P-1 21.6.84 No issue A-1+ 13.2.87 -- France 
Emerson P-1 29.11.74 No issue - --- Electrical Co 
ENEL Commercial P-1 7.1.87 No issue A-1 16.1.87 -- Paper 
Ensearch Corp P-2 19.4.85 No issue - --- Equitable P-1 21.1.80 No issue A-1 7.2,86 -- Life (USA) 
Ericsson Tel e- P-2 4.12.85 No issue - --- fan AB 
European Invest P-1 5.12.84 No issue - --- 
-ment Bank 
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Company 
1st 
rating Date Notes issued 
2nd 3rd 
rating Date rating Date 
Export Devpt P-1 22.12.78 No issue ---- 
Corp 
Finnish Export P-1 12.1.83 No issue ---- 
Credit 
First Kentucky P-1 10.2.84 No issue ---- 
Nat Corp 
Fleet Fin Group P-1 18.1.84 No issue ---- 
Ford Motor P-1 17.12.84 No issue A-1+ 26.9.86 -- 
Credit Co 
Gasunie P-1 10.1.86 No issue ---- 
General P-1 14.1.81 No issue ---- 
Dynamics Corp 
General P-1 2.11.73 No issue ---- 
Electrical Co 
General Instr- P-3 9.5.85 - ---- 
ment Corp 
General Motors P-1 30.11.71 - A-1+ 27.6.86 -- 
Accept Corp 
Gotabanken P-1 19.12.86 No issue A-1 8.11.85 E-1 9.3.87 
Gothenburg P-1 20.4.82 No issue A-1+ 1.2.86 -- 
(City of) 
Hammermi 11 P-2 29.9.80 No issue ---- 
Paper Co 
Hertz Corp P-2 16.7.81 No issue ---- 
Holiday Inns P-2 16.3.83 No issue ---- 
Inc 
Hospital Corp P-2 4.2.86 No issue ---- 
of America 
Household P-1 10.3.72 - E-1 9.3.87 -- 
Fin Corp 
IBM Credit Corp P-1 4.6.81 No issue ---- 
ICI Finance plc P-1 30.1.78 - ---- 
ITT Finance P-1 29.10.75 No issue ---- 
Corp 
Investors in P-1 12.3.81 No issue ---- 
Industry 
Ireland A-1+ 7.11.86 T bills+63 P-1 4.12.86 E-1 9.3.87 
Kansalis Osake P-1 11.12.86 LIBID+0.01 -- E-1 9.3.87 
Pan kki 
Kansas City P-2 2.7.80 - ---- 
Power & Light 
Koch Industries P-2 22.11.85 No issue A-1 27.6.86 -- 
Inc 
Landesbank P-1 21.12.84 - -- 
Schleswig- 
holstein GZ 
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Company 
Ist 
rating Date Notes issued 
2nd 
rating 
3rd 
Date rating Date 
Lear Siegler NP 16.1.87 No issue - --- Inc 
Lockheed Corp P-2 31.7.86 No issue - --- 
Marriot Corp P-2 7.3.80 No issue - --- 
Maryland Nat P-1 15.12.79 No issue - --- 
Corp 
MCorp P-2 21.10.86 - - --- 
Merrill Lynch P-1 14.10.76 - A-1+ 5.2.86 -- 
& Co 
Midi antic P-1 21.5.84 No issue - --- 
Banks Inc 
Morgan Stanley P-1 4.10.86 No issue A-1+ 24.10.86 -- 
Group 
Nat Australia A-1 23.5.86 - P-1 5.12.86 -- 
Bank Ltd 
Nat Mutual Grp P-1 12.5.86 - A-1 25.7.86 
Finance Ltd 
Nat Nederlanden P-1 18.3.82 - - --- (US Holdings 
Inc) 
Nestle Capital P-1 14.7.80 No issue - --- 
Corp 
Govt of New P-1 26.9.86 - - - Zealand 
Nordbanken A-1 29.8.86 No issue P-1 19.12.86 -- 
Norddeutsche P-1 6.7.83 No issue - --- Landesbank GZ 
Nordic Invest- P-1 15.8.80 No issue - -- 
ment Bank 
Northern A-1 3.12.85 - P-3 14.12.85 -- 
Indiana Public 
Service Co 
Nynex Corp P-1 5.12.83 No issue - --- Occidental P-3 16.12.86 No issue - --- Petroleum Corp 
of California 
Oesterreichishe P-1 3.6.86 No issue - --- Landerbank 
Okobank P-1 19.6.86 No issue A-1 27.6.86 -- PHH Group Inc A-1+ 6.6.86 No issue P-1 19.6.86 E-1 9.3.87 
PPG Inds Inc P-1 8.9.72 No issue - --- Paccar Finance P-1 5.9.78 No issue - --- Corp 
Pacific P-1 2.6.72 No issue - --- Lighting Corp 
Pacificorp P-2 14.4.72 No issue A-2 23.5.86 -- Pennwalt Corp P-2 12.1.72 No issue - --- 
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Company 
1st 
rating Date Notes issued 
2nd 
rating 
3rd 
Date rating Date 
Piedmont P-2 27.9.85 - - --- 
Aviation Inc 
Post-och A-1 4.4.86 - P-1 19.12.86 -- 
Kredietbanken 
(PK Banken) 
Postipankki A-1+ 17.10.86 - P-1 11.12.86 -- 
Prudential P-1 19.4.82 No issue A-1 6.12.85 -- 
Funding Corp 
Queensl and P-1 20.10.83 No issue - --- 
Electricity 
Commission 
Reckitt & P-1 10.4.86 No issue A-1 18.4.86 -- 
Col eman 
Finance BV 
Redland Credit A-1 1.11.85 No issue P-1 16.12.85 -- Corp 
Renault Accept- P-1 11.10.77 No issue - --- 
ance BV 
Republic New P-1 25.8.80 No issue - --- York Corp 
Royal Insurance P-1 30.6.86 - A-1 7.86 -- 
plc 
SKF AB P-1 29.4.82 No issue - --- 
Scott Paper Co P-2 30.9.85 No issue - --- Security 
Pacific Corp P-1 21.9.73 - - --- SGA A-1 17.10.86 No issue P-1 29.10.86 -- Skandi a Inter- A-1+ 11.4.86 No issue P-1 12.5.86 -- 
national 
Capital Corp 
Sko pban k P-1 6.11.86 - - --- SNCF P-1 26.2.79 No issue - --- Southland Corp P-1 26.8.83 No issue - --- Spain P-1 23.8.85 - A-1+ 13.12.85 -- (Kingdom of) 
Sparekassen SDS P-1 27.8.86 No issue A-1 29.8.86 -- State Bank of A-1+ 2.5.86 - P-1 9.12.86 -- New South 
Wal es 
Svenska A-1+ 29.11.85 - P-1 19.12.85 -- Handelsbanken 
Swedbank P-1 19.12.86 No issue A-1 6.2.87 E-1+ 9.3.87 
Sweden P-1 25.8.86 - A-1+ 29.8.86 -- (Kingdom of) 
Tenneco Inc P-2 6.9.85 - - --- Texas Eastern P-1 5.12.84 No data - --- Corp available 
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1st 2nd 3rd 
Company rating Date Notes issued rating Date rating Date 
Thomson-Brandt P-1 29.8.86 No issue A-1 29.8.86 -- Internati onal 
BV 
Time Inc P-1 19.2.79 No issue E-1 9.3.87 -- Total Inter- P-2 27.1.84 No issue - - -- 
national Ltd 
Transamerica P-1 21.4.72 No issue - - -- Fin Corp 
Transcon- P-2 26.5.82 No issue - - -- tinental Gas 
Pipeline 
Travellers P-1 31.12.71 No issue - - -- Corp 
US Bancorp P-1 4.8.75 No issue - - -- UT Financial P-1 22.4.85 No issue - - -- Services Corp 
Unigate BV P-1 11.7.86 No issue A-1 18.7.86 E-1 9.3.87 
Unilever P-1 1.5.84 - E-1 9.3.87 -- Capital Corp 
Union Bank of P-1 11.12.86 LIBID+0.01 E-1 9.3.87 -- Finland 
Union Oil P-1 5.6.86 No issue E-1 9.3.87 -- Company of 
California 
United Tech- P-1 27.4.80 - - - -- 
nologies Corp 
Vermont Yankee P-1 29.10.85 No issue - - -- Power Corp 
Volvo AB P-1 15.8.80 - A-1+ 30.5.86 E-1 9.3.87 Washington Post P-1 4.8.80 No issue A-1 3.1.86 -- Wells Fargo P-1 14.7.72 No issue - - -- & Co 
Westpac Banking P-1 15.12.86 - - - -- Cor p 
Weyerhaeuser Co P-1 12.1.73 No issue - - -- 
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1st 
rating Date Notes 
2nd 3rd 
issued rating Date rating Date 
ASEA Capital A-1+ 30.1.87 No issue ---- 
Corp BV 
Banco Inter- A-1+ 3.1.86 No issue ---- 
national SNC 
Banco Itau SA A-1+ 19.12.86 No issue ---- 
Calfed Inc A-2/P-2 7.11.86 No issue ---- 
Eli Lilly & Co A-1+ 30.1.87 No issue ---- 
Kloeckner & Co A-1 26.9.86 No issue ---- 
Fin Services 
Kred i et ban k A-1 28.11.86 No issue ---- 
NV 
MCA Inc A-1 20.2.87 No issue ---- 
Mass Transit A-1 20.2.87 ----- 
Railway Corp 
Panasonic A-1+ 25.7.86 No issue ---- 
Finance BV 
Petrobras A-1+ 30.1.87 No issue ---- 
Pfizer Inter- A-1+ 4.7.86 No issue ---- 
national Bank 
The Upjohn Co A-1+ 21.11.86 No issue ---- 
Argyl Group plc E-2 9.3.87 ----- 
ESAB E-3+ 9.3.87 ----- 
Fisons Finance E-1 9.3.87 ----- 
BV 
Jaguar Inter- E-2+ 9.3.87 ----- 
national Fin 
Ladbroke Group E-2+ 9.3.87 ----- 
Finance BV 
NBS Finance E-1 9.3.87 No issue ---- 
Ltd 
Source: compiled from Standard & Poor's Credit Overview 
International; Moody's Short-term Market Record, Euro1 sting's 
EuroRating's Report and International Financing Review 
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PART TWO 
Introduction 
The first part of this study was mainly concerned with identifying 
areas of the euronote market that may impact on systemic risk, either to 
increase it or to reduce it. It was not suggested that any of the areas 
examined would contribute to an increase or reduction in systemic risk, 
merely that they have the operational potential to affect systematic 
risk under certain market conditions. The conditions are those of high 
risk/low return, i. e. where returns are insufficient to account for the 
risks incurred. 
The particular area of concern, as far as systemic risk is 
concerned, was identified as the underwriting of euronote facilities 
rather than the dealing and the placement of the underlying notes. To a 
certain extent the credit risk attached to investing in euronotes was 
seen to be reducable by the application of credit ratings in the lower 
qual ity sector of the market. In the higher quality sectors of the 
market credit risk appears to be more efficiently reflected in pricing. 
It is not insignificant that the euronote market has not suffered 
from the stock market crash of 1987. In most areas it has actual ly 
strengthened as funds flowed into the market. Traditionally funds have 
flowed into gold and gilt-edged stocks in times of market recession, so 
effectively restricting companies' ability to raise marketable debt as 
demand fell. The euronote market appears to have provided an 
alternative home for this 'panic money', thereby keeping funds within 
the financial system. In this respect it could be argued that the 
euronote market actually contributed to the stability of the financial 
system in times of capital market crisis and so reduced systemic risk. 
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As the stock market fell sharply in 1987, the euronote market 
provided a haven for investors' funds due to the desirable 
characteristics of euronotes/eurocommerci al paper, ie1 iqui di ty and 
short maturity paper. Under such circumstances euronote underwriters 
were redundant as demand outstripped supply. But what if a crisis was 
to occur in the euronote market? The first five chapters indicate that 
underwriting fees may be insufficient to reward underwriters for the 
risks they incur. In Chapter 3 1t was seen that euronote facilities 
carry considerably lower country risk premia than do eurocredits (the 
funding instrument that they are largely replacing). This will only 
increase systemic risk if these premia are insufficient. Nevertheless, 
the very size of the differences charged between risk premiums in the 
euronote market and those in the eurocredit market for the same 
borrowers (sometimes 50 basis points lower in the euronote market) could 
be a cause for concern, and they certainly suggest the need for a more 
detailed examination of underwriting practices in the euronote market. 
The concern with underwriting returns in the euronote market was 
further accentuated in Chapter 5. Prior to April 1985 there was no 
regulatory cost to underwriting euronotes. Following the application of 
risk asset ratios after April 1985 banks found themselves with a capital 
cost which had to be taken on to the balance sheet. These costs do not 
appear to have been passed on to borrowers in higher fees, but have been 
absorbed by the underwriting banks, thereby reducing further their 
already low renumeration on these facilities. 
From our first five chapters it would appear that, of the various 
features of a euronote facility, the practice of underwriting these 
facilities may be the feature most likely to lead to an increase in 
systemic risk. 
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The second part of this thesis will therefore concentrate mainly on 
underwriting practices in the euronote market. The aim of this part of 
the thesis is to determine whether the returns to underwriting banks in 
the euronote market justify the risks incurred. If they do then 
systemic risk is not increased. It may even be reduced. If they do 
not, systemic risk may be increased. If the second is found to be the 
case then it will necessary to determine why banks undertake to 
underwrite euronote facilities at returns which do not appear to justify 
the risks incurred. 
Various research methodologies are used to collect, test and 
investigate different data sets. 
Chapter 6 explains how semi-structured interviews were used to 
convey our concern to the market and to elicit their responses. We felt 
it necessary to determine whether the areas of concern identified were 
also areas of concern for market practitioners. The semi-structured 
interviews were used as an exercise to gather both qualitative and 
quantitative data. If we were to determine whether underwriting returns 
were inadequate it was necessary also to obtain quantitative data on 
underwriting fees on a market basis. Although it was known that certain 
banks and securities houses co 11 ected these data, the data were not 
publicly available. It was felt that simply writing and asking for such 
sensitive information would invariably fail and that a more personal 
approach - where our work could be presented to the 'keepers' of this 
information as evidence of our intent - would be more successful. This 
is also an accepted methodological approach in business research of this 
kind. 
The interviews were also used to gain a greater understanding of 
the operations of the market and to determine what market practitioners 
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believed to be an 'adequate' return for underwriting a euronote facility 
as well as to learn how such returns are calculated. Evidence is sought 
as to the major factors affecting the pricing of euronote facilities. 
Chapters 7 and 8 use the quantitative data collected through the 
semi-structured interviews to determine, on a simulation basis, whether 
returns to underwriting banks are adequate to compensate underwriters 
for the risks incurred through underwriting euronote facilities. 
Returns are viewed on a 'stand-alone' basis, ie outside of the customer 
relationship. In Chapter 7, returns to underwriters are calculated on a 
return on assets (ROA) basis, whereas in Chapter 8 returns are 
calculated on a return on exposure (ROX) basis. These were found to be 
the two major methodologies used in the market in order to calculate 
returns on underwriting facilities. They are explained in their 
respective chapters. The funding scenarios used in Chapters 7 and 8 are 
chosen not only to represent a feasible range of funding possibilities 
but also to highlight the systemic risk properties inherent in such 
funding scenarios and, indeed, in the application of the return 
methodologies themselves. A systemic gap is found to exist in the 
euronote market (the gap between required returns and actual returns). 
Chapter 9 reviews the bank and financial pricing literature to 
formulate two hypotheses to explain pricing in the euronote market. 
Evidence is drawn from the qualitative findings of the semi-structured 
interviews and the quantitative results of the simulation exercises to 
support the formulation of these hypotheses. 
The two hypotheses are then tested in Chapter 10 through 
naturalistic (participant observation fieldwork) research methodologies. 
In an ideal setting it might have been preferable to begin our fieldwork 
along the lines of naturalistic examination, using this as a stage to 
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identify loose hypotheses which could then be strengthened by more 
structured research at a later stage. Unfortunately, such naturalistic 
examination requires the observer to spend a considerable amount of time 
amongst the social agents being studied, but investment banks are high 
pressure and high risk environments. Not surprisingly, on reflection, 
an early approach to spend some time as an observer in these banks 
proved fruitless. It was only after initial contact, through semi- 
structured interviews, where the benefits of the study could be 
explained at first hand, that two banks agreed to allow such an 
incursion. The results of our period of observation revealed that a 
relationship pricing strategy is being employed by banks in the euronote 
market. 
Chapter 11 extends the case study approach used in Chapter 10 to 
examine the profitability systems in place in the National Westminster 
Bank with a view to determining whether a relationship pricing strategy 
can be feasibly employed in the euronote market. If the systems are 
found to be adequate for the employment of such a strategy, then the 
systemic gap identified in Chapter 8 may prove to be bridgeable. 
The study, therefore, employs a variety of research methodologies 
to collect data, formulate hypotheses and test these hypotheses. In 
this sense, the study has a triangulation aspect to it, ie exploratory 
data analysis and preliminary fieldwork; simulation exercises and 
formulation of hypotheses; and naturalistic research, case study and 
final data analysis and conclusions. This triangulation aspect is shown 
diagramatically in Figure A. 
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Figure A Triangulation of research methodology 
Exploratory 
analysis and 
preliminary 
data 
fi ei dwor k 
Naturalistic research, 
case study and final 
data analysis and 
conclusions 
Chapter 12 concludes the study and examines its limitations. 
223 
Simulation exercises and 
formulation of hypotheses 
CHAPTER 6 
THE PRELIMINARY FIELDWORK STAGE 
6.1 Introduction 
Research is the quest for knowledge through exploration and 
examination. Too often in the financial world this has been taken to 
mean simply the formulation of a theory which is used to establish a 
research problem, which is in turn translated into hypotheses and thence 
into dependent and independent variables. This is usually followed by 
precise and highly structured procedures for data collection after which 
the data are subjected to mathematical or statistical techniques, 
concluded by a quantitative validation of the hypotheses tested. 
Perhaps the most outspoken modern day critics of such an 
unequivocal or unqualified research approach in the financial world have 
been Findlay III (1983) and Tomkins and Groves (1983). Although their 
critique of the so-ca11 ed Is cientifi c'1 method of research (outlined 
above) relates mainly to the academic accounting and finance fraternity, 
it has relevance to research in all areas of the social sciences that 
attempt to force data into predetermined moulds. Tomkins and Groves 
argue (1983, p 361): 
'The academic accounting fraternity seems to be locked into a 
myopic view of what research is. It often seems to consider 
alternative quantitative techniques as the equivalent of the 
available range of research styles; or at least it often 
seems content to adopt one single stereotype of research 
style'. 
In other areas of the social sciences, in particular sociology, the 
so-called scientific approach has never completely dominated the field 
and has become increasingly challenged by advocates of more 
1 'Scientific' is used to refer to conventional research procedures 
adopted in the social sciences. 
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'naturalistic' research methodologies involving greater use of 
qualitative data. Blumer (1978, p 41) goes even further to challenge 
not only the abstract content of the scientific approach but its actual 
validity as a means of understanding social behaviour. 
'this conventional protocol of scientific analysis is not 
suitable or satisfactory for the kind of analysis that is 
needed in direct examination of the empirical social world 
... (it) forces ... data into an artificial framework that 
seriously limits and impairs general empirical analysis'. 
Many financial economists have no direct contact with the firms 
they are studying. As Reid states (1986, p 1): 
'their experience of the very object on which they lavish 
such intricate mathematical analysis is entirely second 
hand'. 
In other words, the research model becomes a substitute for the 
intimate knowledge of the field being studied. To overcome such 
drawbacks, Blumer argues that the social scientist needs to adopt a more 
naturalistic mode of enquiry through exploration and examination. 
Through exploration the social scientist gains, 
'a clear understanding of how to pose the problem, what data 
are relevant and how to identify significant lines of 
relationships for closer inspections' (Blumer, 1978, p 39). 
Exploration is then followed by examination which enquires deeper into 
the themes which emerge through the exploratory stage. 
The importance of a naturalistic (exploratory) approach to 
research has also been recognised by Abdel-Khalik and Ajinkya (1979, p 
19). They contend that: 
'In situations where it is not feasible to develop 
theoretical models prior to empirical observation, the ... next best alternative (an exploratory approach) may be followed'. 
225 
As Tomki ns and Groves (1983, p 365) point out, Abde 1-Kha 11 k and 
Ajinkya appear to be arguing that research may well begin with a 
'naturalistic' research mode to identify hypotheses and then move into a 
'scientific' mode to test the hypotheses. Tomkins and Groves (1983, p 
365) see nothing wrong with this proposal, 
'provided that, at the end of the naturalistic exploratory 
stage, one feels confident enough to adopt the view of the 
world and related set of ontological assumptions to enable 
the scientific approach to be used with validity'. 
Blumer also sees this approach as preferable to purely scientific 
methods, saying (1978, p 41): 
'to apply this conventional scheme (the so-called scientific 
method) to the account yielded by exploration would certainly 
be a gain over what is usually done'. 
The proponents of the naturalistic style of research are not 
necessarily condemning the scientific method itself but rather the way 
it is often employed as a universal methodology capable of tackling all 
research problems. In certain cases, the scientific method may be 
inappropriate (for instance, where uncertainty prevails) or only 
partial partially appl icabl e. 
The approach taken within this thesis encompasses the research 
methodologies called for by Tomkins and Groves (1983) and Blumer (1978) 
and also the more scientific methodologies usually adopted by financial 
economists. In other words, a range of research methodologies are 
employed to explore and examine the area under study. We believe this 
to be Important in a study of this kind where neither quantitative nor 
qualitative data are publicly available and where the nature of the 
research questions requires a wide selection of data to be collected. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to advance arguments for applying 
field research methods to the analysis of the financial environment and 
to outline one of the main methodologies used in this study: the semi- 
structured interview. We begin by examining the methodological issues 
which arise in the application of field research methods in general. 
6.2 Methodological Issues2 
An appropriate place to begin would be by defining the notions of a 
field and a site. Reid (1986, p 3) defines a field as: 
'any clearly delineated area which may be the subject of 
social research'. 
This might be interpreted in physical terms as a school, a factory or a 
bank, but is most likely to be interpreted in analytical terms, ie the 
university system in the United Kingdom, the motor car industry, or in 
our case the eurorote market. 
Uni ike scientific research methodologies which tend to use 
secondary data collected for purposes different to those for which the 
researcher wishes to use the data, field research methodologies tend to 
discard the arms-length approach. The field researcher specialises in 
the collection of primary data, acquiring as he does so a first-hand 
experience of whatever social world is to be defined as the field. Any 
secondary data that are collected (i e mainly numerical data) are sought 
out for their particular applicability to the field. They should be 
used not as an alternative or substitute for the primary data but as an 
2 This section draws on the work of Reid (1986); G1 aser and Strauss (1967); Porter (1980) and Fry (1983) amongst others. 
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additional database to complement and if appropriate validate the 
primary database (see Tomkins and Groves, 1983, p 365). 
Knowledge of the field is obtained by collecting data at a set of 
sites. A site can only be categorically defined within the context of 
the investigation. It could be described as a partitioning of the 
field. Within this study a site is defined as the euronote department 
of a bank participating in that market (or field). 
Typically it is not possible to visit and explore all sites. 
Access may be limited as generally the consent of an individual or 
institution is required before access to the site is granted, and 
consent may be witheld. Even with consent it may not be economically 
viable to visit all sites given that the labour and financial resources 
of the researcher will be limited. For these reasons it is necessary to 
sample a number of sites from the overall population. The fieldworker 
is, therefore, faced with one of his first research problems - that of 
representativeness of the sites chosen. 
To gain access to a site it is necessary to locate and contact the 
'gatekeeper' (see Burgess, 1984, p 48). The gatekeeper is the person 
with the authority to permit access to the site. In the case of a 
school he would be the headmaster; if a prison, the warden and in our 
case, if a euronote department, the head of department. 
It is worth noting that the gatekeeper will not always be the 
person best conversant with the site to be examined. For instance, the 
person to discuss production lags in a factory may be the production 
manager although he will almost certainly not be the gatekeeper to that 
particular site. This person (ie the one with whom the researcher 
should interact) will be called the 'key man'. Although the gatekeeper 
and the key man may be one and the same, in practice consent from the 
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gatekeeper is likely to set up a chain of referrals to possible key men 
and one must use facilities of qualitative judgement to decide which of 
these referrals is worth persuing seriously. 
As Reid (1986, p 4) emphasises, because information gathering 
proceeds in this way, it is often impossible to utilise techniques 
based on statistical sampling theory (eg stratified proportional random 
samp l ing). Instead the research proceeds by a variety of non- 
statistical sampling methods, including theoretical sampling (see 
Burgess, 1984, pp 54-56). Glaser and Strauss (1967) emphasise 
theoretical sampling as a means of generating and validating hypotheses. 
The term 'theoretical sampling' can be misleading in that it 
describes a process which is most definitely empirical in nature. It 
requires that, 
'sampling should be consciously organised to suggest, to 
develop, and to make precise, a theory about relationships in 
the universe of the investigation' (Reid, 1986, p 5). 
With theoretical sampling the aim is to: 
'obtain the best data one can, when one can, by a variety of 
strategies, and at the margin always try to edge towards 
acquiring especially informative data' (Reid, 1986, p 10). 
Once data have been gathered by fieldwork methods, the researcher 
then faces the problem of generalisation from the sample obtained to the 
wider population under examination. However, the need to obtain a 
sample which is representative of the population should not override the 
opportunity to study so-called 'outliers'. These may be parti cul arl y 
informative. For instance, if an industrial economist was undertaking a 
study of why firms fail, firms of just average profitability might 
warrant less attention than their abundance might suggest. It may be 
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more informative for the researcher to examine firms lying on the tails 
of the profitability distribution. 
Theoretical sampling, then, real ises the need to obtain the best 
data one can within the constraints of time and resources. Whilst the 
sample should be representative on the whole of the population, analysis 
of outliers is also recommended. 
Samples gathered in this way are certainly non-probabilistic, and 
also judgemental. According to the methodology of Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) the researcher about to begin an empirical investigation should 
do so without any preconceptions about the appropriateness of any 
particular theoretical model. The investigation, they contend, should 
proceed by suggesting tentative hypotheses and then by modifying them in 
the light of the unfolding evidence. Glaser and Strauss are essentially 
concerned with an approach which Miles and Huberman (1984) call 
'qualitative data analysis'. 
It is important to point out that qualitative data analysis and 
naturalistic research are not necessarily the same. Naturalistic 
research is encompassed within the area of qualitative data analysis but 
is embodied at the more extreme end of the spectrum. It has as its main 
research tool, participant observation which will be discussed more 
fully in Chapter 10. 
Ideally, a period as participant observer at various sites in the 
field should provide the researcher with the data necessary to construct 
a more formal data collection tool - such as a semi-structured interview 
- which could be aimed at collecting more precise data with which to 
formulate and (in some cases) even test hypotheses. By this means, the 
data are collected initially using only the very broadest economic 
perspective. 
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In this study such an approach was not possible at the initial 
fieldwork stage. Although a variety of banks within the euronote market 
were approached to par ti ci pate in such an exercise, all declined (see 
Appendix 6.1 for example of 1 etter sent out). Most banks declined on 
the premise that they could not possibly allow someone from outside the 
organisation to study their highly confidential operations. Others 
declined on the grounds that at the present time they could not see how 
such an exercise could benefit them but stated that if a positive return 
to them could be proven they may consider the request at a later stage. 
Many did, however, suggest that they would be willing to be interviewed. 
For these reasons we were forced to rely on the evidence of the 
first five exploratory data chapters to compile the semi-structured 
interviews discussed later in this chapter. 
Although, ideally, we would have preferred to spend some time in a 
participant observation role prior to the compilation of our semi- 
structured interviews, in achieving the final form of a theory no 
precise guidelines are offered, except that the theory should be stable 
in the face of new data and rich in detail. In achieving such detail, 
the collection of different 'slices of data' is favoured (see Tomkins 
and Groves, 1983; Abdel-Khal ik and Ajinkya, 1979; Glaser and Strauss, 
1967 and Reid, 1986). This is to argue in favour of using diverse 
methods for collecting data, with the purpose of gaining different 
perspectives on categories, or emerging hypotheses. In this study four 
slices of data were collected: from initial exploratory data analysis 
(mainly quantitative); from semi-structured interviews; from simulation 
experiments on the quantitative data collected through the semi- 
structured interviews; and through participant observation. The role of 
participant observation in this study was one of testing hypotheses 
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rather than its traditional role of co 11 ecting data from which 
hypotheses may be formulated. However, as Becker (1919, p 321) 
emphasises: 
'Participant observation may be used to either formulate or 
test hypotheses ... The observer may have his probt em wel 1 
worked out and be actively looking for evidence to test a 
hypothesis, or he may not be as yet aware of the problem'. 
Becker (1979, p 321) goes to to contend that: 
'... a well formulated hypothesis makes possible a deliberate 
search for negative cases, particularly when other knowledge 
suggests likely areas in which to look for such evidence. 
This kind of search requires advanced conceptualisation of 
the problem, and evidence gathering in this way might carry 
greater weight for certain kinds of conclusions'. 
This statement is not inconsistent with the naturalistic 
researchers' call for hypotheses to be formulated by first hand 
experience in the field. The hypotheses to be tested through 
participant observation will have been formulated from the data 
collected through initial fieldwork research, both qualitative and 
quantitative. Through this process it will be shown that qualitative 
and quantitative data are not substitutes for each other but should 
rather complement each other as essential counterparts of any research 
effort in the social sciences. 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) dispute the criticism that theoretical 
sampling 1 eads to 'unbounded relativism'. As Reid (1986, p 8) explains: 
'The very strength of taking s1 ices of data ... is that this tends to offset the bias of methods and to balance the 
misrepresentations of respondents against one another'. 
By comparing different slices of data new perspectives can be achieved. 
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6.3 Construction of the Semi-structured Interviews 
Up to this point attention has been concentrated on methodological 
issues, with only passing reference to empirical considerations. 
However, as Reid (1986, p 12) points out: 
'mere methodological speculation can prove particularly 
fruitless unless tempered by the more concrete considerations 
of empirical enquiry'. 
From this point forward, attention is directed at empirical 
considerations in the application of the semi-structured interview 
technique to the euronote market. However, the way in which the 
empirical enquiry proceeds should now be informed by a clear 
methodological position. 
During 1986 the author undertook a detailed analysis of the various 
sectors of the euronote market and their relevance to systemic risk. 
This analysis used mainly publicly available information in the form of 
publications, transcripts of speeches and publicly available market data 
in an attempt to identify the main areas of concern as far as systemic 
risk is concerned. This analysis formed the basis of the first five 
exploratory data analysis chapters of the study (see Feeney, 1986). 
This early exploratory work led to the design of a semi-structured 
interview. The data obtained through this instrument, which were both 
quantitative (numeric) and qualitative (textual), were then mounted on a 
database. 
It will be observed in this study that a certain degree of prior 
instrumentation (initial structuring of the proposed research) was 
favoured, although interviewees were given considerable scope to discuss 
what they felt to be most relevant. This latter point is important in 
the sense that without a certain degree of prior instrumentation the 
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interview can become hard to decipher afterwards and topics which both 
parties may wish to discuss may never be raised, perhaps because the 
interviewee feels them to be too complex for the interviewer to 
understand. However, once in the interview it is important to allow the 
interviewee time to expand beyond the boundaries of prior 
instrumentation if he so wishes or to elucidate on particular areas 
within it. 
The advantages of prior instrumentation have been well documented 
by Miles and Huberman (1984, pp 42-43) and include: avoiding superfluous 
information and facilitating comparability across studies. 
In regard to the conduct of the fieldwork, general methodological 
guidelines were available from standard research texts like Leedy 
(1985). Recommendations followed included: 
1 using the telephone as a follow-up to an introductory 
pre-letter 
2 providing a reference in with the pre-letter 
3 lowering the possible level of threat in an interview by 
beginning with general non-direct questions 
The study was conducted only with the informed consent of the 
respondents. Respondents were given the assurance of complete 
confidentiality, and anonymity where desired. 
Reference was made previously to 'gatekeepers'. The main 
gatekeeper in this study was almost invariably the head of the euronote 
department in the bank. It was a simple task to identify these 
gatekeepers, most appearing in financial magazines and journals on a 
regular basis. Where this was not so, a simple phone call to the bank's 
reception desk was all that was required. 
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There are some 300 banks participating in the euronote market 
although the market itself is dominated by the top fifteen. Time and 
resources precluded the study of the vast majority of these sites. The 
top fifteen banks were all targeted (all carrying over US$ 500 mill ion 
worth of underwriting facilities on their books) as well as twenty 
middle runners (carrying between US $200 million and US$ 499 million of 
underwriting facilities on their books) and twenty small runners 
(carrying less than US$ 200 mill ion on their books). 
The sample was chosen not only to capture the richness of the 
market but also to examine some of the outlying market players. Having 
said this, the choice of sample was necessarily, to a certain extent, 
judgemental. 
A standard 'pre-letter' was sent out to all potential respondents 
(see Appendix 6.2). In compiling the pre-letter general guidelines laid 
down by Jacobson (1986) were followed. These included: making the 
letter short; using letterhead stationery; starting with a personal 
salutation, and finishing with a personal signature in ink. 
There is evidence to support the contention that pre-letters lower 
refusal rates, improve the quality of data and increase the co- 
operati veness of respondents (see, for example, Fry, 1983, pp 92-93). 
As well as signalling the authenticity of the study, pre-letters also 
allow the respondent to evaluate the prospect of his participation. 
One week after the pre-letter was sent, the potential respondent 
was contacted by telephone in order to arrange an interview date for the 
semi-structured interview. In a few instances the 'gatekeeper' had 
passed on the pre-letter to a colleague as he felt ill-equipped to deal 
with the interview personally. In these cases the gatekeepers and the 
key men were seen to be different although in the majority of cases 
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where the gatekeepers responded positively they agreed to meet the 
researcher personally. 
Fry (1983, p 91) argues that: 
'constructing an introductory message should command the same 
(or even more) attention as question design and arrangement 
... the respondent may not even hear the bulk of the introductory message because he or she is so busy 
concentrating on whether or not to participate'. 
In constructing the introductory telephone message, guidelines laid 
down by Fry (1983, chapter 4) and i ater reiterated by Reid (1986, p 17) 
were followed. These included: identifying the caller; explaining why 
the call is being made; explaining the type of information being sought; 
explaining the conditions (especially terms of confidentiality) under 
which the interview was to be conducted and explaining the benefits of 
participation. Additionally, where the gatekeeper had referred us to 
this contact, his/her name was mentioned in this respect and it was 
explained that the respondent had a free choice on the time of 
interview. 
Where responses were positive a confirmatory letter with an outline 
of the interview agenda was sent to the respondent for his/her perusal 
prior to the interview with a note to the effect that this agenda was 
flexible and that he/she was free to talk about anything outside the 
agenda or to ignore areas which he/she would not wish to comment on (see 
Appendix 6.2). 
6.3.1 Response rate 
The response rate was satisfactory: 8 from 15 large players; 4 from 
15 medium players and 3 from 15 small players agreed to participate 
providing an overall response rate of 34 per cent. The Bank of Engl and 
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also agreed to participate although the main results of this meeting (at 
this stage) were to confirm that the Bank of England was also concerned 
that returns to underwriters in the euronote market might be too low to 
account for risks incurred in that market. As such the data from the 
Bank of England interview are not written up separately. 
Two respondents agreed to participate only on the grounds that 
'anonymity' was also assured. This was agreed. 
Not surpri singly the response rate for the smal 1 players in the 
market was very low (only 20 per cent). Their role in the euronote 
market is only minimal and most felt that the meeting would be 
unproductive. Conversely, the response rate for the large players was 
very good (54 per cent) reflecting the fact that they felt that they 
might gain something from such an interview. Interestingly, the mention 
that 'other 1 arge banks' had agreed to an interview was enough to sway 
most respondents in this category. Although the sample included only 
nineteen banks, between them they accounted for over 35 per cent of the 
total euronote underwriting market (see Appendix 6.3 for list of 
participants). 
During interviews, interruptions were usually not a major problem 
although they did occur. This had no apparent effect on the flow or 
quality of data. Towards the end of the proceedings, the possibility of 
the interviewer taking part in a period of participant observation at 
some 1 ater date was broached. Most decl fined such a request but a few 
proved reasonably willing to grant the request under rules which were to 
be laid down if and when they were approached accordingly in the future. 
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6.3.2 The database 
To facilitate the processing of data obtained from the semi- 
structured interviews, a computerised database was established on the 
Dec 20 system at the University Col 1 ege of North Wales. The database 
contains two different sets of records. The first set encompasses all 
the quantitative data collected thorugh the semi-structured interviews. 
This set of records which contains over 10,000 separate pieces of 
information was used to perform the simulation exercises explained in 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
The second set of records encompasses all the qualitative 
(narrative) data acquired through the semi-structured interviews. 
This relates mainly to the text of notes obtained from these interviews. 
Originally this section of the database was set up as 19 different 
records, one for each interview. It was then collected together under 
three different sections, relating to the three main topics covered in 
the semi-structured interviews. 
6.4 Semi-structured Interview Agenda 
Although it is generally recommended that interviews be taped (see, 
for example, Jahoda et al, 1964, pp 228-30) it was decided that in this 
study the disadvantages of doing so outweighed the advantages. The 
first problem was by itself probably sufficient to eschew the use of a 
tape recorder: namely that consent would have been very hard to obtain. 
Like all financial markets, a certain amount of secrecy surrounds its 
Internal operation. It was our intention to get underneath this shroud 
and to delve more deeply into the practical operations of the market and 
its players. Anything which could have caused tension or raised 
suspicion of our intentions would have been counterproductive. Indeed, 
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even with consent the respondent might have held back sensitive 
information which may have been given more freely if not recorded for 
posterity on tape. Another disadvantage of using a tape recorder is 
apty documented by Reid (1986, p 32): 
'It leads to the possibility that the interviewee's remarks 
may not be listened to carefully, because everything is going 
down on tape. The structure of the interview can therefore 
suffer, and the quality of data gathered is thereby reduced 
Further, specific information may be given to the 
interviewer more than once, though the respondent may not 
necessarily be aware that he is simply conveying the same 
information in a variety of different ways'. 
Finally, there is the problem of the sheer volume of information 
collected on tape which makes generalisation and the establishment of 
rel ationships difficult. 
It was for these reasons that a tape recorder was not used during 
the interviews. Instead field notes and debriefing were favoured. The 
model followed for recording notes was that proposed by Schatzman et al 
(1973, chapter 6). Firstly, rough field notes were jotted down in the 
particular area al l oted for each agenda item. Following this, summary 
notes of greater detail and precision were written from field notes and 
memory. These were subsequently entered on to the database. 
As just described, interviews involved working through an agenda 
whilst taking notes. Lof l and (1971) proposed as a universal standard 
for agenda construction that no more than ten main topics be covered, 
with eight being the normal limit. In our agenda there were only three 
main topics which was found to be a practical limit. 
Following proposals laid down by Reid (1986) a more detailed 
structure was obtained by using what Reid (1986, p 31) refers to as a 
'nested or hierarchical arrangement'. This was achieved by using a 
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'probe' structure. For example, under risk one can probe further for 
risks to the investor compared to risks to the underwriter and how such 
risks are captured in pricing etc. Figure 6.1 presents a summary of the 
agenda used in the semi-structured interviews. The actual agenda is 
presented in Appendix 6.4. 
Figure 6.1 Semi-structured interview agenda outline 
1 Risk 
1.1 To the investor 
1.2 To the underwriter 
1.3 To the placing agent 
1.4 Systemic risk 
2 Pricing 
2.1 Of notes 
2.2 Of underwriting 
3 Campeti ti ve forces 
3.1 Ease of entry 
3.2 Ease of exit 
3.3 The market/concentration 
The summary agenda was sent to all respondents prior to the 
interview for their perusal. Naturally it was couched in general terms 
but it at least provided the respondent with an outline of the proposed 
meeting. The actual agenda was, to a certain extent, judgemental. 
There has been no study conducted in this area before. 
There were a certain number of aims to the interviews: firstly, to 
determine whether the researcher was 'on the right tracks' in the sense 
of identifying the area of underwriting euronotes as the most likely (if 
any) to lead to an increase in systemic risk; secondly, to discover how 
price is determined and what is seen to be adequate; thirdly, to elicit 
views on systemic risk, and, finally, to gain a greater understanding of 
the structure and operations of the market. 
240 
To achieve these aims it was felt necessary to keep the agenda 
deliberately open compared to studies of industrial operations (such as 
Porter, 1980 and 1985) where the interview agenda is usually extremely 
detailed. The ultimate goal of this thesis is not just to provide a 
detailed manuscript of the operations of the euronote market but to 
tackle the question of systemic risk: something which studies of other 
industries, to our knowledge, have never addressed. 
6.5 Presentation of the Data 
Much thought was given to how the qualitative data of the 
interviews should be presented given that banks of very differing sizes 
were involved. One possibility would have been to present the data 
relating to large, medium and small banks separately. As it turned out 
this would have involved considerable repetition. It was decided, 
therefore, that the data should be presented (as far as possible) 
following the outline laid down by the agenda, highlighting points where 
different sized banks (or indeed banks of similar size) differed. 
6.5.1 Risk 
6.5.1.1 The investor 
The consensus of opinion here was that the main risk to the 
investor in euronotes was credit risk. Having said this, most 
respondents believed this risk to be only minimal due mainly to the 
liquidity and short-term nature of the notes. A valid point, however, 
made on two occasions was that the risk faced by the investor is to a 
certain extent determined by the type of investor. A retail investor 
will usually 'buy and hold' until maturity. In such a case the main 
risk faced is undoubtedly credit risk. An institutional investor, on 
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the other hand, is looking to 'take a turn', ie to on-sel 1 the notes at 
a profit. In other words he plays the yield curve, buying when interest 
rates are high and selling when they fall, taking a small spread on the 
notes. For this type of investor interest rate risk is also relevant. 
If a house (securities house) books a considerable amount of notes in 
the hope that interest rates will fall and they do not, then it has two 
choices. It can either hold the notes to maturity at which time it will 
make its return, or it can sell the notes at a loss. In the first 
instance this may mean holding the notes for anything up to six months. 
For many securities houses this would be too much of a strain on their 
capital base. However, it was interesting to note that many houses 
actually refused to sell to other houses because it distorts prices in 
the secondary market as paper is sold on and on. As a result of this, 
most paper now ends up in the books of commercial banks or retail 
investors, both of which usually hold paper to maturity. 
Risk measurement was not seen to be a problem with euronotes. Most 
respondents saw the market still as a 'prime name' market. Ratings were 
seen to be becoming more important but name recognition was undoubtedly 
the main benchmark by which risk was assessed. This feeling was borne 
out in our results of the previous chapter where a rating only rea lly 
affected the price of paper in the lower quality categories. On several 
occasions respondents made the point that top quality names don't 'go 
bust' in three months. Furthermore, the only investors buying poor 
quality paper would be the commercial banks in order to gain a higher 
return. However, most commercial banks wouldn't buy this paper today 
without a rating. 
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All in all, risk to investors was seen to be minimised by the 
extent of liquidity in the market, the short-term nature of the notes 
and generally good quality paper. Many respondents questioned whether 
institutions who bought paper to sell on to other institutions could 
really be classified as investors but were actually dealers in their own 
right. For these institutions interest rate risk is a problem but no 
more so than it is in other markets such as CDs or eurobonds. 
6.5.1.2 The underwriter 
Although credit risk was seen to be more of a problem to the 
underwriter than the investor because of his longer tern commitment to 
the borrower, the most important risk was seen to be what respondents 
referred to as 'market risk'. Market risk was generally defined as the 
risk that the market would turn against the underwriter, perhaps because 
of the collapse of a large borrower which would trigger panic selling, 
or because of the onset of a bear market in euronotes. In either case 
yields would have to rise on paper in the primary market to make it 
attractive to end investors. The point of crisis would come where 
yields in the primary market hit the 'strike offer yield' at which 
underwriters are committed to purchase paper. At this yield the 
underwriters are left holding paper that the market has already refused. 
Furthermore, since many underwriters are also committed to 'make a 
market' in their client's paper they will also be forced to purchase 
unwanted paper in the secondary market. In this scenario respondents 
stated that there would be a risk that the bank may not be able to fund 
its liabilities in the market at short notice. Hence, funding risk and 
market risk were seen to go hand in hand. 
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Much concern was also voiced about the advent of 'unlimited' 
programmes: euronote programmes with no maximum limit where the borrower 
could theoretically issue as much paper as desired irrespective of 
gearing, and the underwriters would be forced to purchase. Although 
such programmes are only made available to the very best names such as 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC, the wholly-owned finance 
subsidiary of General Motors) it is significant that Standard & Poor's 
downgraded the debt rating of GMAC in January 1988 from A-1+ to A-1. 
When asked why they underwrite euronotes, responses differed 
between different banks. Most of the larger banks argued that they had 
no choice: that if they did not do it somebody else would. They also 
stated that it was a good way into a relationship with attractive 'spin 
off' income. Many of the 1 arger banks argued that without these 'spin 
offs' they wouldn't consider underwriting. As expected, the main 'spin 
off' was placement business. 
Some smaller banks argued, also, that they had very little choice 
but to do some underwriting, but for a different reason. None of the 
smaller banks had actually ever lead managed a deal or approached a 
borrower directly for underwriting business. All of their underwriting 
business came through syndication, where the large banks were laying off 
some of the risk with other banks. These smaller banks argued that by 
refusing to take part in a syndication they wou ld be in effect 'biting 
the hand that feeds them'. Indeed one respondent claimed that by 
refusing to take part in a 'ridiculously cut' (underpriced) deal not 
only had he never been approached again by that bank to participate in a 
syndication but also lost other 'perks' previously passed his way, such 
as tender panel membership. 
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It was interesting to note, that although the smaller banks felt 
obliged to participate in syndications, they were also the only banks to 
quote pricing as an incentive to underwrite a deal. Two in particular 
argued that they could get excellent returns on employed assets 
depending on whether or not they had to fund (see later on 'pricing'). 
On the question of risk measurement this proved to be a 
particularly 'hazy' area. All respondents agreed that there was no way 
that risk could be measured accurately with these facilities. Most said 
that although risk should be reflected through the price attached to the 
facility, this was not always so. There has never been a default in the 
euronote market and so there are no adverse statistics on which to base 
a measurement of risk: actuarial calculations are impractical. Most of 
the larger and medium-sized banks said they would look at such things as 
credit ratings, name recognition, how the potential borrower tended to 
fare in other markets, but that in fixing a price such matters took a 
back seat to what the market commanded, which was generally far less 
than they would like to see. 
The smaller banks argued that it was not necessary for them to 
attempt to measure the risk attached to underwriting a particular 
f aci 1i ty as this risk assessment wi 11 have a1 ready been done by the 1 ead 
manager and will therefore be priced accordingly. Given the responses 
of the larger banks which suggested that this was not so, the attitude 
of the smaller banks indicated a lack of knowledge on their part of risk 
assessment practices in their larger competitors. 
6.5.1.3 The placing agent 
Al 1 respondents commented that the practice of placing euronotes, 
by itself, was virtually risk-free unless the placing agent is also the 
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underwriter. Placement of euronotes is conducted on a 'best efforts' 
basis only. Any notes which the placing agent cannot place are returned 
to the underwriter at the strike-offer yield. Alternatively, the 
placing agent may itself choose to purchase notes left unplaced. This, 
however, is not compulsory and the placing agent would only take this 
course of action where it felt it could still sell the notes at a profit 
at a later date. Having said this, many of the larger banks felt that 
there was a certain necessity for a placing agent to ensure that notes 
did not return to the underwriters on a regular basis. This would 
damage the credibility of the placing agent and possibly lead to the 
agent's dismissal from the facility. 
Because of this need to appear as capable placers of paper, many 
pl acing agents have actually 'dumped' paper in the market when they 
could not sell it above the price at which it was bid for. This has 
been a particular problem for the tender panel system (a problem 
identified in Chapter 4) where placing agents have actually taken losses 
on paper rather than return the paper to the underwriters. The move 
away from the tender panel mechanism to one or two dealerships is partly 
removing this inefficiency in the placement mechanism. 
6.5.1.4 Systemic risk 
Most respondents were cognisant with the implications of systemic 
risk (a sudden and unexpected di sequi 1i bri um in the market) but referred 
to it as 'market risk'. The consensus of opinion was that as far as 
investors and placing agents were concerned, systemic risk was not a 
problem, but that for underwriters it was probably their main problem. 
One respondent made the comment that, although untested in 1 aw, material 
adverse change clauses may protect the underwriter in individual cases 
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but that if the whole market was to go wrong then such clauses would be 
useless . 
When probed as to whether they felt they were actually increasing 
risk within the system by underwriting euronotes, four respondents 
replied posi ti ve l y. Two in particular made the comment that by 
underwriting these issues at such low prices, any financial crisis would 
be concentrated within the banking system as opposed to being 
diversified throughout the system. Because of this concentration, 
system failure would be more probable. They felt that prices did not 
allow for adequate reserves to be compiled in order to withstand such a 
crisis and that central bank support may be required. 
This led to the question of the role of lender-of-last-resort in 
this market. There is, as such, no lender-of-last-resort in the 
euronote market. However, respondents felt that the parent bank's own 
central bank would be responsible for this role. 
Most respondents felt the probability of systemic failure to be 
very low and impossible to account for when deciding whether to 
-underwrite an issue or not. Many respondents also felt that a lot 
rested on the returns gained on underwriting such facilities and whether 
these were adequate to compensate for the low probability of such a risk 
arising. Much depends here on how such returns are calculated. It was 
not surprising to hear that most of the small banks felt that returns 
were adequate to compensate for the risk of systems failure given that 
they had previously mentioned that they calculated returns on an ROA 
basis (see pricing). 
When probed as to whether systemic risk was really a risk at all if 
they would be bailed out under such a scenario by the lender-of-last- 
resort, interestingly all felt that it was but for very individual 
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reasons. Most respondents stated that if their bank had to be 'bailed 
out' due to severe losses in their department then they would certainly 
lose their jobs. In this sense, failure was a threat which most felt 
they had to guard against by not engaging in overtly 'risky' business. 
6.5.2 Pricing 
6.5.2.1 Notes 
There was a firm consensus that as far as the eventual price of 
notes was concerned, this would be determined principally by demand and 
supply in the market. An issuer could not expect to double his supply 
of notes and obtain the same price. The price paid for notes, then, is, 
to a certain extent, determined by the aims of the borrower. If his 
primary aim is to gain the best price he can then he will invariably go 
the tender panel path, forcing a variety of banks and securities houses 
to bid against each other for the notes. Although this undoubtedly 
produces fine pricing it also leads to erratic distribution with notes 
often being 'dumped' in the market, thereby affecting 1 ater 
distribution . 
If the main aim of the borrower, however, is to maintain a 
permanently diversified investor base then supply will be favoured over 
price. In this scenario a sole or multiple placing agency will be 
favoured. 
Eventually, the price at which the notes settle in the market will 
be determined by demand and supply factors. 
What is seen to be an 'adequate' return on the notes will also be 
determined by market factors, but also returns on substitute 
investments. Several respondents made the comment that the yield on 
euronotes could not vary substantially from the yield on US commercial 
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paper as arbitrage between the two would bring yields back in line: the 
same would be true with euro-CDs. 
Adequacy is always, to a certain degree, subjective. Adequacy of 
return can, of course, only be calculated in association with risk; both 
are meaningless by themselves. As risk is more easily judged on a 
three-month liquid asset then, one respondent commented, perhaps the 
best standard of adequacy is what the market is prepared to accept. 
Where notes are rated then investors have a visibly quantifiable 
benchmark on which to determine a price. If a previously A1+ issue went 
for LIBOR-10 then a same rated issue will probably fetch a similar price 
(depending of course on current rates and the present demand for that 
issuer's paper). 
The calculation of return on a euronote is simply that outlined in 
Chapter 5, equation (5.1). 
6.5.2.2 Underwriting 
An important consideration in the fixing of a price for an 
underwriting facility was found to be the customer relationship. 
Interestingly, many large and medium sized banks indicated that 
somewhere between 60 to 80 per cent of all underwriting business was 
obtained from existing customers who were replacing old credit 1 Ines 
with euronote facilities. The fear of losing the customer relationship 
(which was generally found to encompass a wide range of facilities from 
overdrafts to foreign exchange) was found to be an important factor in 
the pricing of these f aci 1i ti es. For this reason, and because of the 
competitive nature of the market many respondents felt that the price of 
underwriting facilities themselves provides an 'inadequate' return to 
compensate the underwriters for the risks incurred, but that prices were 
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justifiable on an overall customer relationship basis. A main factor 
here was found to be the acquisition of placement business. 
Significantly all large and medium-sized banks stated that they would 
usually only accept underwriting business where the opportunity to place 
notes was offered. The revenue from this service was virtually risk- 
free in the sense that they would have to underwrite anyway any notes 
they could not place. 
Given respondents' comments on the need to price in order to 
maintain customer relationships, the question of adequacy of return 
raised some interesting responses. Taking into account revenue from 
other parts of the customer relationship, most respondents were unable 
to determine a quantitative level of adequacy for an underwriting 
facility, arguing that this would have to be judged on an individual 
basis. In the end it was decided that the on 1y way a direct 1 eve 1 of 
adequacy could be estimated would be where the return from the facility 
was judged outside of the customer relationship. That is, the direct 
level of return from an underwriting facility that would justify the 
provision of that facility on its own merits. Even on this basis, in an 
area where risk is virtually unassessable, a price adequate to 
compensate for such risk is also extremely hard to quantify. The 
consensus of opinion was that on an individual basis there could be no 
firm standard of adequacy but that the underwriting portfolio should at 
least' yield a return in line with that of the bank's average return on 
assets of approximately 0.5 per cent. Most respondents felt that on a 
drawn basis a return of 0.5 per cent would be the minimum acceptable 
amount on the underwriting portfolio if viewed outside the customer 
relationship, and half this only where the facility was never drawn. 
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Interestingly, the smaller banks interviewed felt that, for them, 
the customer relationship was not as important. Many felt that they 
would be unlikely ever to secure placement business through the 
acceptance of a portion of the underwriting because of their smal l er 
presence in the market. Significantly, the need to maintain good 
'competitor relationships' was more important than the desire to 
establish good customer relationships in the market. To have good 
relationships with their larger competitors was important if they were 
to be offered a place in syndicated deals. Many remarked again that 
they depended for a large part of their business on invitations to join 
a syndicate of banks, whether it be in the euronote, eurobond, 
syndicated loan or other markets. Many feared that there would be 
repercussions of refusing to syndicate an underwriting facility in the 
euronote market, which would carry to other more profitable markets. 
Having said this, all small bank respondents felt that returns gained on 
underwriting euronotes were 'generally adequate'. They stated that 
returns of well over one per cent were achievable in many cases, 
depending on how the facility was drawn. 
When probed as to how these returns were calculated it was again 
interesting to note the diversity of opinion between banks of different 
sizes. All small banks said that they use a simple RCA formula. Under 
the ROA methodology all returns to the underwriter are applied only to 
those assets actually funded. As this methodology is explained in 
detail in Chapter 7, it is not described in any detail here. 
All of the other banks stated that they calculated return on a 
return on exposure (ROX) basis. Under the ROX methodology all returns 
are applied to the exposure of the underwriter as opposed to just the 
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assets funded. The exposure of the underwriter is taken as the maximum 
amount on which he may be called to fund. As this methodology is 
explained in detail in Chapter 8, again it will not be covered in any 
detail here. Significantly the Bank of England expressed its definite 
preference for ROX over ROA for reasons expressed in the following two 
chapters. 
During this section of each interview a request was made for market 
data to which the various return methodologies could be applied. On 
three occasions the researcher was successful - gaining data from County 
NatWest, Merrill Lynch and Bank of America. 
6.5.3 Competitive forces 
6.5.3.1 Ease of entry 
As far as economies of scale were concerned, the consensus of 
opinion was that these were only relevant where banks were competing to 
gain the lead manager position on a euronote facility. In these 
circumstances the power to take a large slice of the underwriting 
business as well as the ability to convince other banks to join the 
syndicate was seen as extremely important. As far as simply 
underwriting was concerned, however, the only barrier to entry was seen 
to be capital. Al 1 respondents stated that where a borrower is just 
looking to underwrite a euronote programme, product differentiation is 
virtually impossible. Price is all important. In this sense the market 
is easy to enter if a bank is preparing to 'buy the business'. On this 
latter point several respondents commented on the deal struck by 
Manufacturers Hanover for Renfe (the Spanish state-owned railway 
company) in 1987. Fully drawn Manufacturers Hanover would receive just 
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ten basis points on the deal. Most respondents saw this as suicidal 
pricing to 'buy in' to the market. 
The only retaliation possible with such action is a price war. 
Most respondents stated that this was not an open policy of their bank 
and that to try to undercut a ful 1y drawn return of ten basis points 
would do nobody any good. One comment worth mentioning was that 
al though the top fifteen banks contro 11 ed over 50 per cent of the 
market, this had been achieved not so much through buying market share 
in order to increase prices later (as the strike offer yield is fixed at 
the outset) but simply because they have been able to take a higher 
proportion of underwriting on each facility due to their considerable 
capital resources. This has been a significant attraction to potential 
borrowers who like the lead bank to take the 'lions share' of the 
underwriting business. 
Some of the smaller banks stated that far from underpricing to 
build up market share, the larger banks were able to keep most of the 
front-end fees and facility fees, passing on only a small proportion of 
these fees in syndication to the smaller banks. Surprisingly, the 
smaller banks still felt adequately renumerated for their part. 
6.5.3.2 Ease of exit 
As with most financial markets, entry was seen to be far easier 
than exit from the market. To exit from this market would mean the 
transfer of existing underwriting facilities. There is a facility known 
as a transferable revolving underwriting facility (TRUF) where the 
transfer of the underlying liability is possible. However, such 
transferability has to be agreed with the borrower prior to the signing 
of the facility. As such there are very few TRUFs in existence. 
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Transferability, however, is still possible using one of three methods 
borrowed from the syndicated loan market, sub-participation, assignment 
or novation, all of which have serious defects (see Feeney, 1986, pp 62- 
64). 
Under the sub-participation method, the sub-participant makes a 
payment to the original lender in consideration of a right to receive a 
stream of payments in return, gauged, or measured, by the amounts of 
principal and interest received by the original lender from the 
borrower. With this method the sub-participant has no legal claim on 
the borrower or on the funds paid by the borrower to the original 
lender. A sub-participant is therefore taking a two-fold credit risk on 
both the borrower and the original lender. Furthermore, any protection 
given by contingency risk clauses in a loan agreement, such as material 
adverse change clauses, may not be passed on to a sub-parti ci pant. 
For the above reasons, assignment was usually thought by 
respondents to be more acceptable, giving an enhanced degree of 
protection compared to the sub-participant because the rights and 
benefits of the assigner are simply transferred, but an assignee may 
still have no direct claim on the borrower or a direct interest in the 
funds paid to the lender by the borrower. Indeed, an assignment may 
also 1 ead to stamp duty. It may turn out to be more costly than sub- 
parti ci pati on. 
Novati on, on the other hand, i nvo 1 ves the discharge of one 
obligation and the creation of an entirely new one, rather than simply 
the transfer of an existing liability. This method, although avoiding 
stamp duty, is cumbersome and requires the co-operation of the borrower 
and other underwriters (if the facility is syndicated). As a result, 
the structure has not been much used. 
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In theory, then, although exit from the market is possible through 
the transfer of existing underwriting obligations, in practice this is 
not al ways so. When probed as to whether it would be possible for a 
large bank to exit from the market through the transfer of its existing 
liabilities, most respondents agreed that this would be virtually 
impossible given the scale of transfers that would be required. 
The other route out of a market is, of course, through failure. 
This again led us back to the question of whether the respondents felt 
they would be allowed to fail. Again, most respondents felt they would 
not be allowed to fail and therefore exit from the market through this 
route was not a possibility for the bank itself, although it was 
certainly a possibility for them if heavy losses were sustained in their 
department. 
6.5.3.3 The market 
There are about 300 banks in the euronote market although the top 
50 have over 50 per cent of the entire underwriting business (see 
Appendix 6.5). Despite the multitude of banks in the market, the top 
twenty to thirty own over 90 per cent of all lead-manager mandates, 
passing down portions of the risk (and return) to members of a syndicate 
which they will have formed. Most respondents stated that it was 
virtually impossible to break the grip of these larger banks in terms of 
gaining lead mandates unless a bank was prepared to 'buy a deal', ie 
undercut the competition as did Manufacturers Hanover with the Renf e 
deal. However, again respondents stated that most lead mandates were 
won not so much on price, but on the portion of underwriting the 
potential lead manager was prepared to take on to its own books. Since 
only the very largest banks in the market could continually take very 
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large portions of the underwriting it was not surprising that they won 
most of the 1 ead-manager mandates. 
The price, however, is often fixed in conjunction with the borrower 
and the bank arranging the facility (which will often be different to 
the lead bank) and so prices were seen to be kept very competitive. 
There was much mention throughout the interviews of league tables 
and the need to be seen to be 'doing the business'. One respondent 
commented that it was not just a coincidence that the largest and 
cheapest facilities are contracted for in December of each year just 
before the end of year league tables are published in financial 
magazines such as Euromoney and The Banker. It is also interesting to 
note the number of new names on the Lead Manager League Tables at this 
time of year. 
6.6 Preliminary Assessment of the Data 
The data of the semi-structured interviews proved to be reassuring 
- in the sense that it confirmed the indications of our exploratory data 
analysis chapters that the area of concern as far as systemic risk is 
concerned is the underwriting of euronotes more so than the placement of 
notes or investment in notes. A greater insight was also gained into 
the pricing of euronotes and the market's views on risk and competition. 
Perhaps most rewarding, and surprising, was the evidence of differing 
views on how returns should be calculated to the underwriter. There was 
no clear reason for this divergence of opinion (mainly between 1 arge and 
small banks) and it is too early at this stage to postulate any 
hypothesis why this might be so. 
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As far as systemic risk was concerned there was a consensus of 
opinion that whether or not underwriting of euronotes led to an increase 
in systemic risk depended mainly on whether returns to the underwriter 
were adequate in the light of the risks he was facing. This view is 
totally consistent with the view expressed by the BIS (1986, p 199), ie: 
'... the question of whether new financial instruments 
contribute to an increase in systemic risk depends ... on 
whether they produce sufficient profit margins on average to 
cover potential losses from market, credit or other risks, 
both in the short and long-run'. 
As far as adequacy was concerned, a minimum level of 0.5 per cent 
on a drawn basis was declared, although many smaller banks felt that 
this should be higher given that if they were to be asked to fund then 
they would be accepting a risk at a price already refused by the market. 
The figure of 0.5 per cent was, however, justified by two factors: 
firstly a 50 per cent risk assets ratio is now applied on all 
underwriting facil ities and most respondents felt that a 0.5 per cent 
return would only just offset this cost. Secondly, 0.5 per cent is 
accepted as the average return on assets for most banks and respondents 
felt that in this market in parti cul ar an average return must at 1 east 
be achieved in order to justify the participation in the market. 
Most respondents felt that if a facility was never drawn that half 
the drawn return would be acceptable. Again, however, this is obviously 
to a1 arge extent judgemental but does take into account that most banks 
saw that below 0.25 per cent they would not be able to cover costs. 
However, there was a consensus of opinion that where the facility was 
drawn at all then a 0.5 per cent return was a minimum requirement. 
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No questionnaire was presented to arrive at these figures as we 
felt that we would not be able to cover the range of possible returns. 
It was therefore decided to simply ask the question of what respondents 
saw to be adequate. It may be that the divergence of opinion between 
the large banks and the smaller banks is due to their differing methods 
of calculating returns. This will be tested in Chapters 7 and 8. Any 
hypotheses to be formulated from the data of the semi-structured 
interviews will be analysed in Chapters 7 and 8. 
6.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has served to. advance arguments for applying field 
research methods - particularly in this case the semi-structured 
interview - to the analysis of the financial environment. Attention was 
concentrated not only on methodological issues but also on empirical 
considerations in the application of the semi-structured interview 
technique to the euronote market. The quantitative data collected 
through the semi-structured interviews provide the data base for the 
simulation exercises conducted in the following two chapters. 
Chapters 7 and 8 employ the ROA and ROX methodologies found to be 
used in the market to calculate returns to the underwriter under 
different scenarios which have been chosen partly to emphasise the 
systemic risk properties of underwriting euronotes and also the systemic 
risk properties inherent in the return methodologies generally. Both 
ROA and ROX may appear similar to internal rate of return (IRR) 
calculations with the capital investment being assets funded under ROA, 
and exposure under ROX. However, whereas IRR is used to choose between 
different projects, this is certainly not the case with ROA or ROX. 
Underwriters have no choice as to their funding strategy: this will be 
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scenario would be preferable. For instance, under a ROX methodology we 
shall see that higher returns are only achievable by funding more assets 
and hence taking greater risk. It is impossible to determine the 
probability of any one scenario arising. Any probabilities which could 
be attached would be at best inaccurate and at worst wholly misleading. 
For these reasons ROA and ROX cannot be viewed as proxies for IRR. 
259 
PAGE 
4 
NUMBERING 
AS ORIGINAL, 
Appendix 6.1 
lEE INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN FINANCE 
Our reference: 
Dear 
Your reference: 
DIRECTOR: 
PROFESSOR E. P. M. GARDENER. 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES 
BANGOR, GWYNEDD, LLS7 20G. 
I am studying for a PhD at Bangor in the general area of securi ti satt on 
and the euronote market. My work entails documenting the market in some 
detail (something which to my knowledge has not been done previously). 
To be able to study the operations of the market in the depth required I 
will need to spend some time in the euronote department of various 
banks, primarily as an observer. I have already spent over a year 
studying available information on the market and would hope to be able 
to contribute as well as learn from my period within the market. 
Both my supervisor, Professor EPM Gardener, and myself are aware of 
your bank's success within the euronote market and your unsurpassed 
knowledge of its operations. Professor Gardener therefore suggested to 
me that I might approach you to spend some time with your euronote team, 
in a purely observational role: perhaps for a week or so. 
I realise that this is an unusual request and that you have no knowlege 
of my background other than that related to you in this letter. I can, 
of course, provide references to prove my qualifications to undertake 
such research. I can also assure you that my period with the bank would 
be treated as totally confidential and you would have the chance to see 
my work and results at every stage of their compilation. Although any 
data collected will be used only for my PhD, you will have the chance to 
vet anything that you are unhappy with. 
Naturally you will need some time to consider my request so Professor 
Gardener or myself will telephone you approximately one week after you 
receive this letter in order to discuss it then. 
The IEF Is part of the School of Accounting, Banking and Economics (S AB E), University College of North Wales, Bangor. Chairman: Professor L A. Winters, Director: Professor E. P. M. Gardener, Consultant Director: Professor J. R. S. Revell. 
Telephone: (0248) 351151 (Ext. 2277 or 2278). Telex: 61100. Cable: Unicol Bangor. Bank Account No: 404530 90830038. 
My apologies for any inconvenience, and I do appreciate any time that 
you may be able to allow me. I thank you in advance for your kind co- 
operation. 
Yours sincerely 
Paul Feeney 
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Appedix 6.2 
lEE 
Introductory Letter 
INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN FINANCE 
Our reference: 
PF/SAP 
Dear 
Your reference: 
DIRECTOR: 
PROFESSOR E. P. M. GARDENER. 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES 
BANGOR, GWYNEDD, LL5120G. 
J am studying for a PhD at Bangor in the general area of securitisation in international 
banking, and Professor Ted Gardener (my supervisor) has suggested that you may 
be willing to give me a short interview in order to discuss relevant aspects of my 
research. My specific research interests are the comparative risks and profitability 
of Euronote"(NIFs, RUFs, etc. ) facilities for banks. 
I am hoping to be in London for the week commencing ?, and I am planning to see 
a number of banks about my research. I will send you in advance of any interview 
a list of my particular research interests and associated questions, and you can decide 
in advance the areas you would be happy to discuss. The objective of these interviews 
is for me to gain a greater understanding and feel for how banks and the markets 
operate. Of course, I will treat the interview and our discussions as totally confidential. 
If you feel that there is somebody in your oganisation who may be in a better position 
to see me, I would appreciate your advice. Professor Gardener or myself will telephone 
you approximately one week after you receive this letter In order to discuss this 
request. 
Aly apologies for any inconvenience, and I do appreciate any time that you may be 
able to give me. I thank you in advance for your kind co-operation. 
Yours sincerely, 
Paul Feeney 
The IEF is part of the School of Accounting, Banking and Economics (S AB E). University College of North Wales, Bangor. Chairman: Professor L A. Winters, Director: Professor E. P. M. Gardener, Consultant Director: Professor J. R. S. Revell. 
Telephone: (0248) 351151 (Ext 2277 or 2278). Telex: 6110026kie: Unicol Bangor. Bank Account No: 404530 90830038. 
Telephone: (0246) 351151 (Ext. 298) Telex: 61100 Cable: Unicol Bangor Bank Account No: 404530 90830038 
Appendix 6.2 Follow-up letter 
DIRECTOR: 
PROFESSOR E. P. M. GARDENER. 
INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN FINANCE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES BANGOR, GWYNEDD, LLS7 200. 
Our reference: Your reference: 
PF/SAP 
7 November 1986 
Mr Bruce Chapman 
Director 
County NatWest 
Drapers Gardens 
12 Throgmorton Avenue 
London 
EC2P 2ES 
Dear Mr Chapman 
Following our telephone conversation relating to the arrangement of a 
date and time at which you would kindly be available to talk with me on 
the subject of 'Securitisation and the Euronote Market' (i. e. my 
doctoral research) I write to confirm our arrangement. 
The date and time agreed upon was Thursday 4 December 1986 at 10.00 am. 
I also contacted Mr Keith Glover in connection with sterling commercial 
paper. He kindly agreed to make himself available at 10.00 am if 
required. Enclosed with this letter is a sheet containing a few 
questions which Iwill probably bring up at our meeting. If you are 
unhappy with any of these questions then I can be contacted on (0248) 
351151 ext. 539. 
The meeting will,, of course, be treated as totally confidential. Thank 
you for finding the time to speak to me, and I look forward to meeting 
you. 
Yours sincerely 
Paul Feeney 
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The IEF Is part of the School of Accounting, Banking and Economics (S AB E), University College of North Wales, Bangor. Chairman: Professor L A. Winters, Director: Professor E. P. M, Gardener, Consultant Director: Professor J. R. S. Revell. 
Telephone: (0248) 351151 (Ext. 2277 or 2278). Telex: 61100, Cable: Unlcol Bangor. Bank Account No: 404530 90830038. 
Appendix 6.2 (tont) 
TOPICS ON WHICH GENERAL QUESTIONS WILL BE ASKED 
1 Risk 
1.1 To the investor 
1.2 To the underwriter 
1.3 To the pl acing agent 
1.4 Systemic risk 
2 Pricing 
2.1 Of notes , 2.2 Of underwriting 
3 Competitive forces 
3.1 Ease of entry 
3.2 Ease of exit 
3.3 The market/concentration 
This agenda isf1 exi bl e and you are free to talk about any topics which 
you feel to be more significant within the euronote market or to avoid 
any areas you may not wish to comment on. 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
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Appendix 6.3 List of participants in semi-structured interviews 
Morgan Guaranty Mr James J Fuschetti, Executive Director, 
Corporate Finance 
Mr Edmund Carton, Assistant Director, 
Commercial Paper 
Merrill Lynch Mr Kevin Regan, Executive Director 
SG Warburg & Co Ltd Mr James Hamilton, General Manager 
Citicorp Investment Bank Mr David Pritchard, Managing Director 
Ltd Mr Len Harwood, Executive Director, 
Commercial Paper 
Bank of America Mr Ronald A Baker, Vice President, Capital 
International Ltd Markets 
Mr 0 Kissane, Assistant Vice President, 
Money Markets 
Canadian Imperial Bank Mr Geoffrey R Mountford, Director, Money 
of Commerce Markets 
Mr David J Calver, Director, Money Markets 
and Floating Rates Assets 
County NatWest Capital Mr Bruce Chapman, Director 
Markets Ltd Mr Keith Glover, Director, Commercial 
Paper 
Dean Witter Capital Markets Mr M Jones, Vice President, Money Markets 
Ltd 
Lloyds Merchant Bank Ltd Mr Andrew Winckler, Director 
Samuel Montagu & Co Mr John M Neary, Director, Money Markets 
Panmure Gordon & Co Ltd Mr James Johnson, Chief Analyst, Money 
Markets 
Chase Manhattan Bank Ltd Mr H Bethe, Executive Director, Money 
Markets 
Credit Suisse First Mr Andrew Reicher, Director 
Boston Ltd 
Bank of England Mr JWC Osborn, Manager, Banking Super- 
vision Division 
National Westminster Bank Mr AJW Watson, Assistant Treasurer 
plc 
Shearson-Lehman Brothers Anonymous 
Bankers Trust Anonymous 
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Appendix 6.4 Sans-structured interview agenda 
1 Risk 
1.1 The investor 
Probe on: 
Main risk to the investor 
Reasons for investing in euronotes 
Measurement of risk 
1.2 The Underwriter 
Probe on: 
Main risk to the underwriter 
Reasons for underwriting euronotes 
Measurement of risk 
1.3 The Placing Agent 
Probe on: 
Main risk to the placing agent 
Reasons for placing euronotes 
Measurement of risk 
1.4 Systemic Risk 
Probe on: 
Extent to which this is viewed as a problem 
Opinions on LLR 
2 Pricing 
2.1 Notes 
Probe on: 
Now price is determined 
Adequacy 
Calculation of return 
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2.2 Underwriting 
Probe on: 
How price is determined 
Adequacy 
Calculation of return 
3 Competitive Forces 
3.1 Ease of entry 
Probe on: 
Economies of scale 
Product differenti ation 
Capital requirements 
Expected retaliation 
3.2 Ease of exit 
Probe on: 
Transferability of 11 abi I ity 
Cost of restructuring operations 
Possibility of failure/being allowed to fail 
3.3 The Market 
Probe on: 
Industry concentration and market share 
Industry growth 
Indicators of success 
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Appendix 6.5 Underwriter rankings January - December 1986 
Ranked by volume 
Rank Bank Amount 
$m 
Number of 
transactions 
1 Banque Nationale de Paris 1027.7 64 
2 Credit Suisse 827.2 . 52 3 Orion Royal Bank/RBC 791.1 48 
4 IBJ 760.6 58 
5 Sumitomo Bank/Sumitomo Finance 757.3 50 
6 Bankers Trust 707.0 51 
7 Credit Lyonnais 687.9 55 
8 Swiss Bank Corp/SBCI 659.8 38 
9 Bank of America 654.3 38 
10 CIBC Ltd 632.7 46 
11 Algemene Bank Nederland 630.0 38 
12 Toronto-Dominion International 628.0 31 
13 Westpac Banking Corp 596.5 45 
14 Banque Paribas 583.2 43 
15 Bank of Tokyo 551.2 36 
16 Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank NV 550.0 31 
17 Bank of Montreal 543.8 26 
18 NatWest/County Bank 541.7 31 
19 Fuji Bank 534.9 40 
20 Barclays Bank 508.6 37 
21 Societe Generale 502.6 37 
22 First Interstate 499.9 23 
23 Commerzbank 493.2 30 
24 Citicorp 484.4 44 
25 Banque I ndos ue z 474.4 44 
26 Midland Bank Group 452.3 34 
27 Dai-Ichs Kangyo Bank 427.2 35 
28 LTCB 422.8 31 
29 Sanwa Bank 422.2 37 
30 Chase Manhattan 408.1 34 
31 First Chicago 407.4 28 
32 Security Pacific National Bank 403.8 24 
33 Chemical Bank 402.8 25 
34 Generale Bank 341.5 30 
35 Mitsubishi Bank/Mitsubishi Finance 338.5 27 
36 Deutsche Bank 334.6 17 
37 WestLB 318.3 31 
38 National Australia Bank 315.6 22 
39 Saitama Bank 310.7 28 
40 Mitsui Bank/Mitsui Finance 308.8 23 
41 Hongkong & Shanghai Bank/Wardley 297.8 22 
42 Continental Illinois 297.4 15 
43 Morgan Guaranty 293.8 20 
44 Kans al li s-Osake-Pan kki 283.9 32 
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Appendix 6.5 Underwriter rankings January - December 1986 continued 
Ranked by volume 
Rank Bank Amount 
$m 
Number of 
transactions 
45 CTB Australia 261.0 17 
46 Credit Commercial de France 254.2 17 
47 Lloyds Bank International 247.7 22 
48 Bank of Nova Scotia 243.9 17 
49 ANZ/Gri ndl ays 243.0 17 
50 Manufacturers Hanover 242.5 18 
51 Tokai Bank 242.0 19 
52 Standard Chartered Bank 240.9 24 
53 Union Bank of Switzerland 228.4 17 
54 Mitsubishi Trust & Banking Corp 226.3 12 
55 Credit Agr i co le 215.5 14 
56 T ai yo Kobe Bank 194.9 16 
57 Nippon Credit Bank 189.5 10 
58 Banco di Roma 188.1 16 
59 Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co 183.3 15 
60 Daiwa Bank 174.5 18 
61 Irving Trust Co 171.7 10 
62 Mitsui Trust 170.9 11 
63 Dresdner Bank 158.1 10 
64 Bank of New York 157.5 7 
65 Banca Commerciale Italiana 133.9 8 
66 Kyowa Bank 131.5 14 
67 BHF -Bank 131.0 10 68 Arab Banking Corp 127.2 11 
69 BSFE 126.2 10 
70 CIC 126.1 9 
71 Nederlandsche Middenstandsbank 122.4 6 
72 State Bank of New South Wales 121.5 12 
73 Italian Iternational Bank 118.4 10 
74 Mellon Bank 115.9 5 
75 PKbanken 115.3 12 
76 SEB 114.0 14 
77 Bank of New Zealand 112.8 9 
78 Svenska Handelsbanken 111.8 14 
79 Banque Bruxelles Lambert 110.2 6 
80 Rural and Industries Bank of WA 108.2 7 
81 Bank of Yokohama 103.0 10 
82 Kredietbank 104.1 11 
83 Rabobank Nederland 99.3 6 
84 Banco di Napoli 97.5 8 
85 Yasuda Trust & Banking Co 95.1 9 
86 First National Bank of Boston 94.6 10 
87 Bank of Scotland 94.6 9 
88 Banco Exterior de Espana 89.7 1 
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Appendix 6.5 Underwriter rankings January - December 1986 continued 
Ranked by volume 
Rank Bank Amount 
$m 
Numr of 
t ansactions 
89 Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino 88.9 9 
90 Salomon Brothers 88.5 3 
91 Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 87.9 8 
92 Gulf International Bank 86.0 9 
93 National Bank of Canada 83.9 5 
94 Den Norske Creditbank 82.4 11 
95 San Paolo Bank 81.7 10 
96 Associated Japanese Bank 79.3 7 
97 SG Warburg & Co 79.0 8 
98 Gulf Bank 96.9 7 
99 Kuwaiti French Bank 75.8 8 
100 Bank of Ireland 75.5 7 
Other underwriters 
Hambros Bank 74.1 6 
Caisses Central e de Banques Popul ai res 73.5 4 
Banco di Bilbao 73.1 5 
Credit du Nord 69.7 10 
DG Bank 68.8 7 
Union Bank of Finland 68.6 9 
Banco di Sicilia 65.6 6 
Merrill Lynch 64.9 4 
Schroders 64.7 12 
Kleinwort Benson 64.4 9 
Trust Company Bank 62.8 2 
Chuo Trust & Banking Co 61.0 5 
Girozentrale Vienna 60.8 4 
Bayerishe Vereinsbank 59.9 6 
Banca Nazionale dell 'Agri coltura 59.5 5 
PRIVATbanken 59.2 5 
Saudi International Bank 59.1 5 
Morgan Grenfell & Co 56.5 4 
Credito Italiano 55.5 5 
Union Bank of Norway 54.9 6 
Al Saudi Bank 54.8 4 
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp 53.5 6 
Nomura Securities 52.6 7 
Postipankki 49.9 4 
State Bank of Victoria 49.3 3 
Creditanstalt-Bankverein 48.3 5 
Hang Seng Bank 48.3 8 
Great Pacific Capital 48.1 1 
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Ranked by volume 
Rank Bank 
Bergen Bank 
Banque Internationale a Luxembourg 
Bank of China 
Societe Generale Alsacienne de Banque 
Pittsburgh National Bank 
Malayan Banking Bhd 
Continental Bank of Canada 
American Express Bank 
Osterrei chi sche Landerbank 
Swed Bank 
Banco Hispano Americano 
Banca de Vizcaya 
Caj a de Madrid 
Caja de Barcelona 
American Scandinavian Banking Corp 
Takugin International 
Burgan Bank 
Den Danske Bank 
B FCE 
Development Bank of Singapore 
First Austrian Bank 
Abu Dhabi International Bank 
American National Bank & Trust 
Banco Central of New York 
California First Bank 
First National State Bank (New 
National Commercial Bank of SA 
Second National Bank of Seginaw 
Wells Fargo International Ltd 
BAI I 
Crocker Bank 
Sparebanken Rogal and 
Banque Generale de Luxembourg 
ItaB Bank Group 
Banca Popolare di Milano 
Toyo Trust & Banking Co 
European American Bank 
MBank 
National Bank of Kuwait 
Tromso Sparebanken 
KI IC 
Invest Securities A/S 
Banco di Santo Spi ri to 
NM Rothschild & Sons 
Co 
Jersey) 
Number of 
Amount transactions 
$m 
46.3 
46.3 
45.8 
45.6 
44.1 
43.1 
42.0 
41.9 
41.9 
41.0 
39.7 
39.7 
39.7 
39.8 
38.4 
38.4 
38.1 
37.9 
36.4 
36.1 
35.9 
34.6 
34.6 
34.6 
34.6 
34.6 
34.6 
34.6 
34.6 
33.9 
31.3 
30.9 
30.5 
29.6 
29.4 
29.2 
26.7 
25.5 
25.3 
25.2 
24.7 
24.1 
24.0 
23.7 
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Ranked by volume 
Rank Bank 
Number of 
Amount transactions 
$m 
Allied Irish Bank 22.4 3 
Christiania Bank 21.7 4 
NCNB National Bank of North Carolina 21.6 2 
National Bank of Canada 21.5 2 
Bank Mees & Hope 21.2 2 
First Maryland 20.7 2 
Banque Louis Drefus 20.0 1 
Banque Hervet 20.0 1 
Landesbanken 19.7 2 
Bank of Bahrain & Kuwait 19.0 3 
Copenhagen Handelsbank 18.9 3 
Alahl i Bank of Kuwait 18.7 3 
Gulf Riyad Bank 18.7 2 
Kidder Peabody 18.5 2 
Capel Court 18.5 2 
Dean Witter Capital Markets - 
International 18.4 1 
Arab Bank Ltd 18.0 3 
Sparebanken Vest 17.5 2 
Sparekassen SDS 17.3 2 
Texas Commerce Bank 17.2 2 
BRED 17.0 7 
Caisse Centrale des Jardins du Quebec 16.7 1 
Norinchukin Bank 16.7 1 
Hokur i ku Bank 16.7 1 
CDPQ 16.7 1 
Overseas Union Bank 16.6 3 
BAC-COB Savings Bank 15.6 2 
Yamaichi International 15.5 2 
Societe Europeenne de Banque 15.4 2 
Singapore Numura Merchant Banking Ltd 14.2 1 
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co 14.1 2 
Caisse d'Epargne de 1'Etat 14.1 1 
F van Lanschot Bankers 14.1 1 
Nanyang Commercial Bank 13.7 2 
Saudi European Bank 13.5 1 
Bank of East Asia 13.5 3 
State Bank of India 13.2 2 
Allied Irish Investment Bank 13.1 1 
Sparebanken Mi dt-Norge 13.1 2 
Royal Bank of Scotland 13.0 1 
Scandinavia Bank 12.8 2 
A/S Bank 12.1 1 
Nikko 12.1 2 
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Ranked by volume 
Rank Bank 
Number of 
Amount transactions 
$m 
Bayerische Landerbank 12.0 
Chicago-Tokyo Bank 12.0 
AGIFEL 11.7 
Handelsbanken 11.5 
PK Christiania 11.5 
National Bank of Oman 11.1 
Oman International 11.1 
Uni Insurance 10.9 
KDB International (Singapore) Ltd 10.7 
Banque Worms 10.6 
Bank Ekspor Impor Indonesi a 10.5 
Bank Negara Indonesia 10.5 
Bank Bumi purta Malaysia 10.5 
Bank of Fukuoka 10.5 
Banque Francaise du Agriculture 10.5 
Irish Bank of Commerce 10.5 
Societe Industrielle de Banque 10.5 
State Bank of South Australia 10.5 
Shoko Chukin Bank 10.5 
Gotabanken 10.1 
China Development Finance 9.6 
Jardine Fleming & Co 9.0 
Tat Lee Bank 8.7 
Cjensidige Insurance A/S 8.6 
Australian-European Finance Corp 8.3 
Development Finance Corp of New Zealand 8.3 
Elders 8.3 
Hill Samuel & Co 8.3 
InterFirst Bank Dallas 8.3 
Marac Corp 8.3 
Vereins und Westbank 8.3 
UBAF 'Bank Group 8.3 
French-American Banking Corp 8.2 
EF Hutton 8.0 
Bank I ppa 7.9 
Korea Exchange Bank 7.7 
Rainier National Bank 7.7 
L'Europeenne de Banque 7.7 
Chemical-Sanwa Merchant Bank 7.7 
Zentralsparkasse und Kommerzialbank 7.7 
Roga l an ds ban ken 7.4 
Bank of Helsinki 7.2 
Banque de Neufl ize Schlumberger Mallet 7.1 
Canadian Eastern Finance 7.1 
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Ranked by volume 
Rank Bank 
Number of 
Amount transactions 
$m 
Banco Totta y Acores 6.3 
New Japan Securities 6.3 
Bank of Boston 6.3 
Deutsch-Scandinavische Bank 6.3 
Sundsvall sban ken 6.3 
CCIC Finance Ltd 6.0 
Ojensidige Insurance 6.0 
Sparebanken Nord 6.0 
Sparebanken Oslo Akershus 6.0 
Banco Atl anti co 5.9 
Cater Allen Ltd 5.7 
King and Shaxon 5.7 
Smith St Aubyn & Co 5.7 
Union Discount Company of London 5.7 
Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtschaft 5.6 
Banco Espirito e Commercial de Lisboa 5.6 
Banco Nacional Ultramarino 5.6 
Australia Japanese Int Finance 5.6 
Banco Saudi Espanol 5.6 
Al Baab 5.6 
Berliner Bank 5.5 
Commerce Union Bank 5.5 
First Tennesse Bank 5.5 
Valley National Bank of Arizona 5.5 
Banque Conti nental e du Luxembourg 5.4 
National Bank of Greece 5.3 
Nippon Trust & Banking Co 5.3 
Bank of British Columbia 5.3 
Arab Hellenic Bank 5.3 
CARIPLO 5.3 
International Trade & Investment Co 5.3 
Iran Overseas Investment Bank 5.3 
KFTCIC 5.3 
Banca del la Svizzera Ital i ana 5.0 
Commerce Bank of Singapore 5.0 
Gennossenschaftliche Zentralbank 5.0 
Kuwait Arab Bank 5.0 
Banque Nordeurope 4.8 
Banque de l' Uni on Europeenne 4.5 
Morgan Stanley International 4.5 
Singapore International Merchant Bankers 4.3 
Skanska Banken 3.9 
Forsta Sparebanken 3.8 
Republic Bank Dallas 3.8 
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Ranked by volume 
Rank Bank 
Number of 
Amount transactions 
$m 
Bondernes Bank 3.7 
Samvirke Insurance 3.7 
Sparebanken Sor 3.7 
First Pacific Finance 3.2 
Kin Cheng Banking Group 3.2 
Sun Hung Kai 3.2 
V ar de Bank 3.0 
Amagerbanken Akti eselshab 2.9 
Industrial & Commercial Bank 2.9 
Al-Bank Al-Saudi Al-Franst 2.7 
Tunis International Bank 2.7 
Union de Banques a Paris 2.7 
Norddeutsche Landesbank 2.5 
Trinkhaus & Burkhardt 2.5 
Source: Euromoney Capital Markets Annual 
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CHAPTER 7 
MEASURING THE FINANCIAL RETURN TO UNDERWRITING BANKS 
ON A RETURN ON ASSETS METHODOLOGY: 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SYSTEMIC RISK 
7.1 Introduction 
For an institution as a whole, return on equity (ROE) is considered 
a key measure of performance. At this level, ROE may certainly be 
appropriate. It measures the success of the institution against its 
objectives. However, as Ernst and Whinney (1987, p. 146) point out: 
'Just as it is misleading to consider ROE without looking at. 
its components, it is also misleading to consider an 
institution's performance without looking at the performance 
of its components. ' 
Ernst and Whinney (1987, pp. 146-48) state that whilst ROE is 
appropriate at the organisational level, it fails as a performance 
measure be 1 ow this level. However, if profitability is to be examined 
thoroughly: 
'... it must be examined below the organisational level (and) 
... management effort therefore shifts to ROA' 
It is not surprising, then, that return on assets (ROA) was found to be 
widely employed in the euronote market (mainly by small banks). 
The aim of this chapter is to use the quantitative data gathered in 
the semi-structured interviews (documented in Chapter 6) in order to 
determine whether the returns to underwriting banks are adequate as 
measured by a ROA methodology. If they are found to be adequate then it 
might be argued that, at least under the respective scenarios simulated, 
systemic risk is unlikely to be increased. If they are found to be 
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inadequate we might argue that systemic risk is likely to be increased 
under these scenarios. There is some uncertainty as to how an 
underwriter's financial return should be calculated. The prevailing 
view of smal 1 bank respondents (and some 1 arger banks) appears to be 
that the financial return to the underwriter is best measured by 
applying a ROA calculation (see, for example, Dungan, 1985, p 12). 
Under a ROA methodology all returns to the underwriter (from the front- 
end fees, facility fees and maximum margins) are applied only to those 
assets actually funded. It is also an objective of this chapter to 
identify and emphasise the drawbacks of using a RDA methodology in order 
to calculate the return to underwriting banks in a euronote facility. 
When employing a ROA methodology to determine whether the return to 
the underwriting banks is adequate to compensate for the risks incurred, 
a problem arises. The problem relates to the determinancy of adequacy. 
As emphasised in responses from semi-structured interviews, commercial 
banks generally require a minimum average return on total assets of 
approximately 0.5 per cent. Naturally, adequacy will also be determined 
by the proportion of costs which are allocated to certain services. 
Where technology is concerned, for instance, a 0.5 per cent return on 
assets may be insufficient to recoup the costs associated with starting 
up the systems. Similarly, if a bank was to make a loan to a company 
with doubtful creditworthiness, a 0.5 per cent return on assets would be 
considered generally to be totally insufficient for the risks incurred. 
On the other hand, a straightforward loan to a top quality company would 
probably carry a premium of just below 0.5 per cent. Obvious 1 y, 
adequacy is to al arge extent subjective and deal-specific. 
However, when an underwri ter is asked to f und his commitment ina 
euronote facility, he is being asked to purchase notes which the market 
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has already refused. In other words, the market is turning down the 
credit at the price offered. It would seem highly unlikely that 
underwriting banks would be able to sell these notes other than at a 
loss (if they could sell them at all) especially since skilled, 
professional investment banks with market placing power will have 
already tried and failed. Under these conditions it does not seem 
unreasonable to argue that, when asked to fund, underwriters in the 
euronote market should receive at least the average minimum total ROA of 
0.5 per cent generally required by large commercial banks. This being 
so, an adequate rate of return, for the purposes of our initial 
analysis, will be set at a return of 0.5 per cent or more when drawn. 
In keeping with the findings of the semi-structured interviews an 
undrawn return of half that (ie 0.25 per cent) will be taken as a 
minimum standard of adequacy only where the f aci 1 ity is never drawn. 
The results of the semi-structured interviews revealed that most 
respondents believed that returns of at 1 east these levels would have to 
be gained on the underwriting portfolio if that portfolio is to be 
looked at on a stand alone basis; i. e. as separate from the customer 
rel ationship. 
A second problem arises in choosing the scenarios to simulate. 
There are an infinite number of possible funding scenarios which could 
be employed in calculating a return to the underwriters. The problem 
lies in choosing a limited number of scenarios which simulate an 
effective range of funding possibilities, whilst also highlighting 
factors that may provide an undication that the underwriting of euronote 
facilities on a ROA basis may lead to an increase in systemic risk - 
possibly by providing underwriters with misleading information on which 
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to base their underwriting decisions. The funding scenarios chosen are 
as follows: 
1 If all funds were drawn at the end of the first month and the 
underwriter was forced to continue to fund until the maturity 
of the facility (worst case scenario) 
2 If no funds were drawn (best case scenario) 
3 If all funds were drawn for a period of 1 year throughout the 
life of the facility 
4 If all funds were drawn once each year for a three-month 
period only 
5 If 50 per cent of the f aci 1 ity was drawn once each year for a 
three-month period only 
These scenarios simulate an effective range of funding possibilities 
from best scenario (where systemic risk implications may be minor) to a 
worst-case scenario where systemic risk implications are major, i. e. 
funding risk and credit risk are maximised. 
The researcher was able to construct and simulate these scenarios 
because of the provision of non-publicly available pricing data kindly 
provided by NatWest Investment Bank, Bank of America Capital Markets and 
Merrill Lynch Capital Markets collected through the semi-structured 
interviews. The data cover prices for all euronote facilities signed 
between January 1985 and January 1987. 
7.2 Simulation and Experimentation 
Where research is to be conducted to analyse a business problem 
with a number of unknown variables, a simulation approach may be 
employed. The essence of the simulation approach involves conducting 
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experiments (simulations) on a mathematical model of the system being 
studied. By employing a simulation approach, the model building process 
may be divided into its smaller component units, which may in turn be 
combined in an operationally useful sequence. These component units may 
then be analysed in a structured manner through the resulting simulation 
model. There are basically three main methods of simulation. These 
are Monte Carlo, operational gaming and system simulation. The current 
research is concerned primarily with the last. 
With system simul ation, real-world data are processed through a 
model that is itself a representation of the system or environment under 
analysis. It is this type of simulation that will be conducted in this 
chapter and the next. The model produces a series of results (outputs) 
based on the sample of inputs. As with other methods of research, the 
RIRO dictim will sti 11 apply, that is, 'rubbish in, rubbish out'. A 
high quality of input data is essential if good results are to be 
expected. Fortunately, our data input set comprises total market 
pricing data for all euronote facilities signed between January 1985 and 
January 1987: it is both detailed and comprehensive. 
A system simulation technique provides a kind of laboratory where 
controlled experiments can be conducted. It may a1 so be more easi 1y 
understood by practitioners than more arcane mathematical or statistical 
tools. This is of particular importance to our study where fieldwork 
methods of research have been employed within our total research effort. 
Indeed, simulation may offer a particularly useful vehicle for possibly 
new directions in applied and practical methods of research that have 
been proposed in the literature (see Tomkins and Groves, 1983). A 
financial simulation model offers a potentially powerful communications 
interface between researchers and practitioners: an interface which will 
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be employed within this study by running the quantitative data gathered 
in the field through ROA (and later ROX) formulae under different 
funding scenarios. It is not, however, a forecasting tool. The 
simulations to follow are not forecasts or estimations. No estimate is 
made as to the probability of each arising: such an estimate would be at 
best arbitrary and at worst misleading. 
The kind of funding possibilities facing underwriting banks in the 
euronote market seem particularly appropriate for exploration' by 
simulation as there are no actual data on which one may gauge the 
probability of these events occurring. They are characterised by 
uncertainty (see Chapter 9). Alternative possibilities based on a 
mixture of facts and assumptions can be explored. But simulation 
cannot produce optimum solutions to a problem, and the process can be 
very time-consuming. 
Having said this, simulation can be a very useful research 
technique under the kind of conditions mentioned earlier. What is not 
so clear is the formal 'experimentation value' of such research. 
Although setting up 'What if ... V simulations can be a very useful 
, exercise, their experimental content may be comparatively restricted. 
We, therefore, need to consider what kind of simulation experiment is 
possible for more formal research purposes with this kind of model. 
We can categorise experimental research designs into three basic 
types, depending on their respective contro 1 characteristics: pre- 
experiments, true experiments and quasi-experiments. Al 1 three main 
distinctions between these kinds of basic experiment concern the degree 
of control that the researcher has over the 'validity problems' that are 
central to experimental design. 
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There are a number of levels and kinds of validity that are 
relevant to formal experimental design. Emory (1980, p 332) summarises 
four basic types of validity: 
1 internal validity 
2 external validity 
3 statistical conclusion validity 
4 construct validity 
External validity is most applicable to our study. Experiments are 
said to have high internal validity if the researcher has confidence 
that the experimental treatment has been the reason why the dependent 
variable has changed. High external validity is concerned with how 
generalisable the results are to the entire population. Much of the 
formal literature in the area of business research relates to the design 
and conduct of quasi- experiments and true experiments in the setting of 
field research in areas like marketing. 
Although the scenarios can be chosen to research their systemic 
risk implications, it is impossible to predict the probability of their 
occurrence. The simulation exercises turn the problem around to ask not 
what is the probability of their occurrence, but rather what would the 
situation be if they did. In the face of uncertainty, estimating 
probabilities and scenarios is difficult, perhaps impossible. By 
turning the problem around and examining the implications of 
unforseeable events occurring we are able to examine the systemic risk 
potential inherent in different scenarios. 
These initial considerations on experimental design are at least a 
caution in the setting up and interpretation of the simulation exercises 
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that will shortly be described. However, as Gardener (1987, p 21) 
points out: 
'... a great deal of research in the social sciences must 
always remain questionable in a strict scientific sense; 
criticisms can always be made. If all these views were taken 
to heart there would be very little formal research 
undertaken. Practical reseach usually involves some 
compromise, and a primary desideratum for researchers is to 
be aware of the extent and nature of such compromises. ' 
Against this background, we should be careful about the use of 
terms 'experiment' and 'scientific'. The question must be raised as to 
how scientific is our own research. Our own research does satisfy three 
basic conditions for a scientific experiment: it is public in the sense 
that it is explained and repeatable; it produces measurements or results 
designed to address a specific question; and it uses real-world data for 
the population under study. 
Although one can argue that these experiments are scientific, they 
are, to a certain extent, a very restricted kind of 'scientific 
experiment'. It is true that different kinds of experiment will address 
different types of questions. The type of simulations conducted in this 
study are essentially exploratory (or Baconian) experiments. They are 
'What if ...? ' experiments. Our concerns in this context are the 
volume, time and exposure effects of draw-down rates on the financial 
returns to underwriting banks in the euronote market. The results of 
the simulation experiments (in this chapter and the next) wil 1 be fed 
back to market practitioners for their opinions and suggestions. This 
should increase the external validity of the simulation experiments and, 
indeed, our entire research effort. 
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7.3 The Return on Assets Scenarios: Methodology and Presentation of 
Results 
The scenarios are, naturally, not all-encompassing, but provide a 
feasible range of funding possibilities which will probe for systemic 
risk potential. Support is taken for conducting these scenario 
experiments from the BIS (1986a, p 4): 
'Banks may wish to assess (and set limits on) their total 
volume of commitments in terms of their perceived funding 
capacity, perhaps assessing this on a 'worst case' basis and 
revising it in line with market conditions and actual draw 
down. ' 
Although an individual bank may assess its own exposure in this way, 
this may bear little relevance to the exposure of the entire market. It 
is this latter type of exposure which may affect systemic risk. 
The quantitative database established on the Dec 20 computer at the 
University College of North Wales (subsequent to our semi-structured 
interviews) was used to compute each scenario. The database was 
comprised of full fee data for each euronote facility established in the 
market between December 1985 and January 1987 along with the stated 
amount and maturity of each facility. Five data columns were thus 
established on the original database, relating to: the amount of the 
facility; the maturity of the facility; the maximum margin achievable on 
the notes; the front-end fee; and the facility fee. 
Working on these five on gi na 1 data co 1 umns, other co 1 umns were 
compiled, depending on the requirements of the scenario. For example, 
in scenario 1 (worst-case scenario) it was necessary to discover the 
maximum drawn cost of each facility. This was achieved by adding all 
three fee columns together to form a new column to give the maximum 
percentage return achievable. This was in turn converted to a dollar 
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value by multiplying this column by the column rel ating to the amount of 
each facility. All scenarios were conducted on this basis with new data 
columns compiled from the original database depending on the 
requirements of the particular scenario. 
The following scenarios make use of the total market pricing data 
established on the original database. Table 7.1 identifes the different 
objectives of each scenario. 
7.3.1 Scenario 1 (ROA) 
To compute the first (worst case) scenario (where all funds are 
drawn at the end of the first month and not paid back until the maturity 
of the facility) the front-end fee, facility fee, maximum margin, 
committed values and maturities were used for each facility (387 
facilities in all) from the data collected in the fieldwork stage. When 
an underwriter is asked to fund his commitment, he receives al 1 three 
fees (the front-end fee, the fach ity fee and the maximum margin on the 
notes). The formula for calculating the ROA in this (worst case) 
scenario is as follows: 
(front end fees + facility fees 100 
+ maximum margins) x committed value x 
ROA = 
1 
committed value 
,.. (7.1) 
(undrawn cost + maximum margin) x committed value 100 
x 
committed value 1 
1 .. (7.2) 
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fully drawn cost x committed value 
=x 
committed value 
100 
= fully drawn cost x 
1 
Source: Merrill Lynch Capital Markets International 
... (7.4) 
This formula was applied to the total market data. As the total market 
data consists of data for 387 facilities, it was not feasible to show 
al 1 of these data in the main text. For expositional purposes, only 
data and results for the first four facilities, the last two facilities 
and the mean for each complete column are shown in Table 7.2 below (see 
Appendix 7.1 for the presentation of the complete table). 
The final row provides us with the mean value of each column for 
the full market data (as presented in Appendix 7.1). The final column 
gives the ROA for each individual facility. A mean of this column 
provides us with the overall market ROA per annum of 0.32824 per cent. 
On our standard of adequacy (a ROA of at least 0.5 per cent) a 
return of 0.32824 per cent would seem to be quite inadequate. This 
conc1 usion is accentuated all the more by the fact that this scenario 
has been calculated on a worst-case basis. The most conceivable time 
for this scenario to occur would be in times of financial crises. In 
such a situaton, on our calculations, the market would only receive a 
return of 0.32824 per cent on its assets. 
In conclusion for this scenario, we would argue that on a worst- 
case basis (where the entire market is required to fund fully its 
100 
... (7.3) 
1 
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commitments until maturity) the per annum ROA appears to be inadequate 
to compensate for the risks incurred. In this sense systemic risk may 
be increased. Whether the banks could or could not survive such a 
scenario would be dependent on their capital bases and, not least, the 
position of the LLR: these points will be discussed later. At this 
stage it seems prudent to argue that a return of 0.32824 per cent is 
inadequate for this market. 
7.3.2 Scenario 2 (ROA) 
To compute the second (best case) scenario (where no funds are 
drawn), only the front-end fees and facility fees had to be calculated 
for each facility (not a maximum margin). These are the only fees the 
underwriter receives if he is never asked to fund his commitment. These 
fees were then added together to give the total 'undrawn' cost for each 
individual facility (these figures are presented in the fourth column of 
Table 7.2). The front-end fees and facility fees were then multiplied 
by the amount of the facility (column 1 of Table 7.2) to give the total 
monetary return on the facility per annum (column 5 of Table 7.2). The 
mean of this column gives the average monetary return per annum for the 
euronote market when no assets are funded. The mean was found to be US 
$193,800 (see Appendix 7.1 for the presentation of the complete table). 
In order to give a per cent return on assets, this figure has to be 
applied to those assets actually funded. Since no assets are funded in 
this scenario, this, theoretically, leaves the underwriters with an 
infinite ROA. Under this scenario, using a ROA methodology, the 
underwriters would appear to be getting effectively 'money for nothing'. 
In conclusion for this scenario, we would argue that on a best-case 
basis (where no assets are ever funded) using a ROA methodology, the per 
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annum return on assets to the euronote market appears to be sufficiently 
adequate to compensate for the risks incurred. If one accepts the ROA 
methodology, it is unlikely that systemic risk would be increased by a 
situation where no assets are funded in the euronote market. The point 
raised by presenting this scenario, however, is that a methodology that 
lulls an underwriter into believing that an infinite ROA is achievable 
carries its own systemic risk properties. This will be discussed in the 
conclusion to this chapter. 
7.3.3 Scenario 3 (ROA) 
To compute the third scenario (where all funds are drawn for a 
period of 1 year throughout the life of the facility) the front-end 
fee, facility fee, maximum margin, total committed value and maturity 
were taken for each facility. 
As with scenarios 1 and 2, all fees (including the maximum margin) 
are applied only to those assets actually funded. The front-end fees 
and facility fees are calculated for the full committed value each year. 
The maximum margin is calculated for the one year that the full 
commitment is drawn. The two totals are then added together and applied 
only to those assets actual 1y funded. The formula for calculating the 
ROA in this scenario is as follows: 
(Front-end fees + facility fees) + maximum margin (x committed value ) 
(x 
draw-down ) 100 
ROA x 
draw-down 1 
... (7.5) 
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= (undrawn cost x committed value) + maximum margin x 
100 
1 
... (7.6) 
Source: Merrill Lynch Capital Markets International 
This formula was applied to the total market data. For expositional 
purposes, only the data and results for the first four facilities, the 
last two facilities and the mean for each complete column are shown in 
Table 7.3 below (see Appendix 7.2 for the presentation of the complete 
table). 
The fi na 1 row pro vi des us with the mean va 1 ue of each co 1 umn for 
the ful 1 market data (as presented in Appendix 7.2). The final column 
gives the ROA for each individual facility. The mean of this column 
provides us with the overall market ROA per annum of 0.88818 per cent. 
On our standard of adequacy (an ROA of at least 0.5 per cent), a return 
of 0.88818 per cent would appear to be adequate. One fact which is 
materialising with the use of a ROA methodology to calculate the return 
to underwriting banks is that the less the underwriters are asked to 
fund their commitments, the higher their ROA. This is proven 
mathematically through the simple application of the ROA formula. Since 
in this scenario underwriters are only asked to fund the full commitment 
for one year, all the front-end fees and facility fees (paid each year 
irrespective of draw down) are applied to that amount for that period as 
is the maximum margin on the notes. 
In conclusion for this scenario, we would argue that (where all 
funds are drawn for a period of one year throughout the life of the 
facility) using a ROA methodology, the per annum ROA to the euronote 
290 
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market appears to be sufficiently adequate to compensate for the risks 
incurred. If one accepts the ROA methodol ogy, it woul d seem unlikely 
that systemic risk would be increased by a situation where all funds are 
drawn for a period of one year throughout the life of each euronote 
facility. 
7.3.4 Scenario 4 (ROA) 
To compute scenario 4 (where all funds are drawn once each year for 
a three-month period only) - like scenarios 1,2 and 3- all fees 
(including maximum margins) are applied only to those assets actually 
funded. Under this scenario, however, all funds are drawn for a three- 
month period each year. All fees have, therefore, to be applied to the 
drawdown. The formula for calculating the ROA in this scenario is as 
follows: 
(undrawn cost x committed value) + (maximum margin x 
draw down divided by 4) 100 
ROA =x 
draw down 1 
... (7.7) 
(undrawn cost x committed value) + (maximum margin 100 
divided by 4) x 
1 
... (7.8) 
Source: Merrill Lynch Capital Markets International 
This formula was applied to the total market data. The data and results 
for the first four facilities, the last two facilities and the mean for 
each complete column are shown in Table 7.4 (see Appendix 7.3 for the 
presentation of the complete table). 
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The final row provides us with the mean value of each column for 
the full market data (as presented in Appendix 7.3). The final column 
gives the ROA for each individual facility. The mean of this column 
provides the overall market ROA per annum of 0.17526 per cent. On our 
standard of adequacy (a ROA of at 1 east 0.5 per cent), a return of 
0.17526 per cent appears inadequate to compensate for the risks 
incurred. 
We can observe from this scenario that applying the ROA methodology 
strictly means that if the underwriters are only asked to fund for a 
proportion of the year, the ROA is further reduced. In this scenario, 
the market only funds for a period of three months per year. This does 
not mean that the market receives a quarter of its fully drawn return 
each year (which was calculated in scenario 1 as 0.32824 per cent) as 
the front-end fees and facility fees are paid irrespective of draw down. 
Rather, it receives a quarter of its drawn cost less its undrawn cost. 
In conclusion to this scenario, we would argue that (where all 
funds are drawn each year for a three month period only) using a ROA 
methodology, the per annum ROA to the euronote market appears to be 
inadequate to compensate for the risks incurred. In this sense, 
systemic risk may be increased. 
7.3.5 Scenario 5 (ROA) 
The purpose of this scenario is to highlight what we consider to be 
a fundamental weakness in the ROA methodology: namely that it takes no 
account of the amount of assets funded in its calculation of ROA. The 
critical factor is maturity. 
As with scenarios 1,2,3 and 4, all fees (including maximum 
margins) are applied only to those assets actually funded. The 
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important factor, however, is the length of time for which these assets 
are funded. 
The procedure for calculating an underwriter's ROA under this 
scenario is exactly the same as the procedure employed for calculating 
the return on assets under scenario 4. The front-end fees and facility 
fees are calculated for the full committed amount each year. The 
maximum margin is calculated for the three month period each year that 
the full commitment is drawn. The two figures are added together and 
may be applied to the drawdown. The formula for calculating the ROA 
under this scenario is the same as in scenario 4: 
(undrawn cost x committed value) + (maximum margin x 
draw down divided by 4) 100 
ROA =x 
draw down 1 
,.. (7.9) 
100 
= (undrawn cost x committed value) + (maximum margin x 
divided by 4) 
1 
... (7.10) 
Source: Merrill Lynch Capital Markets Internatipnal 
Applying this formula to the total market data leaves us with 
exactly the same ROA as was achieved in scenario 4, ie 0.17526 per cent. 
The f act that the dr awdown is now exact 1y half of what it previous 1y was 
is of no consequence in the ROA methodology. 
In conclusion to this scenario we would argue that (where 50 per 
cent of every facility is drawn once each year for a three month period 
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only) using a ROA methodology, the per annum return on assets to the 
euronote market appears to be inadequate to compensate for the risks 
incurred. In this sense, systemic risk may be increased. 
7.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The scenarios conducted in this chapter are not all-encompassing: 
nor do we cl aim them to be. What we do cl aim is that they simul ate an 
effective range of funding possibilities (feasible events) in the 
euronote market that serve to highlight the danger that the application 
of a ROA methdo l ogy may lead underwriters into a false sense of security 
as far as the profitability of these facil i ties is concerned. 
Similarly, the choice of a measure of adequacy is to a certain extent 
subjective but market determined, and factually defended. 
The funding scenarios not only simulate an effective range of 
funding possibilities but also highlight a number of significant flaws 
in the ROA methodology. The results for scenarios 1 to 5 on a ROA basis 
are displayed in Table 7.5 below. 
Table 7.5 Return on assets for scenarios 1 to 5 
Scenario ROA (%) 
I (fully drawn) 0.32824 
2 (no draw down) 
3 (drawn for 1 year) 
Ch< 
0.88818 
4 (fully drawn for 3 months each year) 0.17526 
5 (50 per cent drawn for 3 months each year) 0.17526 
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Table 7.5 shows that (on our standard of adequacy of 0.5 per cent) 
the use of a ROA methodology provides an adequate return in only two 
cases: scenario 2 and scenario 3. In scenarios 1,4 and 5 the ROA is 
below 0.5 per cent. We are reminded here of the BIS' (1986b, pp 200-02) 
warning that the underpricing of new financial instruments may 
contribute to an increase in systemic risk. The results of scenarios 1, 
4 and 5 would seem to suggest that under these funding scenarios the 
growth of the euronote market may contribute to an increase in systemic 
risk. One particularly disturbing result in this context is that of 
scenario 1. 
Scenario 1 represents what might be termed the 'disaster scenario' 
where all the euronote market is asked to meet its commitments fully for 
their entire duration. Under this 'disaster scenario', applying a ROA 
methodology, the euronote market would only receive an average ROA of 
0.32824 per cent, substantially below our standard of adequacy of 0.5 
per cent. It might reasonably be argued that in times of crises, the 
return to the market should be substantially higher than that received 
during other periods of time. If anything, the opposite appears to be 
true when employing a ROA methodo 1 ogy to ca 1 cu 1 ate the ret urn to the 
euronote market. 
There are, however, a number of significant flaws in the ROA 
methodology which our funding scenarios have identified. To begin with, 
it is noticeable that an underwriter's ROA is almost totally dependent 
on the number of years over which he is asked to f und his commitment. 
The amount he is asked to fund has virtually no relevance in the 
calculation of a ROA. This flaw is emphasised particularly in scenario 
5 (where 50 per cent of the facility is drawn once each year for a three 
month period only). The formula for the calculation of the ROA under 
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this scenario is exactly the same as that in scenario 4 (where all funds 
are drawn once each year for a three month period only). No account is 
taken of the fact that only 50 per cent of the facil ity is funded each 
year in scenario 5 as compared to the full amount in scenario 4. 
In scenario 3 (where all funds are drawn for one year only 
throughout the life of the facility) all fees are applied only to the 
amount funded for that one year. No account is taken of exposure over 
subsequent years. As such, the ROA of 0.88818 per cent is almost 
certainly inflated. This flaw is accentuated further in scenario 2. 
Since under a ROA methodology all fees are applied only to those assets 
actually funded, then if no assets are funded underwriters are left, 
theoretically, with an infinite ROA. It is reasonable to assume, 
however, that large multinational companies do not give money away for 
nothing. Even in a situation where a company may not immediately 
require an underwriter to fund his commitment, the company is still 
paying for a commitment to fund if necessary. In other words, the 
company is paying for the underwriter's exposure to that company. Banks 
employing a ROA methodology may decide to underwrite an issue under the 
impression that their return is more than adequate. In reality, such a 
return methodology takes no account of the underwriter's exposure. 
Underwriters may, therefore, be applying the return to only a small 
proportion of the risk which they are being paid to assume. The 
scenarios chosen highlight how returns can be grossly inflated by 
applying them only to assets actually funded: in the extreme case 
providing an infinite ROA. By doing so, the scenarios also emphasise 
the systemic risk properties inherent in the ROA methodology. 
It is our belief that any methodology employed to calculate the 
return to underwriting banks in the euronote market should take account 
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of both exposure and the period of that exposure. It is for this reason 
that we now turn our attention to the second return methodology employed 
in the market for calculating returns to underwriting banks: a return on 
exposure (ROX) methodology. In the following chapter ROX will be 
explained and the five funding scenarios will be re-run using a ROX 
methodology. 
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Appendix 7.1 ROA data and results for scenarios 1 and 2 
Amount Yrs M Marg U cost U cost D cost 
x amount x amount 
$$ 
ROA 
ä 
80.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0010000 0.08000 0.18000 0.22500 
50.0 15.0 0.001000 0.0007920 0.03960 0.08960 0.17920 
125.0 3.0 0.002000 0.0006670 0.08337 0.33338 0.26670 
100.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0024000 0.24000 0.36500 0.36500 
250.0 10.0 
200.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0008750 0.17500 0.37500 0.18750 
80.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0012500 0.10000 0.30000 0.37500 
250.0 8.0 0.003750 0.0025780 0.64450 1.58200 0.63280 
500.0 5.0 * 0.0006250 0.31250 
100.0 5.0 0.000800 0.0007250 0.07250 0.15250 0.15250 
300.0 10.0 0.003250 0.0010000 0.30000 1.27500 0.42500 
125.0 7.0 0.002000 
45.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0030000 0.13500 0.29250 0.65000 
200.0 8.0 0.000500 0.0008500 0.17000 0.27000 0.13500 
750.0 10.0 0.000800 0.0008000 0.60000 1.20000 0.16000 
12.5 5.0 0.001500 0.0006880 0.00860 0.02735 0.21880 
400.0 10.0 0.004000 0.0015630 0.62520 2.22520 0.55630 
200.0 7.0 0.001500 
500.0 10.0 0.001250 
1500.0 6.0 0.001625 
340.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0008250 0.28050 0.91800 0.27000 
500.0 10.0 0.002875 0.0007440 0.37200 1.80950 0.36190 
100.0 7.0 0.003250 0.0024290 0.24290 0.56790 0.56790 
350.0 10.0 0.001875 0.0010130 0.35455 1.01080 0.28880 
100.0 2.0 0.000625 0.0003125 0.03125 0.09375 0.09375 
1300.0 8.0 0.004375 0.0008780 1.14140 6.82890 0.52530 
85.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0008250 0.07012 0.26137 0.30749 
700.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0006000 0.42000 1.82000 0.26000 
400.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0006630 0.26520 1.06520 0.26630 
350.0 10.0 0.001250 
200.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0015000 0.30000 0.80000 0.40000 
100.0 5.0 0.001125 0.0006250 0.06250 0.17500 0.17500 
2000.0 8.5 0.001750 0.0005980 1.19600 4.69600 0.23480 
500.0 10.0 0.001750 0.0010750 0.53750 1.41250 0.28250 
75.0 7.0 0.002250 0.0010710 0.08032 0.24907 0.33209 
70.0 5.0 0.001000 
500.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0013930 0.69650 1.94650 0.38930 
1000.0 5.5 0.002250 0.0008070 0.80700 3.05700 0.30570 
75.0 7.0 0.002500 
40.0 7.0 0.002000 
100.0 5.5 0.000625 0.0006140 0.06140 0.12390 0.12390 
100.0 5.0 0.001125 0.0005880 0.05880 0.17130 0.17130 
350.0 8.0 0.001875 0.0006160 0.21560 0.87185 0.24910 
500.0 8.0 0.001000 0.0005440 0.27200 0.77200 0.15440 
300.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0008860 0.26580 0.71580 0.23860 
45.0 5.0 0.010000 
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Appendix 7.1 ROA data and results for scenarios 1 and 2 
Amount 
$ 
Yrs M Marg U cost U 
x 
cost 
amount 
$ 
D cost 
x amount 
$ 
ROA 
60.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0007750 0.04650 0.19650 0.32750 
80.0 4.5 0.004000 
30.0 2.0 0.000625 
300.0 10.0 0.001000 0.0004930 0.14790 0.44790 0.14930 
400.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0005000 0.20000 0.70000 0.17500 
150.0 7.0 0.001100 0.0005890 0.08835 0.25335 0.16890 
200.0 10.0 0.001000 0.0005500 0.11000 0.31000 0.15500 
315.0 6.0 0.001250 0.0003420 0.10773 0.50148 0.15920 
75.0 7.0 0.004000 
50.0 7.0 0.001875 
20.0 5.0 0.003750 0.0015500 0.03100 0.10600 0.53000 
75.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0014170 0.10627 0.20003 0.26671 
65.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0012000 0.07800 0.15925 0.24500 
100.0 2.0 0.001250 0.0006250 0.06250 0.18750 0.18750 
100.0 2.0 0.0012 50 
25.0 7.0 0.001875 
100.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0014290 0.14290 0.29290 0.29290 
50.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0008250 0.04125 0.11625 0.23250 
150.0 2.0 0.001250 
75.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0007130 0.05347 0.12847 0.17129 
25.0 5.0 0.001250 
100.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007750 0.07750 0.26500 0.26500 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 
40.0 3.0 0.002000 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0007750 0.03875 0.08875 0.17750 
20.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0023960 0.04792 0.10792 0.53960 
35.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0022920 0.08022 0.16772 0.47920 
100.0 5.0 * 0.0014750 0.14750 
30.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0015500 0.04650 0.07650 0.25500 
100.0 5.0 0.002750 0.0014250 0.14250 0.41750 0.41750 
50.0 2.0 0.000625 
50.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0026050 0.13025 0.25525 0.51050 
60.0 4.0 * 0.0015630 0.09378 
30.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0015000 0.04500 0.09000 0.30000 
40.0 3.0 0.000625 0.0011700 0.04680 0.07180 0.17950 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 
50.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0010750 0.05375 0.17875 0.35750 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 
20.0 5.0 0.002500 
50.0 3.0 0.000625 
60.0 3.0 0.002250 
150.0 6.0 0.001875 0.0013130 0.19695 0.47820 0.31880 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0013750 0.13750 0.38750 0.38750 
300.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0007500 0.22500 0.67500 0.22500 
50.0 3.0 0.002250 0.0018330 0.09165 0.20415 0.40830 
155.0 5.0 0.003375 
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Appendix 7.1 ROA data and results for scenarios 1 and 2 
Amount Yrs M Marg U cost U 
x 
$ ýý 
cost D cost ROA 
amount x amount 
$$ 
30.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0024080 0.07224 0.14724 0.49080 
50.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0006430 0.03215 0.15715 0.31430 
* 3.0 0.002500 
15.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0015830 0.02374 0.06125 0.40833 
30.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0015750 0.04725 0.07725 0.25750 
100.0 4.0 0.002000 0.0013750 0.13750 0.33750 0.33750 
35.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0012500 0.04375 0.10500 0.30000 
100.0 5.0 0.000750 0.0012500 0.12500 0.20000 0.20000 
100.0 2.0 0.000625 
100.0 5.0 0.000750 0.0008350 0.08350 0.15850 0.15850 
25.0 1.0 0.007500 
100.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0017850 0.17850 0.35350 0.35350 
200.0 3.0 0.001500 0.0018330 0.36660 0.66660 0.33330 
40.0 3.0 0.001000 0.0016000 0.06400 0.10400 0.26000 
100.0 5.0 0.000400 0.0003125 0.03125 0.07125 0.07125 
35.0 5.0 0.001500 
25.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0012000 0.03000 0.09250 0.37000 
100.0 5.0 0.003000 0.0012750 0.12750 0.42750 0.42750 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 
30.0 5.0 0.001000 
325.0 5.0 0.001000 
25.0 7.0 0.000500 0.0014290 0.03572 0.04823 0.19292 
13.0 6.0 0.001875 
80.0 3.0 0.002500 
400.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0010000 0.40000 0.90000 0.22500 
50.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0009380 0.04690 0.17190 0.34380 
400.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0022680 0.90720 1.50720 0.37680 
75.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0013750 0.10312 0.25313 0.33751 
75.0 7.0 0.003250 0.0011430 0.08573 0.32948 0.43931 
22.0 3.0 0.003000 
50.0 7.0 0.001000 
50.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0013930 0.06965 0.16965 0.33930 
150.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007250 0.10875 0.39000 0.26000 
75.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0009500 0.07125 0.21188 0.28251 
100.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0013330 0.13330 0.25830 0.25830 
70.0 2.0 0.001250 
45.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0015000 0.06750 0.12375 0.27500 
125.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0025000 0.31250 0.62500 0.50000 
50.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0017190 0.08595 0.21095 0.42190 
155.0 2.0 0.003750 * * * * 
50.0 3.0 0.002500 
75.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007500 0.05625 0.19687 0.26249 
65.0 7.0 0.001875 0.0006960 0.04524 0.16712 0.25711 
150.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0014500 0.21750 0.44250 0.29500 
67.0 5.0 0.002500 
100.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0011790 0.11790 0.36790 0.36790 
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Amount Yrs M Marg U cost U 
x 
$ ýý 
cost D cost ROA 
amount x amount 
$$ 
225.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007500 0.16875 0.59062 0.26250 
50.0 8.0 0.001000 
100.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0012000 0.12000 0.22000 0.22000 
125.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007125 0.08906 0.32344 0.25875 
400.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0007400 0.29600 0.79600 0.19900 
450.0 7.0 0.003000 0.0011250 0.50625 1.85625 0.41250 
200.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0015000 0.30000 1.00000 0.50000 
25.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0031000 0.07750 0.12750 0.51000 
1200.0 3.0 0.002000 0.0014000 1.68000 4.08000 0.34000 
150.0 5.0 0.001725 0.0013250 0.19875 0.45750 0.30500 
150.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0013930 0.20895 0.50895 0.33930 
30.0 3.0 0.001 875 0.0010420 0.03126 0.08751 0.29170 
62.5 5.0 0.002500 0.0008500 0.05313 0.20937 0.33499 
60.0 3.0 
85.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0012500 0.10625 0.31875 0.37500 
100.0 5.0 0.002200 0.0009750 0.09750 0.31750 0.31750 
150.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0005630 0.08445 0.30945 0.20630 
50.0 10.0 0.001563 0.0010260 0.05130 0.12945 0.25890 
100.0 7.0 0.001250 0.0014820 0.14820 0.27320 0.27320 
75.0 7.0 0.001000 0.0009640 0.07230 0.14730 0.19640 
125.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007250 0.09062 0.32500 0.26000 
62.5 5.0 0.001500 0.0009000 0.05625 0.15000 0.24000 
500.0 7.0 0.001250 0.0005200 0.26000 0.88500 0.17700 
150.0 7.0 0.003750 0.0013320 0.19980 0.76230 0.50820 
400.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0013750 0.55000 0.95000 0.23750 
1300.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0019750 2.56750 5.49250 0.42250 
360.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0010000 0.36000 1.08000 0.30000 
50.0 5.0 0.002000 
200.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0008650 0.17300 0.54800 0.27400 
50.0 3.0 0.001250 
25.0 5.5 0.002000 0.0008180 0.02045 0.07045 0.28180 
200.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0011250 0.22500 0.47500 0.23750 
200.0 5.0 0.001375 
200.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0010800 0.21600 0.56600 0.28300 
56.0 3.0 0.002500 
75.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0009510 0.07133 0.14633 0.19511 
170.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0009000 0.15300 0.36550 0.21500 
87.5 2.5 0.003000 
300.0 3.0 0.001500 0.0012080 0.36240 0.81240 0.27080 
130.0 8.0 0.003750 
175.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0011650 0.20387 0.55387 0.31650 
125.0 4.0 0.005000 
220.0 5.0 0.002750 
50.0 3.0 0.003250 **** 
90.0 7.0 0.001000 
300.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0018570 0.55710 1.30710 0.43570 
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Amount Yrs M Marg U cost U 
x 
$ ý% 
cost D cost ROA 
amount x amount 
$$ 
35.0 3.0 0.004500 
37.5 7.0 0.002500 0.0011430 0.04286 0.13661 0.36429 
45.0 3.0 0.002500 
55.0 4.0 0.001000 0.0014500 0.07975 0.13475 0.24500 
125.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0008250 0.10312 0.33750 0.27000 
400.0 5.0 0.002500 
200.0 5.0 0.002500 
300.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0014100 0.42300 1.47300 0.49100 
150.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0014250 0.21375 0.47625 0.31750 
630.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0007780 0.49014 2.06514 0.32780 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 
100.0 3.0 0.005500 
97.5 8.5 0.007500 
20.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.03334 0.08334 0.41670 
60.0 2.0 0.001000 0.0014690 0.08814 0.14814 0.24690 
200.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0012125 0.24250 0.64250 0.32125 
195.0 7.0 0.002750 0.0013750 0.26812 0.80437 0.41250 
100.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0008000 0.08000 0.25500 0.25500 
150.0 8.0 0.003750 
400.0 4.0 0.003500 
60.0 5.0 0.003250 0.0014380 0.08628 0.28128 0.46880 
50.0 1.0 0.002000 
50.0 2.0 0.001250 
100.0 7.0 0.001500 
50.0 5.0 0.001563 
22.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0011000 0.02420 0.06820 0.31000 
75.0 5.0 0.002000 
125.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0012500 0.15625 0.31250 0.25000 
125.0 3.0 0.003000 0,0010210 0.12763 0.50262 0.40210 
200.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0011500 0.23000 0.63000 0.31500 
65.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0010050 0.06532 0.22783 0.35051 
300.0 7.0 0.002750 
110.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0008930 0.09823 0.37323 0.33930 
60.0 5.0 0.002 500 
38.0 6.0 0.001875 0.0014170 0.05385 0.12510 0.32921 
75.0 8.5 0.005500 0.0020070 0.15052 0.56302 0.75069 
140.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0013700 0.19180 0.47180 0.33700 
65.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007950 0.05167 0.17355 0.26700 
110.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0016070 0.17677 0.45177 0.41070 
75.0 5.0 0.003000 
60.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0010250 0.06150 0.15150 0.25250 
700.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0011030 0.77210 1.64710 0.23530 
320.0 7.0 0.003500 0.0023570 0.75424 1.87424 0.58570 
50.0 7.0 0.001250 0.0006960 0.03480 0.09730 0.19460 
* 3.0 0.002500 0.0012500 *** 
* 8.0 0.001875 0.0014060 *** 
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Amount Yrs M Marg U cost U cost 0 cost ROA 
x amount x amount 
$X$$ 
100.0 3.0 0.002500 
100.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0014170 0.14170 0.26670 0.26670 
70.0 5.0 0.003000 0.0016000 0.11200 0.32200 0.46000 
30.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0023750 0.07125 0.17625 0.58750 
100.0 10.0 0.001875 0.0008750 0.08750 0.27500 0.27500 
50.0 5.0 0.003750 0.0014000 0.07000 0.25750 0.51500 
22.0 5.0 0.003750 0.0025000 0.05500 0.13750 0.62500 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 
100.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0014250 0.14250 0.34250 0.34250 
50.0 5.0 0.003500 
400.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0011700 0.46800 0.96800 0.24200 
220.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0012000 0.26400 0.75900 0.34500 
350.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0009380 0.32830 1.20330 0.34380 
75.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0012000 0.09000 0.20250 0.27000 
70.0 2.0 0.000625 
30.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0012670 0.03801 0.07551 0.25170 
50.0 3.0 0.001000 0.0008330 0.04165 0.09165 0.18330 
175.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0013750 0.24062 0.45937 0.26250 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 
125.0 5.0 0.001000 
105.0 8.0 0.001750 0.0010310 0.10826 0.29201 0.27810 
20.0 4.0 0.001500 
225.0 4.0 0.001500 0.0008910 0.20047 0.53798 0.23910 
100.0 5.0 0.001750 
70.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0015000 0.10500 0.28000 0.40000 
30.0 5.0 0.000875 
1000.0 3.0 0.002250 0.0014580 1.45800 3.70800 0.37080 
140.0 8.0 0.000750 0.0040310 0.56434 0.66934 0.47810 
100.0 3.0 0.002625 0.0017500 0.17500 0.43750 0.43750 
50.0 3.0 0.001250 
100.0 3.0 0.001200 
70.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0009560 0.06692 0.20692 0.29560 
25.0 3.0 0.006250 0.0022920 0.05730 0.21355 0.85420 
300.0 5.0 0.002000 
200.0 5.0 0.002000 
70.0 3.0 0.002000 
60.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0011000 0.06600 0.17100 0.28500 
18.0 3.0 0.000563 
25.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.04168 0.10417 0.41668 
110.0 7.0 0.001500 
25.0 2.0 0.001250 
143.0 10.0 0.001875 0.0007710 0.11025 0.37838 0.26460 
43.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0016670 0.07168 0.20068 0.46670 
100.0 1.0 0.003500 **** 
100.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0013250 0.13250 0.38250 0.38250 
45.0 12.0 0.001000 
305 
Appendix 7.1 RQA data and results for scenarios 1 and 2 
Amount Yrs M Marg U cost U cost D cost ROA 
x amount x amount 
$%%$$% 
300.0 14.0 0.002000 0.0011570 0.34710 0.94710 0.31570 
40.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0011070 0.04428 0.12428 0.31070 
25.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.04168 0.10417 0.41668 
85.0 5.0 0.003000 0.0042500 0.36125 0.61625 0.72500 
100.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0007750 0.07750 0.17750 0.17750 
280.0 6.0 0.004250 
85.0 2.0 0.001875 0.0006250 0.05312 0.21250 0.25000 
100.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0011250 0.11250 0.31250 0.31250 
30.0 3.0 0.002500 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0009380 0.04690 0.09690 0.19380 
250.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0007750 0.19375 0.56875 0.22750 
13.0 5.0 * 0.0021250 0.02763 
72.5 5.0 0.001250 
70.0 5.0 0.001875 
45.0 5.0 0.001875 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0006500 0.06500 0.21500 0.21500 
250.0 10.0 0.001375 0.0006630 0.16575 0.50950 0.20380 
145.0 8.0 0.002500 0.0009750 0.14137 0.50388 0.34750 
50.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0011000 0.05500 0.14875 0.29750 
100.0 10.0 0.001500 0.0011250 0.11250 0.26250 0.26250 
500.0 1.0 0.001500 0.0007750 0.38750 1.13750 0.22750 
150.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0020000 0.30000 0.75000 0.50000 
110.0 5.0 0.001500 
**0.001250 
60.0 3.0 0.004000 0.0020000 0.12000 0.36000 0.60000 
450.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0007070 0.31815 1.44315 0.32070 
100.0 8.0 0.002000 0.0014070 0.14070 0.34070 0.34070 
200.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0006820 0.13640 0.48640 0.24320 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 
75.0 6.0 0.001250 0.0011250 0.08437 0.17812 0.23749 
30.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0014580 0.04374 0.08124 0.27080 
25.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.04168 0.10417 0.41668 
75.0 4.0 0.005000 0.0009500 0.07125 0.44625 0.59500 
100.0 1.0 0.002500 
100.0 3.0 0.002000 0.0011700 0.11700 0.31700 0.31700 
75.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0013300 0.09975 0.24975 0.33300 
36.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0011430 0.04115 0.10415 0.28931 
40.0 6.0 0.001500 
300.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0007440 0.22320 0.97320 0.32440 
45.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0007250 0.03263 0.11137 0.24749 
45.0 5.0 0.004000 0.0026250 0.11812 0.29812 0.66249 
185.0 7.0 0.001875 0.0011070 0.20479 0.55167 0.29820 
30.0 10.0 0.003000 
500.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0014000 0.70000 1.82500 0.36500 
400.0 4.0 0.003500 
100.0 5.0 0.003250 0.0019250 0.19250 0.51750 0.51750 
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Amount Yrs M Marg U cost U cost D cost ROA 
x amount x amount 
$$$ 
100.0 7.0 0.003250 0.0014820 0.14820 0.47320 0.47320 
125.0 11.0 0.001750 0.0023410 0.29262 0.51138 0.40910 
125.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0008500 0.10625 0.29375 0.23500 
150.0 7.0 0.002370 
60.0 3.0 0.003750 0.0020000 0.12000 0.34500 0.57500 
75.0 2.5 0.008500 0.0065000 0.48750 1.12500 1.50000 
200.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0011500 0.23000 0.73000 0.36500 
30.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0013930 0.04179 0.09429 0.31430 
150.0 5.0 0.000625 0.0009050 0.13575 0.22950 0.15300 
25.0 30.0 0.003000 0.0012500 0.03125 0.10625 0.42500 
320.0 5.0 0.000500 
110.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0008000 0.08800 0.25300 0.23000 
75.0 7.0 0.002000 
45.0 2.0 0.001875 0.0006250 0.02812 0.11250 0.25000 
200.0 6.0 0.003450 0.0008880 0.17760 0.86760 0.43380 
350.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0012750 0.44625 1.67125 0.47750 
160.0 5.0 0.004500 0.0016700 0.26720 0.98720 0.61700 
120.0 8.0 0.002750 0.0012500 0.15000 0.48000 0.40000 
125.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0010800 0.13500 0.35375 0.28300 
75.0 10.0 0.003000 0.0015750 0.11812 0.34313 0.45751 
185.0 5.0 0.002000 
* 5.0 0.001200 
75.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0012000 0.09000 0.20250 0.27000 
* 7.0 0.001250 0.0013210 
375.0 5.0 0.004000 
150.0 5.0 0.001750 
35.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0013750 0.04812 0.11813 0.33751 
100.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0012000 0.12000 0.34500 0.34500 
350.0 5.0 0.002500 
250.0 5.0 0.001875 
60.0 3.0 * 0.0011670 0.07002 
75.0 7.0 0.001000 0.0008930 0.06698 0.14198 0.18931 
50.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0012000 0.06000 0.18500 0.37000 
300.0 8.0 0.001500 0.0010660 0.31980 0.76980 0.25660 
* 7.0 0.005000 0.0011270 
100.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0009580 0.09580 0.34580 0.34580 
125.0 5.0 0.010000 
300.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0011070 0.33210 0.78210 0.26070 
130.0 8.0 0.001125 0.0007000 0.09100 0.23725 0.18250 
200.0 7.0 0.000800 0.0004640 0.09280 0.25280 0.12640 
100.0 10.0 0.001000 
* 5.0 0.001250 0.0006060 *** 
105.0 5.0 0.000563 0.0007750 0.08138 0.14049 0.13380 
140.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0014370 0.20118 0.55118 0.39370 
127.0 8.0 0.001750 0.0007030 0.08928 0.31153 0.24530 
142.0 5.0 0.001500 
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Amount Yrs M Marg U cost U cost D cost ROA 
x amount x amount 
$$$ 
* 5.0 0.002000 0.0013000 
200.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0011250 0.22500 0.72500 0.36250 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0011250 0.11250 0.36250 0.36250 
200.0 7.0 0.002250 0.0008570 0.17140 0.62140 0.31070 
50.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0008250 0.04125 0.14125 0.28250 
40.0 3.0 0.002250 
38.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0015000 0.05700 0.15200 0.40000 
50.0 10.0 0.001000 0.0005875 0.02937 0.07937 0.15874 
125.0 5.0 0.001500 
35.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0011750 0.04112 0.09363 0.26751 
105.0 3.0 0.001500 0.0006190 0.06499 0.22250 0.21190 
250.0 7.0 0.005000 
170.0 7.0 0.005000 
355.0 7.0 0.001250 
57.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0010800 0.06156 0.14706 0.25800 
70.0 5.0 0.001500 
100.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0014000 0.14000 0.31500 0.31500 
150.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0020750 0.31125 0.68625 0.45750 
250.0 2.0 0.001500 0.0008750 0.21875 0.59375 0.23750 
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U cost 
Amount Yrs M Marg U cost x draw M marg Total 
-down x amount value ROA $X$$$ 9' 
80.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0010000 0.2400 0.10000 0.3400 0.42500 
50.0 15.0 0.001000 0.0007920 0.5940 0.05000 0.6440 1.28800 
125.0 3.0 0.002000 0.0006670 0.2501 0.25000 0.5001 0.40009 
100.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0024000 1.2000 0.12500 1.3250 1.32500 
250.0 10.0 
200.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0008750 0.8750 0.20000 1.0750 0.53750 
80.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0012500 0.5000 0.20000 0.7000 0.87500 
250.0 8.0 0.003750 0.0025780 5.1560 0.93750 6.0935 2.43740 
500.0 5.0 * 0.0006250 1.5625 
100.0 5.0 0.000800 0.0007250 0.3625 0.08000 0.4425 0.44250 
300.0 10.0 0.003250 0.0010000 3.0000 0.97500 3.9750 1.32500 
125.0 7.0 0.002000 **0.25000 
45.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0030000 0.6750 0.15750 0.8325 1.85000 
200.0 8.0 0.000500 0.0008500 1.3600 0.10000 1.4600 0.73000 
750.0 10.0 0.000800 0.0008000 6.0000 0.60000 6.6000 0.88000 
12.5 5.0 0.001500 0.0006880 0.0430 0.01875 0.0618 0.49400 
400.0 10.0 0.004000 0.0015630 6.2520 1.60000 7.8520 1.96300 
200.0 7.0 0.001500 **0.30000 
500.0 10.0 0.001250 **0.62500 
1500.0 6.0 0.001625 **2.43750 
340.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0008250 1.4025 0.63750 2.0400 0.60000 
500.0 10.0 0.002875 0.0007440 3.7200 1.43750 5.1575 1.03150 
100.0 7.0 0.003250 0.0024290 1.7003 0.32500 2.0253 2.02530 
350.0 10.0 0.001875 0.0010130 3.5455 0.65625 4.2018 1.20050 
100.0 2.0 0.000625 0.0003125 0.0625 0.06250 0.1250 0.12500 
1300.0 8.0 0.004375 0.0008780 9.1312 5.68750 14.8187 1.13990 
85.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0008250 0.3506 0.19125 0.5419 0.63747 
700.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0006000 4.2000 1.40000 5.6000 0.80000 
400.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0006630 2.6520 0.80000 3.4520 0.86300 
350.0 10.0 0.001250 **0.43750 
200.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0015000 0.9000 0.50000 1.4000 0.70000 
100.0 5.0 0.001125 0.0006250 0.3125 0.11250 0.4250 0.42500 
2000.0 8.5 0.001750 0.0005980 10.1660 3.50000 13.6660 0.68330 
500.0 10.0 0.001750 0,0010750 5.3750 0.87500 6.2500 1.25000 
75.0 7.0 0.002250 0.0010710 0.5622 0.16875 0.7310 0.97465 
70.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.07000 
500.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0013930 4.8755 1.25000 6.1255 1.22510 
1000.0 5.5 0.002250 0.0008070 4.4385 2.25000 6.6885 0.66885 
75.0 7.0 0.002500 **0.18750 
40.0 7.0 0.002000 **0.08000 
100.0 5.5 0.000625 0.0006140 0.3377 0.06250 0.4002 0.40020 
100.0 5.0 0.001125 0.0005880 0.2940 0.11250 0.4065 0.40650 
350.0 8.0 0.001875 0.0006160 1.7248 0.65625 2.3811 0.68030 
500.0 8.0 0.001000 0.0005440 2.1760 0.50000 2.6760 0.53520 
300.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0008860 1.8606 0.45000 2.3106 0.77020 
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U cost 
Amount Yrs M Marg U cost x draw M marg Total 
-down x amount value ROA $%$$$ 
45.0 
60.0 
80.0 
30.0 
300.0 
400.0 
150.0 
200.0 
315.0 
75.0 
50.0 
20.0 
75.0 
65.0 
100.0 
100.0 
25.0 
100.0 
50.0 
150.0 
75.0 
25.0 
100.0 
100.0 
40.0 
50.0 
20.0 
35.0 
100.0 
30.0 
100.0 
50.0 
50.0 
60.0 
30.0 
40.0 
50.0 
50.0 
50.0 
20.0 
50.0 
60.0 
150.0 
100.0 
300.0 
5.0 0.010000 
5.0 0.002500 0.0007750 
4.5 0.004000 
2.0 0.000625 
10.0 0.001000 0.0004930 
10.0 0.001250 0.0005000 
7.0 0.001100 0.0005890 
10.0 0.001000 0.0005500 
6.0 0.001250 0.0003420 
7.0 0.004000 
7.0 0.001875 
5.0 0.003750 0.0015500 
3.0 0.001250 0.0014170 
5.0 0.001250 0.0012000 
2.0 0.001250 0.0006250 
2.0 0.001250 
7.0 0.001875 
7.0 0.001500 0.0014290 
5.0 0.001500 0.0008250 
2.0 0.001250 
5.0 0.001000 0.0007130 
5.0 0.001250 
5.0 0.001875 0.0007750 
5.0 0.002500 
3.0 0.002000 
5.0 0.001000 0.0007750 
3.0 0.003000 0.0023960 
3.0 0.002500 0.0022920 
5.0 * 0.0014750 
5.0 0.001000 0.0015500 
5.0 0.002750 0.0014250 
2.0 0.000625 
3.0 0.002500 0.0026050 
4.0 * 0.0015630 
5.0 0.001500 0.0015000 
3.0 0.000625 0.0011700 
5.0 0.001000 
5,0 0.002500 0.0010750 
5.0 0.001000 
5.0 0.002500 
3.0 0.000625 
3.0 0.002250 
6.0 0.001875 0.0013130 
5.0 0.002500 0.0013750 
5.0 0.001500 0.0007500 
* 0.45000 
0.2325 0.15000 
* 0.32000 
* 0.01875 
1.4790 0.30000 
2.0000 0.50000 
0.6184 0.16500 
1.1000 0.20000 
0.6464 0.39375 
* 0.30000 
* 0.09375 
0.1550 0.07500 
0.3188 0.09375 
0.3900 0.08125 
0.1250 0.12500 
* 0.12500 
* 0.04688 
1.0003 0.15000 
0.2063 0.07500 
* 0.18750 
0.2674 0.07500 
* 0.03125 
0.3875 0.18750 
* 0.25000 
* 0.08000 
0.1938 0.05000 
0.1438 0.06000 
0.2407 0.08750 
0.7375 
0.2325 0.03000 
0.7125 0.27500 
* 0.03125 
0.3908 0.12500 
0.3751 
0.2250 0.04500 
0.1404 0.02500 
* 0.05000 
0.2688 0.12500 
* 0.05000 
* 0.05000 
* 0.03125 
* 0.13500 
1.1817 0.28125 
0.6875 0.25000 
1.1250 0.45000 
0.3825 0.63750 
1.7790 0.59300 
2.5000 0.62500 
0.7835 0.52230 
1.3000 0.65000 
1.0401 0.33020 
0.2300 1.15000 
0.4126 0.55008 
0.4713 0.72500 
0.2500 0.25000 
1.1503 1.15030 
0.2813 0.56250 
0.3424 0.45647 
0.5750 0.57500 
0.2438 0.48750 
0.2038 1.01880 
0.3282 0.93760 
0.2625 0.87500 
0.9875 0.98750 
0.5158 1.03150 
0.2700 0.90000 
0.1654 0.41350 
0.3938 0.78750 
1.4629 0.97530 
0.9375 0.93750 
1.5750 0.52500 
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Amount Yrs M Marg U cost 
$%% 
U cost 
x draw M marg Total 
-down x amount value ROA $$$% 
50.0 3.0 0.002250 0.0018330 
155.0 5,0 0.003375 
30.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0024080 
50.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0006430 
* 3.0 0.002500 
15.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0015830 
30.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0015750 
100.0 4.0 0.002000 0.0013750 
35.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0012500 
100.0 5.0 0.000750 0.0012500 
100.0 2.0 0.000625 
100.0 5.0 0.000750 0.0008350 
25.0 1.0 0.007500 
100.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0017850 
200.0 3.0 0.001500 0.0018330 
40.0 3.0 0.001000 0.0016000 
100.0 5.0 0.000400 0.0003125 
35.0 5.0 0.001500 
25.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0012000 
100.0 5.0 0.003000 0.0012750 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 
30.0 5.0 0.001000 
325.0 5.0 0.001000 
25.0 7.0 0.000500 0.0014290 
13.0 6.0 0.001875 
80.0 3.0 0.002500 
400.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0010000 
50.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0009380 
400.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0022680 
75.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0013750 
75.0 7.0 0.003250 0.0011430 
22.0 3.0 0.003000 
50.0 7.0 0.001000 
50.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0013930 
150.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007250 
75.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0009500 
100.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0013330 
70.0 2.0 0.0012 50 
45.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0015000 
125.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0025000 
50.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0017190 
155.0 2.0 0.003750 
50.0 3.0 0.002500 
75.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007500 
65.0 7.0 0.001875 0.0006960 
0.2749 0.11250 
* 0.52312 
0.2167 0.07500 
0.1608 0.12500 
** 
0.0712 0.03750 
0.2362 0.03000 
0.5500 0.20000 
0.2188 0.06125 
0.6250 0.07500 
* 0.06250 
0.4175 0.07500 
* 0.18750 
0.8925 0.17500 
1.0998 0.30000 
0.1920 0.04000 
0.1563 0.04000 
* 0.05250 
0.1500 0.06250 
0.6375 0.30000 
* 0.25000 
* 0.03000 
* 0.32500 
0.2500 0.01250 
* 0.02437 
* 0.20000 
4.0000 0.50000 
0.1407 0.12500 
6.3504 0.60000 
1.0312 0.15000 
0.6001 0.24375 
* 0.06600 
* 0.05000 
0.4876 0.10000 
0.5437 0.28125 
0.3562 0.14063 
0.3999 0.12500 
* 0.08750 
0.3375 0.05625 
1.2500 0.31250 
0.3438 0.12500 
* 0.58125 
* 0.12500 
0.2813 0.14063 
0.3167 0.12187 
0.3875 0.77490 
0.2917 0.97240 
0.2858 0.57150 
0.1087 0.72480 
0.2663 0.88750 
0.7500 0.75000 
0.2800 0.80000 
0.7000 0.70000 
0.4925 0.49250 
1.0675 1.06750 
1.3998 0.69990 
0.2320 0.58000 
0.1963 0.19625 
0.2125 0.85000 
0.9375 0.93750 
0.2625 1.05016 
4.5000 1.12500 
0.2657 0.53140 
6.9504 1.73760 
1.1812 1.57493 
0.8439 1.12515 
0.5876 1.17510 
0.8250 0.55000 
0.4969 0.66250 
0.5249 0.52490 
0.3938 0.87500 
1.5625 1.25000 
0.4688 0.93760 
0.4219 0.56250 
0.4386 0.67470 
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U cost 
Amount Yrs M Marg U cost x draw M marg Total 
-down x amount value ROA $X$$$ 
150.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0014500 1.0875 0.22500 1.3125 0.87500 
67.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.16750 
100.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0011790 0.8253 0.25000 1.0753 1.07530 
225.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007500 0.8438 0.42187 1.2656 0.56250 
50.0 8.0 0.001000 **0.05000 
100.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0012000 0.6000 0.10000 0.7000 0.70000 
125.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007125 0.4453 0.23437 0.6797 0.54374 
400.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0007400 2.9600 0.50000 3.4600 0.86500 
450.0 7.0 0.003000 0.0011250 3.5438 1.35000 4.8938 1.08750 
200.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0015000 1.5000 0.70000 2.2000 1.10000 
25.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0031000 0.3875 0.05000 0.4375 1.75000 
1200.0 3.0 0.002000 0.0014000 5.0400 2.40000 7.4400 0.62000 
150.0 5.0 0.001725 0.0013250 0.9938 0.25875 1.2525 0.83500 
150.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0013930 1.4626 0.30000 1.7627 1.17510 
30.0 3.0 0.001875 0.0010420 0.0938 0.05625 0.1500 0.50010 
62.5 5.0 0.002500 0.0008500 0.2657 0.15625 0.4219 0.67504 
60.0 3.0 
85.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0012500 0.3188 0.21250 0.5312 0.62500 
100.0 5.0 0.002200 0.0009750 0.4875 0.22000 0.7075 0.70750 
150.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0005630 0.4223 0.22500 0.6472 0.43150 
50.0 10.0 0.001563 0.0010260 0.5130 0.07815 0.5912 1.18230 
100.0 7.0 0.001250 0.0014820 1.0374 0.12500 1.1624 1.16240 
75.0 7.0 0.001000 0.0009640 0.5061 0.07500 0.5811 0.77480 
125.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007250 0.4531 0.23437 0.6875 0.54998 
62.5 5.0 0.001500 0.0009000 0.2813 0.09375 0.3750 0.60000 
500.0 7.0 0.001250 0.0005200 1.8200 0.62500 2.4450 0.48900 
150.0 7.0 0.003750 0.0013320 1.3986 0.56250 1.9611 1.30740 
400.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0013750 2.7500 0.40000 3.1500 0.78750 
1300.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0019750 12.8375 2.92500 15.7625 1.21250 
360.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0010000 1.8000 0.72000 2.5200 0.70000 
50.0 5.0 0.002000 **0.10000 
200.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0008650 0.8650 0.37500 1.2400 0.62000 
50.0 3.0 0.001250 **0.06250 
25.0 5.5 0.002000 0.0008180 0.1125 0.05000 0.1625 0.64990 
200.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0011250 1.1250 0.25000 1.3750 0.68750 
200.0 5.0 0.001375 **0.27500 
200.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0010800 1.0800 0.35000 1.4300 0.71500 
56.0 3.0 0.002500 **0.14000 
75.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0009510 0.3567 0.07500 0.4317 0.57553 
170.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0009000 0.4590 0.21250 0.6715 0.39500 
87.5 2.5 0.003000 **0.26250 
300.0 3.0 0.001500 0.0012080 1.0872 0.45000 1.5372 0.51240 
130.0 8.0 0.003750 **0.48750 
175.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0011650 1.0194 0.35000 1.3694 0.78249 
125.0 4.0 0.005000 **0.62500 
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Amount Yrs M Marg U cost 
$ ý% 
220.0 5.0 0.002750 
50.0 3.0 0.003250 
90.0 7.0 0.001000 
300.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0018570 
35.0 3.0 0.004500 
37.5 7.0 0.002500 0.0011430 
45.0 3.0 0.002500 
55.0 4.0 0.001000 0.0014500 
125.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0008250 
400.0 5.0 0.002500 
200.0 5.0 0.002500 
300.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0014100 
150.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0014250 
630.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0007780 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 
100.0 3.0 0.005500 
97.5 8.5 0.007500 
20.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 
60.0 2.0 0.001000 0.0014690 
200.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0012125 
195.0 7.0 0.002750 0.0013750 
100.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0008000 
150.0 8.0 0.003750 
400.0 4.0 0.003500 
60.0 5.0 0.003250 0.0014380 
50.0 1.0 0.002000 
50.0 2.0 0.001250 
100.0 7.0 0.001500 
50.0 5.0 0.001563 
22.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0011000 
75.0 5.0 0.002000 
125.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0012500 
125.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0010210 
200.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0011500 
65.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0010050 
300.0 7.0 0.002750 
110.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0008930 
60.0 5.0 0.002 500 
38.0 6.0 0.001875 0.0014170 
75.0 8.5 0.005500 0.0020070 
140.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0013700 
65.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007950 
110.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0016070 
75.0 5.0 0.003000 
60.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0010250 
U cost 
x draw M urarg Total 
-down x amount value ROA $$$ 
* 0.60500 
* 0.16250 
* 0.09000 
3.8997 0.75000 
* 0.15750 
0.3000 0.09375 
* 0.11250 
0.3190 0.05500 
0.5156 0.23437 
* 1.00000 
* 0.50000 
2.1150 1.05000 
1.0688 0.26250 
1.9606 1.57500 
* 0.25000 
* 0.55000 
* 0.73125 
0.1000 0.05000 
0.1763 0.06000 
2.4250 0.40000 
1.8768 0.53625 
0.5600 0.17500 
* 0.56250 
* 1.40000 
0.4314 0.19500 
* 0.10000 
* 0.06250 
* 0.15000 
* 0.07815 
0.2420 0.04400 
* 0.15000 
0.4688 0.15625 
0.3829 0.37500 
1.1500 0.40000 
0.3266 0.16250 
* 0.82500 
0.6876 0.27500 
* 0.15000 
0.3231 0.07125 
1.2794 0.41250 
0.9590 0.28000 
0.2584 0.12187 
1.2374 0.27500 
* 0.22500 
0.3075 0.09000 
** 
4.6497 1.54990 
0.3938 1.05005 
0.3740 0.68000 
0.7500 0.59998 
3.1650 1.05500 
1.3313 0.88750 
3.5356 0.56120 
0.1500 0.75010 
0.2363 0.39380 
2.8250 1.41250 
2.4131 1.23748 
0.7350 0.73500 
0.6264 1.04400 
** 
0.2860 1.30000 
0.6250 0.50000 
0.7579 0.60631 
1.5500 0.77500 
0.4891 0.75246 
0.9626 0.87510 
0.3943 1.03776 
1.6919 2.25589 
1.2390 0.88500 
0.3802 0.58496 
1.5124 1.37490 
0.3975 0.66250 
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Amount Yrs M Marg U cost 
$%% 
700.0 
320.0 
50.0 
100.0 
100.0 
70.0 
30.0 
100.0 
50.0 
22.0 
100.0 
100.0 
50.0 
400.0 
220.0 
350.0 
75.0 
70.0 
30.0 
50.0 
175.0 
100.0 
125.0 
105.0 
20.0 
225.0 
100.0 
70.0 
30.0 
1000.0 
140.0 
100.0 
50.0 
100.0 
70.0 
25.0 
300.0 
200.0 
70.0 
60.0 
18.0 
25.0 
110.0 
10.0 0.001250 0.0011030 
7.0 0.003500 0.0023570 
7.0 0.001250 0.0006960 
3.0 0.002500 0.0012500 
8.0 0.001875 0.0014060 
3.0 0.002500 
3.0 0.001250 0.0014170 
5.0 0.003000 0.0016000 
5.0 0.003500 0.0023750 
10.0 0.001875 0.0008750 
5.0 0.003750 0.0014000 
5.0 0.003750 0.0025000 
5.0 0.001500 
5.0 0.002000 0.0014250 
5.0 0.003500 
3.0 0.0012 50 0.0011700 
5.0 0.002250 0.0012000 
5.0 0.002500 0.0009380 
5.0 0.001500 0.0012000 
2.0 0.000625 
3.0 0.001250 0.0012670 
3.0 0.001000 0.0008330 
5.0 0.001250 0.0013750 
5.0 0.001500 
5.0 0.001000 
8.0 0.001750 0.0010310 
4.0 0.001500 
4.0 0.001500 0.0008910 
5.0 0.001750 
5.0 0.002500 0.0015000 
5.0 0.000875 
3.0 0.002250 0.0014580 
8.0 0.000750 0.0040310 
3.0 0.002625 0.0017500 
3.0 0.001250 
3.0 0.001200 
7.0 0.002000 0.0009560 
3.0 0.006250 0.0022920 
5.0 0.002000 
5.0 0.002000 
3.0 0.002000 
5.0 0.001750 0.0011000 
3.0 0.000563 
3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 
7.0 0.001500 
U cost 
x draw M marg Total 
-down x amount value ROA $$$ 
7.7210 0.87500 
5.2797 1.12000 
0.2436 0.06250 
** 
* 0.25000 
0.4251 0.12500 
0.5600 0.21000 
0.3562 0.10500 
0.8750 0.18750 
0.3500 0.18750 
0.2750 0.08250 
* 0.15000 
0.7125 0.20000 
* 0.17500 
1.4040 0.50000 
1.3200 0.49500 
1.6415 0.87500 
0.4500 0.11250 
* 0.04375 
0.1140 0.03750 
0.1250 0.05000 
1.2031 0.21875 
* 0.15000 
* 0.12500 
0.8661 0.18375 
* 0.03000 
0.8019 0.33750 
* 0.17500 
0.5250 0.17500 
* 0.02625 
4.3740 2.25000 
4.5147 0.10500 
0.5250 0.26250 
* 0.06250 
* 0.12000 
0.4684 0.14000 
0.1719 0.15625 
* 0.60000 
* 0.40000 
* 0.14000 
0.3300 0.10500 
* 0.01013 
0.1250 0.06250 
* 0.16500 
8.5960 1.22800 
6.3997 1.99990 
0.3061 0.61220 
0.5501 0.55010 
0.7700 1.10000 
0.4613 1.53750 
1.0625 1.06250 
0.5375 1.07500 
0.3575 1.62500 
0.9125 0.91250 
1.9040 0.47600 
1.8150 0.82500 
2.5165 0.71900 
0.5625 0.75000 
0.1515 0.50510 
0.1750 0.34990 
1.4218 0.81249 
1.0498 0.99984 
1.1394 0.50639 
0.7000 1.00000 
6.6240 0.66240 
4.6197 3.29980 
0.7875 0.78750 
0.6084 0.86920 
0.3282 1.31260 
0.4350 0.72500 
0.1875 0.75016 
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Amount Yrs M Marg U cost 
$ % 
25.0 2.0 0.001250 
143.0 10.0 0.001875 0.0007710 
43.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0016670 
100.0 1.0 0.003500 
100.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0013250 
45.0 12.0 0.001000 
300.0 14.0 0.002000 0.0011570 
40.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0011070 
25.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 
85.0 5.0 0.003000 0.0042500 
100.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0007750 
280.0 6.0 0.004250 
85.0 2.0 0.001875 0.0006250 
100.0 5.0 0.002000 0.00112 50 
30.0 3.0 0.002500 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0009380 
250.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0007750 
13.0 5.0 * 0.0021250 
72.5 5.0 0.001250 
70.0 5.0 0.001875 
45.0 5.0 0.001875 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0006500 
250.0 10.0 0.001375 0.0006630 
145.0 8.0 0.002500 0.0009750 
50.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0011000 
100.0 10.0 0.001500 0.0011250 
500.0 1.0 0.001500 0.0007750 
150.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0020000 
110.0 5.0 0.001500 
* * 0.001250 
60.0 3.0 0.004000 0.0020000 
450.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0007070 
100.0 8.0 0.002000 0.0014070 
200.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0006820 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 
75.0 6.0 0.001250 0.0011250 
30.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0014580 
25.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 
75.0 4.0 0.005000 0.0009500 
100.0 1.0 0.002500 
100.0 3.0 0.002000 0.0011700 
75.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0013300 
36.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0011430 
40.0 6.0 0.001500 
300.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0007440 
U cost 
x draw M marg Total 
-down x amount value ROA $$$ 
* 0.03125 
1.1025 0.26812 
0.2150 0.12900 
* 0.35000 
0.3975 0.25000 
* 0.04500 
4.8594 0.60000 
0.3100 0.08000 
0.1250 0.06250 
1.8063 0.25500 
0.3875 0.10000 
* 1.19000 
0.1062 0.15937 
0.5625 0.20000 
* 0.07500 
0.2345 0.05000 
0.9687 0.37500 
0.1381 
* 0.09062 
* 0.13125 
* 0.08438 
0.3250 0.15000 
1.6575 0.34375 
1.1310 0.36250 
0.2750 0.09375 
1.1250 0.15000 
0.3875 0.75000 
0.9000 0.45000 
* 0.16500 
* 
0.3600 0.24000 
1.5908 1.12500 
1.1256 0.20000 
0.9548 0.35000 
* 0.15000 
0.5062 0.09375 
0.1312 0.03750 
0.1250 0.06250 
0.2850 0.37500 
* 0.25000 
0.3510 0.20000 
0.4988 0.15000 
0.2880 0.06300 
* 0.06000 
1.5624 0.75000 
1.3706 0.95848 
0.3440 0.80009 
0.6475 0.64750 
5.4594 1.81980 
0.3900 0.97490 
0.1875 0.75016 
2.0613 2.42500 
0.4875 0.48750 
0.2656 0.31249 
0.7625 0.76250 
0.2845 0.56900 
1.3437 0.53750 
0.4750 0.47500 
2.0013 0.80050 
1.4935 1.02997 
0.3688 0.73750 
1.2750 1.27500 
1.1375 0.22750 
1.3500 0.90000 
0.6000 1.00000 
2.7158 0.60350 
1.3256 1.32560 
1.3048 0.65240 
0.6000 0.79996 
0.1687 0.56240 
0.1875 0.75016 
0.6600 0.88000 
0.5510 0.55100 
0.6488 0.86500 
0.3510 0.97514 
2.3124 0.77080 
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Appendix 7.2 ROA data and results for scenario 3 
Amount Yrs M Marg U cost 
$ 
45.0 
45.0 
185.0 
30.0 
500.0 
400.0 
100.0 
100.0 
125.0 
125.0 
150.0 
60.0 
75.0 
200.0 
30.0 
150.0 
25.0 
320.0 
110.0 
75.0 
45.0 
200.0 
350.0 
160.0 
120.0 
125.0 
75.0 
185.0 
75.0 
375.0 
150.0 
35.0 
100.0 
350.0 
250.0 
60.0 
75.0 
50.0 
300.0 
100.0 
125.0 
300.0 
ýý 
5.0 0.001750 0.0007250 
5.0 0.004000 0.0026250 
7.0 0.001875 0.0011070 
10.0 0.003000 
5.0 0.002250 0.0014000 
4.0 0.003500 
5.0 0.003250 0.0019250 
7.0 0.003250 0.0014820 
11.0 0.001750 0.0023410 
5.0 0.001500 0.0008500 
7.0 0.0023 70 
3.0 0.003750 0.0020000 
2.5 0.008500 0.0065000 
5.0 0.002500 0.0011500 
7.0 0.001750 0.0013930 
5.0 0.000625 0.0009050 
30.0 0.003000 0.0012500 
5.0 0.000500 
5.0 0.001500 0.0008000 
7.0 0.002000 
2.0 0.001875 0.0006250 
6.0 0.003450 0.0008880 
5.0 0.003500 0.0012750 
5.0 0.004500 0.0016700 
8.0 0.002750 0.0012500 
5.0 0.001750 0.0010800 
10.0 0.003000 0.0015750 
5.0 0.002000 
5.0 0.001200 
5.0 0.001500 0.0012000 
7.0 0.001250 0.0013210 
5.0 0.004000 
5.0 0.001750 
5.0 0.002000 0.0013750 
5.0 0.002250 0.0012000 
5.0 0.002 500 
5.0 0.001875 
3.0 * 0.0011670 
7.0 0.001000 0.0008930 
5.0 0.002500 0.0012000 
8.0 0.001500 0.0010660 
7.0 0.005000 0.0011270 
3.0 0.002500 0.0009580 
5.0 0.010000 
7.0 0.001500 0.0011070 
U cost 
x draw M marg Total 
-down x amount value ROA $$$% 
0.1 631 0.07875 
0.5906 0.18000 
1.4335 0.34687 
* 0.09000 
3.5000 1.12500 
* 1.40000 
0.9625 0.32500 
1.0374 0.32500 
3.2188 0.21875 
0.5312 0.18750 
* 0.35550 
0.3600 0.22500 
1.2187 0.63750 
1.1500 0.50000 
0.2925 0.05250 
0.6787 0.09375 
0.9375 0.07500 
* 0.16000 
0.4400 0.16500 
* 0.15000 
0.0562 0.08438 
1.0656 0.69000 
2.2313 1.22500 
1.3360 0.72000 
1.2000 0.33000 
0.6750 0.21875 
1.1812 0.22500 
* 0.37000 
** 
0.4500 0.11250 
* 
* 1.50000 
* 0.26250 
0.2406 0.07000 
0.6000 0.22500 
* 0.87500 
* 0.46875 
0.2101 
0.4689 0.07500 
0.3000 0.12500 
2.5584 0.45000 
* 
0.2874 0.25000 
* 1.25000 
2.3247 0.45000 
0.2419 0.53756 
0.7706 1.71244 
1.7804 0.96238 
4.6250 0.92500 
1.2875 1.28750 
1.3624 1.36240 
3.4376 2.75006 
0.7187 0.57500 
0.5850 0.97500 
1.8563 2.47500 
1.6500 0.82500 
0.3450 1.15010 
0.7725 0.51500 
1.0125 4.05000 
0.6050 0.55000 
0.1406 0.31248 
1.7556 0.87780 
3.4563 0.98750 
2.0560 1.28500 
1.5300 1.27500 
0.8938 0.71500 
1.4062 1.87493 
0.5625 0.75000 
0.3106 0.88743 
0.8250 0.82500 
0.5439 0.72515 
0.4250 0.85000 
3.0084 1.00280 
0.5374 0.53740 
2.7747 0.92490 
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Appendix 7.2 ROA data and results for scenario 3 
U cost 
Amount Yrs M Marg U cost x draw M marg Total 
-down x amount value ROA $ö$$$ 
130.0 8.0 0.001125 0.0007000 
200.0 7.0 0.000800 0.0004640 
100.0 10.0 0.001000 
* 5.0 0.001250 0.0006060 
105.0 5.0 0.000563 0.0007750 
140.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0014370 
127.0 8.0 0.001750 0.0007030 
142.0 5.0 0.001500 
* 5.0 0.002000 0.0013000 
200.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0011250 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0011250 
200.0 7.0 0.002250 0.0008570 
50.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0008250 
40.0 3.0 0.002250 
38.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0015000 
50.0 10.0 0.001000 0.0005875 
125.0 5.0 0.001500 
35.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0011750 
105.0 3.0 0.001500 0.0006190 
250.0 7.0 0.005000 
170.0 7.0 0.005000 
355.0 7.0 0.001250 
57.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0010800 
70.0 5.0 0.001500 
100.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0014000 
150.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0020750 
250.0 2.0 0.001500 0.0008750 
0.7280 0.14625 
0.6496 0.16000 
* 0.10000 
** 
0.4069 0.05911 
0.8047 0.35000 
0.7142 0.22225 
* 0.21300 
** 
1.1250 0.50000 
0.5625 0.25000 
1.1998 0.45000 
0.2063 0.10000 
* 0.09000 
0.2850 0.09500 
0.2937 0.05000 
* 0.18750 
0.2056 0.05250 
0.1950 0.15750 
* 1.25000 
* 0.85000 
* 0.44375 
0.3078 0.08550 
* 0.10500 
0.7000 0.17500 
1.5562 0.37500 
0.4375 0.37500 
0.8742 0.67250 
0.8096 0.40480 
0.4660 0.44382 
1.1547 0.82480 
0.9365 0.73739 
1.6250 0.81250 
0.8125 0.81250 
1.6498 0.82490 
0.3063 0.61250 
0.3800 1.00000 
0.3437 0.68740 
0.2581 0.73743 
0.3525 0.33569 
0.3933 0.69000 
0.8750 0.87500 
1.9312 1.28750 
0.8125 0.32500 
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Appendix 7.3 ROA data and results for scenario 4 
U cost M marg/4 
M marg U cost x draw Draw x draw Total 
-down -down -down value ROA $$$$ 
0.001250 0.0010000 0.2400 240.0 
0.001000 0.0007920 0.5940 750.0 
0.002000 0.0006670 0.2501 375.0 
0.001250 0.0024000 1.2000 500.0 
*** 2500.0 
0.001000 0.0008750 0.8750 1000.0 
0.002500 0.0012500 0.5000 400.0 
0.003750 0.0025780 5.1560 2000.0 
* 0.0006250 1.5625 2500.0 
0.000800 0.0007250 0.3625 500.0 
0.003250 0.0010000 3.0000 3000.0 
0.002000 ** 875.0 
0.003500 0.0030000 0.6750 225.0 
0.000500 0.0008500 1.3600 1600.0 
0.000800 0.0008000 6.0000 7500.0 
0.001500 0.0006880 0.0430 62.5 
0.004000 0.0015630 6.2520 4000.0 
0.001500 ** 1400.0 
0.001250 ** 5000.0 
0.001625 ** 9000.0 
0.001875 0.0008250 1.4025 1700.0 
0.002875 0.0007440 3.7200 5000.0 
0.003250 0.0024290 1.7003 700.0 
0.001875 0.0010130 3.5455 3500.0 
0.000625 0.0003125 0.0625 200.0 
0.004375 0.0008780 9.1312 10400.0 
0.002250 0.0008250 0.3506 425.0 
0.002000 0.0006000 4.2000 7000.0 
0.002000 0.0006630 2.6520 4000.0 
0.001250 ** 3500.0 
0.002500 0.0015000 0.9000 600.0 
0.001125 0.0006250 0.3125 500.0 
0.001750 0.0005980 10.1660 17000.0 
0.001750 0.0010750 5.3750 5000.0 
0.002250 0.0010710 0.5622 525.0 
0.001000 ** 350.0 
0.002500 0.0013930 4.8755 3500.0 
0.002250 0.0008070 4.4385 5500.0 
0.002500 ** 525.0 
0.002000 ** 280.0 
0.000625 0.0006140 0.3377 550.0 
0.001125 0.0005880 0.2940 500.0 
0.001875 0.0006160 1.7248 2800.0 
0.001000 0.0005440 2.1760 4000.0 
0.001500 0.0008860 1.8606 2100.0 
0.0750 0.3150 0.131250 
0.1875 0.7815 0.104200 
0.1875 0.4376 0.116693 
0.1563 1.3563 0.271260 
*** 
0.2500 1.1250 0.112500 
0.2500 0.7500 0.187500 
1.8750 7.0310 0.351550 
*** 
0.1000 0.4625 0.092500 
2.4375 5.4375 0.181250 
0.4375 
0.1969 0.8719 0.387511 
0.2000 1.5600 0.097500 
1.5000 7.5000 0.100000 
0.0234 0.0664 0.106240 
4.0000 10.2520 0.256300 
0.5250 
1.5625 
3.6562 
0.7969 2.1994 0.129376 
3.5937 7.3138 0.146276 
0.5687 2.2690 0.324143 
1.6406 5.1861 0.148174 
0.0313 0.0938 0.046900 
11.3750 20.5062 0.197175 
0.2391 0.5897 0.138753 
3.5000 7.7000 0.110000 
2.0000 4.6520 0.116300 
1.0937 
0.3750 1.2750 0.212500 
0.1406 0.4531 0.090620 
7.4375 17.6035 0.103550 
2.1875 7.5625 0.151250 
0.2953 0.8575 0.163333 
0.0875 
2.1875 7.0630 0.201800 
3.0938 7.5322 0.136949 
0.3281 
0.1400 
0.0859 0.4236 0.077018 
0.1406 0.4346 0.086920 
1.3125 3.0373 0.108475 
1.0000 3.1760 0.079400 
0.7875 2.6481 0.126100 
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U cost M urarg/4 
M marg U cost x draw Draw x draw Total 
-down -down -down value ROA %%$$$$ 
0.010000 
0.002500 0.0007750 
0.004000 
0.000625 
0.001000 0.0004930 
0.001250 0.0005000 
0.001100 0.0005890 
0.001000 0.0005500 
0.001250 0.0003420 
0.004000 
0.001875 
0.003750 0.0015500 
0.0012 50 0.0014170 
0.001250 0.0012000 
0.001250 0.0006250 
0.001250 
0.001875 
0.001500 0.0014290 
0.001500 0.0008250 
0.001250 
0.001000 0.0007130 
0.001250 
0.001875 0.0007750 
0.002500 
0.002000 
0.001000 0.0007750 
0.003000 0.0023960 
0.002500 0.0022920 
* 0.0014750 
0.001000 0.0015500 
0.002750 0.0014250 
0.000625 
0.002500 0.0026050 
* 0.0015630 
0.001500 0.0015000 
0.000625 0.0011700 
0.001000 
0.002500 0.0010750 
0.001000 
0.002500 
0.000625 
0.002250 
0.001875 0.0013130 
0.002500 0.0013750 
0.001500 0.0007500 
0.2325 
1.4790 
2.0000 
0.6184 
1.1000 
0.6464 
0.1550 
0.3188 
0.3900 
0.1250 
1.0003 
0.2063 
0.2674 
0.3875 
0.1938 
0.1438 
0.2407 
0.7375 
0.2325 
0.7125 
0.3908 
0.3751 
0.2250 
0.1404 
0.2688 
1.1817 
0.6875 
1.1250 
225.0 
300.0 
3 60.0 
60.0 
3000.0 
4000.0 
1050.0 
2000.0 
1890.0 
525.0 
350.0 
100.0 
225.0 
325.0 
200.0 
200.0 
175.0 
700.0 
250.0 
300.0 
375.0 
125.0 
500.0 
500.0 
120.0 
250.0 
60.0 
105.0 
500.0 
150.0 
500.0 
100.0 
150.0 
240.0 
150.0 
120.0 
250.0 
250.0 
250.0 
100.0 
150.0 
180.0 
900.0 
500.0 
1500.0 
0.562 5 
0.1875 0.4200 0.140000 
0.3600 
0.0094 
0.7500 2.2290 0.074300 
1.2500 3.2500 0.081250 
0.2888 0.9072 0.086400 
0.5000 1.6000 0.080000 
0.5906 1.2370 0.065450 
0.5250 
0.1641 
0.0938 0.2488 0.248800 
0.0703 0.3891 0.172933 
0.1016 0.4916 0.151262 
0.0625 0.1875 0.093750 
0.0625 
0.0820 
0.2625 1.2628 0.180400 
0.0938 0.3001 0.120040 
0.0938 
0.0938 0.3611 0.096293 
0.0391 
0.2344 0.6219 0.124380 
0.3125 
0.0600 
0.0625 0.2563 0.102520 
0.0450 0.1888 0.314667 
0.0656 0.3063 0.291714 
*** 
0.0375 0.2700 0.180000 
0.3438 1.0562 0.211240 
0.0156 
0.0938 0.4845 0.323000 
*** 
0.0563 0.2813 0.187533 
0.0188 0.1592 0.132667 
0.0625 
0.1563 0.4250 0.170000 
0.0625 
0.0625 
0.0234 
0.1013 
0.4219 1.6036 0.178178 
0.3125 1.0000 0.200000 
0.5625 1.6875 0.112500 
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U cost M marg/4 
M marg U cost x draw Draw x draw Total 
-down -down -down value ROA X$$$$ 
0.002250 0.0018330 
0.0033 75 
0.002500 0.0024080 
0.002500 0.0006430 
0.002500 
0.002500 0.0015830 
0.001000 0.0015750 
0.002000 0.0013750 
0.001750 0.0012500 
0.000750 0.0012500 
0.000625 
0.000750 0.0008350 
0.007500 
0.001750 0.0017850 
0.001500 0.0018330 
0.001000 0.0016000 
0.000400 0.0003125 
0.001500 
0.002500 0.0012000 
0.003000 0.0012750 
0.002500 
0.001000 
0.001000 
0.000500 0.0014290 
0.001875 
0.002500 
0.0012 50 0.0010000 
0.002500 0.0009380 
0.001500 0.0022680 
0.002000 0.0013750 
0.003250 0.0011430 
0.003000 
0.001000 
0.002000 0.0013930 
0.001875 0.0007250 
0.001875 0.0009500 
0.001250 0.0013330 
0.001250 
0.001250 0.0015000 
0.002500 0.0025000 
0.002500 0.0017190 
0.003750 
0.002500 * 
0.001875 0.0007500 
0.001875 0.0006960 
0.2749 
0.2167 
0.1608 
0.0712 
0.2362 
0.5500 
0.2188 
0.6250 
0.4175 
0.8925 
1.0998 
0.1920 
0.1563 
0.1500 
0.6375 
0.2500 
4.0000 
0.1407 
6.3504 
1.0312 
0.6001 
0.4876 
0.5437 
0.3562 
0.3999 
0.3375 
1.2500 
0.3438 
0.2813 
0.3167 
150.0 
775.0 
90.0 
250.0 
45.0 
160.0 
400.0 
175.0 
500.0 
200.0 
500.0 
25.0 
500.0 
600.0 
120.0 
500.0 
175.0 
125.0 
500.0 
500.0 
150.0 
1625.0 
175.0 
78.0 
240.0 
4000.0 
150.0 
2800.0 
750.0 
525.0 
66.0 
350.0 
350.0 
750.0 
375.0 
300.0 
140.0 
225.0 
500.0 
200.0 
310.0 
150.0 
375.0 
455.0 
0.0844 0.3593 0.239533 
0.6539 
0.0563 0.2729 0.303222 
0.1563 0.3171 0.126840 
*** 
0.0281 0.0993 0.220667 
0.0375 0.2737 0.182467 
0.2000 0.7500 0.187500 
0.0766 0.2954 0.168800 
0.0938 0.7187 0.143740 
0.0313 
0.0938 0.5113 0.102260 
0.0469 
0.2188 1.1113 0.222260 
0.2250 1.3248 0.220800 
0.0300 0.2220 0.185000 
0.0500 0.2063 0.041260 
0.0656 
0.0781 0.2281 0.182480 
0.3750 1.0125 0.202500 
0.3125 
0.0375 
0.4063 
0.0219 0.2719 0.155371 
0.0366 
0.1500 
1.2500 5.2500 0.131250 
0.0938 0.2344 0.156267 
1.0500 7.4004 0.264300 
0.3750 1.4062 0.187493 
0.4266 1.0267 0.195562 
0.0495 
0.0875 
0.1750 0.6626 0.189314 
0.3516 0.8953 0.1193 73 
0.1758 0.5320 0.141867 
0.0938 0.4936 0.164533 
0.0437 
0.0703 0.4078 0.181244 
0.3125 1.5625 0.312500 
0.1250 0.4688 0.234400 
0.2906 
0.0938 ** 
0.1758 0.4571 0.121893 
0.2133 0.5300 0.116484 
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U cost 
M marg U cost x draw 
-down 
0.001500 0.0014500 1.0875 
0.002500 
0.002500 0.0011790 0.8253 
0.001875 0.0007500 0.8438 
0.001000 
0.001000 0.0012000 0.6000 
0.001875 0.0007125 0.4453 
0.001250 0.0007400 2.9600 
0.003000 0.0011250 3.5438 
0.003500 0.0015000 1.5000 
0.002000 0.0031000 0.3875 
0.002000 0.0014000 5.0400 
0.001725 0.0013250 0.9938 
0.002000 0.0013930 1.4626 
0.001875 0.0010420 0.0938 
0.002500 0.0008500 0.2657 
** 
0.002500 0.0012500 0.3188 
0.002200 0.0009750 0.4875 
0.001500 0.0005630 0.4223 
0.001563 0.0010260 0.5130 
0.001250 0.0014820 1.0374 
0.001000 0.0009640 0.5061 
0.001875 0.0007250 0.4531 
0.001500 0.0009000 0.2813 
0.001250 0.0005200 1.8200 
0.003750 0.0013320 1.3986 
0.001000 0.0013750 2.7500 
0.002250 0.0019750 12.8375 
0.002000 0.0010000 1.8000 
0.002000 
0.001875 0.0008650 0.8650 
0.001250 
0.002000 0.0008180 0.1125 
0.001250 0.0011250 1.1250 
0.0013 75 
0.001750 0.0010800 1.0800 
0.002500 
0.001000 0.0009510 0.3567 
0.001250 0.0009000 0.4590 
0.003000 
0.001500 0.0012080 1.0872 
0.003750 
0.002000 0.0011650 1.0194 
0.005000 
Draw 
-down 
750.0 
335.0 
700.0 
1125.0 
400.0 
500.0 
625.0 
4000.0 
3150.0 
1000.0 
125.0 
3600.0 
750.0 
1050.0 
90.0 
312.5 
180.0 
255.0 
500.0 
750.0 
500.0 
700.0 
525.0 
625.0 
312.5 
3500.0 
1050.0 
2000.0 
6500.0 
1800.0 
250.0 
1000.0 
150.0 
137.5 
1000.0 
1000.0 
1000.0 
168.0 
375.0 
510.0 
218.8 
900.0 
1040.0 
875.0 
500.0 
M marg, 
x draw 
-down 
0.2813 
0.2094 
0.4375 
0.5273 
0.1000 
0.1250 
0.2930 
1.2500 
2.3625 
0.8750 
0.0625 
1.8000 
0.3234 
0.5250 
0.0422 
0.1953 
0.1594 
0.2750 
0.2813 
0.1954 
0.2188 
0.1313 
0.2930 
0.1172 
1.0937 
0.9844 
0.5000 
3.6562 
0.9000 
0.1250 
0.4688 
0.0469 
0.0688 
0.3125 
0.3438 
0.4375 
0.1050 
0.0938 
0.1594 
0.1641 
0.3375 
0.9750 
0.4375 
0.6250 
14 
Total 
value ROA 
$% 
1.3687 0.182493 
1.2628 0.180400 
1.3711 0.121876 
0.7250 0.145000 
0.7383 0.118128 
4.2100 0.105250 
5.9063 0.187502 
2.3750 0.237500 
0.4500 0.360000 
6.8400 0.190000 
1.3172 0.175627 
1.9876 0.189295 
0.1360 0.151111 
0.4610 0.147520 
0.4782 0.187529 
0.7625 0.152500 
0.7036 0.093813 
0.7084 0.141680 
1.2562 0.179457 
0.6374 0.121410 
0.7461 0.119376 
0.3985 0.127520 
2.9138 0.083251 
2.3830 0.226952 
3.2500 0.162500 
16.4937 0.253749 
2.7000 0.150000 
1.3338 0.133380 
0.1813 0.131855 
1.4375 0.143750 
1.5175 0.151750 
0.4505 0.120133 
0.6184 0.121255 
1.4247 0.158300 
1.4569 0.166503 
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M marg U cost 
U cost 
x draw 
-down $ 
Draw 
-down $ 
M marg/4 
x draw 
-down $ 
Total 
value 
$ 
RDA 
q 
0.002750 * * 1100.0 0.7563 
0.003250 * * 150.0 0.1219 
0.001000 * * 630.0 0.1575 
0.002500 0.0018570 3.8997 2100.0 1.3125 5.2122 0.248200 
0.004500 * * 105.0 0.1181 
0.002500 0.0011430 0.3000 262.5 0.1641 0.4641 0.176800 
0.002500 * * 135.0 0.0844 
0.001000 0.0014500 0.3190 220.0 0.0550 0.3740 0.170000 
0.001875 0.0008250 0.5156 625.0 0.2930 0.8086 0.129376 
0.002500 * * 2000.0 1.2500 
0.002500 * * 1000.0 0.6250 
0.003500 0.0014100 2.1150 1500.0 1.3125 3.4275 0.228500 
0.001750 0.0014250 1.0688 750.0 0.3281 1.3969 0.186253 
0.002500 0.0007780 1.9606 2520.0 1.5750 3.5356 0.140302 
0.002500 * * 500.0 0.3125 
0.005500 * * 300.0 0.4125 
0.007500 * * 828.8 1.5539 
0.002500 0.0016670 0.1000 60.0 0.0375 0.1375 0.229167 
0.001000 0.0014690 0.1763 120.0 0.0300 0.2063 0.171917 
0.002000 0.0012125 2.4250 2000.0 1.0000 3.4250 0.171250 
0.002750 0.0013750 1.8768 1365.0 0.9384 2.8152 0.206242 
0.001750 0.0008000 0.5600 700.0 0.3063 0.8663 0.123757 
0.003750 * * 1200.0 1.1250 
0.003500 * * 1600.0 1.4000 
0.003250 0.0014380 0.4314 300.0 0.2437 0.6751 0.225033 
0.002000 * * 50.0 0.0250 
0.001250 * * 100.0 0.0313 
0.001500 * * 700.0 0.2625 
0.001563 * * 250.0 0.0977 
0.002000 0.0011000 0.2420 220.0 0.1100 0.3520 0.160000 
0.002000 * * 375.0 0.1875 
0.001250 0.0012500 0.4688 375.0 0.1172 0.5860 0.156267 
0.003000 0.0010210 0.3829 375.0 0.2813 0,6641 0.177093 
0.002000 0.0011500 1.1500 1000.0 0.5000 1.6500 0.165000 
0.002500 0.0010050 0.3266 325.0 0.2031 0.5297 0.162985 
0.002750 * * 2100.0 1.4438 
0.002500 0.0008930 0.6876 770.0 0.4813 1.1689 0.151805 
0.002500 * * 300.0 0.1875 
0.001875 0.0014170 0.3231 228.0 0.1069 0,4300 0.188597 
0.005500 0.0020070 1.2794 637.5 0.8766 2.1560 0.338196 
0.002000 0.0013700 0.9590 700.0 0.3500 1.3090 0.187000 
0.001875 0.0007950 0.2584 325.0 0.1523 0.4107 0.126369 
0.002500 0.0016070 1.2374 770.0 0.4813 1.7187 0.223208 
0.003000 * * 375.0 0.2813 
0.001500 0.0010250 0.3075 300.0 0.1125 0.4200 0.140000 
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Appendix 7.3 RQA data and results for scenario 4 
M marg U cost 
U cost 
x draw 
-down $ 
Draw 
-down $ 
M marg/4 
x draw 
-down $ 
Total 
value 
$ 
ROA 
0.001250 0.0011030 7.7210 7000.0 2.1875 9.9085 0.141550 
0.003500 0.0023570 5.2797 2240.0 1.9600 7.2397 0.323201 
0.001250 0.0006960 0.2436 350.0 0.1094 0.3530 0.100857 
0.002500 0.0012500 
0.001875 0.0014060 
0.002500 * * 300.0 0.1875 
'0.001250 0.0014170 0.4251 300.0 0.0938 0.5189 0.172967 
0.003000 0.0016000 0.5600 350.0 0.2625 0.8225 0.235000 
0.003500 0.0023750 0.3562 150.0 0.1312 0.4875 0.325000 
0.001875 0.0008750 0.8750 1000.0 0.4688 1.3437 0.134370 
0.003750 0.0014000 0.3500 250.0 0.2344 0.5844 0.233760 
0.003750 0.0025000 0.2750 110.0 0.1031 0.3781 0.343727 
0.001500 * * 500.0 0.1875 
0.002000 0.0014250 0.7125 500.0 0.2500 0.9625 0.192500 
0.003500 * * 250.0 0.2188 
0.001250 0.0011700 1.4040 1200.0 0.3750 1.7790 0.148250 
0.002250 0.0012000 1.3200 1100.0 0.6188 1.9388 0.176255 
0.002500 0.0009380 1.6415 1750.0 1.0937 2.7352 0.156297 
0.001500 0.0012000 0.4500 375.0 0.1406 0.5906 0.157493 
0.000625 * * 140.0 0.0219 
0.001250 0.0012670 0.1140 90.0 0.0281 0.1421 0.157889 
0.001000 0.0008330 0.1250 150.0 0.0375 0.1625 0.108333 
0.001250 0.0013750 1.2031 875.0 0.2734 1.4765 0.168743 
0.001500 * * 500.0 0.1875 
0.001000 * * 625.0 0.1563 
0.001750 0.0010310 0.8661 840.0 0.3675 1.2336 0.146857 
0.001500 * * 80.0 0.0300 
0.001500 0.0008910 0.8019 900.0 0.3375 1.1394 0.126600 
0.001750 * * 500.0 0.2188 
0.002500 0.0015000 0.5250 350.0 0.2188 0.7437 0.212486 
0.000875 * * 150.0 0.0328 
0.002250 0.0014580 4.3740 3000.0 1.6875 6.0615 0.202050 
0.000750 0.0040310 4.5147 1120.0 0.2100 4.7247 0.421848 
0.002625 0.0017500 0.5250 300.0 0.1969 0.7219 0.240633 
0.001250 * * 150.0 0.0469 
0.001200 * * 300.0 0.0900 
0.002000 0.0009560 0.4684 490.0 0.2450 0.7134 0.145592 
0.006250 0.0022920 0.1719 75.0 0.1172 0.2891 0.385467 
0.002000 * * 1500.0 0.7500 
0.002000 * * 1000.0 0.5000 
0.002000 * * 210.0 0.1050 
0.001750 0.0011000 0.3300 300.0 0.1312 0.4613 0.153767 
0.000563 * * 54.0 0.0076 
0.002500 0.0016670 0.1250 75.0 0.0469 0.1719 0.229200 
0.001500 * * 770.0 0.2888 
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Appendix 7.3 RQA data and results for scenario 4 
M marg U cost 
X 
U cost 
x draw 
-down $ 
Draw 
-down $ 
M marg/4 
x draw 
-down $ 
Total 
value 
$ 
ROA 
0.001250 * * 50.0 0.0156 
0.001875 0.0007710 1.1025 1430.0 0.6703 1.7728 0.123972 
0.003000 0.0016670 0.2150 129.0 0.0967 0.3117 0.241628 
0.003500 * * 100.0 0.0875 
0.002500 0.0013250 0.3975 300.0 0.1875 0.5850 0.195000 
0.001000 * * 540.0 0.1350 
0.002000 0.0011570 4.8594 4200.0 2.1000 6.9594 0.165700 
0.002000 0.0011070 0.3100 280.0 0.1400 0.4500 0.160714 
0.002500 0.0016670 0.1250 75.0 0.0469 0.1719 0.229200 
0.003000 0.0042500 1.8063 425.0 0.3187 2.1251 0.500023 
0.001000 0.0007750 0.3875 500.0 0.1250 0.5125 0.102500 
004250 0 * * 1680.0 1.7850 . 0.001875 0.0006250 0.1062 170.0 0.0797 0.1859 0.109353 
0.002000 0.0011250 0.5625 500.0 0.2500 0.8125 0.162500 
0.002500 * * 90.0 0.0563 
0.001000 0.0009380 0.2345 250.0 0.0625 0.2970 0.118800 
0.001500 0.0007750 0.9687 1250.0 0.4688 1.4375 0.115000 
* 0.0021250 0.1381 65.0 
0.001250 * * 362.5 0.1133 
0.001875 * * 350.0 0.1641 
0.001875 * * 225.0 0.1055 
0.001500 0.0006500 0.3250 500.0 0.1875 0.5125 0.102500 
0.001375 0.0006630 1.6575 2500.0 0.8594 2.5169 0.100676 
0.002500 0.0009750 1.1310 1160.0 0.7250 1.8560 0.160000 
0.001875 0.0011000 0.2750 250.0 0.1172 0.3922 0.156880 
0.001500 0.0011250 1.1250 1000.0 0.3750 1.5000 0.150000 
0.001500 0.0007750 0.3875 500.0 0.1875 0.5750 0.115000 
0.003000 0.0020000 0.9000 450.0 0.3375 1.2375 0.275000 
0.001500 * * 550.0 0.2063 
0.001250 * * * * * * 
0.004000 0.0020000 0.3600 180.0 0.1800 0.5400 0.300000 
0.002500 0.0007070 1.5908 2250.0 1.4062 2.9971 0.133204 
0.002000 0.0014070 1.1256 800.0 0.4000 1.5256 0.190700 
0.001750 0.0006820 0.9548 1400.0 0.6125 1.5673 0.111950 
0.001500 * * 500.0 0.1875 
0.001250 0.0011250 0.5062 450.0 0.1406 0.6468 0.143733 
0.001250 0.0014580 0.1312 90.0 0.0281 0.1593 0.177000 
0.002500 0.0016670 0.1250 75.0 0.0469 0.1719 0.229200 
0.005000 0.0009500 0.2850 300.0 0.3750 0.6600 0.220000 
0.002500 * * 100.0 0.0625 
0.002000 0.0011700 0.3510 300.0 0.1500 0.5010 0.167000 
0.002000 0.0013300 0.4988 375.0 0.1875 0.6863 0.183013 
0.001750 0.0011430 0.2880 252.0 0.1103 0.3982 0.158016 
0.001500 * * 240.0 0.0900 
0.002500 0.0007440 1.5624 2100.0 1.3125 2.8749 0.136900 
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Appendix 7.3 ROA data and results for scenario 4 
U cost M urarg/4 
M marg U cost x draw Draw x draw Total 
-down -down -down value ROA $$$$ 
0.001750 0.0007250 
0.004000 0.0026250 
0.001875 0.0011070 
0.003000 
0.002250 0.0014000 
0.003500 
0.003250 0.0019250 
0.003250 0.0014820 
0.001750 0.0023410 
0.001500 0.0008500 
0.002370 
0.003750 0.0020000 
0.008500 0.0065000 
0.002500 0.0011500 
0.001750 0.0013930 
0.000625 0.0009050 
0.003000 0.0012500 
0.000500 
0.001500 0.0008000 
0.002000 
0.001875 0.00062 50 
0.003450 0.0008880 
0.003500 0.0012750 
0.004500 0.0016700 
0.002750 0.0012500 
0.001750 0.0010800 
0.003000 0.0015750 
0.002000 
0.001200 
0.001500 0.0012000 
0.001250 0.0013210 
0.004000 
0.001750 
0.002000 0.0013750 
0.002250 0.0012000 
0.002500 
0.001875 
* 0.0011670 
0.001000 0.0008930 
0.002500 0.0012000 
0.001500 0.0010660 
0.005000 0.0011270 
0.002500 0.0009580 
0.010000 
0.001500 0.0011070 
0.1631 
0.5906 
1.4335 
3.5000 
0.9625 
1.0374 
3.2188 
0.5312 
0.3600 
1.2187 
1.1500 
0.2925 
0.6787 
0.9375 
0.4400 
0.0562 
1.0656 
2.2313 
1.3360 
1.2000 
0.6750 
1.1812 
0.4500 
0.2406 
0.6000 
0.2101 
0.4689 
0.3000 
2.5584 
0.2874 
2.3247 
225.0 
225.0 
1295.0 
300.0 
2500.0 
1600.0 
500.0 
700.0 
1375.0 
625.0 
1050.0 
180.0 
187.5 
1000.0 
210.0 
750.0 
750.0 
1600.0 
550.0 
525.0 
90.0 
1200.0 
1750.0 
800.0 
960.0 
625.0 
750.0 
925.0 
375.0 
1875.0 
750.0 
175.0 
500.0 
1750.0 
1250.0 
180.0 
525.0 
250.0 
2400.0 
300.0 
625.0 
2100.0 
0.0984 0.2615 0.116222 
0.2250 0.8156 0.362489 
0.6070 2.0405 0.157568 
0.2250 
1.4062 4.9062 0.196248 
1.4000 
0.4063 1.3687 0.273740 
0.5687 1.6062 0.229457 
0.6016 3.8204 0.277847 
0.2344 0.7656 0.122496 
0.6221 
0.1688 0.5288 0.293778 
0.3984 1.6171 0.862453 
0.6250 1.7750 0.177500 
0.0919 0.3844 0.183048 
0.1172 0.7959 0.106120 
0.5625 1.5000 0.200000 
0.2000 
0.2063 0.6463 0.117509 
0.2625 
0.0422 0.0984 0.109333 
1.0350 2.1006 0.175050 
1.5312 3.7626 0.215006 
0.9000 2.2360 0.279500 
0.6600 1.8600 0.193750 
0.2734 0.9484 0.151744 
0.5625 1.7437 0.232493 
0.4625 
** 
0.1406 0.5906 0.157493 
** 
1.8750 
0.3281 
0.0875 0.3281 0.187486 
0.2813 0.8813 0.176260 
1.0937 
0.5859 
0.1313 0.6001 0.114305 
0.1563 0.4563 0.182520 
0.9000 3.4584 0.144100 
** 
0.1875 0.4749 0.158300 
1.5625 
0.7875 3.1122 0.148200 
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Appendix 7.3 ROA data and results for scenario 4 
U cost M marg/4 
M marg U cost x draw Draw x draw Total 
-down -down -down value ROA $$$$X 
0.001125 0.0007000 
0.000800 0.0004640 
0.001000 
0.001250 0.0006060 
0.000563 0.0007750 
0.002500 0.0014370 
0.001750 0.0007030 
0.001500 
0.002000 0.0013000 
0.002500 0.0011250 
0.002500 0.0011250 
0.002250 0.0008570 
0.002000 0.0008250 
0.002250 
0.002500 0.0015000 
0.001000 0.0005875 
0.001500 
0.001500 0.0011750 
0.001500 0.0006190 
0.005000 
0.005000 
0.001250 
0.001500 0.0010800 
0.001500 
0.001750 0.0014000 
0.002500 0.0020750 
0.001500 0.0008750 
0.7280 
0.6490' 
0.4069 
0.8047 
0.7142 
1.1250 
0.5625 
1.1998 
0.2063 
0.2850 
0.2937 
0.2056 
0.1950 
0.3078 
0.7000 
1.5562 
0.4375 
1040.0 
1400.0 
1000.0 
525.0 
560.0 
1016.0 
710.0 
1000.0 
500.0 
1400.0 
250.0 
120.0 
190.0 
500.0 
625.0 
175.0 
315.0 
1750.0 
1190.0 
2485.0 
285.0 
350.0 
500.0 
750.0 
500.0 
0.2925 1.0205 0.098125 
0.2800 0.9296 0.066400 
0.2500 
* 
0.0739 0.4808 0.091581 
0.3500 1.1547 0.206196 
0.4445 1.1587 0.114045 
0.2663 
*** 
0.6250 1.7500 0.175000 
0.3125 0.8750 0.175000 
0.7875 1.9873 0.141950 
0.1250 0.3313 0.132520 
0.0675 
0.1187 0.4038 0.212526 
0.1250 0.4187 0.083740 
0.2344 
0.0656 0.2712 0.154971 
0.1181 0.3131 0.099397 
2.1875 
1.4875 
0.7766 
0.1069 0.4147 0.145509 
0.1312 
0.2188 0.9187 0.183 740 
0.4688 2.0250 0.270000 
0.1875 0.6250 0.125000 
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CHAPTER 8 
MEASURING THE FINACIAL RETURN TO UNDERWRITING BANKS 
ON A RETURN ON EXPOSURE METHODOLOGY: 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SYSTEMIC RISK 
8.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to determine whether the returns to 
underwriting banks in the euronote market are adequate to compensate for 
the risks incurred measured by a return on exposure (ROX) methodology. 
If returns are found to be adequate under the funding scenarios chosen, 
this might provide support for the view that the growth of the euronote 
market has not contributed to an increase in systemic risk. If the 
returns to the market are found to be inadequate, this might, 
conversely, provide support for the view that the growth of the euronote 
market has contributed to an increase in systemic risk. 
The methodology employed in this chapter to calculate the return to 
underwriting banks in the euronote market is a return on exposure (ROX) 
technique found to be employed in the market mainly by the 1 arge bank 
respondents, and favoured by the Bank of England. ROX is different to 
ROAwhere all fees are applied only to those assets actually funded. 
Under ROX all fees are applied to the exposure of the underwriter to the 
borrower. ROX recognises that even where an underwriter is only called 
upon to fund a portion of the facility he is still exposed to the 
possibility of being called upon tomorrow to fund the facility in its 
entirety. The facility fee is paid to compensate the underwriter not 
just for his exposure to what he has already funded but also to what he 
may be called upon to fund under the terms of the contract. Al 1 front- 
end fees and facility fees (undrawn cost) are calculated for each year 
on the full amount of the facility (as with ROA), but are then divided 
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by the number of years of the facility to give the return on exposure 
each year (unlike ROA where all front-end fees and facility fees are 
multiplied by the number of years and then simply applied to the amount 
drawn for a particular length of time). Under an ROXmethodology all 
maximum margins are calcuated for the number of years that the facility 
is drawn (as with ROA), but are then divided by the number of years of 
the facility to provide a per annum return on exposure (unlike ROA where 
all maximum margins are simply multiplied by the number of years and 
then applied to the amount drawn for a particular length of time). 
Finally, under an ROX methodology, all fees are applied to the yearly 
exposure of the facility as opposed to the drawdown of the facility. 
The methodo 1 ogy of ROX wi 11 become more apparent as each funding 
scenario is conducted on an ROX basis. 
Our standard of adequacy will remain at 0.5 per cent return, this 
time on exposure not just funded assets where the facility is drawn, and 
0.25 per cent only where the facility is never drawn. The funding 
strategies are the same as those employed in the previous chapter, 
namely: 
1 If all funds were drawn at the end of the first month and the 
underwriter was forced to continue to fund until the maturity 
of the facility (worst case scenario) 
2 If no funds were drawn (best case scenario) 
3 If all funds were drawn for a period of one year throughout 
the life of the facility 
4 If all funds were drawn once each year for a three month 
period only 
5 If 50 per cent of the facil itywas drawn once each year for a 
three month period only 
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8.2 The Return on Exposure Scenarios: Methodology and Presentation of 
Results 
The following scenarios make use of the same total market pricing 
data used in the previous chapter. Unlike the previous chapter, 
however, the scenarios are conducted on an ROX, not an ROA basis. It 
will be argued that ROX provides a more relevant methodology with which 
to ca 1 cu 1 ate the financial return to the underwriting banks ina 
euronote facility. As emphasised in Chapter 6, ROX (like ROA) is not a 
proxy for IRR. The underwriter has no choice over his funding strategy. 
This is wholly determined by uncertain market conditions. Also, a 
higher ROX under one scenario does not necessarily indicate that this 
scenario is preferable to another as it may be that higher risk is also 
faced in such a scenario. The standard of adequacy is only a guideline 
below which market practitioners would accept systemic risk may be 
increased. 
8.2.1 Scenario 1 (ROX) 
The computation of ROX for the first (worst case) scenario (where 
all funds are drawn at the end of the first month and not paid back 
until the maturity of the facility) follows exactly the same procedure 
as ROA for the same scenario in the previous chapter. 
(front-end fees + facility fees + maximum margins) 
x yearly exposure 100 
ROX =x 
yearly exposure 1 
... (8.1) 
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100 
= undrawn cost + maximum margin x 
1 
= fully drawn cost x 
... (8.2) 
100 
1 ... (8.3) 
The 'yearly exposure' used in this scenario is equivalent to the 
'committed value' used in the ROA computation of the same scenario in 
the previous chapter. Both cancel out. 
Since the formula for calculating an ROX under this scenario is 
exactly the same as the formula used to calcul ate an ROA under the same 
scenario in the previous chapter, and the formul a is being appl ied to 
the same data, the return will also be the same, 0.32824 per cent. The 
return to the euronote market under this worst case scenario (where the 
entire market is required to fund fully its commitments until maturity) 
appears to be inadequate - measured by our standard of adequacy of a 
return of 0.5 per cent - on both an ROA and an ROX basis. 
However, by using an ROA methodology to ca 1 cu i ate the return to 
underwriting banks, it is possible to get returns of both higher and 
lower than this 'worst case' rate under different funding scenarios. It 
will soon become clear that a 'worst case' return of 0.32824 per cent is 
the highest return possible under an ROX methodology. Under an ROX 
methodology the more the underwriters have to fund, and the longer they 
are asked to fund, the higher will be their ROX up to amaximum ROX of 
0.32824 per cent. 
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In conclusion to this scenario, we would argue that on a worst case 
basis (where the entire market is required to fund fully its commitments 
until maturity) the per annum return on exposure of 0.32824 per cent 
appears to be inadequate to compensate for the risks incurred. In this 
sense, systemic risk may be increased. 
8.2.2 Scenario 2 (ROX) 
To compute the second (best case) scenario (where no funds are 
drawn), only the front-end fees and facility fees had to be calculated 
for each facility (as was the case for the ROA methodology for the same 
scenario in the previous chapter). Again, these are the only fees that 
the underwriter receives if he never has to fund his commitment. These 
fees were then added together to give the total undrawn cost for each 
individual facility (figures presented in the fourth column of Table 
7.1). So f ar, the methodol gy for calculating the ROX for the euronote 
market under this scenario is exactly the same as the methodology 
employed to calculate the ROA for the euronote market under the same 
scenario in the previous chapter. The next step in the ROA methodology 
was to multi ply the undrawn cost by the committed amount to give an 
average 'monetary' return per annum for the euronote market when no 
assets are funded. To provide a percentage ROA, however, under the ROA 
methodology, the column depicting undrawn cost X amount (column 5 in 
Table 7.1) has to be applied to those assets actually funded. Since no 
assets are funded under this scenario this left us with an infinite ROA. 
Under an ROX methodology, however, all returns are applied not to assets 
funded but to yearly exposure. Yearly exposure is the same as the 
committed amount. The formula for calculating the ROX under this 
scenario can thus be written: 
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ROX 
front-end fees + facility fees x yearly exposure 
x 
100 
= 
yearly exposure 1 
= un dr awn cost x 
... (8.4) 
100 
1 ... (8.5) 
For expositional purposes the first four columns of Table 7.1 are 
reprinted be 1 ow in Table 8.1. The ROX for the market is computed simply 
by taking a mean of column 4 (front-end fees + facility fees). This 
leaves us with an ROX under this (best case) scenario of 0.12438 per 
cent, as compared to an infinite ROA under this scenario in the previous 
chapter. 
Table 8.1 Computation of return on exposure when no funds are drawn 
Amount Years Maximum margin Front-end fee + facility fee 
$m %% 
80.0 3.0 0.001250 0.001000 
50.0 15.0 0.001000 0.000792 
125.0 3.0 0.002000 0.000667 
100.0 5.0 0.001250 0.002400 
150.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0020750 
250.0 2.0 0.001500 0.0008750 
MEAN 
159.40 5.4443 0.0021291 0.0012438 
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In conclusion to this scenario, we would argue that on a best case 
basis (where no assets are funded) using an ROX methodology, the per 
annum ROX to the euronote market appears to be inadequate to compensate 
for the risks incurred (as measured by our standard of adequacy of 0.25 
per cent ROX). Even where no assets are funded, an ROX of 0.12438 per 
cent per annum appears to be dangerously low for a market which is 
exposed to the possibility of having to fund over US $61 bill ion each 
year. With such low returns (given a 0.5 per cent capital cost), it is 
unlikely that capital could be accumulated to provide against potential 
losses. In this sense systemic risk may be increased. 
8.2.3 Scenario 3 (ROX) 
To compute the third scenario on an ROX basis (where all funds are 
drawn for a period of one year throughout the life of the facility), the 
front-end fee, facility fee, maximum margin, total committed value and 
maturity were calculated for each facility (as was the case with the ROA 
methodology for the same scenario in the previous chapter). 
With the ROX methodology all front-end fees and facility fees are 
appl ied to exposure not just assets funded. In other words, the front- 
end fees and facility fees are added together and multiplied by the 
exposure each year (same as the committed value) and then divided by the 
yearly exposure to give a per annum ROX. Not surprisingly, it may seem 
futile to multiply a figure by a number and then divide it by the same 
number. The result is the same as if the figure was in no way amended. 
The procedure is simply related to show the reader that under an ROX 
methodology it is not sufficient simply to multiply the undrawn cost 
(front-end fees and facility fees) by the number of years of the 
facility, and then apply that number to the assets funded. This wil 1 
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invariably provide an inflated return. It will become clear that under 
the ROX methodology, the undrawn ROX is always the same under any 
scenario. 
In a similar way, the maximum margins are multiplied by the amount 
of assets funded (as was the case with the ROA methodology) but are then 
divided by the number of years of the facility to provide a per annum 
ROX. The formula for calculating the ROX under this scenario (where all 
funds are drawn for a period of one year throughout the life of the 
facility) is as follows: 
(front-end fees + facility fees x exposure) + (maximum 
margins x assets funded divided by years) 100 
ROX =x 
exposure 1 
... 
(8.6) 
(undrawn cost x exposure) + (maximum margins x assets 
funded divided by years) 100 
x 
exposure 1 
... (8.7) 
100 
undrawn cost + (maximum margins x assets funded x 
divided by years) 
1 "". 
( 8. g) 
In this scenario the assets funded are equivalent to the yearly 
exposure. So, for this particular scenario the formula can be reduced 
still further to read: 
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100 
ROX = undrawn cost + maximum margins divided by years x 
1 ... (8.9) 
This formula was applied to the total market data. To present all of 
these data in the main text would, once again, have meant presenting 
data for 387 facilities. Again, this was not feasible. For 
expositional purposes, and in keeping with the presentation of data in 
the preceeding chapter, only the data and results for the first four 
f aci 1 iti es, the 1 ast two f aci 1 iti es and the mean for each complete 
column are shown in Table 8.2 (see Appendix 8.1 for the presentation of 
the complete table). 
The fi na 1 row pro vi des us with the mean va 1 ue of each co 1 umn for 
the full market data (as presented in Appendix 8.1). The final column 
gives the ROXfor each individual facility. The mean of this column 
provides us with the overall market ROX per annum of 0.16731 per cent. 
On our standard of adequacy (an ROX of at least 0.5 per cent when 
funded), an ROX of 0.16731 per cent appears to be quite inadequate to 
compensate for the risks incurred and is even below our minimum standard 
of adequacy of 0.25 per cent for totally unfunded facilities. This 
conclusion, once more, contradicts the conclusion arrived at by applying 
an ROA methodology to the same scenario in the previous chapter. 
The ROX methodology acknowledges that front-end fees and facility 
fees are not just paid as return for funding the facility; rather they 
are paid for the commitment to fund each year if and when required up to 
the exposure of the underwriter. As such they may not simply be applied 
only to those assets actually funded, but to the exposure of the 
underwriter per annum. 
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Similarly, any returns received from the maximum margin on funding 
assets should be divided by the number of years of the facility to 
provide a return per annum. 
In conclusion to this scenario, we would argue that (where all 
funds are drawn for a period of one year throughout the life of the 
facility) using an ROX methodology, the per annum ROX to the euronote 
market appears to be inadequate to compensate for the risks i. ncurred. 
In this sense, systemic risk may be increased. 
8.2.4 Scenario 4 (ROX) 
To compute scenario 4 (where all funds are drawn once each year for 
a three month period only) the front-end fee, facility fee, maximum 
margin, total committed value and maturity were calculated for each 
facility (as was the case for the ROA methodology for the same scenario 
in the previous chapter). 
As with the previous ROX scenarios, all front-end fees and facility 
fees are applied directly to yearly exposure. The maximum margins are 
multiplied by the amount of assets funded and then divided by the number 
of years of the facility to give a per annum return. This figure is 
then applied to exposure. Under this scenario, however, all funds are 
drawn only for a three-month period each year. The maximum margins 
have, therefore, to be calculated accordingly. The formula for 
calculating the ROX under this scenario is as follows: 
(front-end fees + facility fees x exposure) + (maximum 
ROX 
margins divided by 4x assets funded divided by years) 
exposure 
100 
I 
... (8.10) 
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= undrawn cost + (maximum margin divided by 4x assets funded 100 
divided by years) x 
1 
... (8.11) 
In this particular scenario all assets are funded each year for a three 
month period. Since the three month period is accounted for by dividing 
the maximum margins by 4, we can further reduce the formul a if we take 
'assets funded' as equivalent to assets funded on a per annum basis 
(which equates 'assets funded' to exposure in this scenario) and then 
eliminate 'years' from the numerator. The revised formula now reads: 
100 
ROX = undrawn cost + maximum margins divided by 4x assets x 
funded per annum 
1 
... (8.12) 
This formula was applied to the total market data. Again, it was not 
feasible to provide the data and results for 387 facilities in the main 
text. As before, only the data and results for the first four 
facilities, the last two facilities and the mean for each complete 
column are shown in Table 8.3 below (see Appendix 8.2 for the 
presentation of the complete table). 
As with previous scenarios, the final row provides us with the mean 
value of each column for the complete market data (as presented in this 
case in Appendix 8.2). The final column gives the ROX for each 
individual facility. The mean of this column provides us with the 
overall market ROX per annum of 0.17526 per cent. 
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This is exactly the same as the return calculated under the ROA 
methodology for the same scenario in the previous chapter. It becomes 
more apparent, then, that under certain scenarios the returns calculated 
under the ROA methodology and the returns calculated under the ROX 
methodology will be the same. This will always be true where the entire 
facility is drawn at least once each year for the ful 1 duration of the 
facility. 
One feature which is becoming apparent with the ROX methodology is 
that the more assets the market is asked to fund, and the longer the 
period of time over which the market is asked to fund, the higher A1 1 
be the ROX to the market, up to a maximum ROX of 0.32824 per cent where 
all assets are funded for the entire duration of the facility. This is 
consistent in the sense that the greater risk the underwriter assumes 
through funding more assets, the greater is his return. 
In conclusion to this scenario we would argue that (where all funds 
are drawn each year for a three month period only) using an ROX 
methodology, the per annum ROX to the euronote market of 0.17526 per 
cent appears to be inadequate, even against our undrawn standard 
adequacy, to compensate for the risks incurred. In this sense, systemic 
risk may be, increased. 
8.2.5 Scenario 5 (ROX) 
To compute scenario 5 (where 50 per cent of the facility is drawn 
once each year for a three month period only), the front-end fee, 
facility fee, maximum margin, committed value and maturity were once 
more calculated for each facility. 
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This scenario will further emphasise one of the main conclusions of 
the previous scenario, that ROX takes into account both maturity and 
assets funded as well as exposure in its calculation of the financial 
return to underwriting banks. 
It is not possible to equate the 'assets funded' category to 
'exposure' (as we did in the previous scenario), because only 50 per 
cent of the facility is drawn each year for a three month period. The 
formula for this scenario must, therefore, be written: 
(front-end fees + facility fees x exposure) + (maximum 
margins divided by 4x assets funded divided by years) 100 
ROX =x 
exposure 1 
... (8.13) 
undrawn cost + (maximum margins divided by 4x assets 100 
funded divided by years) x 
1 
... (8.14) 
The formula was applied to the total market data. In keeping with the 
presentation of previous results, only the data and results for the 
first four facilities, the last two facilities and the mean for each 
complete column are presented in Table 8.4 below (see Appendix 8.3 for 
the presentation of the complete table). 
Once more, the final row provides us with the mean value of each 
column for the complete market data. The final column gives the ROX for 
each individual facility. 
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The mean of this column provides us with an overall market ROX per annum 
under this scenario of 0.14977 per cent. This figure is different to 
the return calculated under the ROA methodology for the same scenario in 
the previous chapter of 0.17526 per cent. The reason for the difference 
is that by applying fees to exposure as opposed to merely assets funded, 
ROX takes into account assets funded as well as maturity in its 
calculation of returns to underwriting banks. 
In conclusion to this scenario we would argue that (where 50 per 
cent of funds are drawn each year for a three month period only) using 
an ROX methodology, the per annum ROX to the euronote market of 0.14977 
per cent appears to be inadequate to compensate for the risks incurred. 
In this sense, systemic risk may be increased. 
8.3 Sunmary and Conclusions 
The results for scenarios 1 to 5on an ROX basis are presented in 
Table 8.5 below. 
Table 8.5 ROX for scenarios 1 to 5 
Scenario ROX (%) 
1 (fully drawn) 0.32824 
2 (no draw down) 0.12438 
3 (drawn for 1 year) 0.16731 
4 (fully drawn for 3 months of each year) 0.17526 
5 (50 per cent drawn for 3 months of each year) 0.14977 
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What can be seen from Table 8.5 is that the ROX increases/fal ls as the 
amount of assets funded for a particular number of years 
increases/falls. In scenario 4, for instance, more assets are funded 
for a slightly 1 onger period of time than in scenario 3. The ROX in 
scenario 4 is, therefore, slightly higher than in scenario 3. The 
reason it is not higher still is because in scenario 4 all assets are 
funded on 1y for a three month period each year. Simi 1 ar 1y the ROX f or 
scenario 5 is below that for scenario 4 as only half the amount of 
assets are funded each year. The reason the ROX for scenario 5 is not 
exactly half of that for scenario 4 is that the amount of assets funded 
only affects the return attributable to the maximum margin and not the 
front-end fees or facility fees. 
The ROX methodology reveals that underwriters in the euronote 
market are indeed rewarded for funding more assets over longer periods 
of time but only to a maximum ROX of 0.32824 per cent where al 1 assets 
are funded for the full duration of the facility. Nor does the ROX ever 
fall below a market average of 0.12438 per cent where no assets are ever 
funded. 
Again, a particularly disturbing result is that of scenario 1. An 
ROX (and ROA) of 0.32824 per cent seems to be totally inadequate as a 
market return in times of financial crisis which is the most likely time 
that such a scenario would come to fruition. 
Although we do not claim our standard of adequacy (of 0.5 per cent 
return) to be a totally objective measure, even if it were to be 
reduced substantially, the returns in our ROX scenarios would still be 
inadequate. Furthermore, as emphasised in Chapter 4, many banks must 
now maintain capital measures up to 0.5 per cent against their euronote 
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exposures. This, if factored in to the calculation would further reduce 
the bank's ROX. 
ROX is also a more systematic method of calculating the financial 
return to an underwriter. If we compare the ROX results with the ROA 
results we can see that some of the ROA results are highly variable (see 
Table 8.6 below). 
Table 8.6 ROA and ROX for Scenarios 1 to 5 
Scenario ROA ROX 
1 (fully drawn) 0.32824 0.32824 
2 (no draw down) oC 0.12438 
3 (drawn for 1 year) 0.88818 0.16731 
4 (fully drawn for 3 months of each year) 0.17526 0.17526 
5 (50 per cent drawn for 3 months of each year) 0.17526 0.14977 
Both ROA and ROX methodologies provide the same results when the 
facilities are fully drawn. For other scenarios, however, results vary 
dramatically - in particular, the results of scenarios 2 and 3. By 
applying all fees just to assets funded, an infinite return on assets is 
possible under the ROA methodology. We believe this to be a dangerous 
flaw in the ROA methodology. 
With ROX, all possible market returns will lie within a boundary of 
0.12438 per cent (where no assets are funded) and 0.32824 per cent 
(where all assets are funded over the duration of the facility). 
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All ROX results are well below our standard of adequacy for this 
market. This would seem to add support to the hypothesis that the 
growth of the euronote market may contribute to an increase in systemic 
risk. 
We have been dealing in this chapter and the previous chapters with 
total market data. As mentioned previously, however, the euronote 
market comprises three main sectors: the sovereign sector, the bank 
sector and the corporate sector. It is possible that returns in one or 
two of these sectors are pulling down overall market returns. In order 
to-explore this hypothesis, the market data were broken down into their 
three respective sectors. Scenarios I to 5 were re-run once more on an 
ROX basis - first for the sovereign sector, then for the bank sector and 
finally for the corporate sector of the euronote market. The ROX 
results for these three sectors under the respective scenarios are 
displayed alongside the ROX results for the entire market in Table 8.7 
below. 
Table 8.7 ROX for entire market, sovereign sector, bank sector and 
corporate sector (for scenarios 1 to 5) 
Scenario Market Sovereign Bank Corporate 
1 (fully drawn) 0.32824 0.28444 0.31173 0.34180 
2 (no draw down) 0.12438 0.09683 0.13680 0.12805 
3 (drawn for 1 year) 0.16731 0.12754 0.17921 0.17402 
4 (fully drawn for 
3 months each year) 0.17526 0.14436 0.17990 0.18141 
5 (50 per cent drawn 
for 3 months each 
year) 0.14977 0.12101 0.15793 0.15471 
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From Table 8.7 we can observe that the sovereign sector of the 
euronote market provides the least financial return to underwriting 
banks: always a few points below the market. Prices in the corporate 
sector, on the other hand, are always slightly above the market. Prices 
in neither of these sectors, however, appear to affect significantly 
overall market ROX. It woul d not be feasible to present all the data 
for the sovereign, corporate and bank sectors for scenarios 1-to 5 (even 
in an appendix). Data are,. therefore, available on request. 
We would conclude that (measured on an ROX basis) prices in the 
euronote market do not appear to be adequate sufficiently to compensate 
underwriters for the risks incurred when viewed outside the customer 
relationship. This 'underpricing' does not appear to be due to low 
prices in one sector of the market pulling down prices in other sectors. 
On this evidence, the growth of the euronote market may contribute to an 
increase in systemic risk. 
The returns to an underwriter on a ROX basis can be shown 
graphically to increase as the underwriter's exposure (amount funded X 
years) increases. In Figure 8.1 years are held constant at the market 
mean of 5.44 years to show how ROX increases as the amount funded 
increases. In Figure 8.2 the amount funded is held constant at US$ 
60.014 billion (the total amount which the euronote market is committed 
to fund should it be called upon to do so) to show how ROX increases the 
longer the underwriter is asked to fund his commitment. 
The five funding scenarios analysed in this chapter served to 
emphasise how different funding strategies affect the ROX. The points 
at which the ROX for the five scenarios intersect the actual ROX line 
for the market are marked by a number and a cross in Figures 8.1 and 
8.2. Significantly, the actual ROX line for the market is well below 
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the ROX said to be required by the market (dotted 1 ine) in both figures. 
The gap between the two lines (actual ROX and required ROX) wil 1 be 
referred to as the 'systemic gap', ie the amount by which the actual ROX 
would have to be increased to prevent any increase in systemic risk 
arising from the growth of the euronote market. 
The line depicting the required market return is, to a certain 
extent, a theoretical construction. Market respondents argued that 
where the facility was drawn then a minimum return of 0.5 per cent would 
be required. This was seen to be a minimum standard of adequacy 
irrespective of how much of the facility was drawn. This unwillingness 
to stipulate lower returns in the face of lower exposure was due to 
respondents' uncertainty about the probability of various exposure 
scenarios occurring. As a 'rule of thumb', therefore, a standard of 
adequacy was given on a drawn and undrawn basis only. 
Even on an undrawn basis where underwriters are never asked to fund 
their commitments there is still a need to recoup capital costs, 
particularly since the application of risk asset ratios, hence the 0.25 
per cent unfunded return required by the market. For theoretical 
exposition, however, the required ROX lines in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 have 
been drawn to represent differing exposure levels between the unexposed 
and fully exposed scenarios. Even on this basis it is noticeable that 
the actual market ROX line is well below the required market ROX line. 
Judged on the market's required minimum standards of adequacy it 
would appear that a 'systemic gap' has developed in the euronote market. 
It may be that this gap is closed by the transfer of returns from other 
parts of the customer relationship to the euronote market. This is an 
empirical question and will be discussed in the following two chapters. 
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For the present time, however, it is important to note that such 
transfer of returns will only close the systemic gap where the 
'portfolio return' from the customer relationship is more than adequate 
to compensate for the 'portfolio risk' from that relationship. If such 
transfer of returns is not possible or if it is inadequate to close the 
systemic gap then the gap will be more analogous to Van Horne's (1985) 
financial 'bubble' which may eventually burst so leading to a systemic 
crisis. If a transfer of returns can close the gap then it may be more 
analogous to Van Horne's financial 'balloons' that will eventually 
deflate (close the gap) as the market matures. 
It is important to note that the systemic gap does not equate to 
the systemic risk existing in the financial system or even in the 
euronote market for that matter. The systemic gap merely indicates the 
potential 'increase' in systemic risk brought about by the practice of 
underpricing in the euronote market. The closure of this gap would 
offset the increase in systemic risk which underpricing in the euronote 
market may have contributed to but would not eliminate the systemic risk 
inherent in the system. 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 highlighted the main limitation of the ROX 
methodology. Under the ROX methodology the return gained on $10 billion 
drawn for five years is the same as the return on $50 bill ion drawn for 
one year. It is arguable, however, that the latter places more funding 
pressure on the underwriters and so risk may be greater in such a 
scenario. ROX views the two similarly for return calculations. This is 
the main reason why the term 'exposure' is favoured to that of 'risk'. 
ROX should also not be confused with the risk-return models of 
financial economic theory such as the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). Under CAPM assets can be identified with risk-return features 
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different to those found on the securities market line and can be added 
to a portfolio of assets in accordance with these characteristics. A 
euronote underwriter has absolutely no choice, or knowledge, of his 
funding strategy or exposure. This will be determined by uncertain 
market conditions. The actual return to the underwriter can only be 
shown ex post and this will depend on how much of the f aci 1i ty the 
underwriter is asked to fund and for how long. The actual ROX -lines in 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 merely depict the ROX from an infinite number of 
feasible funding scenarios. As the underwriter has no knowledge as to 
the probability of any one scenario occurring it would be wrong to use 
ROX as a forecasting model. For these same reasons ROX cannot be seen 
as a proxy for IRR. 
The question sti l1 to answer is why underwriters are prepared to 
accept such low returns for their services in the euronote market? The 
possibility of customer relationship pricing has already been mentioned 
briefly and it will be explored more fully in the following chapters. 
By drawing on the qualitative and quantitative findings of the last 
three chapters, Chapter 9 will seek to formulate hypotheses to explain 
the reason for the existence of the systemic gap identified in the 
euronote market. The hypotheses formulated will then be tested in the 
market and our results presented to the market to complete the 
triangulation research approach adopted in this study. 
352 
Appendix 8.1 ROX data and results for scenario 3 
Mmarg x 
U cost x assets Total 
Exposure Yrs M Marg U cost exposure /years volume ROX 
$$$$ 
80.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0010000 0.08000 0.033333 0.11333 0.141667 
50.0 15.0 0.001000 0.0007920 0.03960 0.003333 0.04293 0.085867 
125.0 3.0 0.002000 0.0006670 0.08337 0.083333 0.16671 0.133367 
100.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0024000 0.24000 0.025000 0.26500 0.265000 
250.0 10.0 
200.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0008750 0.17500 0.040000 0.21500 0.107500 
80.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0012500 0.10000 0.040000 0.14000 0.175000 
250.0 8.0 0.003750 0.0025780 0.64450 0.117188 0.76169 0.304675 
500.0 5.0 * 0.0006250 0.31250 
100.0 5.0 0.000800 0.0007250 0.07250 0.016000 0.08850 0.088500 
300.0 10.0 0.003250 0.0010000 0.30000 0.097500 0.39750 0.132500 
125.0 7.0 0.002000 **0.035714 
45.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0030000 0.13500 0.031500 0.16650 0.370000 
200.0 8.0 0.000500 0.0008500 0.17000 0.012500 0.18250 0.091250 
750.0 10.0 0.000800 0.0008000 0.60000 0.060000 0.66000 0.088000 
12.5 5.0 0.001500 0.0006880 0.00860 0.003750 0.01235 0.098800 
400.0 10.0 0.004000 0.0015630 0.62520 0.160000 0.78520 0.196300 
200.0 7.0 0.001500 **0.042857 
500.0 10.0 0.001250 **0.062500 
1500.0 6.0 0.001625 **0.406250 
340.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0008250 0.28050 0.127500 0.40800 0.120000 
500.0 10.0 0.002875 0.0007440 0.37200 0.143750 0.51575 0.103150 
100.0 7.0 0.003250 0.0024290 0.24290 0.046429 0.28933 0.289329 
350.0 10.0 0.001875 0.0010130 0.35455 0.065625 0.42018 0.120050 
100.0 2.0 0.000625 0.0003125 0.03125 0.031250 0.06250 0.062500 
1300.0 8.0 0.004375 0.0008780 1.14140 0.710938 1.85234 0.142487 
85.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0008250 0.07012 0.038250 0.10837 0.127500 
700.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0006000 0.42000 0.140000 0.56000 0.080000 
400.0 10.0 0,002000 0.0006630 0.26520 0.080000 0.34520 0.086300 
350.0 10.0 0.001250 **0.043750 
200.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0015000 0.30000 0.166667 0.46667 0.233333 
100.0 5.0 0.001125 0.0006250 0.06250 0.022500 0.08500 0.085000 
2000.0 8.5 0.001750 0.0005980 1.19600 0.411765 1.60776 0.080388 
500.0 10.0 0.001750 0.0010750 0.53750 0.087500 0.62500 0.125000 
75.0 7.0 0.002250 0.0010710 0.08032 0.024107 0.10443 0.139243 
70.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.014000 
500.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0013930 0.69650 0.178571 0.87507 0.175014 
1000.0 5.5 0.002250 0.0008070 0.80700 0.409091 1.21609 0.121609 
75.0 7.0 0.002500 **0.02 6786 
40.0 7.0 0.002000 **0.011429 
100.0 5.5 0.000625 0.0006140 0.06140 0.011364 0.07276 0.072764 
100.0 5.0 0.001125 0.0005880 0.05880 0.022500 0.08130 0.081300 
350.0 8.0 0.001875 0.0006160 0.21560 0.082031 0.29763 0.085038 
500.0 8.0 0.001000 0.0005440 0.27200 0.062500 0.33450 0.066900 
300.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0008860 0.26580 0.064286 0.33009 0.110029 
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Appendix 8.1 ROX data and results for scenario 3 
M marg x 
U cost x assets Total 
Exposure Yrs M Marg U cost exposure /years volume ROX 
$$$$ 
45.0 5.0 0.010000 **0.090000 
60.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0007750 0.04650 0.030000 0.07650 0.127500 
80.0 4.5 0.004000 **0.071111 
30.0 2.0 0.000625 **0.009375 
300.0 10.0 0.001000 0.0004930 0.14790 0.030000 0.17790 0.059300 
400.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0005000 0.20000 0.050000 0.25000 0.062500 
150.0 7.0 0.001100 0.0005890 0.08835 0.023571 0.11192 0.074614 
200.0 10.0 0.001000 0.0005500 0.11000 0.020000 0.13000 0.065000 
315.0 6.0 0.001250 0.0003420 0.10773 0.065625 0.17336 0.055033 
75.0 7.0 0.004000 **0.042857 
50.0 7.0 0.001875 **0.013393 
20.0 5.0 0.003750 0.0015500 0.03100 0.015000 0.04600 0.230000 
75.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0014170 0.10627 0.031250 0.13753 0.183367 
65.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0012000 0.07800 0.016250 0.09425 0.145000 
100.0 2.0 0.001250 0.0006250 0.06250 0.062500 0.12500 0.125000 
100.0 2.0 0.001250 **0.062500 
25.0 7.0 0.001875 **0.006697 
100.0 7.0 0.001500 0.00142 90 0.14290 0.021429 0.16433 0.164329 
50.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0008250 0.04125 0.015000 0.05625 0.112500 
150.0 2.0 0.001250 **0.093750 
75.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0007130 0.05347 0.015000 0.06848 0.091300 
25.0 5.0 0.001250 **0.006250 
100.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007750'0.07750 0.037500 0.11500 0.115000 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.050000 
40.0 3.0 0.002000 **0.026667 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0007750 0.03875 0.010000 0.04875 0.097500 
20.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0023960 0.04792 0.020000 0.06792 0.339600 
35.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0022920 0.08022 0.029167 0.10939 0.312533 
100.0 5.0 * 0.0014750 0.14750 
30.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0015500 0.04650 0.006000 0.05250 0.175000 
100.0 5.0 0.002750 0.0014250 0.14250 0.055000 0.19750 0.197500 
50.0 2.0 0.000625 **0.015625 
50.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0026050 0.13025 0.041 667 0.17192 0.343833 
60.0 4.0 * 0.0015630 0.09378 
30.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0015000 0.04500 0.009000 0.05400 0.180000 
40.0 3.0 0.000625 0.0011700 0.04680 0.008333 0.05513 0.137833 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.010000 
50.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0010750 0.05375 0.025000 0.07875 0.157500 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.010000 
20.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.010000 
50.0 3.0 0.000625 **0.010417 
60.0 3.0 0.002250 **0.045000 
150.0 6.0 0.001875 0.0013130 0.19695 0.046875 0.24383 0.162550 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0013750 0.13750 0.050000 0.18750 0.187500 
300.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0007500 0.22500 0.090000 0.31500 0.105000 
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Appendix 8.1 ROX data and results for scenario 3 
M urarg x 
U cost x assets Total 
Exposure Yrs M Marg U cost exposure /years volume ROX 
$%$$$ 
50.0 3.0 0.002250 0.0018330 0.09165 0.037500 0.12915 0.258300 
155.0 5.0 0.003375 **0.104624 
30.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0024080 0.07224 0.025000 0.09724 0.324133 
50.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0006430 0.03215 0.025000 0.05715 0.114300 
* 3.0 0.002500 
15.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0015830 0.02374 0.012500 0.03624 0.241633 
30.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0015750 0.04725 0.006000 0.05325 0.177500 
100.0 4.0 0.002000 0.0013750 0.13750 0.050000 0.18750 0.187500 
35.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0012500 0.04375 0.012250 0.05600 0.160000 
100.0 5.0 0.000750 0.0012500 0.12500 0.015000 0.14000 0.140000 
100.0 2.0 0.000625 **0.031250 
100.0 5.0 0.000750 0.0008350 0.08350 0.015000 0.09850 0.098500 
25.0 1.0 0.007500 **0.187500 
100.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0017850 0.17850 0.035000 0.21350 0.213500 
200.0 3.0 0.001500 0.0018330 0.36660 0.100000 0.46660 0.233300 
40.0 3.0 0.001000 0.0016000 0.06400 0.013333 0.07733 0.193333 
100.0 5.0 0.000400 0.0003125 0.03125 0.008000 0.03925 0.039250 
35.0 5.0 0.001500 **0.010500 
25.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0012000 0.03000 0.012500 0.04250 0.170000 
100.0 5.0 0.003000 0.0012750 0.12750 0.060000 0.18750 0.187500 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.050000 
30.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.00 6000 
325.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.065000 
25.0 7.0 0.000500 0.0014290 0.03573 0.001786 0.03751 0.150043 
13.0 6.0 0.001875 **0.004062 
80.0 3.0 0.002500 **0.066667 
400.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0010000 0.40000 0.050000 0.45000 0.112500 
50.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0009380 0.04690 0.041667 0.08857 0.177133 
400.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0022680 0.90720 0.085714 0.99291 0.248229 
75.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0013750 0.10312 0.015000 0.11812 0.157500 
75.0 7.0 0.003250 0.0011430 0.08572 0.034821 0.12055 0.160729 
22.0 3.0 0.003000 **0.022000 
50.0 7.0 0.001000 **0.007143 
50.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0013930 0.06965 0.014286 0.08394 0.167871 
150.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007250 0.10875 0.056250 0.16500 0.110000 
75.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0009500 0.07125 0.028126 0.09938 0.132501 
100.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0013330 0.13330 0.041667 0.17497 0.174967 
70.0 2.0 0.001250 **0.043750 
45.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0015000 0.06750 0.011250 0.07875 0.175000 
125.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0025000 0.31250 0.078125 0.39062 0.312500 
50.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0017190 0.08595 0.031250 0.11720 0.234400 
155.0 2.0 0.003750 **0.290625 
50.0 3.0 0.002500 **0.041667 
75.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007500 0.05625 0.028126 0.08438 0.112501 
65.0 7.0 0.001875 0.0006960 0.04524 0.017410 0.06265 0.096385 
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M marg x 
U cost x assets Total 
Exposure Yrs M Marg U cost exposure /years volume ROX 
$$$$ 
150.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0014500 0.21750 0.045000 0.26250 0.175000 
67.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.033500 
100.0 7.0 0.002 500 0.0011790 0.11790 0.035714 0.15361 0.153 614 
225.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007500 0.16875 0.084374 0.25312 0.112500 
50.0 8.0 0.001000 **0.0062 50 
100.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0012000 0.12000 0.020000 0.14000 0.140000 
125.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007125 0.08906 0.046874 0.13594 0.108749 
400.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0007400 0.29600 0.050000 0.34600 0.086500 
450.0 7.0 0.003000 0.0011250 0.50625 0.192857 0.69911 0.155357 
200.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0015000 0.30000 0.140000 0.44000 0.220000 
25.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0031000 0.07750 0.010000 0.08750 0.350000 
1200.0 3.0 0.002000 0.0014000 1.68000 0.800000 2.48000 0.206667 
150.0 5.0 0.001725 0.0013250 0.19875 0.051750 0.25050 0.167000 
150.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0013930 0.20895 0.042857 0.25181 0.167871 
30.0 3.0 0.001875 0.0010420 0.03126 0.018750 0.05001 0.166700 
62.5 5.0 0.002500 0.0008500 0.05313 0.031250 0.08438 0.135000 
60.0 3.0 *** 
85.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0012500 0.10625 0.070833 0.17708 0.208333 
100.0 5.0 0.002200 0.0009750 0.09750 0.044000 0.14150 0.141500 
150.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0005630 0.08445 0.045000 0.12945 0.086300 
50.0 10.0 0.001563 0.0010260 0.05130 0.007815 0.05912 0.118230 
100.0 7.0 0.001250 0.0014820 0.14820 0.017857 0.16606 0.166057 
75.0 7.0 0.001000 0.0009640 0.07230 0.010714 0.08301 0.110686 
125.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007250 0.09062 0.046874 0.13750 0.109999 
62.5 5.0 0.001500 0.0009000 0.05625 0.018750 0.07500 0.120000 
500.0 7.0 0.001250 0.0005200 0.26000 0.089286 0.34929 0.069857 
150.0 7.0 0.003750 0.0013320 0.19980 0.080357 0.28016 0.186771 
400.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0013750 0.55000 0.080000 0.63000 0.157500 
1300.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0019750 2.56750 0.585000 3.15250 0.242500 
360.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0010000 0.36000 0.144000 0.50400 0.140000 
50.0 5.0 0.002000 **0.02 0000 
200.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0008650 0.17300 0.075000 0.24800 0.124000 
50.0 3.0 0.001250 **0.020833 
25.0 5.5 0.002000 0.0008180 0.02045 0.009091 0.02954 0.118164 
200.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0011250 0.22500 0.050000 0.27500 0.137500 
200.0 5.0 0.001375 **0.055000 
200.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0010800 0.21600 0.070000 0.28600 0.143000 
56.0 3.0 0.002500 **0.046667 
75.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0009510 0.07133 0.015000 0.08633 0,115100 
170.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0009000 0.15300 0.070833 0.22383 0.131667 
87.5 2.5 0.003000 **0.105000 
300.0 3.0 0.001500 0.0012080 0.36240 0.150000 0.51240 0.170800 
130.0 8.0 0.003750 **0.060938 
175,0 5.0 0.002000 0.0011650 0.20388 0.070000 0.27387 0.156500 
125.0 4.0 0.005000 **0.156250 
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M marg x 
U cost x assets Total 
Exposure Yrs M Marg U cost exposure /years volume ROX 
220.0 5.0 0.002750 * * 0.121000 
50.0 3.0 0.003250 * * 0.054167 
90.0 7.0 0.001000 * * 0.012857 
300.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0018570 0.55710 0.107143 0.66424 0.221414 
35.0 3.0 0.004500 * * 0.052500 
37.5 7.0 0.002500 0.0011430 0.04286 0.013393 0.05626 0.150014 
45.0 3.0 0.002500 * * 0.03 7500 
55.0 4.0 0.001000 0.0014500 0.07975 0.013750 0.09350 0.170000 
125.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0008250 0.10312 0.046874 0.15000 0.119999 
400.0 5.0 0.002500 * * 0.200000 
200.0 5.0 0.002500 * * 0.100000 
300.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0014100 0.42300 0.210000 0.63300 0.211000 
150.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0014250 0.21375 0.052500 0.26625 0.177500 
630.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0007780 0.49014 0.393750 0.88389 0.140300 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 * * 0.050000 
100.0 3.0 0.005500 * * 0.183333 
97.5 8.5 0.007500 * * 0.086029 
20.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.03334 0.016667 0.05001 0.250033 
60.0 2.0 0.001000 0.0014690 0.08814 0.030000 0.11814 0.196900 
200.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0012125 0.24250 0.040000 0.28250 0.141250 
195.0 7.0 0.002750 0.0013750 0.26812 0.076607 0.34473 0.176786 
100.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0008000 0.08000 0.025000 0.10500 0.105000 
150.0 8.0 0.003750 * * 0.070313 
400.0 4.0 0.003500 * * 0.350000 
60.0 5.0 0.003250 0.0014380 0.08628 0.039000 0.12528 0.208800 
50.0 1.0 0.002000 * * 0.100000 
50.0 2.0 0.001250 * * 0.031250 
100.0 7.0 0.001500 * * 0.021429 
50.0 5.0 0.001563 * * 0.015630 
22.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0011000 0.02420 0.004400 0.02860 0.130000 
75.0 5.0 0.002000 * * 0.030000 
125.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0012500 0.15625 0.052083 0.20833 0.166667 
125.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0010210 0.12763 0.125000 0.25263 0.202100 
200.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0011500 0.23000 0.080000 0.31000 0.155000 
65.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0010050 0.06532 0.032500 0.09782 0.150500 
300.0 7.0 0.002750 * * 0.117857 
110.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0008930 0.09823 0.039286 0.13752 0.125014 
60.0 5.0 0.002500 * * 0.030000 
38.0 6.0 0.001875 0.0014170 0.05385 0.011875 0.06572 0.172950 
75.0 8.5 0.005500 0.0020070 0.15052 0.048529 0.19905 0.265406 
140.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0013700 0.19180 0.056000 0.24780 0.177000 
65.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007950 0.05167 0.024374 0.07605 0.116998 
110.0 7.0 0.002 500 0.00160 70 0.17677 0.03 9286 0.21606 0.196414 
75.0 5.0 0.003000 * * 0.045000 
60.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0010250 0.06150 0.018000 0.07950 0.132500 
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M marg x 
U cost x assets Total 
Exposure Yrs M Marg U cost exposure /years volume ROX 
$X$$$ 
700.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0011030 0.77210 0.087500 0.85960 0.122800 
320.0 7.0 0.003500 0.0023570 0.75424 0.160000 0.91424 0.285700 
50.0 7.0 0.001250 0.0006960 0.03480 0.008929 0.04373 0.087457 
* 3.0 0.002500 0.0012500 
* 8.0 0.001875 0.0014060 
100.0 3.0 0.002500 **0.083333 
100.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0014170 0.14170 0.041667 0.18337 0.183367 
70.0 5.0 0.003000 0.0016000 0.11200 0.042000 0.15400 0.220000 
30.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0023750 0.07125 0.021000 0.09225 0.307500 
100.0 10.0 0.001875 0.0008750 0.08750 0.018750 0.10625 0.106250 
50.0 5.0 0.003750 0.0014000 0.07000 0.037500 0.10750 0.215000 
22.0 5.0 0.003750 0.0025000 0.05500 0.016500 0.07150 0.325000 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 **0.030000 
100.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0014250 0.14250 0.040000 0.18250 0.182500 
50.0 5.0 0.003500 **0.03 5000 
400.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0011700 0.46800 0.166667 0.63467 0.158667 
220.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0012000 0.26400 0.099000 0.36300 0.165000 
350.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0009380 0.32830 0.175000 0.50330 0.143800 
75.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0012000 0.09000 0.022500 0.11250 0.150000 
70.0 2.0 0.000625 **0.021875 
30.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0012670 0.03801 0.012500 0.05051 0.168367 
50.0 3.0 0.001000 0.0008330 0.04165 0.016667 0.05832 0.116633 
175.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0013750 0.24062 0.043750 0.28437 0.162500 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 **0.030000 
125.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.025000 
105.0 8.0 0.001750 0.0010310 0.10826 0.022969 0.13122 0.124975 
20.0 4.0 0.001500 **0.007500 
-225.0 4.0 0.001500 0.0008910 0.20047 0.084375 0.28485 0.126600 100.0 5.0 0.001750 **0.03 5000 
70.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0015000 0.10500 0.035000 0.14000 0.200000 
30.0 5.0 0.000875 **0.005250 
1000.0 3.0 0.002250 0.0014580 1.45800 0.750000 2.20800 0.220800 
140.0 8.0 0.000750 0.0040310 0.56434 0.013125 0.57747 0.412475 
100.0 3.0 0.002625 0.0017500 0.17500 0.087500 0.26250 0.262500 
50.0 3.0 0.001250 **0.020833 
100.0 3.0 0.001200 **0.040000 
70.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0009560 0.06692 0.020000 0.08692 0.124171 
25.0 3.0 0.006250 0.0022920 0.05730 0.052083 0.10938 0.437533 
300.0 5.0 0.002000 **0.120000 
200.0 5.0 0.002000 **0.080000 
70.0 3.0 0.002000 **0.046667 
60.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0011000 0.06600 0.021000 0.08700 0.145000 
18.0 3.0 0.000563 **0.003377 
25.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.04168 0.020833 0.06251 0.250033 
110.0 7.0 0.001500 **0.023571 
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M marg x 
U cost x assets Total 
Exposure Yrs M Marg U cost exposure /years volume ROX 
$$$$ 
25.0 2.0 0.001250 * * 0.015625 
143.0 10.0 0.001875 0.0007710 0.11025 0.026812 0.13706 0.095850 
43.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0016670 0.07168 0.043000 0.11468 0.266700 
100.0 1.0 0.003500 * * 0.350000 
100.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0013250 0.13250 0.083333 0.21583 0.215833 
45.0 12.0 0.001000 * * 0.003750 
300.0 14.0 0.002000 0.0011570 0.34710 0.042857 0.38996 0.129986 
40.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0011070 0.04428 0.011429 0.05571 0.139271 
25.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.04168 0.020833 0.06251 0.250033 
85.0 5.0 0.003000 0.0042500 0.36125 0.051000 0.41225 0.485000 
100.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0007750 0.07750 0.020000 0.09750 0.097500 
280.0 6.0 0.004250 * * 0.198333 
85.0 2.0 0.001875 0.0006250 0.05312 0.079685 0.13281 0.156247 
100.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0011250 0.11250 0.040000 0.15250 0.152500 
30.0 3.0 0.002500 * * 0.025000 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0009380 0.04690 0.010000 0.05690 0.113800 
250.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0007750 0.19375 0.075000 0.26875 0.107500 
13.0 5.0 * 0.0021250 0.02763 
72.5 5.0 0.001250 * * 0.018124 
70.0 5.0 0.001875 * * 0.026250 
45.0 5.0 0.001875 * * 0.016876 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0006500 0.06500 0.030000 0.09500 0.095000 
250.0 10.0 0.001375 0.0006630 0.16575 0.034375 0.20012 0.080050 
145.0 8.0 0.002500 0.0009750 0.14137 0.045313 0.18669 0.128750 
50.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0011000 0.05500 0.018750 0.07375 0.147500 
100.0 10.0 0.001500 0.0011250 0.11250 0.015000 0.12750 0.127500 
500.0 1.0 0.001500 0.0007750 0.38750 0.750000 1.13750 0.227500 
150.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0020000 0.30000 0.150000 0.45000 0.300000 
110.0 5.0 0.001500 * * 0.033000 
* * 0.001250 
60.0 3.0 0.004000 0.0020000 0.12000 0.080000 0.20000 0.333333 
450.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0007070 0.31815 0.225000 0.54315 0.120700 
100.0 8.0 0.002000 0.0014070 0.14070 0.025000 0.16570 0.165700 
200.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0006820 0.13640 0.050000 0.18640 0.093200 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 * * 0.030000 
75.0 6.0 0.001250 0.0011250 0.08437 0.015625 0.10000 0.133333 
30.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0014580 0.04374 0.012500 0.05624 0.187467 
25.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.04168 0.020833 0.06251 0.250033 
75.0 4.0 0.005000 0.0009500 0.07125 0.093750 0.16500 0.220000 
100.0 1.0 0.002500 * * 0.250000 
100.0 3.0 0.002000 0.0011700 0.11700 0.066667 0.18367 0.183667 
75.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0013300 0.09975 0.030000 0.12975 0.173000 
36.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0011430 0.04115 0.009000 0.05015 0.139300 
40.0 6.0 0.001500 * * 0.010000 
300.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0007440 0.22320 0.107143 0.33034 0.110114 
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Mm arg x 
U cost x assets Total 
Exposure Yrs M Marg U cost exposure /years volume ROX 
$X$$$ 
45.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0007250 0.03263 0.015750 0.04838 0.107500 
45.0 5.0 0.004000 0.0026250 0.11812 0.036000 0.15413 0.342500 
185.0 7.0 0.001875 0.0011070 0.20480 0.049553 0.25435 0.137485 
30.0 10.0 0.003000 **0.009000 
500.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0014000 0.70000 0.225000 0.92500 0.185000 
400.0 4.0 0.003500 **0.350000 
100.0 5.0 0.003250 0.001 9250 0.19250 0.065000 0.25750 0.257500 
100.0 7.0 0.003250 0.0014820 0.14820 0.046429 0.19463 0.194629 
125.0 11.0 0.001750 0.0023410 0.29262 0.019886 0.31251 0.250009 
125.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0008500 0.10625 0.037500 0.14375 0.115000 
150.0 7.0 0.002370 **0.050786 
60.0 3.0 0.003750 0.0020000 0.12000 0.075000 0.19500 0.325000 
75.0 2.5 0.008500 0.0065000 0.48750 0.255000 0.74250 0.990000 
200.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0011500 0.23000 0.100000 0.33000 0.165000 
30.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0013930 0.04179 0.007500 0.04929 0.164300 
150.0 5.0 0.000625 0.0009050 0.13575 0.018750 0.15450 0.103000 
25.0 30.0 0.003000 0.0012500 0.03125 0.002500 0.03375 0.135000 
320.0 5.0 0.000500 **0.032000 
110.0 5,0 0.001500 0.0008000 0.08800 0.033000 0.12100 0.110000 
75.0 7.0 0.002000 **0.021429 
45.0 2,0 0.001875 0.0006250 0.02812 0.042190 0.07032 0.156256 
200.0 6.0 0.003450 0.0008880 0.17760 0.115000 0.29260 0.146300 
350.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0012750 0.44625 0.245000 0.69125 0.197500 
160.0 5.0 0.004500 0.0016700 0.26720 0.144000 0.41120 0.257000 
120.0 8.0 0.002750 0.0012500 0.15000 0.041250 0.19125 0.159375 
125.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0010800 0.13500 0.043750 0.17875 0.143000 
75.0 10.0 0.003000 0.0015750 0.11812 0.022500 0.14063 0.187500 
185.0 5.0 0.002000 **0.0 74000 
* 5.0 0.001200 
75.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0012000 0.09000 0.022500 0.11250 0.150000 
* 7.0 0.001250 0.0013210 
375.0 5.0 0.004000 **0.300000 
150.0 5.0 0.001750 **0.052500 
35.0 510 0.002000 0.0013750 0.04812 0.014000 0.06213 0.177500 
100.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0012000 0.12000 0.045000 0.16500 0.165000 
350.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.175000 
250.0 5.0 0.001875 **0.093750 
60.0 3.0 * 0.0011670 0.07002 
75.0 7.0 0.001000 0.0008930 0.06697 0.010714 0.07769 0.103586 
50.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0012000 0.06000 0.025000 0.08500 0.170000 
300.0 8.0 0.001500 0.0010660 0.31980 0.056250 0.37605 0.125350 
* 7.0 0.005000 0.0011270 **** 
100.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0009580 0.09580 0.083333 0.17913 0.179133 
125.0 5.0 0.010000 **0.250000 
300.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0011070 0.33210 0.064286 0.39639 0.132129 
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U cost x assets Total 
Exposure Yrs M Marg U cost exposure /years volume ROX 
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130.0 8.0 0.001125 0.0007000 0.09100 0.018281 0.10928 0.084062 
200.0 7.0 0.000800 0.0004640 0.09280 0.022857 0.11566 0.057829 
100.0 10.0 0.001000 * * 0.010000 
* 5.0 0.001250 0.0006060 
105.0 5.0 0.000563 0.0007750 0.08138 0.011822 0.09320 0.088759 
140.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0014370 0.20118 0.087500 0.28868 0.206200 
127.0 8.0 0.001750 0.0007030 0.08928 0.027781 0.11706 0.092175 
142.0 5.0 0.001500 * * 0.042600 
* 5.0 0.002000 0.0013000 
200.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0011250 0.22500 0.100000 0.32500 0.162500 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0011250 0.11250 0.050000 0.16250 0.162500 
200.0 7.0 0.002250 0.0008570 0.17140 0.064286 0.23569 0.117843 
50.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0008250 0.04125 0.020000 0.06125 0.122500 
40.0 3.0 0.002250 * * 0.030000 * * 
38.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0015000 0.05700 0.019000 0.07600 0.200000 
50.0 10.0 0.001000 0.0005875 0.02937 0.005000 0.03438 0.068750 
125.0 5.0 0.001500 * * 0.03 7500 
35.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0011750 0.04112 0.010500 0.05162 0.147500 
105.0 3.0 0.001500 0.0006190 0.06499 0.052500 0.11750 0.111900 
250.0 7.0 0.005000 * * 0.178571 
170.0 7.0 0.005000 * * 0.121429 
355.0 7.0 0.001250 * * 0.063393 
57.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0010800 0.06156 0.017100 0.07866 0.138000 
70.0 5.0 0.001500 * * 0.021000 
100.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0014000 0.14000 0.035000 0.17500 0.175000 
150.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0020750 0.31125 0.075000 0.38625 0.257500 
250.0 2.0 0.001500 0.0008750 0.21875 0.187500 0.40625 0.162500 
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U cost xM marg x Total 
Exposure Yrs M marg U cost exposure assets/4 volume ROX 
$$$$ 
80.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0010000 0.08000 0.02500 0.10500 0.131250 
50.0 15.0 0.001000 0.0007920 0.03960 0.01250 0,05210 0.104198 
125.0 3.0 0.002000 0.0006670 0.08337 0.06250 0.14587 0.116696 
100.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0024000 0.24000 0.03125 0.27125 0.271250 
250.010.0 
200.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0008750 0.17500 0.05000 0.22500 0.112500 
80.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0012500 0.10000 0.05000 0.15000 0.187500 
250.0 8.0 0.003750 0.0025780 0.64450 0.23438 0.87888 0.351550 
500.0 5.0 * 0.0006250 0.31250 
100.0 5.0 0.000800 0.0007250 0.07250 0.02000 0.09250 0.092500 
300.0 10.0 0.003250 0.0010000 0.30000 0.24375 0.54375 0.181250 
125.0 7.0 0.002000 **0.06250 
45.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0030000 0.13500 0.03937 0.17438 0.387500 
200.0 8.0 0.000500 0.0008500 0.17000 0.02500 0.19500 0.097500 
750.0 10.0 0.000800 0.0008000 0.60000 0.15000 0.75000 0.100000 
12.5 5.0 0.001500 0.0006880 0.00860 0.00469 0.01329 0.106300 
400.0 10.0 0.004000 0.0015630 0.62520 0.40000 1.02520 0.256300 
200.0 7.0 0.001500 **0.07500 
500.0 10.0 0.001250 **0.15625 
1500.0 6.0 0.001625 **0.60938 
340.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0008250 0.28050 0.15937 0.43988 0.129375 
500.0 10.0 0.002875 0.0007440 0.37200 0.35937 0.73138 0.146275 
100.0 7.0 0.003250 0.0024290 0.24290 0.08125 0.32415 0.324151 
350.0 10.0 0.001875 0.0010130 0.35455 0.16406 0.51861 0.148175 
100.0 2.0 0.000625 0.0003125 0.03125 0.01562 0.04688 0.046875 
1300.0 8.0 0.004375 0.0008780 1.14140 1.42188 2.56328 0.197175 
85.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0008250 0.07012 0.04781 0.11793 0.138744 
700.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0006000 0.42000 0.35000 0.77000 0.110000 
400.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0006630 0.26520 0.20000 0.46520 0.116300 
350.0 10.0 0.001250 **0.10937 
200.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0015000 0.30000 0.12500 0.42500 0.212500 
100.0 5.0 0.001125 0.0006250 0.06250 0.02813 0.09063 0.090625 
2000.0 8.5 0.001750 0.0005980 1.19600 0.87500 2.07100 0.103550 
500.0 10.0 0.001750 0.0010750 0.53750 0.21875 0.75625 0.151250 
75.0 7.0 0.002250 0.0010710 0.08032 0.04219 0.12251 0.163343 
70.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.01750 
500.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0013930 0.69650 0.31250 1.00900 0.201800 
1000.0 5.5 0.002250 0.0008070 0.80700 0.56250 1.36950 0.136950 
75.0 7.0 0.002500 **0.04688 
40.0 7.0 0.002000 **0.02000 
100.0 5.5 0.000625 0.0006140 0.06140 0.01563 0.07703 0.077026 
100.0 5.0 0.001125 0.0005880 0.05880 0.02813 0.08692 0.086925 
350.0 8.0 0.001875 0.00061 60 0.21560 0.16406 0.37966 0.108475 
500.0 8.0 0.001000 0.0005440 0.27200 0.12500 0.39700 0.079400 
300.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0008860 0.26580 0.11250 0.37830 0.126100 
45.0 5.0 0.010000 **0.11250 
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U cost xM marg x Total 
Exposure Yrs M marg U cost exposure assets/4 volume ROX 
60.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0007750 0.04650 0.03750 0.08400 0.140000 
80.0 4.5 0.004000 **0.08000 
30.0 2.0 0.000625 **0.00469 
300.0 10.0 0.001000 0.0004930 0.14790 0.07500 0.22290 0.074300 
400.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0005000 0.20000 0.12500 0.32500 0.081250 
150.0 7.0 0.001100 0.0005890 0.08835 0.04125 0.12960 0.086399 
200.0 10.0 0.001000 0.0005500 0.11000 0.05000 0.16000 0.080000 
315.0 6.0 0.001250 0.0003420 0.10773 0.09844 0.20617 0.065450 
75.0 7.0 0.004000 **0.07500 
50.0 7.0 0.001875 **0.02344 
20.0 5.0 0.003750 0.0015500 0.03100 0.01875 0.04975 0.248750 
75.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0014170 0.10627 0.02344 0.12971 0.172943 
65.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0012000 0.07800 0.02031 0.09831 0.151250 
100.0 2.0 0.001250 0.0006250 0.06250 0.03125 0.09375 0.093750 
100.0 2.0 0.001250 **0.03125 
25.0 7.0 0.001875 **0.01172 
100.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0014290 0.14290 0.03750 0.18040 0.180401 
50.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0008250 0.04125 0.01875 0.06000 0.120000 
150.0 2.0 0.001250 **0.04688 
75.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0007130 0.05347 0.01875 0.07222 0.096293 
25.0 5.0 0.001250 **0.00781 
100.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007750 0.07750 0.04688 0.12438 0.124375 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.06250 
40.0 3.0 0.002000 **0.02000 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0007750 0.03875 0.01250 0.05125 0.102500 
20.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0023960 0.04792 0.01500 0.06292 0.314600 
35.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0022920 0.08022 0.02188 0.10210 0.291701 
100.0 5.0 * 0.0014750 0.14750 
30.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0015500 0.04650 0.00750 0.05400 0.180000 
100.0 5.0 0.002750 0.0014250 0.14250 0.06875 0.21125 0.211250 
50.0 2.0 0.000625 **0.00781 
50.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0026050 0.13025 0.03125 0.16150 0.323001 
60.0 4.0 * 0.0015630 0.09378 
30.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0015000 0.04500 0.01125 0.05625 0.187500 
40.0 3.0 0.000625 0.0011700 0.04680 0.00625 0.05305 0.132624 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.01250 
50.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0010750 0.05375 0.03125 0.08500 0.170000 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.01250 
20.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.01250 
50.0 3.0 0.000625 **0.00781 
60.0 3.0 0.002250 **0.03375 
150.0 6.0 0.001875 0.0013130 0.19695 0.07031 0.26726 0.178175 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0013750 0.13750 0.06250 0.20000 0.200000 
300.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0007500 0.22500 0.11250 0.33750 0.112500 
50.0 3.0 0.002250 0.0018330 0.09165 0.02813 0.11978 0.239550 
155.0 5.0 0.003375 **0.13078 
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30.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0024080 0.07224 0.01875 0.09099 0.303300 
50.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0006430 0.03215 0.03125 0.06340 0.126800 
* 3.0 0.002 500 
15.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0015830 0.02374 0.00938 0.03311 0.220767 
30.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0015750 0.04725 0.00750 0.05475 0.182500 
100.0 4.0 0.002000 0.0013750 0.13750 0.05000 0.18750 0.187500 
35.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0012500 0.04375 0.01531 0.05906 0.168750 
100.0 5.0 0.000750 0.0012500 0.12500 0.01875 0.14375 0.143750 
100.0 2.0 0.000625 **0.01562 
100.0 5.0 0.000750 0.0008350 0.08350 0.01875 0.10225 0.102250 
25.0 1.0 0.007500 **0.04688 
100.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0017850 0.17850 0.04375 0.22225 0.222250 
200.0 3.0 0.001500 0.0018330 0.36660 0.07500 0.44160 0.220800 
40.0 3.0 0.001000 0.0016000 0.06400 0.01000 0.07400 0.184999 
100.0 5.0 0.000400 0.0003125 0.03125 0.01000 0.04125 0.041250 
35.0 5.0 0.001500 **0.01312 
25.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0012000 0.03000 0.01562 0.04563 0.182500 
100.0 5.0 0.003000 0.0012750 0.12750 0.07500 0.20250 0.202500 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.06250 
30.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.00750 
325.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.08125 
25.0 7.0 0.000500 0.0014290 0.03573 0.00313 0.03886 0.155422 
13.0 6.0 0.001875 **0.00609 
80.0 3.0 0.002500 **0.05000 
400.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0010000 0.40000 0.12500 0.52500 0.131250 
50.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0009380 0.04690 0.03125 0.07815 0.156301 
400.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0022680 0.90720 0.15000 1.05720 0.264300 
75.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0013750 0.10312 0.03750 0.14062 0.187493 
75.0 7.0 0.003250 0.0011430 0.08572 0.06094 0.14666 0.195542 
22.0 3.0 0.003000 **0.01650 
50.0 7.0 0.001000 **0.01250 
50.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0013930 0.06965 0.02500 0.09465 0.189301 
150.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007250 0.10875 0.07031 0.17906 0.119375 
75.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0009500 0.07125 0.03516 0.10641 0.141877 
100.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0013330 0.13330 0.03125 0.16455 0.164550 
70.0 2.0 0.001250 **0.02187 
45.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0015000 0.06750 0.01406 0.08156 0.181250 
125.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0025000 0.31250 0.07812 0.39062 0.312500 
50.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0017190 0.08595 0.03125 0.11720 0.234400 
155.0 2.0 0.003750 **0.14531 
50.0 3.0 0.002500 **0.03125 
75.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007500 0.05625 0.03516 0.09141 0.121877 
65.0 7.0 0.001875 0.0006960 0.04524 0.03047 0.07571 0.116473 
150.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0014500 0.21750 0.05625 0.27375 0.182500 
67.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.04188 
100.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0011790 0.11790 0.06250 0.18040 0.180400 
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U cost xMm arg x Total 
Exposure Yrs M marg U cost exposure assets/4 volume ROX 
$%$$$ 
225.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007500 0.16875 0.10547 0.27422 0.121874 
50.0 8.0 0.001000 **0.01250 
100.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0012000 0.12000 0.02500 0.14500 0.145000 
125.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007125 0.08906 0.05859 0.14765 0.118122 
400.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0007400 0.29600 0.12500 0.42100 0.105250 
450.0 7.0 0.003000 0.0011250 0.50625 0.33750 0.84375 0.187500 
200.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0015000 0.30000 0.17500 0.47500 0.237500 
25.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0031000 0.07750 0.01250 0.09000 0.360000 
1200.0 3.0 0.002000 0.0014000 1.68000 0.60000 2.28000 0.190000 
150.0 5.0 0.001725 0.0013250 0.19875 0.06469 0.26344 0.175625 
150.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0013930 0.20895 0.07500 0.28395 0.189300 
30.0 3.0 0.001875 0.0010420 0.03126 0.01406 0.04532 0.151075 
62.5 5.0 0.002500 0.0008500 0.05313 0.03906 0.09219 0.147508 
60.0 3.0 
85.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0012500 0.10625 0.05312 0.15937 0.187500 
100.0 5.0 0.002200 0.0009750 0.09750 0.05500 0.15250 0.152500 
150.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0005630 0.08445 0.05625 0.14070 0.093800 
50.0 10.0 0.001563 0.0010260 0.05130 0.01954 0.07084 0.141675 
100.0 7.0 0.001250 0.0014820 0.14820 0.03125 0.17945 0.179450 
75.0 7.0 0.001000 0.0009640 0.07230 0.01875 0.09105 0.121399 
125.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007250 0.09062 0.05859 0.14921 0.119370 
62.5 5.0 0.001500 0.0009000 0.05625 0.02344 0.07969 0.127500 
500.0 7.0 0.001250 0.0005200 0.26000 0.15625 0.41625 0.083250 
150.0 7.0 0.003750 0.0013320 0.19980 0.14062 0.34042 0.226950 
400.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0013750 0.55000 0.10000 0.65000 0.162500 
1300.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0019750 2.56750 0.73125 3.29875 0.253750 
360.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0010000 0.36000 0.18000 0.54000 0.150000 
50.0 5.0 0.002000 **0.02500 
200.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0008650 0.17300 0.09375 0.26675 0.133375 
50.0 3.0 0.001250 **0.01562 
25.0 5.5 0.002000 0.0008180 0.02045 0.01250 0.03295 0.131801 
200.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0011250 0.22500 0.06250 0.28750 0.143750 
200.0 5.0 0.001375 **0.06875 
200.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0010800 0.21600 0.08750 0.30350 0.151750 
56.0 3.0 0.002500 **0.03500 
75.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0009510 0.07133 0.01875 0.09008 0.120107 
170.0 3.0 0.0012 50 0.0009000 0.15300 0.05312 0.20612 0.1212 50 
87.5 2.5 0.003000 **0.06562 
300.0 3.0 0.001500 0.0012080 0.36240 0.11250 0.47490 0.158300 
130.0 8.0 0.003750 **0.12188 
175.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0011650 0.20388 0.08750 0.29138 0.166503 
125.0 4.0 0.005000 **0.15625 
220.0 5.0 0.002750 **0.15125 
50.0 3.0 0.003250 **0.04063 
90.0 7.0 0.001000 **0.02250 
300.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0018570 0.55710 0.18750 0.74460 0,248200 
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Appendix 8.2 ROX data and results for scenario 4 
U cost xM marg x Total 
Exposure Yrs M urarg U cost exposure assets/4 volume ROX 
$$$$ ý6 
35.0 3.0 0.004500 * * 0.03937 
37.5 7.0 0.002500 0.0011430 0.04286 0.02344 0.06630 0.176794 
45.0 3.0 0.002500 * * 0.02813 
55.0 4.0 0.001000 0.0014500 0.07975 0.01375 0.09350 0.170000 
125.0 5.0 0.001875 0.00082 50 0.10312 0.05859 0.16171 0.12 93 70 
400.0 5.0 0.002500 * * 0.25000 
200.0 5.0 0.002500 * * 0.12500 
300.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0014100 0.42300 0.26250 0.68550 0.228500 
150.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0014250 0.21375 0.06562 0.27938 0.186250 
630.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0007780 0.49014 0.39375 0.88389 0.140300 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 * * 0.06250 
100.0 3.0 0.005500 * * 0.13750 
97.5 8.5 0.007500 * * 0.18281 
20.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.03334 0.01250 0.04584 0.229201 
60.0 2.0 0.001000 0.0014690 0.08814 0.01500 0.10314 0.171900 
200.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0012125 0.24250 0.10000 0.34250 0.171250 
195.0 7.0 0.002750 0.0013750 0.26812 0.13406 0.40218 0.206247 
100.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0008000 0.08000 0.04375 0.12375 0.123750 
150.0 8.0 0.003750 * * 0.14063 
400.0 4.0 0.003500 * * 0.35000 
60.0 5.0 0.003250 0.0014380 0.08628 0.04875 0.13503 0.225050 
50.0 1.0 0.002000 * * 0.02500 
50.0 2.0 0.001250 * * 0.01562 
100.0 7.0 0.001500 * * 0.03750 
50.0 5.0 0.001563 * * 0.01954 
22.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0011000 0.02420 0.01100 0.03520 0.160000 
75.0 5.0 0.002000 * * 0.03750 
125.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0012500 0.15625 0.03906 0.19531 0.156250 
125.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0010210 0.12763 0.09375 0.22138 0.177104 
200.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0011500 0.23000 0.10000 0.33000 0.165000 
65.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0010050 0.06532 0.04062 0.10594 0.162992 
300.0 7.0 0.002750 * * 0.20625 
110.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0008930 0.09823 0.00875 0.16698 0.151800 
60.0 5.0 0.002500 * * 0.03750 
38.0 6.0 0.001875 0.0014170 0.05385 0.01781 0.07166 0.188586 
75.0 8.5 0.005500 0.0020070 0.15052 0.10312 0.25364 0.338192 
140.0 5.0 0,002000 0.0013700 0.19180 0.07000 0.26180 0.187000 
65.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007950 0.05167 0.03047 0.08214 0.126365 
110.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0016070 0.17677 0.06875 0.24552 0.223200 
75.0 5.0 0.003000 * * 0.05625 
60.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0010250 0.06150 0.02250 0.08400 0.140000 
700.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0011030 0.77210 0.21875 0.99085 0.141550 
320.0 7.0 0.003500 0.0023570 0.75424 0.28000 1.03424 0.323200 
50.0 7.0 0.001250 0.0006960 0.03480 0.01563 0.05043 0.100851 
* 3.0 0.002500 0.0012500 * * * * 
* 8.0 0.001875 0.0014060 * * * 
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U cost xM marg x Total 
Exposure Yrs M marg U cost exposure assets/4 volume ROX 
$Y$$$ 
100.0 3.0 0.002500 **0.06250 
100.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0014170 0.14170 0.03125 0.17295 0.172950 
70.0 5.0 0.003000 0.0016000 0.11200 0.05250 0.16450 0.235000 
30.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0023750 0.07125 0.02625 0.09750 0.325000 
100.0 10.0 0.001875 0.0008750 0.08750 0.04688 0.13438 0.134375 
50.0 5.0 0.003750 0.0014000 0.07000 0.04688 0.11688 0.233750 
22.0 5.0 0.003750 0.0025000 0.05500 0.02063 0.07503 0.343750 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 **0.03750 
100.0 5.0 0.002 000 0.00142 50 0.14250 0.05000 0.19250 0.192 500 
50.0 5.0 0.003500 **0.04375 
400.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0011700 0.46800 0.12500 0.59300 0.148250 
220.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0012000 0.26400 0.12375 0.38775 0.176250 
350.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0009380 0.32830 0.21875 0.54705 0.156300 
75.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0012000 0.09000 0.02813 0.11813 0.157500 
70.0 2.0 0.000625 **0.01094 
30.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0012670 0.03801 0.00938 0.04739 0.157950 
50.0 3.0 0.001000 0.0008330 0.04165 0.01250 0.05415 0.108300 
175.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0013750 0.24062 0.05469 0.29531 0.168747 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 **0.03750 
125.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.03125 
105.0 8.0 0.001750 0.0010310 0.10826 0.04594 0.15420 0.146855 
20.0 4.0 0.001500 **0.00750 
225.0 4.0 0.001500 0.0008910 0.20047 0.08438 0.28484 0.126598 
100.0 5.0 0.001750 **0.04375 
70.0 5.0 0.002 500 0.0015000 0.10500 0.04375 0.14875 0.212 500 
30.0 5.0 0.000875 **0.00656 
1000.0 3.0 0.0022 50 0.0014580 1.45800 0.56250 2.02050 0.202 050 
140.0 8.0 0.000750 0.0040310 0.56434 0.02625 0.59059 0.421850 
100.0 3.0 0.002625 0.0017500 0.17500 0.06562 0.24062 0.240625 
50.0 3.0 0.001250 **0.01562 
100.0 3.0 0.001200 **0.03000 
70.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0009560 0.06692 0.03500 0.10192 0.145600 
25.0 3.0 0.006250 0.0022920 0.05730 0.03906 0.09636 0.385449 
300.0 5.0 0.002000 **0.15000 
200.0 5.0 0.002000 **0.10000 
70.0 3.0 0.002000 **0.03500 
60.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0011000 0.06600 0.02625 0.09225 0.153 750 
18.0 3.0 0.000563 **0.00253 
25.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.04168 0.01562 0.05730 0.229219 
110.0 7.0 0.001500 **0.04125 
25.0 2.0 0.001250 **0.00781 
143.0 10.0 0.001875 0.0007710 0.11025 0.06703 0.17728 0.123972 
43.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0016670 0.07168 0.03225 0.10393 0.241698 
100.0 1.0 0.003500 **0.08750 
100.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0013250 0.13250 0.06250 0.19500 0.195000 
45.0 12.0 0.001000 **0.01125 
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U cost xM marg x Total 
Exposure Yrs M urarg U cost exposure assets/4 volume ROX 
300.0 14.0 0.002000 0.0011570 0.34710 0.15000 0.49710 0.165700 
40.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0011070 0.04428 0.02000 0.06428 0.160702 
25.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.04168 0.01562 0.05730 0.229219 
85.0 5.0 0.003 000 0.0042 500 0.36125 0.06375 0.42500 0.500000 
100.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0007750 0.07750 0.02500 0.10250 0.102500 
280.0 6.0 0.004250 **0.29750 
85.0 2.0 0.001875 0.00062 50 0.05312 0.03984 0.09296 0.1093 68 
100.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0011250 0.11250 0.05000 0.16250 0.162500 
30.0 3.0 0.002500 **0.01875 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0009380 0.04690 0.01250 0.05940 0.118800 
250.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0007750 0.19375 0.09375 0.28750 0.115000 
13.0 5.0 * 0.0021250 0.02763 
72.5 5.0 0.001250 **0.02265 
70.0 5.0 0.001875 **0.03281 
45.0 5.0 0.001875 **0.02110 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0006500 0.06500 0.03750 0.10250 0.102500 
250.0 10.0 0.001375 0.0006630 0.16575 0.08594 0.25169 0.100675 
145.0 8.0 0.002500 0.0009750 0.14137 0.09063 0.23200 0.159997 
50.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0011000 0.05500 0.02344 0.07844 0.156875 
100.0 10.0 0.001500 0.0011250 0.11250 0.03750 0.15000 0.150000 
500.0 1.0 0.001500 0.0007750 0.38750 0.18750 0.57500 0.115000 
150.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0020000 0.30000 0.11250 0.41250 0.275000 
110.0 5.0 0.001500 **0.04125 
**0.001250 
60.0 3.0 0.004000 0.0020000 0.12000 0.06000 0.18000 0.300000 
450.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0007070 0.31815 0.28125 0.59940 0.133200 
100.0 8.0 0.002000 0.0014070 0.14070 0.05000 0.19070 0.190700 
200.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0006820 0.13640 0.08750 0.22390 0.111950 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 **0.03750 
75.0 6.0 0.001250 0.0011250 0.08437 0.02344 0.10781 0.143743 
30.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0014580 0.04374 0.00938 0.05312 0.177050 
25.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.04168 0.01562 0.05730 0.229219 
75.0 4.0 0.005000 0.0009500 0.07125 0.09375 0.16500 0.220000 
100.0 1.0 0.002500 **0.06250 
100.0 3.0 0.002000 0.0011700 0.11700 0.05000 0.16700 0.167000 
75.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0013300 0.09975 0.03750 0.13725 0.183000 
36.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0011430 0.04115 0.01575 0.05690 0.158056 
40.0 6.0 0.001500 **0.01500 
300.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0007440 0.22320 0.18750 0.41070 0.136900 
45.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0007250 0.03263 0.01969 0.05232 0.116261 
45.0 5.0 0.004000 0.0026250 0.11812 0.04500 0.16312 0.362489 
185.0 7.0 0.001875 0.0011070 0.20480 0.08672 0.29152 0.157577 
30.0 10.0 0.003000 **0.02250 
500.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0014000 0.70000 0.28125 0.98125 0.196250 
400.0 4.0 0.003500 **0.35000 
100.0 5.0 0.003250 0.0019250 0.19250 0.08125 0.27375 0.273750 
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U cost xM marg x Total 
Exposure Yrs M marg U cost exposure assets/4 volume ROX 
$%$$$ 
100.0 7.0 0.003250 0.0014820 0.14820 0.08125 0.22945 0.229451 
125.0 11.0 0.001750 0.0023410 0.29262 0.05469 0.34731 0.277845 
125.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0008500 0.10625 0.04688 0.15313 0.122500 
150.0 7.0 0.002370 **0.08888 
60.0 3.0 0.003750 0.0020000 0.12000 0.05625 0.17625 0.293750 
75.0 2.5 0.008500 0.0065000 0.48750 0.15937 0.64688 0.862500 
200.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0011500 0.23000 0.12500 0.35500 0.177500 
30.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0013930 0.04179 0.01312 0.05491 0.183050 
150.0 5.0 0.000625 0.0009050 0.13575 0.02344 0.15919 0.106125 
25.0 30.0 0.003000 0.0012500 0.03125 0.01875 0.05000 0.200000 
320.0 5.0 0.000500 **0.04000 
110.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0008000 0.08800 0.04125 0.12925 0.117500 
75.0 7.0 0.002000 **0.03750 
45.0 2.0 0.001875 0.0006250 0.02812 0.02110 0.04922 0.109367 
200.0 6.0 0.003450 0.0008880 0.17760 0.17250 0.35010 0.175050 
350.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0012750 0.44625 0.30625 0.75250 0.215000 
160.0 5.0 0.004500 0.0016700 0.26720 0.18000 0.44720 0.279500 
120.0 8.0 0.002750 0.0012500 0.15000 0.08250 0.23250 0.193750 
125.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0010800 0.13500 0.05469 0.18969 0.151750 
75.0 10.0 0.003000 0.0015750 0.11812 0.05625 0.17437 0.232493 
185.0 5.0 0.002000 **0.09250 
* 5.0 0.001200 
75.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0012000 0.09000 0.02813 0.11813 0.157500 
* 7.0 0.001250 0.0013210 
375.0 5.0 0.004000 **0.37500 
150.0 5.0 0.001750 **0.06562 
35.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0013750 0.04812 0.01750 0.06562 0.187486 
100.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0012000 0.12000 0.05625 0.17625 0.176250 
350.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.21875 
250.0 5.0 0.001875 **0.11719 
60.0 3.0 * 0.0011670 0.07002 
75.0 7.0 0.001000 0.0008930 0.06697 0.01875 0.08572 0.114293 
50.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0012000 0.06000 0.03125 0.09125 0.182500 
300.0 8.0 0.001500 0.0010660 0.31980 0.11250 0.43230 0.144100 
* 7.0 0.005000 0.0011270 
100.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0009580 0.09580 0.06250 0.15830 0.158300 
125.0 5.0 0.010000 **0.31250 
300.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0011070 0.33210 0.11250 0.44460 0.148200 
130.0 8.0 0.001125 0.0007000 0.09100 0.03656 0.12756 0.098125 
200.0 7.0 0.000800 0.0004640 0.09280 0.04000 0.13280 0.066400 
100.0 10.0 0.001000 **0.02500 
* 5.0 0.001250 0.0006060 
105.0 5.0 0.000563 0.0007750 0.08138 0.01478 0.09616 0.091579 
140.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0014370 0.20118 0.08750 0.28868 0.206200 
127.0 8.0 0.001750 0.0007030 0.08928 0.05556 0.14484 0.114049 
142.0 5.0 0.001500 **0.05325 
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U cost xM marg x Total 
Exposure Yrs M marg U cost exposure assets/4 volume ROX 
$$$$ 
* 5.0 0.002000 0.0013000 
200.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0011250 0.22500 0.12500 0.35000 0.175000 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0011250 0.11250 0.06250 0.17500 0.175000 
200.0 7.0 0.002250 0.0008570 0.17140 0.11250 0.28390 0.141950 
50.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0008250 0.04125 0.02500 0.06625 0.132500 
40.0 3.0 0.002250 **0.02250 
38.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0015000 0.05700 0.02375 0.08075 0.212500 
50.0 10.0 0.001000 0.0005875 0.02937 0.01250 0.04187 0.083740 
125.0 5.0 0.001500 **0.04688 
35.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0011750 0.04112 0.01312 0.05424 0.154986 
105.0 3.0 0.001500 0.0006190 0.06499 0.03937 0.10436 0.0993 95 
250.0 7.0 0.005000 **0.31250 
170.0 7.0 0.005000 **0.21250 
355.0 7.0 0.001250 **0.11094 
57.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0010800 0.06156 0.02138 0.08294 0.145500 
70.0 5.0 0.001500 **0.02625 
100.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0014000 0.14000 0.04375 0.18375 0.183 750 
150.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0020750 0.31125 0.09375 0.40500 0.270000 
250.0 2.0 0.001500 0.0008750 0.21875 0.09375 0.31250 0.125000 
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Appendix 8.3 ROX data and results for scenario 5 
U cost xM marg Total 
Exposure Yrs M marg U cost exposure x assets volume ROX 
/8 
80.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0010000 0.08000 0.012500 0.09250 0.115625 
50.0 15.0 0.001000 0.0007920 0.03960 0.006250 0.04585 0.091700 
125.0 3.0 0.002000 0.0006670 0.08337 0.031250 0.11462 0.091696 
100.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0024000 0.24000 0.015625 0.25563 0.255625 
250.010.0 
200.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0008750 0.17500 0.025000 0.20000 0.100000 
80.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0012500 0.10000 0.025000 0.12500 0.156250 
250.0 8.0 0.003750 0.0025780 0.64450 0.117190 0.76169 0.304676 
500.0 5.0 * 0.0006250 0.31250 
100.0 5.0 0.000800 0.0007250 0.07250 0.010000 0.08250 0.082500 
300.0 10.0 0.003250 0.0010000 0.30000 0.121875 0.42188 0.140625 
125.0 7.0 0.002000 **0.031250 
45.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0030000 0.13500 0.019685 0.15469 0.343 744 
200.0 8.0 0.000500 0.0008500 0.17000 0.012500 0.18250 0.091250 
750.0 10.0 0.000800 0.0008000 0.60000 0,075000 0.67500 0.090000 
12.5 5.0 0.001500 0.0006880 0.00860 0.002345 0.01095 0.087560 
400.0 10.0 0.004000 0.0015630 0.62520 0.200000 0.82520 0.206300 
200.0 7.0 0.001500 **0.037500 
500.0 10.0 0.001250 **0.078125 
1500.0 6.0 0.001625 **0.304690 
340.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0008250 0.28050 0.079685 0.36018 0.105937 
500.0 10.0 0.002875 0.0007440 0.37200 0.179685 0.55169 0.110337 
100.0 7.0 0.003250 0.0024290 0.24290 0.040625 0.28352 0.283525 
350.0 10.0 0.001875 0.0010130 0.35455 0.082030 0.43658 0.124737 
100.0 2.0 0.000625 0.0003125 0.03125 0.007810 0.03906 0.039060 
1300.0 8.0 0.004375 0.0008780 1.14140 0.710940 1.85234 0.142488 
85.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0008250 0.07012 0.023905 0.09403 0.110618 
700.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0006000 0.42000 0.175000 0.59500 0.085000 
400.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0006630 0.26520 0.100000 0.36520 0.091300 
350.0 10.0 0.001250 **0.054685 
200.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0015000 0.30000 0.062500 0.36250 0.181250 
100.0 5.0 0.001125 0.0006250 0.06250 0.014065 0.07656 0.076565 
2000.0 8.5 0.001750 0.0005980 1.19600 0.437500 1.63350 0.081675 
500.0 10.0 0.001750 0.0010750 0.53750 0.109375 0.64688 0.129375 
75.0 7.0 0.002250 0.0010710 0.08032 0.021095 0.10142 0.135220 
70.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.008750 
500.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0013930 0.69650 0.156250 0.85275 0.170550 
1000.0 5.5 0.002250 0.0008070 0.80700 0.281250 1.08825 0.108825 
75.0 7.0 0.002500 **0.023440 
40.0 7.0 0.002000 **0.010000 
100.0 5.5 0.000625 0.0006140 0.06140 0.007815 0.06921 0.069215 
100.0 5.0 0.001125 0.0005880 0.05880 0.014065 0.07287 0.072865 
350.0 8.0 0.001875 0.0006160 0.21560 0.082030 0.29763 0.085037 
500.0 8.0 0.001000 0.0005440 0.27200 0.062500 0.33450 0.066900 
300.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0008860 0.26580 0.056250 0.32205 0.107350 
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/8 
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45.0 5.0 0.010000 **0.056250 
60.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0007750 0.04650 0.018750 0.06525 0.108750 
80.0 4.5 0.004000 **0.040000 
30.0 2.0 0.000625 **0.002345 
300.0 10.0 0.001000 0.0004930 0.14790 0.037500 0.18540 0.061800 
400.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0005000 0.20000 0.062500 0.26250 0.065625 
150.0 7.0 0.001100 0.0005890 0.08835 0.020625 0.10898 0.072650 
200.0 10.0 0.001000 0.0005500 0.11000 0.025000 0.13500 0.067500 
315.0 6.0 0.001250 0.0003420 0.10773 0.049220 0.15695 0.049825 
75.0 7.0 0.004000 **0.03 7500 
50.0 7.0 0.001875 **0.011720 
20.0 5.0 0.003750 0.0015500 0.03100 0.0093 75 0.04038 0.201875 
75.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0014170 0.10627 0.011720 0.11799 0.157320 
65.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0012000 0.07800 0.010155 0.08816 0.135623 
100.0 2.0 0.001250 0.0006250 0.06250 0.015625 0.07812 0.078125 
100.0 2.0 0.001250 **0.015625 
25.0 7.0 0.001875 **0.005860 
100.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0014290 0.14290 0.0187 50 0.16165 0.161650 
50.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0008250 0.04125 0.009375 0.05063 0.101250 
150.0 2.0 0.001250 **0.023440 
75.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0007130 0.05347 0.009375 0.06284 0.083793 
25.0 5.0 0.001250 **0.003905 
100.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007750 0.07750 0.023440 0.10094 0.100940 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.0312 50 
40.0 3.0 0.002000 **0.010000 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0007750 0.03875 0.006250 0.04500 0.090000 
20.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0023960 0.04792 0.007500 0.05542 0.277100 
35.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0022920 0.08022 0.010940 0.09116 0.260457 
100.0 5.0 * 0.0014750 0.14750 
30.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0015500 0.04660 0.003750 0.05025 0.167500 
100.0 5.0 0.002750 0.0014250 0.14250 0.034375 0.17687 0.176875 
50.0 2.0 0.000625 **0.003905 
50.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0026050 0.13025 0.015625 0.14588 0.291750 
60.0 4.0 * 0.0015630 0.09378 
30.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0015000 0.04500 0.005625 0.05063 0.168750 
40.0 3.0 0.000625 0.0011700 0.04680 0.003125 0.04992 0.124812 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.006250 
50.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0010750 0.05375 0.015625 0.06938 0.138750 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.006250 
'20.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.0062 50 
50.0 3.0 0.000625 **0.003905 
60.0 3.0 0.002250 **0.016875 
150.0 6.0 0.001875 0.0013130 0.19695 0.035155 0.23211 0.154737 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0013750 0.13750 0.031250 0.16875 0.168750 
300.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0007500 0.22500 0.056250 0.28125 0.093750 
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50.0 3.0 0.002250 0.0018330 0.09165 0.014065 0.10571 0.211430 
155.0 5.0 0.003375 **0.065390 
30.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0024080 0.07224 0.009375 0.08162 0.272050 
50.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0006430 0.03215 0.015625 0.04778 0.095550 
* 3.0 0.002500 
15.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0015830 0.02374 0.004690 0.02843 0.189533 
30.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0015750 0.04725 0.003750 0.05100 0.170000 
100.0 4.0 0.002000 0.0013750 0.13750 0.025000 0.16250 0.162500 
35.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0012500 0.04375 0.007655 0.05140 0.146871 
100.0 5.0 0.000750 0.0012500 0.12500 0.009375 0.13438 0.134375 
100.0 2.0 0.000625 **0.007810 
100.0 5.0 0.000750 0.0008350 0.08350 0.009375 0.09287 0.092875 
25.0 1.0 0.007500 **0.023440 
100.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0017850 0.17850 0.021875 0.20037 0.200375 
200.0 3.0 0.001500 0.0018330 0.36660 0.037500 0.40410 0.202050 
40.0 3.0 0.001000 0.0016000 0.06400 0.005000 0.06900 0.172500 
100.0 5.0 0.000400 0.0003125 0.03125 0.005000 0.03625 0.036250 
35.0 5.0 0.001500 **0.006560 
25.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0012000 0.03000 0.007810 0.03781 0.151240 
100.0 5.0 0.003000 0.0012750 0.12750 0.037500 0.16500 0.165000 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.031250 
30.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.003750 
325.0 5.0 0.001000 **0.040 625 
25.0 7.0 0.000500 0.0014290 0.03573 0.001565 0.03730 0.149180 
13.0 6.0 0.001875 **0.003045 
80.0 3.0 0.002500 **0.02 5000 * 
400.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0010000 0.40000 0.062500 0.46250 0.115625 
50.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0009380 0.04690 0.015625 0.06253 0.125050 
400.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0022680 0.90720 0.075000 0.98220 0.245550 
75.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0013750 0.10312 0.018750 0.12187 0.162493 
75.0 7.0 0.003250 0.0011430 0.08572 0.030470 0.11619 0.154920 
22.0 3.0 0.003000 **0.008250 
50.0 7.0 0.001000 **0.006250 
50.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0013930,0.06965 0.012500 0.08215 0.164300 
150.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007250 0.10875 0.035155 0.14390 0.095937 
75.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0009500 0.07125 0.017580 0.08883 0.118440 
100.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0013330 0.13330 0.015625 0.14893 0.148925 
70.0 2.0 0.001250 **0.010935 
45.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0015000 0.06750 0.007030 0.07453 0.165622 
125.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0025000 0.31250 0.039060 0.35156 0.281248 
50.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0017190 0.08595 0.015625 0.10158 0.203150 
155.0 2.0 0.003750 **0.072655 
50.0 3.0 0.002500 **0.015625 
75.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007500 0.05625 0.017580 0.07383 0.098440 
65.0 7.0 0.001875 0.0006960 0.04524 0.015235 0.06047 0.093038 
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150.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0014500 0.21750 0.028125 0.24563 0.163750 
67.0 5.0 0.002500 * * 0.020940 
100.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0011790 0.11790 0.031250 0.14915 0.149150 
225.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007500 0.16875 0.052735 0.22149 0.098438 
50.0 8.0 0.001000 * * 0.006250 
100.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0012000 0.12000 0.012500 0.13250 0.132500 
125.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007125 0.08906 0.029295 0.11835 0.094684 
400.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0007400 0.29600 0.062500 0.35850 0.089625 
450.0 7.0 0.003000 0.0011250 0.50625 0.168750 0.67500 0.150000 
200.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0015000 0.30000 0.087500 0.38750 0.193750 
25.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0031000 0.07750 0.006250 0.08375 0.335000 
1200.0 3.0 0.002000 0.0014000 1.68000 0.300000 1.98000 0.165000 
150.0 5.0 0.001725 0.0013250 0.19875 0.032345 0.23110 0.154063 
150.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0013930 0.20895 0.037500 0.24645 0.164300 
30.0 3.0 0.001875 0.0010420 0.03126 0.007030 0.03829 0.127633 
62.5 5.0 0.002500 0.0008500 0.05313 0.019530 0.07266 0.116256 
60.0 3.0 
85.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0012500 0.10625 0.026560 0.13281 0.156247 
100.0 5.0 0.002200 0.0009750 0.09750 0.027500 0.12500 0.125000 
150.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0005630 0.08445 0.028125 0.11258 0.075050 
50.0 10.0 0.001563 0.0010260 0.05130 0.009770 0.06107 0.122140 
100.0 7.0 0.001250 0.0014820 0.14820 0.015625 0.16383 0.163825 
75.0 7.0 0.001000 0.0009640 0.07230 0.009375 0.08168 0.108900 
125.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007250 0.09062 0.029295 0.11992 0.095932 
62.5 5.0 0.001500 0.0009000 0.05625 0.011720 0.06797 0.108752 
500.0 7.0 0.001250 0.0005200 0.26000 0.078125 0.33812 0.067625 
150.0 7.0 0.003 750 0.0013320 0.19980 0.0 70310 0.27011 0.1800 73 
400.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0013750 0.55000 0.050000 0.60000 0.150000 
1300.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0019750 2.56750 0.365625 2.93313 0.225625 
360.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0010000 0.36000 0.090000 0.45000 0.125000 
50.0 5.0 0.002000 * * 0.012500 
200.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0008650 0.17300 0.046875 0.21987 0.109937 
50.0 3.0 0.001250 * * 0.007810 
25.0 5.5 0.002000 0.0008180 0.02045 0.006250 0.02670 0.106800 
200.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0011250 0.22500 0.031250 0.25625 0.128125 
200.0 5.0 0.001375 * * 0.034375 
200.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0010800 0.21600 0.043750 0.25975 0.129875 
56.0 3.0 0.002500 * * 0.017500 
75.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0009510 0.07133 0.009375 0.08071 0.107607 
170.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0009000 0.15300 0.026560 0.17956 0.105624 
87.5 2.5 0.003000 * * 0.032810 * * 
300.0 3.0 0.001500 0.0012080 0.36240 0.056250 0.41865 0.139550 
130.0 8.0 0.003750 * * 0.060940 * 
175.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0011650 0.20388 0.043750 0.24763 0.141503 
125.0 4.0 0.005000 * * 0.078125 
3 74 
Appendix 8.3 ROX data and results for scenario 5 
Exposure Yrs M urarg U cost 
$ ýý 
U cost xM marg Total 
exposure x assets volume ROX 
/8 
$$$ 
220.0 5.0 0.002750 **0.075625 
50.0 3.0 0.003250 **0.02 0315 
90.0 7.0 0.001000 **0.011250 
300.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0018570 0.55710 0.093750 0.65085 0.216950 
35.0 3.0 0.004500 **0.019685 
37.5 7.0 0.002500 0.0011430 0.04286 0.011720 0.05458 0.145547 
45.0 3.0 0.002500 **0.014065 
55.0 4.0 0.001000 0.0014500 0.07975 0.006875 0.08663 0.157500 
125.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0008250 0.10312 0.029295 0.13241 0.105932 
400.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.125000 
200.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.062500 
300.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0014100 0.42300 0.131250 0.55425 0.184750 
150.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0014250 0.21375 0.032810 0.24656 0.164373 
630.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0007780 0.49014 0.196875 0.68701 0.109050 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.031250 
100.0 3.0 0.005500 **0.068750 
97.5 8.5 0.007500 **0.091405 
20.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.03334 0.006250 0.03959 0.197950 
60.0 2.0 0.001000 0.0014690 0.08814 0.007500 0.09564 0.159400 
200.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0012125 0.24250 0.050000 0.29250 0.146250 
195.0 7.0 0.002750 0.0013750 0.26812 0.067030 0.33515 0.171872 
100.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0008000 0.08000 0.021875 0.10187 0.101875 
150.0 8.0 0.003750 **0.070315 
400.0 4.0 0.003500 **0.175000 
60.0 5.0 0.003250 0.0014380 0.08628 0.024375 0.11066 0.184425 
50.0 1.0 0.002000 **0.012 500 
50.0 2.0 0.001250 **0.007810 
100.0 7.0 0.001500 **0.018750 
50.0 5.0 0.001563 **0.009770 
22.0 10.0 0.002000 0.0011000 0.02420 0.005500 0.02970 0.135000 
75.0 5.0 0.002000 **0.018750 
125.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0012500 0.15625 0.01 9530 0.17578 0.140624 
125.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0010210 0.12763 0.046875 0.17450 0.139604 
200.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0011500 0.23000 0.050000 0.28000 0.140000 
65.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0010050 0.06532 0.020310 0.08563 0.131738 
300.0 7.0 0.002750 **0.103125 
110.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0008930 0.09823 0.034375 0.13261 0.120550 
60.0 5.0 0.002500 **0.018750 
38.0 6.0 0.001875 0.0014170 0.05385 0.008905 0.06275 0.165145 
75.0 8.5 0.005500 0.0020070 0.15052 0.051560 0.20208 0.269440 
140.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0013 700 0.19180 0.035000 0.22680 0.162000 
65.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0007950 0.05167 0.015235 0.06690 0.102931 
110.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0016070 0.17677 0.034375 0.21114 0.191950 
75.0 5.0 0.003000 **0.028125 ** 
60.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0010250 0.06150 0.011250 0.07275 0.121250 
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700.0 10.0 0.001250 0.0011030 0.77210 0.109375 0.88147 0.125925 
320.0 7.0 0.003500 0.0023570 0.75424 0.140000 0.89424 0.279450 
50.0 7.0 0.001250 0.0006960 0.03480 0.007815 0.04262 0.085230 
* 3.0 0.002500 0.0012500 
* 8.0 0.001875 0.0014060 
100.0 3.0 0.002500 * * 0.031250 
100.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0014170 0.14170 0.015625 0.15732 0.157325 
70.0 5.0 0.003000 0.0016000 0.11200 0.026250 0.13825 0.197500 
30.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0023750 0.07125 0.013125 0.08438 0.281250 
100.0 10.0 0.001875 0.0008750 0.08750 0.023440 0.11094 0.110940 
50.0 5.0 0.003750 0.0014000 0.07000 0.023440 0.09344 0.186880 
22.0 5.0 0.003750 0.0025000 0.05500 0.010315 0.06532 0.296886 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 * * 0.018750 
100.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0014250 0.14250 0.025000 0.16750 0.167500 
50.0 5.0 0.003500 * * 0.021875 
400.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0011700 0.46800 0.062500 0.53050 0.132625 
220.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0012000 0.26400 0.061875 0.32588 0.148125 
350.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0009380 0.32830 0.109375 0.43767 0.125050 
75.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0012000 0.09000 0.014065 0.10407 0.138753 
70.0 2.0 0.000625 * * 0.0054 70 
30.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0012670 0.03801 0.004690 0.04270 0.142333 
50.0 3.0 0.001000 0.0008330 0.04165 0.006250 0.04790 0.095800 
175.0 5.0 0.001250 0.0013750 0.24062 0.027345 0.26796 0.153123 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 * * 0.018750 
125.0 5.0 0.001000 * * 0.015625 
105.0 8.0 0.001750 0.0010310 0.10826 0.022970 0.13123 0.124981 
20.0 4.0 0.001500 * * 0.003750 
225.0 4.0 0.001500 0.0008910 0.20047 0.042190 0.24266 0.107849 
100.0 5.0 0.001750 * * 0.021875 
70.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0015000 0.10500 0.021875 0.12687 0.181250 
30.0 5.0 0.000875 * * 0.003280 
1000.0 3.0 0.002250 0.0014580 1.45800 0.281250 1.73925 0.173925 
140.0 8.0 0.000750 0.0040310 0.56434 0.013125 0.57746 0.412475 
100.0 3.0 0.002625 0.0017500 0.17500 0.032810 0.20781 0.207810 
50.0 3.0 0.001250 * * 0.007810 
100.0 3.0 0.001200 * * 0.015000 
70.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0009560 0.06692 0.017500 0.08442 0.120600 
25.0 3.0 0.006250 0.0022920 0.05730 0.019530 0.07683 0.307320 
300.0 5.0 0.002000 * * 0.075000 
200.0 5.0 0.002000 * * 0.050000 
70.0 3.0 0.002000 * * 0.017500 
60.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0011000 0.06600 0.013125 0.07913 0.131875 
18.0 3.0 0.000563 * * 0.001265 
25.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.04168 0.007810 0.04949 0.197960 
110.0 7.0 0.001500 * * 0.020625 
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25.0 2.0 0.001250 **0.003905 
143.0 10.0 0.001875 0.0007710 0.11025 0.033515 0.14377 0.100535 
43.0 3.0 0.003000 0.0016670 0.07168 0.016125 0.08781 0.204198 
100.0 1.0 0.003500 **0.043750 
100.0 3.0 0.002 500 0.00132 50 0.13250 0.0312 50 0.16375 0.163 750 
45.0 12.0 0.001000 **0.005625 
300.0 14.0 0.002000 0.0011570 0.34710 0.075000 0.42210 0.140700 
40.0 7.0 0.002000 0.0011070 0.04428 0.010000 0.05428 0.135700 
25.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.04168 0.007810 0.04949 0.197960 
85.0 5.0 0.003000 0.0042500 0.36125 0.031875 0.39313 0.462500 
100.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0007750 0.07750 0.012500 0.09000 0.090000 
280.0 6.0 0.004250 *'*0.148750 
85.0 2.0 0.001875 0.0006250 0.05312 0.019920 0.07304 0.085929 
100.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0011250 0.11250 0.025000 0.13750 0.137500 
30.0 3.0 0.002500 **0.009375 
50.0 5.0 0.001000 0.0009380 0.04690 0.006250 0.05315 0.106300 
250.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0007750 0.19375 0.046875 0.24062 0.096250 
13.0 5.0 * 0.0021250 0.02763 
72.5 5.0 0.001250 **0.011325 
70.0 5.0 0.001875 **0.016405 
45.0 5.0 0.001875 **0.010550 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0006500 0.06500 0.018750 0.08375 0.083 750 
250.0 10.0 0.001375 0.0006630 0.16575 0.042970 0.20872 0.083488 
145.0 8.0 0.002500 0.0009750 0.14137 0.045315 0.18668 0.128748 
50.0 5.0 0.001875 0.0011000 0.05500 0.011720 0.06672 0.133440 
100.0 10.0 0.001500 0.0011250 0.11250 0.018750 0.13125 0.131250 
500.0 1.0 0.001500 0.0007750 0.38750 0.093750 0.48125 0.096250 
150.0 3.0 0.003 000 0.002 0000 0.30000 0.0562 50 0.35625 0.23 7500 
110.0 5.0 0.001500 **0.020625 
**0.001250 
60.0 3.0 0.004000 0.0020000 0.12000 0.030000 0.15000 0.250000 
450.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0007070 0.31815 0.140625 0.45878 0.101950 
100.0 8.0 0.002000 0.0014070 0.14070 0.025000 0.16570 0.165700 
200.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0006820 0.13640 0.043750 0.18015 0.090075 
100.0 5.0 0.001500 **0.018750 
75.0 6.0 0.001250 0.0011250 0.08437 0.011720 0.09609 0.128120 
30.0 3.0 0.001250 0.0014580 0.04374 0.004690 0.04843 0.161433 
25.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0016670 0.04168 0.007810 0.04949 0.197960 
75.0 4.0 0.005000 0.0009500 0.07125 0.046875 0.11812 0.157500 
100.0 1.0 0.002500 **0.031250 
100.0 3.0 0.002000 0.0011700 0.11700 0.025000 0.14200 0.142000 
75.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0013300 0.09975 0.018750 0.11850 0.158000 
36.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0011430 0.04115 0.007875 0.04902 0.136181 
40.0 6.0 0.001500 **0.007500 
300.0 7.0 0.002500 0.0007440 0.22320 0.093750 0.31695 0.105650 
377 
Appendix 8.3 ROX data and results for scenario 5 
Exposure Yrs M marg U cost 
$ ýý 
U cost xM marg Total 
exposure x assets volume ROX 
/8 
$$$ 
45.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0007250 0.03263 0.009845 0.04248 0.094389 
45.0 5.0 0.004000 0.0026250 0.11812 0.022500 0.14062 0.312489 
185.0 7.0 0.001875 0.0011070 0.20480 0.043360 0.24816 0.134141 
30.0 10.0 0.003000 * * 0.011250 
500.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0014000 0.70000 0.140625 0.84062 0.168125 
400.0 4.0 0.003500 * * 0.175000 
100.0 5.0 0.003250 0.0019250 0.19250 0.040625 0.23313 0.233125 
100.0 7.0 0.003250 0.0014820 0.14820 0.040625 0.18883 0.188825 
125.0 11.0 0.001750 0.0023410 0.29262 0.027345 0.31997 0.255972 
125.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0008500 0.10625 0.023440 0.12969 0.103752 
150.0 7.0 0.002370 * * 0.044440 
60.0 3.0 0.003750 0.0020000 0.12000 0.028125 0.14812 0.246875 
75.0 2.5 0.008500 0.0065000 0.48750 0.079685 0.56719 0.756247 
200.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0011500 0.23000 0.062500 0.29250 0.146250 
30.0 7.0 0.001750 0.0013930 0.04179 0.006560 0.04835 0.161167 
150.0 5.0 0.000625 0.0009050 0.13575 0.011720 0.14747 0.098313 
25.0 30.0 0.003000 0.0012500 0.03125 0.009375 0.04063 0.162500 
320.0 5.0 0.000500 * * 0.020000 
110.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0008000 0.08800 0.020625 0.10863 0.098750 
75.0 7.0 0.002000 * * 0.018750 
45.0 2.0 0.001875 0.0006250 0.02812 0.010550 0.03867 0.085933 
200.0 6.0 0.003450 0.0008880 0.17760 0.086250 0.26385 0.131925 
350.0 5.0 0.003500 0.0012750 0.44625 0.153125 0.59938 0.171250 
160.0 5.0 0.004500 0.0016700 0.26720 0.090000 0.35720 0.223250 
120.0 8.0 0.002750 0.0012500 0.15000 0.041250 0.19125 0.159375 
125.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0010800 0.13500 0.027345 0.16235 0.129876 
75.0 10.0 0.003000 0.0015750 0.11812 0.028125 0.14625 0.194993 
185.0 5.0 0.002000 * * 0.04 62 50 
* 5.0 0.001200 
75.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0012000 0.09000 0.014065 0.10407 0.138753 
* 7.0 0.001250 0.0013210 
375.0 5.0 0.004000 * * 0.187500 
150.0 5.0 0.001750 * * 0.032810 
35.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0013750 0.04812 0.008750 0.05687 0.162486 
100.0 5.0 0.002250 0.0012000 0.12000 0.028125 0.14812 0.148125 
350.0 5.0 0.002500 * * 0.109375 
250.0 5.0 0.001875 * * 0.058595 
60.0 3.0 * 0.0011670 0.07002 
75.0 7.0 0.001000 0.0008930 0.06697 0.009375 0.07634 0.101793 
50.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0012000 0.06000 0.015625 0.07563 0.151250 
300.0 8.0 0.001500 0.0010660 0.31980 0.056250 0.37605 0.125350 
* 7.0 0.005000 0.0011270 
100.0 3.0 0.002500 0.0009580 0.09580 0.031250 0.12705 0.127050 125.0 5.0 0.010000 * * 0.156250 
300.0 7.0 0.001500 0.0011070 0.33210 0.056250 0.38835 0.129450 
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Appendix 8.3 ROX data and results for scenario 5 
Exposure Yrs M marg U cost 
$ ýý 
U cost xM urarg Total 
exposure x assets volume ROX 
/8 
$$$ 
130.0 8.0 0.001125 0.0007000 0.09100 0.018280 0.10928 0.084062 
200.0 7.0 0.000800 0.0004640 0.09280 0.020000 0.11280 0.056400 
100.0 10.0 0.001000 * * 0.012500 
* 5.0 0.001250 0.0006060 
105.0 5.0 0.000563 0.0007750 0.08138 0.007390 0.08877 0.084543 
140.0 4.0 0.002500 0.0014370 0.20118 0.043750 0.24493 0.174950 
127.0 8.0 0.001750 0.0007030 0.08928 0.027780 0.11706 0.092173 
142.0 5.0 0.001500 * * 0.026625 
* 5.0 0.002000 0.0013000 
200.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0011250 0.22500 0.062500 0.28750 0.143750 
100.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0011250 0.11250 0.031250 0.14375 0.143750 
200.0 7.0 0.002250 0.0008570 0.17140 0.056250 0.22765 0.113825 
50.0 5.0 0.002000 0.0008250 0.04125 0.012500 0.05375 0.107500 
40.0 3.0 0.002250 * * 0.011250 
38.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0015000 0.05700 0.011875 0.06887 0.181250 
50.0 10.0 0.001000 0.0005875 0.02937 0.0062 50 0.03562 0.071240 
125.0 5.0 0.001500 * * 0.023440 
35.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0011750 0.04112 0.006560 0.04768 0.136229 
105.0 3.0 0.001500 0.0006190 0.06499 0.019685 0.08467 0.080643 
250.0 7.0 0.005000 * * 0.156250 
170.0 7.0 0.005000 * * 0.106250 
355.0 7.0 0.001250 * * 0.055470 
57.0 5.0 0.001500 0.0010800 0.06156 0.010690 0.07225 0.126754 
70.0 5.0 0.001500 * * 0.013125 
100.0 5.0 0.001750 0.0014000 0.14000 0.021875 0.16187 0.161875 
150.0 5.0 0.002500 0.0020750 0.31125 0.046875 0.35813 0.238750 
250.0 2.0 0.001500 0.0008750 0.21875 0.046875 0.26562 0.106250 
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CHAPTER 9 
EXAMINATION OF BANK PRICING STRATEGIES AND FORMULATION OF HYPOTHESES 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the bank pricing literature 
and, drawing on the results of the previous three chapters, formulate 
hypotheses that might help to explain why underwriting banks in the 
euronote market are prepared to accept such low returns for their 
services, which has in turn led to the development of a systemic gap in 
this market when viewed on direct returns. These hypotheses will then 
be tested through naturalistic research in the following chapter and our 
results presented to the market, thereby completing the triangulation 
approach to research adopted in this study. 
Competition in banking markets is removing the traditional 
regulatory barriers which previously safeguarded commonality in pricing 
strategies between banks in specific market areas. With the trend 
towards deregulation in the banking industry, new competitors have been 
able to use cost advantages to price their product(s) with the aim of 
capturing market share relative to those institutions which were still 
bundling their products together. Other competitors have used 
differentiated service quality, whilst maintaining price, as a means of 
targeting specific areas of the retail and wholesale markets. 
Furthermore, due to the trends identified in Chapter 1 of this 
study (securitisation, disintermediation, the perceived reduced 
creditworthiness of the banking system, etc) banks have come to rely 
less on interest income and more on fee-based income. This is not just 
observable in the euronote market, but in many other off-balance sheet 
(OBS) markets. Here, pricing strategies have tended to be one of two 
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types. The first type is based on skill. In this type of pricing 
strategy, product or service differentiation is achieved by the creation 
of unique services provided by differing levels of individual expertise. 
This type of pricing strategy has been 1 arge 1y predominant in the 
corporate market, where merchant or investment banks have capitalised on 
relative skill differentials. The second type of pricing strategy in 
the fee-based category has been aimed at gaining market share, mainly by 
the large commercial banks. They have used their placing power and 
ability to commit funds from their own asset bases to accomplish this 
end. With this in mind, the various pricing objectives open to a bank 
(and indeed any corporation) are discussed in the following section. 
9.2 Pricing Objectives 
In this section we will rely heavily on pricing evidence from the 
manufacturing industry to support our claim that, in the long-run, 
profit maximisation is the most plausible of pricing objectives. 
9.2.1 Profit maximisation 
In the traditional theory of the firm, the firm seeks to maximise 
profit in the short-run. The firm also determines quantities of output 
and level of prices with certain knowledge of future costs and revenues. 
Under these two simplifying assumptions, the firm can accurately predict 
price and output under different market conditions. 
The profit maximising assumption, however, is not meant to 
depict accurately the price motivation of management within real firms. 
As Dorward (1987, p 11) emphasises: 
'... it represents a simplification or distillation of the 
complexity of motives and their trade-offs which exist within 
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real-life business organisations. It states not that real 
firms are profit maximisers, but only that the profit- 
maximising assumption provides a meaningful abstraction by 
which to predict the pricing and output behaviour of real 
firms when reacting to given changes in the conditions 
determining costs and revenues. ' 
As Dorward points out, essentially the profit maximising assumption is 
an abstraction from reality with which pricing behaviour may be 
predicted (Dorward, 1986, p 10). 
The Machlup and Lester (1946) debate is also relevant here. Lester 
argued that firms do not equate marginal revenue to marginal cost in 
practice. This point was accepted by Mach 1 up, but Mach 1 up contended 
that marginal revenue and marginal cost were still useful tools. He 
states (1946, pp 519-20) : 
'To recognise the study of certain types of merely 
'traditional' conduct as legitimately within the province of 
economic theory is one thing; it is another to accept as 
correct the interpretations of business behaviour offered by 
the critics of marginal analysis. Unable to see how marginal 
analysis can be applied to their material,, these critics have 
concluded that marginal ism should be discarded. It can be 
shown, however, that the alleged 'inapplicability' of 
marginal analysis is often due to a failure to understand it, 
to faulty research techniques, or to mistaken interpretations 
of findings'. 
This point is similar to that made by Dorward. The marginal ist 
assumption does not state that firms equate marginal revenue to marginal 
cost in practice, but rather that marginal ism provides a meaningful 
abstraction by which to predict price and output. 
9.2.2 Short-run profit maximisation and price prediction 
If R represents total revenue and C represents total costs, the 
total profit of a firm can be written: 
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i-i' = R-C ... 
(9.1) 
Maximum profits are determined by selecting an output, Q, where 
marginal revenue, R/ Q, equals marginal cost, C/ Q. This profit- 
maximising output can be found by differentiating equation (9.1) with 
respect to Q to give marginal profit and then setting this equal to zero 
before solving for Q. 
61T 5R oC 
=-=0 
öQ ÖQ 6Q (9.2) ... 
From equation (9.2) we can predict changes in output and price. As 
Dorward (1987, p 110) emphasises: 
'As marginal revenue and marginal cost define the slopes of 
the total revenue and total cost curves respectively ... the 
only factors of change which will affect the profit- 
maximising price or output will be those affecting the rate 
of change of total cost in respect of changing output'. 
We can, therefore, make the following predictions: 
I If demand i ncreases, 6R, $Q will increase and so output and 
price will increase 
2 If variable costs i ncrease, ÜC/c$Q wi 11 increase and so output 
will decrease and price will increase 
3 An increase in fixed costs will not affect6'C, L Q and so output 
and price will not change 
4 An increase in the rate of profits tax wi l1 not aff ectö R, týQ 
or c C, 6SQ and so output and prices will not change 
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Despite its widespread acceptance among academic economists, the 
profit maximisation assumption has been subjected to three major 
criticisms. First, being a static theory it ignores the dynamic nature 
of business behaviour - like charging relatively high prices in the 
short-run may lead to an influx of new competitors causing relatively 
low prices to be charged in the long-run. Second, if the certainty 
assumption is dropped, there will no longer be an objectively based, 
unique, price-output prediction, but many possible prices, each 
dependent on the subjective risk attitude of individual managers. 
Third, it fails to take account of circumstances where managers wish to 
maximise some other objective such as current sales or growth. Such 
alternative motivational assumptions will result in different pricing 
predictions from those given above (Dorward, 1987, p 11). These 
criticisms will be examined in the following sections. 
The dynamic approach to profit maximisation, while implying a long- 
run pricing strategy, does not imply a specific price at a given point 
in time. It is quite possible, therefore, that a long-run price path 
will be chosen in the knowledge that it will be accompanied by a series 
of short-run tactical price decisions. One example here would be price 
discounting (see, for example, Rao, 1984). 
Furthermore, one cannot sensibly discuss long-run pricing without 
taking into account the uncertainty affecting future revenues and costs. 
For example, a skimming price strategy of charging high prices now to 
those with immediate needs and low prices later to those who can afford 
to wait may have to be abandoned because new competitors may have made 
unexpected price cuts. Under conditions of uncertainty, an objective 
present value criterion is transformed into one of subjective 
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evaluation, dependent upon the assumed risk attitude of management. As 
a result: 
'... the important characteristic of making generally 
acceptable price predictions for a given point in time has 
been lost. Given uncertainty, the long-run model is only 
usefully applicable to the selection of a rather generalised 
and somewhat subjectively based pricing strategy' (Dorward, 
1987, p 12). 
Uncertainty increases with time. As uncertainty devalues longer- 
term profits, a strategy of charging relatively low prices to improve 
market penetration will have a higher probability of being rejected the 
longer it takes to build up a dominant and profitable market share. 
9.2.3 Management objectives in pricing 
In 1957 Dahrendorff, in his theory of post-industrial society 
(building on previous work, particularly that of Berle and Means, 1932), 
argued that ownership was now separated in large corporations. One 
result of this separation of ownership and control was that management 
found itself with sufficient discretion to pursue its own motivations at 
the expense of the owners' profit maximisation objective. Management 
motivations are summarised by Marris (1964, Chapter 2) as power, 
prestige, salary and security from takeover. These motives are, 
however, difficult to evaluate in terms of the traditional theory of the 
firm as they do not easily translate into recognisable variables such as 
profit, sales, output or growth (Dorward, 1987, p 13). 
A more popular view is that managers satisfy their uti 1 ity through 
seeking to increase the size of the firm. Roberts (1956), McGuire, Chui 
and Elbing (1962) and Marris (1964) all found significant correlations 
between executive income and corporate sales. On the basis of this 
empirical work and a number of other detailed studies of actual business 
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organisations, various managerial models of the firm have been 
developed, based on the maximisation of an objective function in which 
profit features as a constraint not an objective. The three main 
examples are: 
1 Baumol's (1959) sales maximisation model, which contends that 
managers of large corporations seek to maximise total revenues 
rather than total profits; 
2 Wi 11i amson's (1963) mode 1 of managerial discretion, which 
contends that managerial motives tend to be realised in the 
form of expense preference behaviour (such as staffing 
expenses, emoluments and discretionary investment 
expenditure); 
3 Marris' (1964) growth model, which contends that the 
motivations of managers are realised by maximising the rate of 
growth of the firm. 
More recent research into the relationship between executive 
income, corporate size and profitability, however, has cast doubt on the 
motivational validity of management objective functions. Although Meeks 
and Whittington (1975) confirmed previous research that executive income 
was more closely correlated with sales than with profit, they also found 
that changes in profitability will have more effect on income than 
changes in size. An even stronger defence of the role of profit was 
provided by Llewellyn and Huntsman (1970). They found executive income 
to be correlated with profit, but not with sales. 
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9.2.4 Pricing objectives in practice 
Shipley's (1981) study of the pricing objectives of 728 British 
manufacturing firms found that although most firms had more than one 
pricing objective, two-thirds specified a target profit or return on 
capital as their principal objective. Similarly, in a study of twenty 
large US companies, Lanzil lotti (1958) found profit, in the form of a 
target return on capital, to be the most popul ar objective. Other 
pricing objectives were, however, also cited, such as 'stable price and 
margin', 'target market share', and 'matching the competition'. 
It should be emphasised that profit as a pricing objective is not 
the same as profit maximisation. Although nearly 50 per cent of 
Shipley's (1981) study claimed to be motivated by profit maximisation, 
just over 16 per cent were classified as 'true maximum profit motivated 
firms', in the sense that the maximisation of profit was taken to be of 
overriding importance. The strongest support for the maximisation of 
profit probably comes from Hague's (1971) study where five of the 
thirteen British firms studied attempted to maximise profits when taking 
the pricing decision. 
Baumol's (1959) revenue-maximisation hypothesis gains even less 
support. In Shipley's (1981) study only one in twenty firms cited 
revenue as the principal goal with profit as the secondary target, while 
one in ten cited profit as the principal goal with revenue as the 
secondary target. 
9.2.5 Profit maximisation reinstated 
From this brief review of the empirical evidence of the pricing 
objectives of firms, the objective of profit maximisation gains most 
support. It should be emphasised that profit maximisation is a pricing 
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objective not a strategy. A pricing strategy which is aimed at gaining 
market share in the short run may be compatible to long-run profit 
maximisation. As stated previously, profit maximisation implies a long- 
run pricing path or direction, not a specific price at any given point 
in time. 
Although most of the literature surveyed in this section so far 
relates to studies of pricing objectives in manufacturing industry the 
principles can be equally applied to the banking industry. When 
examining pricing strategies with respect to the euronote market, we 
will do so on the assumption that in the long run underwriting banks 
will seek to maximise profits. 
9.3 The Selection of a Pricing Strategy 
According to Channon (1986, p 150), the selection of a bank pricing 
strategy is a function of three key determinants: 
1 Demand 
The level of demand will be a function of market segment size and 
service price elasticity. Price sensitivity tends to be more acute in 
corporate markets than in consumer markets. 
2 Competitor prices 
While demand and costs may establish a price ceiling and floor for 
a service respectively, competitor prices will help establish pricing 
range 1 imi ts. It is, therefore, necessary to evaluate carefully the 
price and quality of competitor services. 
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3 Cost structure 
The cost structure of a service will set the floor for pricing 
strategy unless for strategic reasons it is considered desirable or 
necessary to price to make a loss. 
Based upon these three criteria (and their provisos) a number of 
operational pricing options are open to the bank. These alternatives 
include cost-plus pricing, breakeven and profit impact target pricing, 
skimming pricing, value in use pricing, market rate pricing, 
relationship pricing, and penetration pricing. These will be reviewed 
in turn with particular attention to their relevance to pricing in the 
euronote market. 
9.3.1 Cost-plus pricing 
Cost-plus pricing is a relatively simple method of setting a price. 
The costs of a product or service are calculated and a standard mark-up 
is added. This method is widely employed in the retail trades. 
However, in banking it is not a common method of establishing price, due 
to al ack of cost knowledge in many cases. Indeed, it could be argued 
on a more general note that a pricing method which does not take into 
account customer price sensitivity and competitive prices does not often 
lead to the best strategic plan. In the euronote market with nearly 
300 banks competing for US $90 billion of underwritten facilities it is 
doubtful whether cost-plus pricing could be accurately employed. 
No evidence was found to support such a strategy in either the 
qualitative or quantitative data collected through the semi-structured 
interviews. The costs of providing an underwriting service in the 
euronote market are largely dependent on the level of capital that has 
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to be employed to fund drawdown. As drawdown cannot be calculated prior 
to the event then cost-plus does not appear to be a feasible pricing 
strategy in this market. 
9.3.2 Breakeven and profit impact target pricing 
Profit impact target pricing is another cost-orientated pricing 
method. Under this system the bank decides on the required 
profitability of a given service and prices in accordance to meet that 
level of profitability. This method employs break-even analysis as 
illustrated in Figure 9.1. 
Figure 9.1 Breakeven analysis 
evenue 
Money $ 
tat Cost 
Source: Channon (1986, Figure 8.4, p 152) 
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Vi V2 Transaction Volume 
The breakeven chart displays the total cost and total revenue 
expected at different levels of service transaction volume. Direct 
variable costs are added to fixed costs to show a total cost rising with 
service volume. The total revenue curve rises from zero in a linear 
form with increasing volume. The two curves meet at the break-even 
volume V1, with the desired level of profit requiring a higher level of 
volume v 2. 
It is essential to understand the market share position that a 
breakeven and profit impact target pricing strategy implies. If it is 
necessary for the bank to take a high market share to achieve its 
desired level of profitability, it is necessary to understand from where 
this market share gain will emanate. Unless the market is high growth, 
the bank will have to gain market share from its competitors. 
Established competitors may cut prices in an effort to maintain share. 
As Channon (1986, p 152) points out: 
'This may substantially change breakeven and profit impact 
target volumes as revenues decline, and strategies that are 
very sensitive to competitor price reaction should be 
examined carefully to test whether the probable end is worth 
the effort. ' 
In the euronote market it may be that the probable end of such a 
pricing strategy would not be worth the effort. Although most market 
respondents stated that a minimum target of 0.5 per cent return was 
required in this market, the results of Chapter 8 show that this has not 
been achieved in practice. Comment was also made of the fact that it is 
rarely possible to charge what is believed to be 'a correct' return on 
many facilities for fear of losing the deal. 
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9.3.3 Value in use pricing 
A number of banks and other financial institutions are following 
industrial companies and establishing price, not on cost but on 
perceived consumer value for a service (Channon, 1986, p 152). Under 
this system of pricing, management must estimate the volume of a service 
it expects to sel 1 at a specific quality and price. Compared to 
competitive service offerings, the bank must assess relative service 
quality, reliability, together with other key variables, and estimate 
the value that customers would be willing to pay for these facilities. 
By adding these to the average competitive base price the bank is able 
to establish an overall 'value' price for the service. Actual offered 
prices usually represent a discount from this overall value price, but 
at the same time such prices are usually above the market average. 
Value in use pricing implies that the bank offering the service has 
either talents and skills which other banks may not possess or a product 
or service which is different to that offered by other banks in the 
market. 
An underwriting commitment attached to a euronote facility is a 
fairly homogeneous service no matter which bank offers it. Borrowers 
may, however, be prepared to pay a premium on an underwriting commitment 
to a bank that has greater resources to meet the commitment than might 
other banks. This would imply that the largest banks in the euronote 
market (as measured by capital) might be able to charge a premium for 
their services in the form of value in use pricing. It is unlikely, 
however, that such a pricing strategy has ever been consistently used in 
the euronote market. Underwriting fees are mainly fixed by negotiation 
between the lead manager, the borrower and the arranger of the facility 
(where applicable). Each bank is then awarded, or requests, a certain 
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portion of the facility at or below the agreed fees. Fieldwork did 
discover that banks able to take larger portions of the underwriting did 
win more lead manager mandates, but borrowers were generally not 
prepared to pay more for this: the reward being the mandate itself 
rather than an additional fee. The maximum price was already fixed. 
9.3.4 Skinning pricing 
A skimming pricing strategy appl ies when a bank seeks to price a 
service above the normal level of such an activity. As Channon (1986, p 
155) emphasises: 
'For a skimming strategy to be successful there should be 
a sufficiently large customer segment to justify adopting a 
skimming price; the costs of operating at lower volume should 
not be such as to cancel the revenue gain from charging a 
higher price; the high price should not stimulate the entry 
of competitors; and the concept of a higher price should add 
to the image of a superior product. ' 
Due to the homogeneity of the underwriting service and the very low 
prices in the euronote market, a skimming pricing strategy seems to be 
the least likely pricing strategy to be used in this market. Again, 
most evidence from our fieldwork research tends to negate the employment 
of such a strategy in this market: in particul ar, the ease with which 
competitors may enter this market. 
This tends to suggest that the euronote market is contestable. 
Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) argue that a contestable market, 
'is accessible to potential entrants and has the following 
two properties: first, the potential entrants can, without 
restriction, serve the same market demands and use the same 
productive techniques as those available to incumbent firms. 
Second, the potential entrants evaluate the profitability of 
entry at the incumbent firms pre-entry prices'. 
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Contestable market theory implies that only sunk costs, not fixed 
costs, are barriers to entry. However, it would be imprudent to argue 
that the euronote market is 'perfectly contestable' because, although 
transferability of liabilities is possible and has been practical in 
order to recover capital on leaving the market, on a large scale such 
recovery would not be possible until the underwriting commitment had 
matured. Although capital will be recovered on maturity (assuming no 
default) the fact that immediate exit may not be possible may prove to 
be a partial barrier to entry. 
9.3.5 Market rate pricing 
Under a market rate pricing system the bank cedes the initiative to 
key competitors to set price. Smaller banks 'follow the leader' in 
pricing services. This was, in fact, found to be one method of pricing 
employed in the euronote market. Smaller banks are effectively removed 
from the negotiation process whereby fees are set. When invited to 
participate in a facility they are invited to do so at a fixed price per 
level of commitment. Since the euronote market is an international 
financial market, the borrower may be unknown, or more importantly the 
creditworthiness of the borrower may be unknown to many of the potential 
underwriters. They were found to accept the price on the grounds that 
other larger banks were involved in the facility whom they perceived to 
have carried out the credit analysis of the borrower and determined the 
fees to be adequate in the 1i ght of that analysis. This is a form of 
market rate pricing. 
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9.3.6 Market penetration pricing 
For new services in a price-sensitive market, it may be best to 
price low deliberately in order to build rapidly market share. Failure 
to use penetration pricing may encourage new market entries and provide 
a price umbrella for the higher cost competitors. Ultimately, such a 
pricing strategy usually results in a price war. This in turn usually 
leads to a market 'shake-out' when a number of competitors exit from the 
market. Market penetration pricing is a short-term pricing strategy to 
gain market share. If it is sustained in the long run it may lead to 
low rates of return, even losses. Essential 1y, then, if banks were 
employing market penetration pricing in the euronote market, one would 
expect to see an exit of competitors from the market and a rise in 
prices after a certain period of time. There is no evidence that either 
has occurred (yet) in the euronote market (see Figures 5.5 to 5.8). 
Although market share gain may be a short-term pricing objective in 
the euronote market, relationship pricing may be a more viable 
explanation of current pricing trends than market penetration pricing 
given the results of our fieldwork research. The latter implies that 
the service itself must eventually provide adequate profit through an 
increase in prices. Relationship pricing, on the other hand, implies 
that the 'relationship' must eventually provide an adequate return to 
justify the low pricing of the particular service. 
9.3.7 Relationship pricing 
In 1972, the study Unbundling Full Service Banking (written by 
Bryan and Clark) had a significant effect on the US commercial banking 
industry. Its basic premise was the suggestion that bankers should 
price individual products to gain a better understanding of what their 
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products cost them. This book caused many of the large banks to rethink 
their pricing of commercial services. However, the concept of bundling, 
which is the engine of relationship banking, and unbundling should not 
be misunderstood. Bundling is a tactic used for relationship pricing, 
and it can be used very effectively. When it is possible to improve the 
overal 1 profit from a rel ationship by cross-sel 1 ing high margin 
services, it may be worthwhile to provide relationship-building services 
in this manner. For instance, when a corporate customer provides a bank 
with its first piece of business from that customer, the bank usually 
prices the business below cost. If such business is correctly costed 
then this pricing can be accepted as a marketing cost provided future 
business from the relationship is expected to yield an adequate rate of 
return. 
Relationship pricing implies that the bank knows, or is able to 
cal cul ate, its cost structure and is wi 11 ing to accept a1 ow margin or 
loss in favour of optimising return on the total relationship. 
Probably the first proponent of the importance and effect of the 
customer relationship as concerns bank loan-pricing was 0R Hodgman 
(1963). Hodgman emphasised the importance of demand deposits as a 
principal source of the individual bank's capacity to lend and invest 
and so stressed the consequent importance to the bank of its 
relationship to loan customers who hold demand deposits with the bank. 
The effect of this relationship is emphasised in Figure 9.2. The 
formula for calculating the return on the customer relationship under 
Hodgman's analysis is presented and explained in Appendix 9.1. 
In his analysis Hodgman distinguishes three loan rates of interest; 
the market rate, r (adjusted for risk), charged on a non-deposit 
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borrower or available on open market securities; the preferential rate, 
Cif, charged on the ith depositor-borrower for a loan in the jth size 
category (this rate is always below the comparable market rate); and the 
particular preferential rate known as the prime rate (in the United 
States), M. In Hodgman's analysis the notation Lij indicates a loan in 
the jth size category to the ith borrower. 
Figure 9.2 Minimum preferential rate on a bank loan to a depositor 
r 
Interest 
Rate 
M; 
cý 
C j 
If the deposit relation of a borrower is ignored it may be supposed 
that a bank would be willing to lend varying amounts to that particular 
borrower at the market rate, r. The appropriate value for r may be read 
by referring to the 1 ine rr' on Figure 9.2. Consideration of the 
customer relationship of the borrower makes it possible for the bank to 
charge a1 esser preferential rate of interest, Ci j and still be 
compensated equally with a loan of the same size and risk to a non- 
depositor. When the revenue from the loan and the revenue gains from 
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the investments which the borrower's deposit has funded is taken into 
account the bank will still break even as compared with the market rate, 
r. Hence as Hodgman says: 
'The net advantage of the loan to the prime borrower over 
that to the nondepositor is measured by the difference 
between the actual prime rate, M1, and the preferential rate, 
Ci , which the bank could charge because of the customer 
re? ati onshi p and sti 11 break even as compared with the market 
rate'. 
Therefore, al though the bank may price the 1 oan below prime rate (and 
may theoretically appear to be pricing below marginal cost) the revenue 
which may be acquired from the borrrower's deposit (all assuming it is 
greater than the cost of that deposit to the bank) must also be taken 
into account. 
It should be clear, then, that the minimum preferential lending 
rate for a particular customer must increase with an increase in the 
size of a loan relative to the customer's deposit. As Hodgman points 
out, this is simply another way of noticing that the compensating 
balance of a borrower is a variable which enters into the determination 
of his profitability to the bank. 
When a customer borrowers more than he needs and leaves a portion 
on deposit it may be correct to interpret the compensating balance 
requirement as merely a devious way to increase the effective rate of 
interest on the particular loan. However, if the compensating balance 
represents a new primary deposit as it does with a new depositor- 
borrower, it increases the bank's lending capacity and contributes more 
to bank earnings than in its absence. Furthermore, if the deposit 
simply represents the normal working balance of the new depositor then 
it does not raise the effective rate of interest to the deposit- 
borrower. Accordingly, the borrower is no better off and the bank is 
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worse off without the compensating balance requirement in this instance. 
It is this circumstance which RE Emmery (1971) has in mind when he 
argues that: 
'the ratio of cash to short-term funds borrowed from banks is 
so great for most firms that no compensating bal ance 
requirement within the limit that practical business 
procedure will permit banks to require can force them to hold 
idle funds. Consequently, an increase in the compensating 
balance requirement does not, in the usual case, increase the 
cost of money to borrowers'. 
But he adds, 
'A compensating balance requirement on loans to non- 
depositors increases the total volume of loans (a bank) can 
support, given its resources'. 
This would seem to support Hodgman's challenge to the popular 
interpretation of the compensating balance as a device to raise the 
effective rate of interest on and during the life of a particular loan. 
In those cases where it has such an effect it is inferior to an overt 
increase in the contract rate. In cases involving new depositor- 
borrowers it is useful but has a different rationale, that of increasing 
the bank's lending base. 
The primary rationale, then, for the compensating balance 
requirement is the part it plays in restricting price competition for 
demand deposits within the banking industry. 
Although Hodgman was the first to recognise the importance of the 
customer relationship (1961 and 1963) his was a single-period individual 
customer model which did not take account of the dynamic aspects of the 
customer relationship for the bank portfolio problem. By concentrating 
on current information on loan customers, Hodgman ignored the present 
value of future customer relationships. In extending a technique first 
developed by White (1974), Cramer and Sterk (1981) introduced a specific 
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loan pricing formula that uses the present value approach. The formula 
distinguishes between loan relationships with balances expected and 
'rate only' loan relationships. It implies that, 
'loan volumes should be increased until the marginal return 
on loans is equal to the return on investments 1 ess a 
differential amount which reflects the present value of 
future deposits and other business attributable to the 
previous investment in loans'. 
It is important to emphasise, then, that the customer 
relationship includes income gained from future as well as present 
income streams. These present and future measures may come from 
areas not directly associated with the initial loan. As Mason 
(1979, p 304) states: 
'customer profitability analysis as it is set up now in many 
banks includes all the relationships a customer has with the 
bank ... If a customer is going to be judged on the basis of 
all the services it receives from the bank, then the pricing 
relationship should also be based on these factors'. 
All of the points mentioned so far on relationship pricing have 
direct significance for pricing in the euronote market. The need to 
maintain and acquire customer relationships appears, from the findings 
of our preliminary fieldwork research, to be a motivating factor behind 
pricing in the euronote market. One of the most significant findings of 
the semi-structured interviews was that, as far as most large and 
medium-sized banks were concerned, as much as 80 per cent of their 
underwriting business was gained from existing customers who were 
replacing traditional credit lines with euronote facilities. The fear 
of losing existing customer relationships, with various spin-off 
revenues, appears to be a factor which has led to the very low pricing 
experienced in this market. 
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Another finding from our period in the field was that most banks 
were not prepared to underwrite a facility unless placement business was 
also offered. Although no compensating balances, as such, are required 
in the euronote market, this placement business requirement could be 
seen to be analogous to Hodgman's compensating balances. The placement 
of a borrower's notes is a natural necessity with any euronote 
programme. As such, an underwriter requiring such business is not 
asking for business which increases the borrower's cost of funds as this 
placement business would have to be granted to another bank anyway. 
Accordingly, the borrower is not worse off and the bank has an extra 
income stream. 
From our preliminary fieldwork results it would appear that 
underwriters in the euronote market are taking into account the customer 
relationship when pricing these facilities. The extent to which this 
dominates price will be examined in the following naturalistic research 
stage . 
However, the fact that underwriters in this market may be prepared 
to price low in view of the customer relationship does not mean that 
systemic risk is unaffected by such a strategy. This will only be so if 
the return from the entire customer relationship is adequate to 
compensate for the portfolio of risks encompassed within it. This 
requires the establishment of detailed customer profitability systems 
within banks to determine whether sufficient compensation on the total 
package of services to the customer is being obtained. Again, the 
naturalistic research stage to follow will review this area. 
A warning was provided in the early 1970s in the United States of 
the systemic risk potential of underpricing 'committed' facilities on a 
customer relationship basis. Many potential borrowers established 
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'insurance' lines of credit in the 1960s to ensure liquidity during 
periods of tight money. Usage rates were low and so the cost of 
obtaining these lines was also low. However, as the banks learned to 
their distress, the variance of demand on the part of the borrowers was 
extremely high. As Mason (1979, p 90 and 302) points out: 
'... the commitments of banks took on in the 1 ate 1960s and 
early 1970s caused the banks to assume more risk than they 
charged for, because the pricing mechanism they used did not 
compensate them for the potentially large loan demands they 
might have to face and in fact did face as events unfolded 
... they had been providing a very valuable commodity, the 
ability to obtain funds at any time they were needed, but had 
underestimated the cost of providing it'. 
As a result of this uncertainty of funding demand many banks were 
unable to meet loan demands and experienced a liquidity crisis. This 
risk may be heightened with euronote facilities in the sense that banks 
will be accepting risk at prices already refused by the market. It is 
vitally important, therefore, that pricing levels should allow for the 
adequate compilation of reserves. This lack of foresight on the part of 
US banks in the 1960s could be termed 'disaster myopia'. Disaster 
myopia may present an additional explanation of pricing in the euronote 
market and is discussed in the following section. 
9.4 The Disaster Myopia Hypothesis and Researching Its Reality 
9.4.1 Introduction 
It was stated previously that one reason why underwriting banks may 
be willing to accept such low returns in the euronote market may be 
their inability to estimate correctly random shock probabilities. Thi s 
may be because they believe that they will only be called on to fund a 
small portion of their commitments for a short period of time (if they 
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are cal 1 ed on to fund their commitments at al 1). In this sense, they 
may be underestimating long-term shock probabilities. It is this 
systematic tendency to underestimate (or ignore) shock probabilities 
that is known as disaster myopia. 
The objective of this section of the chapter is to layout the basic 
conceptual framework and explain the conditions conducive to disaster 
myopia as well as its possible effects. Particular attention will be 
paid to exploring the possible applicability of the concept to the 
euronote market. Evidence will be drawn from our initial fieldwork 
research where appropriate. 
9.4.2 The conceptual framework 
The disaster myopia hypothesis was originally formulated by 
Guttentag and Herring (1984). They developed a framework to show why 
the financial system tends to become increasingly vulnerable to major 
shocks during long periods when no such shocks occur. They built on 
this framework in a latter essay (1986) to refine the hypothesis. 
Guttentag and Herring (1986, p 1) begin their formulation of the 
disaster myopia hypothesis by distinguishing risk from uncertainty. 
They argue that pure uncertainty describes the situation where we know 
nothing about the probability (p) that the ith event will occur (pi). 
Pure risk, for Guttentag and Herring, describes the situation where pi 
takes on a value between zero and one that is known with complete 
confidence (1986, p 1). They describe perfect certainty as the 
situation where pi is either zero or one. Although their usage differs 
from the one commonly employed in the modern literature on finance, 
where risk is the dispersion of possible outcomes around the expected 
outcome, it is similar to the definitions of risk and uncertainty 
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employed by Luce and Raiffa (1958, p 15). Luce and Raiffa argue that 
risk obtains, 
'If each action leads to one of a set of possible specific 
outcomes, each outcome occurring with a known probability' 
and uncertainty obtains, 
'If either action or both has as its consequence a set of 
possible specific outcomes, but where the probabilities of 
these outcomes are completely unknown or are not even 
meaningful' 
In everyday life we do not know pi with certainty. Our knowledge 
lies somewhere between risk and uncertainty. In this sense, we do not 
know pi but we have some evidence that allows us to estimate it. The 
greater our confidence in that estimate, the closer we are to pure risk 
on Guttentag and Herring's criteria. The lower our confidence, the 
closer we are to pure uncertainty. 
Guttentag and Herring (1986, p 2) argue that two major factors 
determine the extent to which our knowledge about an event is 
characterised by risk or uncertainty. The first is the frequencywih 
which the event occurs relative to the frequency of changes in the 
underlying causal structure. Their contention is that, if an event 
occurs many times but the structure is stable, we accumulate evidence 
that permits us to estimate probabilities with considerable confidence. 
For example (1986, p 2): 
'... if floods over a plain occur on average only once in 
every twenty-five years but basic topographic and cl imati c 
conditions are stable, an historical record over several 
hundred years may yield good estimates of flood 
probabilities. Despite the low probability of a flood in any 
short period, our knowledge about the probability of a flood 
is closer to pure risk than to uncertainty. In contrast, the 
causal structure underlying economic developments is unlikely 
to remain stable for long periods, so that it is very 
difficult to estimate the probability of low-frequency 
economic e vents with much confidence. Our know l edge about 
their probability is much closer to uncertainty' 
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The latter point seems a priori to be especially applicable to 
underwriting practices in the euronote market. There has been no 
default in this market so far and so probability cannot be judged on 
experience of the occurrence of past defaults. 
The second factor that determines whether a situation is better 
characterised by risk or uncertainty, according to Guttentag and 
Herring, is our understanding of the underlying causal structure. They 
argue (1986, p 2) that the probability that the fair toss of a coin wil l 
generate heads is an example of pure risk, because our prior knowledge 
of the mechanism determining the result allows us to specify its exact 
probability, even without knowledge of the results of prior tosses. In 
contrast, as we understand far less about the causal structures 
underlying economic processes, our understanding is much more likely to 
be subject to uncertainty. 
Uncertainty and imperfect knowledge of shock probabilities are both 
central tenets of the disaster myopia hypothesis. Shocks can be 
described quite simply as events that occur very infrequently and have 
very large potential effects. Our understanding of the causal 
structure underlying economic shocks is imperfect. The causal structure 
may also change between shocks. For these reasons, knowledge regarding 
economic shocks is closer to the case of pure uncertainty than pure 
risk. 
Financial institutions are exposed to such shocks because of the 
variety of activities in which they engage and because of the turbulence 
that has characterised all banking and financial systems since the early 
1970s (see, for example, Gardener, 1986). Credit shocks arise due to 
defaults by a major category of borrowers. Funding shocks arise either 
through runs by depositors or the calling of commitments at a time when 
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funding markets are closed to the lending institution. An institution's 
insolvency exposure may become excessive if its expos ure -management 
policies have been based on underestimates of shock probabilities. 
Under uncertain conditions there is no reason why the subjective 
probabilities that market participants (in our case euronote 
underwriting banks) attach to the occurrence of a shock should equate to 
the actual probability of that shock occurring. There is little 
strength in the argument that market discipline will require decision 
makers to form correct expectations: the shock may occur so infrequently 
that institutions which disregard it completely may survive over long 
periods of time. Competition may, in fact, force prudent institutions 
out of the market. As Guttentag and Herring (1986, p 3) emphasise: 
'An institution that attempts to charge an appropriate 
premium to develop a reserve against a low-probability shock 
is likely to lose business to competitors who are willing to 
disregard the shock' 
It may be that certain banks in the euronote market real ise that 
the premiums they are charging are insufficient, but are unable to 
charge higher premiums due to the fear of losing business to competitors 
who are willing to disregard the shock. 
But how are the shock probabi 1 ities formulated? As Lucas (1977) 
observes, in situations of uncertainty the rational-expectations 
hypothesis and efficient-market axioms simply do not hold. Guttentag 
and Herring (1986, p 3) draw, instead, their hypothesis from work on 
cognitive psychology and the behavioural approach to decision making 
under uncertainty. They argue that two of the heuristics that have been 
found to characterise human behaviour with regard to low probability, 
high-loss hazards provide insights into the behaviour of international 
banks confronted with shocks of low but unknown probability. These are 
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the 'availability heuristic' and the 'threshold heuristic'. 
The availability heuristic characterises situations in which people 
assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the 
ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1982, p 11). The validity of the availability heuristic 
has been verified in both controlled laboratory experiments and 
fieldwork. For instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1982) conducted ten 
controlled experiments with 1,500 subjects. They argue that the results 
of these experiments demonstrated that even when probabilities could be 
objectively determined, people tended to employ the availability 
heuristic. Further, they argue that their results are also applicable 
to very infrequent events where probability judgements cannot be based 
on a tally of relative frequencies. Kunreuther et al (1978) conducted a 
field survey of 2,000 homeowners in flood-prone areas and 1,000 
homeowners in earthquake-prone areas. They concluded that insurance 
decisions are subject to the availability bias. 
Although frequent events are usual ly easier to recall than 
infrequent events, ease of recall may be affected by other factors that 
may have little or no relationship to probabilities. This gives rise to 
an availability bias. One such factor is the time elapsed since the 
last occurrence. 
The threshold heuristic, as Guttentag and Herring point out, is an 
implicit rule by which decision makers allocate one of their scarcest 
resources, managerial attention. This heuristic may also contribute to 
bias. The rule is that when a probability reaches some critically low 
va 1 ue itis equated to zero. The thresho 1d heuristic is based on the 
work of Herbert Simon concerning procedural rationality. Slovic et al 
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(1977) used the threshold heuristic in order to explain why people may 
refuse to buy insurance against low probability hazards. The threshold 
heuristic is also supported byKunreuther et al (1978) in their field 
survey of the insurance decisions of 3,000 households. 
The availability heuristic in combination with the threshold 
heuristic may lead to disaster myopia. Guttentag and Herring (1986, p 
4) argue that the subjective probability of a shock becomes a negative 
function of the length of time since the last shock and at some point 
is treated as if it were zero. A similar situation may be arising in 
the euronote market. As Guttentag and Herring (1986, p 4) point out: 
'Disaster myopia leads decision makers to allow the shock 
exposure of their firms to rise and the ability of their 
firms to withstand shocks to decline. In consequence, 
insolvency exposure grows as the period since the last shock 
lengthens. If this pattern is widespread among firms, the 
entire system becomes more vulnerable to shocks and to a 
possible financial crisis' 
To the extent that pricing in the euronote market is based on disaster 
myopic practices, it is possible that the growth of the euronote market 
may indeed contribute to an increase in systemic risk. 
The disaster myopia hypothesis is, however, only of limited use as 
an explanation of insolvency exposure. In a similar vein the 
availability and threshold heuristics are of only limited use as an 
explanation of disaster myopia itself. As Guttentag and Herring fully 
appreciate, it is impossible to demonstrate ex ante excessive insolvency 
exposure to shocks of unknown probability. It is still impossible after 
the shock has occurred. If excessive insolvency exposure is non- 
demonstratable then so is disaster myopia. Even so, valid judgements 
(although inconclusive) can still be made on both topics. As Guttentag 
and Herring explain (1984, p 4): 
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'Many diseases have been known by their symptoms, and 
sometimes by the conditions associated with the symptoms, 
well before the pathogenic substance could be identified by a 
definitive diagnostic test. While a definite test for 
disaster myopia is probably impossible, we know many of its 
symptoms and the conditions that encourage it. For example, 
a lack of information about shock exposures is a good 
indication that no thought has been given to the probability 
that a shock will occur. From a policy standpoint, however, 
it is less important to recognise the symptoms of disaster 
myopia than to understand the conditions that encourage it' 
As far are our own thesis is concerned, it may not be possible to 
identify conclusively the existence of disaster myopia in the euronote 
market, but we may be able to identify the symptoms, and understand the 
conditions that encourage it. 
9.4.3 Conditions which may be conducive to disaster myopia 
Disaster myopia is a perceptual bias that Guttentag and Herring 
associate with two heuristics commonly used to deal with uncertainty. 
This perceptual bias will contribute to an increase in insolvency 
exposure if the exposure toleration to potential shocks appears to be 
profitable. Under the disaster myopia hypothesis, the incentive to 
increase insolvency exposure rises as anticipated returns increase. It 
is argued (1986, p 5) that uncertainty may, at least to a certain 
degree, be converted into risk through investment in information. 
However, the conditions that encourage disaster myopia also discourage 
the accumulation of information required to convert uncertainty i nto 
risk. Some of these conditions are identified. 
If decision makers believe they can reduce their exposures quickly 
should a shock arise, it is unlikely that they will commit substantial 
resources for investment in information. Where there is a certain 
amount of flexibility in exposure management, decision makers may not 
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see the need for increased investment in information. Such 
'flexibility' has traditionally been provided through the establishment 
of revocable commitments: the policy of keeping options open by taking 
positions that the bank believes can be reversed or shifted at short 
noti ce. 
Unfortunately, attempts to deal with uncertainty by making 
revocable commitments usually fail, because they are subject to the 
fallacy of composition. Although short maturities may protect a single 
creditor that has superior information and can shift exposure to other 
banks before they perceive the danger, the strategy cannot protect all 
creditors. Exposure is merely shifted around the system, it is not 
reduced and does not leave the system. In this sense, systemic risk is 
not reduced. 
A bank may commit insufficient resources for investment in 
information if it believes that it will receive government assistance 
should a shock arise, thereby insulating it from the full force of the 
shock. This is known as moral hazard. The existence of a lender of 
last resort (LLR) in fact, or belief, may actually lead banks to 
increase their exposures in the belief that in times of crisis they will 
be 'bailed out'. Banks may, therefore, be encouraged to disregard the 
probability of shocks. Guttentag and Herring (1986, p 6) argue that 
international banks may assume that: 
'... the chances of getting ... protection are better if they 'herd', keeping insolvency exposure, especially capital 
ratios and exposures to individual countries, roughly in line 
with those of their peers. Herding converts any major 
problem into a problem for the whole banking system, raising 
the spectre of a general financial crisis if the government 
fails to assist the banks' 
410 
The syndication process in the eurocredit market may be taken as 
signs of this herding instinct amongst international banks although no 
evidence was found in our initial fieldwork research to indicate that 
underwriters are assuming more risk for this reason. 
Compensation systems for managers that emphasise short-term 
performance can also discourage investment in information as regards 
low-frequency shocks. There will be little incentive for deci si onmakers 
to commit substantial resources for investment in information if such 
resources could be invested in short-run profit maximisation, for both 
the firm and the manager. Compensation systems may encourage 
decisionmakers to increase their own incomes by increasing the exposure 
of their firm to low frequency, high hazard shocks, while shielding 
themselves personally from the impact of the shock. The less frequent 
the shock and the higher the deci si onmaker's Job mobility, the greater 
will be the disparity between the exposure of the decisionmaker and the 
exposure of his firm. Even where shock probabilities are perceived 
without bias, the personal interests of decisionmakers may lead them to 
increase the insolvency exposure of their firms. 
Al 1 these factors are part of the process by which Guttentag and 
Herring argue an institution becomes increasingly vulnerable to 
insolvency shocks. 
9.4.4 Competition and the growth of liability management 
Competition can increase tendencies towards disaster myopia in two 
related ways: 
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'First, competitive markets make it impossible for lenders 
that are not disaster myopic to price loans as if there were 
a finite probability of a major shock when banks that are 
disaster myopic price them as if that probability were zero 
... Second, if international banks are apparently earning 
returns above the competitive level (disregarding the need 
for reserves against future shocks), they will encourage new 
entry by equally myopic banks, which will tend to erode those 
returns' (Guttentag and Herring, 1986, p 14). 
By placing inadequate (or no) capital against potential losses in 
the market, international banks can increase their financial returns. 
Such practices can give a false impression of the profitability of the 
market. Indeed, because of the competitiveness of most international 
financial markets, with negligible barriers to entry, returns can only 
be maintained if lenders either allow their capital positions to decline 
(or their exposure to funding shocks to rise) or forego the collection 
of an uncertainty premium for bearing the hazards of exposure to a major 
shock. It is interesting to note here that respondents in the semi- 
structured interviews claimed it was not possible to price a facility to 
reflect value as the deal would almost certainly go to a competitor. 
However, lest their analysis be viewed as 20-20 hindsight regarding 
shocks that have already occurred, Guttentag and Herring (1986, p 16) 
next turn their attention to a type of exposure that has not yet 
generated a crisis (a type of exposure which is particularly relevant to 
the euronote market): exposure to a funding shock. This risk was 
identified in the semi-structured interviews as being particularly 
hazardous for the euronote market. Where underwriters' liquidity is 
insufficient to meet a call for funds at a time of falling prices (i. e. 
where notes are unsellable in the market) a funding crisis could arise. 
Since the early 1960s, major banks have become increasingly 
dependent on liability mangement rather than asset management to 
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regulate their liquidity positions. They depend on their ability to 
borrow (as well as their abi 1 ity to 1 iquidate assets) to meet unexpected 
cash needs. This trend towards liability management has brought with 
it implications for funding shocks. As Guttentag and Herring (1986, p 
20) reveal: 
'The more a bank depends on liability management, the more 
vulnerable it is to a bank-specific funding shock associated 
with a decline in the market's confidence in that bank's 
solvency. Its survival rests on its ability to place new 
liabilities at least equal to the amount by which maturing 
liabilities exceed maturing and readily saleable assets' 
If depositors are unwilling to roll-over existing claims then a 
bank may be forced to access the LLR (in the euronote market there is no 
lender of last resort, although domestic banking authorities may act as 
such in times of crisis). Substantial borrowings from the LLR may, 
however, provide an adverse signal to the market and other sources of 
finance may dry up. 
To the extent that a bank practicing liability management depends 
on access to an LLR when other sources are no longer available, the 
bank's exposure to a funding shock will rise the more it has to borrow 
from the LLR. If borrowings from the LLR become excessive this may lead 
to an unacceptable level of social subsidisation for the bank. The LLR 
may, therefore, take complete control. A case in point here is the 
Continental Illinois episode (see Continental Illinois Corporation 
Prospectus, 24th August 1984 for a full exposition). 
There is, to an extent, an economic rationale (if only a short term 
one) for banks to expose themselves to funding shocks through the 
practice of liability management. It is more economical for banks to 
issue their own liabilities to meet funding requirements than to hold 
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liquid assets on their books. The margin of interest between liquid and 
illiquid assets is substantial. It is more expensive for banks to hold 
liquid assets on their books for long periods of time to be used when 
needed than it is to issue their own 1 iabil ities as and when the need 
arises. Naturally, this requires the existence of a wel 1-developed 
market for the bank's own 1 iabil ities. 
Guttentag and Herring (1986, p 26) admit that they cannot 
demonstrate that the probability of a contagious liquidity shock exceeds 
some uncomfortable level, let alone that such a shock will occur. They 
do contend, however, that: 
'... exposure to such shocks has increased markedly over the 
last two decades. This reflects the increasing dependence of 
banks on markets in which they can sell their liabilities to 
meet their liquidity needs ... We also know that this increase in exposure to liquidity shocks has occurred under 
condi ti ons conducive to di aster myopia' (1986, p 26). 
In the euronote market, the use of liability management to fund 
commitments of anything from three to fifteen years may prove to be a 
particularly hazardous policy in times of financial crisis. 
9.4.5 Disaster myopia and the euronote market 
The main message of the Guttentag and Herring thesis is their 
contention that banks tend to underestimate or ignore low probability 
shocks that could have major adverse effects. They attribute this to a 
general human tendency to be myopic about low-probability shocks, as 
well as to accounting systems that encourage short planning horizons, 
competitive markets that force banks to ignore such shocks in pricing 
credit, the belief in the existence of government support in times of 
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crisis that encourages moral hazard, and other factors such as liability 
management. All of these factors are relevant to the euronote market. 
In the euronote market, underwriters have to fix a price for the 
facility. It may be that they employ an ROA methodology to calculate 
the returns under different funding scenarios. If this is so then 
underwriters may perceive that they are making adequate returns, at 
least under certain scenarios. The euronote underwriter may perceive 
the probability of ever having to fund the facility completely (or to a 
great extent) as so small that the potential shock of having to do so is 
underestimated or even ignored. Returns may, therefore, be calculated 
under low (and possibly zero) funding scenarios. Under such scenarios, 
using an ROA methodology, returns may be artificially inflated. 
Even if an ROA methodology is not employed by some banks in the 
market, they may be forced to forego the collection of an appropriate 
uncertainty premium for fear of losing business to other disaster myopic 
competitors. 
The fact that disaster myopia is associated with states of 
uncertainty provides us with a methodological dilemma. As Guttentag and 
Herring (1986, p 27) emphasise: 
'... when shock probabilities are governed by uncertainty, 
there is no objective way, even in principle, to determine ex 
ante that a bank is excessively exposed' 
As far as the euronote market is concerned, al 1 we can do is to try to 
determine whether or not the conditions under which underwriters are 
fixing the prices of the facilities are conducive to disaster myopia. 
It should be stated at this juncture that the disaster myopia hypothesis 
may be reconcilable with our other (mutually independent) hypothesis for 
current pricing in the euronote market (relationship pricing). The 
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fact that underwriters may be pricing to gain returns from other parts 
of the relationship does not mean that they are not disaster myopic. 
The 1 atter will be determined by the conditions under which the pricing 
strategies are implemented: that is whether an ROA or ROX methodology 
(or some other form of return calculation is used); whether internal 
exposure limits are fixed; whether customer profitability systems exist; 
whether reserves are compiled against exposures and whether funding 
sources are diversified etc. 
9.5 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter we have reviewed financial and bank pricing 
literature in order to establish hypotheses to explain the low pricing 
of euronote facilities identified in Chapters 7 and 8. In reviewing the 
pricing literature the qualitative and quantitative data obtained 
through the semi-structured interviews have been used to eliminate 
improbable pricing strategies and to add support for more feasible 
hypotheses. In particular, the existing literature relating to 
'disaster myopia' has been reviewed. Disaster myopia provides one 
feasible explanation for the existence of a systemic gap in the euronote 
market. 
Two hypotheses to explain pricing in the market have thus been 
identified. They can be stated as follows: 
1 that current pricing in the euronote market is determined by 
customer relationship factors 
2 that current pricing in the euronote market is determined by 
disaster myopia on the part of euronote underwriters. 
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It should be stressed that these two hypotheses are perfectly 
compatible. It may be that both the customer relationship and disaster 
myopia combine to influence prices in the euronote market. To test 
these hypotheses it will be necessary to move into a more naturalistic 
research mode. The only way to determine whether conditions conducive 
to disaster myopia exist in the euronote market is to spend some time as 
an observer in the market. Similarly if we are to judge whether the 
return on the customer relationship provides justification for such low 
returns in this market it will be necessary to observe how customer 
profitability systems operate within the banks. Such objectives can be 
achieved through open observation and for this reason the author spent 
some time as a participant observer in two banks in the market. The 
results of this period of observation and its implications for our 
hypotheses are discussed in the following chapter. 
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Appendix 9.1 
Return on the customer relationship 
Pi - rdi ((1-R)j + CijLij - pdi + (Si(di) - Fi(di)j 
where Pi = net earnings on the customer relationship, 
r = the market rate of interest (adjusted for risk and net 
of costs) on loans and investments which do not involve 
a deposit relationship, 
di a deposit of ith customer, net of loan proceeds, 
R = ratio of the bank's cash and legal reserves to its 
demand deposits, 
(1-R) = proportion of deposits which can'be used'to acquire 
earning assets 
Lij = a jth size loan to the ith customer, 
Cij = contract rate of interest charged on the jth size 
loan to the ith customer, 
p = the rate of interest paid on demand deposits, 
Si(di) = charges to the customer for services, routine and otherwise, 
Fi(di) = cost to the bank for services, routine and otherwise, 
rendered to the customer, 
i = subscript denoting the ith customer 
j = subscript denoting the size of loan to the ith customer. 
If(Pi \ar, the return on the customer relationship is equal to that on tLij) 
loans and investments made at the market rate, r, to non-customers. 
CHAPTER 10 
THE PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION PERIOD -A TEST OF THE HYPOTHESES 
10.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to gather data as a participant 
observer in the field in order to help support or reject the hypotheses 
identified in the previous chapter. If disaster myopia is identified as 
the main force behind pricing in the euronote market then it may be that 
the systemic gap which has emerged in this market will continue to 
widen. In this sense the widening gap may be akin to Van Horne's 
financial bubble which continues to expand until the bubble finally 
bursts initiating a financial crisis. If this is found to be so, it 
will be necessary to suggest methods for closing or at least reducing 
the systemic gap, possibly through the imposition of stringent 
regu 1 atory contro 1 s. 
If relationship pricing is identified as the main force behind 
pricing levels in the euronote market it will be necessary to determine 
the ability of the banks to employ such a strategy effectively. To do 
so banks must be able to judge the level of return from the customer 
portfolio against the level of risk inherent in that portfolio. This 
requires the establishment of sophisticated customer profitability 
systems as well as a first hand knowledge of the necessity of providing 
certain products at very low prices in order to maintain relationships. 
Both points are important if a relationship pricing strategy is to be 
employed effectively. Without sophisticated customer profitability 
systems any relationship pricing strategy will be based on guesstimates 
and uncertainty. Without a knowledge of the importance of providing 
certain products at low prices for the maintenance of the customer 
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relationship, banks may be providing unprofitable services which may 
generally be viewed as transactional items by customers and, as such, 
relatively unimportant for the maintenance of the relationship. 
To investigate these issues time was spent as a participant 
observer in two banks in London. It was decided that our research would 
be most rewarded by spending time in a bank that was a large player in 
the euronote market and a bank that was a smal I player in the market. 
It was between these two categories of banks that the greatest division 
of opinion was found regarding price strategies and measures of return 
in the earlier semi-structured interviews. 
By referring to a bank as a large player in the market no 
assumption is made about the actual size of the bank as measured by 
capital or assets. Rather, size refers here to the amount of 
underwriting facilities that the bank has signed. A large player is 
defined as any bank that has signed over US $500 million of facilities. 
A smal 1 player is defined as any bank that has signed under US $200 
million of facilities. 
10.2 The Sample 
The choice of which banks to observe could not be made randomly. 
As indicated in Chapter 6 most banks in the euronote market are 
suspicious of outsiders and are reluctant to give interviews. To allow 
an outsider to observe the actions and practices of their euronote team 
on a day-to-day basis was, understandably, not an option that many were 
prepared to consider. 
Because of the author's working relationship with National 
Westminster Bank plc, County NatWest, one of the largest players in the 
euronote market, was willing to meet our request to observe the actions 
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and habits of its euronote team and to examine the systems in place 
throughout the bank to analyse customer revenues and, as such, County 
NatWest was used as a case study representing one of the large players 
in the market. 
Unfortunately, all of the smaller players approached declined our 
request to observe their euronote underwriters over a number of days. 
Most thought the exercise to be futile given their only minor presence 
in the market. Indeed, none of the smaller players who were approached 
actually had a euronote team in the same way that the 1 arger pl ayers 
did. Any underwriting or trading was conducted from the floating rate 
asset desk. Dean Witter Capital Markets did, however, allow us to 
observe their operations over a few non-consecutive days. 
Before discussing our period of observation in these two banks it 
is important to understand first some of the facets and pitfalls of 
using a participant observation methodology. 
10.3 Participant Observation as a Data Collection Tool 
Any attempt to obtain an insider's view presents the researcher 
with the first of his problems - that of gaining entry into the group. 
The researcher needs to enter the group or setting in such a way as to 
disturb as little as possible the lives of those being studied. The way 
in which the researcher decides to enter the group wi ll depend on the 
characteristics of the people under study, and it will vary from field 
situation to field situation. 
There are basically four roles open to the participant observer: 
complete participant; participant as observer; observer as participant; 
and complete observer. The choice of participant role requires a 
cautious anticipation of the nature of the group, its accessibility and 
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openness, research exigencies such as time and other resources, as well 
as the personal qualities of the researcher. In the role of participant 
as observer, both researcher and subjects are aware of the fact that 
theirs is a fieldwork relationship. The role of complete participant, 
on the other hand, involves complete pretence and so incurs the greatest 
risk. Gold (1958) states: 
'The complete participant... must bind the mask of pretence 
to himself or stand the risk of exposure or failure. ' 
However, because of the very competitive nature of most business 
organisations (especially investment banks) it would be on rare 
occasions only that a researcher would be permitted to adopt such a 
role. Indeed, the author found some initial distrust of his motives for 
conducting his research, even under the role of participant as observer. 
There was undoubtedly an early fear that the author may be a spy, or use 
the information gained for commercial profit. It is thus essential that 
the researcher is able to command the trust of those he is observing. 
Hughes (1960, p xi) observed: 
'The unending dialectic between the role of members 
(participant) and stranger (observer and reporter) is 
essential to the very concept of fieldwork, and this all 
participant observers have in common: they must develop a 
dialectic relationship between being researchers and being 
parti ci pants. ' 
Ironically, it is this very role of participant which may 
inevitably affect the role of observer. By taking a role the researcher 
may well affect the structure of the interactions being studied. Indeed 
the researcher too may be affected by his participation in the group. 
There is no one precaution he can take against this occurrence. The 
only safeguard lies in the ability of the researcher to keep in mind the 
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objectives of his research while at the same time being able to assess 
his own effect upon it. 
10.4 Gaining Entry 
As noted, it is important to gain entrance to the group with as 
little disruption as possible. To do this it was necessary to contact 
the head of the euronote team (or head of the relevant division). Thi s 
was to be the only person who had complete knowledge of our intentions. 
Such a person is often referred to as the 'gatekeeper' (as explained in 
Chapter 6). As contact had already been made with the respective 
gatekeepers in the initial fieldwork stage, contact was made this time 
by phone. A time and date was fixed to begin the period of observation. 
With both banks, employees were told simply that the author was a 
research student trying to gain information on the operations of the 
euronote market. 
10.5 Presenting the Data 
Qualitative data and analytic procedures, in contrast to 
quantitative ones, are difficult to present adequately. Statistical 
data can be summarised in tables, and descriptive measures of various 
kinds and the methods by which they are handled can often be accurately 
reported in the space required to print a formula. However, with 
participant observation, the data do not lend themselves to such 
straightforward presentation. As Becker (1979, p 322) points out: 
'The data of participant observation ... frequently consists 
of many different kinds of observations which cannot be 
simply categorised and counted without losing some of their 
value as evidence. ' 
In an attempt to tackle these problems Becker (1979) argues that 
participant observers should provide a description of the 'natural 
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history' of their conclusions, presenting the evidence as it comes to 
their attention. The term 'natural history' implies not the 
presentation of every datum, but only the characteristic forms data 
assumed at every stage of the research. This involves description of 
the form that data took and exceptions to that form in presenting the 
various statements of findings and the inferences and conclusions drawn 
from them. As Becker (1979, p 322) states: 
'The reader would be able, if this method were used, to 
follow the details of the analysis and to see how and on what 
basis any conclusion was reached. This would give the 
reader, as do present models of statistical presentation, 
opportunity to make his own judgement as to the adequacy of 
the proof and the degree of confidence to be assigned the 
conclusion. I 
In this study the results of our period as participant observer in 
the euronote market are presented on a natural historical basis. This 
approach all ows for a steady compi 1 ati on of the res ul ts, whilst al 1 owing 
the reader to compare the similarities and differences between the two 
banks studied. 
A word is in order regarding the use of quotations from field 
notes. These quotations serve several purposes. As previously noted, 
they allow the reader to see how the field operations were conducted. 
In addition they provide a basis on which the reader may consider 
alternative formulations to the ones presented. 
Before presenting the results of this section of our research, it 
is first necessary to describe briefly the two research environments. 
10.6 County NatWest 
The structure of County NatWest's euronote operations has changed 
since our study began. Prior to December 1986 County NatWest's euronote 
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team was separate from its other money/capital markets teams. Since 
December 1986 the team has been restructured and expanded to take 
account of FRNs and euro-CDs, as well as euronotes and euro-CP. The 
entire team now consists of over twenty people, comprising an 
originations group, a trading group and a sal es group. County NatWest 
is a member of many tender panels but will only bid for paper at levels 
at which firm investor demand has been identified. As such, little 
paper is won through tender panels as other banks take up paper at lower 
levels. Most paper is won through dealerships. 
Initial client contact is made mainly through existing commercial 
banking relationships (nearly 80 per cent by this method), and the rest 
mainly by direct marketing by the originations group of the euronote 
team (direct approach to issuers with existing euro-CP programmes), 
although a few syndications are accepted. If the result of initial 
client contact by the commercial banker is favourable, the client is 
referred to the originations group of the euronote team, who will fix a 
time convenient for the client to meet with the team. If the resultant 
meeting proves positive (i. e. if the client wishes to issue paper) a 
date is fixed for the issuance of the paper and, where the dealership 
method of placement is to be used, a price is also fixed. If the tender 
panel method of placement is to be employed then County NatWest will act 
as tender panel agents, advising the client on which banks (or 
investment houses) might be preferable to provide the distribution 
channels that the client wishes to establish. The final decision on 
which banks to invite into the tender panel lies with the client. 
County NatWest will also arrange to underwrite any commitment which 
the client may wish to have. While a proportion of the underwriting 
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business is placed with the parent bank (National Westminster Bank plc), 
County NatWest will attempt to sell down (syndicate) as much of the 
commitment as possible. Although they have in the past accepted 
underwriting business without the possibility of placing paper, 
underwriting business is usually no longer accepted unless the 
opportunity to place paper is guaranteed. 
County NatWest will only guarantee not to sell paper to 
professional traders if it has obtained that paper through a dealership. 
In such cases it will always make a market in its client's paper. This 
means that if end investors wish to liquidate their paper before 
maturity, County NatWest will always bid for it, or if investors wish to 
purchase more paper, County NatWest will always offer it (if it is 
carrying paper on its books) or ask the issuer to issuer more. 
Once the paper 'hits' the market (is issued) it is County NatWest's 
policy never to 'short' a deal (sell paper before it has bought it) and 
will only rarely go 'long' on a deal (buy paper without ready investor 
demand for that paper). 
If County NatWest wishes to obtain paper from an issuer with whom 
it has no dealer relationship, its traders will bid the issuer 
(determine the level at which the issuer is prepared to sell a certain 
quantity of paper). The traders will then inform the salesmen of the 
guaranteed rate at which paper may be obtained. Salesmen will notify 
potential investors to purchase paper once firm investor demand has been 
identified. 
In some cases, however, investors may approach the salesmen for 
paper of a particular quality and maturity. In this scenario the 
traders will be told to bid for such paper. In return for flexibility 
on maturity the issuer will often be more rigid on price. 
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10.7 Dean Witter Capital Markets 
Dean Witter has a far smaller presence in the euronote market than 
County NatWest. It has no defined euronote team. Rather, the 'team' 
consists of six to seven people who also manage the floating rate note 
(FRN) desk. Unlike County NatWest who relies mainly on its parent's 
relationships with customers for business, Dean Witter, as a securities 
house, has no commercial banking relationship with clients. 
Because of its far smaller capital base, Dean Witter cannot commit 
large amounts of funds to underwriting business. It thus takes most of 
its euronote business from syndications rather than from winning 
mandates from existing customers. Although it prefers to participate 
in deals where placement business is available, it will participate in 
syndications where placement business is not on offer. 
Dean Witter sees itself as an innovator rather than a market 
leader. It accepts euronote business to keep its syndications lines 
open and to keep its name in the market. 
10.8 The Participant Observation Period 
10.8.1 Format 
As the time spent observing the actions of those engaged in 
euronote operations in Dean Witter was short compared with the time 
spent observing the actions and operations of County NatWest's euronote 
team, the results of our period at Dean Witter are not presented 
separately. Rather, the results of our period of observation at County 
NatWest are documented and comparisons are made with Dean Witter where 
applicable. Where individual names are used these have been changed to 
ensure anonymity. 
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10.8.2 Getting to know the team 
Although the Group Director of County NatWest's euronote team was 
aware of my links with the parent bank and, in general , the purpose of 
the observation period, I was introduced to the members of the team 
simply as a university researcher studying the operational aspects of 
the euronote market. It was felt that such an introduction would 
prevent any feelings of parental overseeing of their operations. 
After a short 'settling in' period I seemed to be accepted as just 
another face around the office. It was important to identify each 
member's role and responsibilities within the team. The first stage of 
the observation period was spent simply doing this and getting to know 
the team members. The fact that I appeared to have the boss's approval 
undoubtedly helped as far as acceptance into the team was concerned and, 
as such, little resistance was encountered. I was all owed to move 
freely amongst the team, observing their actions and taking notes. 
Again it was decided that a tape recorder should not be used but that 
simple note taking would probably allow for more open conversation. 
By contrast, my movements were restricted at Dean Witter, with the 
observation period thus being more akin to unstructured interviews than 
observation of actions and participation within the team. My presence 
was tolerated but never totally accepted. 
10.8.3 Business sources 
In evidence of the data gathered in the semi-structured interview 
stage, the source of most underwriting business was found to be the 
parent bank in the case of County NatWest. The overall group's 
relationship with a customer is briefly recorded on what are referred to 
as 'relationship sheets'. Reference to County NatWest's relationship 
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sheets revealed that almost 80 per cent of the investment bank's 
underwriting customers already had established relationships with one or 
more other sections within the National Westminster Banking Group. The 
source of such business invariably came from one of these other sections 
within the group with which the customer had an established 
relationship. Interestingly, hardly any customers with which the parent 
bank had a relationship actually approached County NatWest directly. 
Reference to County NatWest's success sheets (referred to by 
members of the team as the 'hit lists') showed a high 90 per cent 
success rate, judged on the percentage of inter-group introductions 
which actually resulted in the establishment of a euronote programme. 
Of the programmes established through such inter-group introductions, 
nearly 90 per cent were established as dealer-led programmes as opposed 
to tender panel programmes. 
Of the 20 per cent (approximately) of County NatWest's euronote 
business which emanated from outside the group as little as five per 
cent originated through participation in other bank-1 ed programmes (a 1i 
tender panel). The remaining 15 per cent came from direct approaches by 
potential customers, again almost all of which was tender panel based. 
'Hit lists' showed a far lower success rate in this category (only 30 
per cent) than where existing bank customers were referred by other bank 
departments (90 per cent success rate). 
By contrast, almost 100 per cent of Dean Witter's euronote business 
came from participation in other bank-led syndications. 
These statistics are presented in Table 10.1. 
One of the most striking statistics from Table 10.1 is that of 
success rates; 90 per cent of all inter-group introductions were 
successful compared to only 30 per cent of direct approaches and as 
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little as 10 per cent of all syndication offers as far as County NatWest 
is concerned. 
Table 10.1 Sources of euronote business and success rates 
Per cent 
Inter-group Direct approach Syndication 
County NatWest 
Source of introduction 80 15 5 
Existing relationships 98 2 Nil 
Success rate 90 30 10 
Dealer-led 90- 5- Nil 
Tender panel 10+ 95+ 100 
Dean Witter 
Source of introduction Nil Nil 100 
Existing relationships na na 5 
Success rate na na 80 
Dealer-led na na Nil 
Tender panel na na 100 
Notes: 1 The figures for Dean Witter are estimates obtained 
through the observation period but have not been 
validated through observation of customer records 
2 The statistics for tender panels relate to where the bank 
was asked to underwrite and not just bid for notes on an 
uncommitted basis 
Evidence was sought to explain the statistics of Table 10.1. As 
far as the high rate of success of inter-group introduction was 
concerned, the overriding factor seemed to be the desire to meet 
customers' requirements in order to secure the maintenance of the 
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relationship. A comment by one of the members of County NatWest's 
underwriting team (Mr X) was revealing in this respect: 
'We're not like a Shearson or a Merrill where most of the 
business is on the nose [transactional] we also have the 
bank's [National Westminster Bank plc] relationships to think 
about when deciding whether to do a deal or not. Its better 
to cut a deal [underprice] than to see the relationship go 
elsewhere. ' 
The philosophy of relationship pricing appeared to have a major 
bearing on deciding whether to accept underwriting business or not, but 
as Mr X went on to say: 
'Don't get me wrong, we won't underwrite at al 1 costs. We 
look at the relationship and if it's worth it we' 11 do it, if 
not then we won't, unless of course the bank gives us a hold 
harmless letter. ' 
It was this latter point which was found to be significant from our 
point of view. Although the risk/return characteristics of underwriting 
a deal were viewed on a bank-wide customer relationship basis, County 
NatWest were still prepared to underwrite euronotes where they believed 
the customer relationship did not justify this action, given that a 
'hold-harmless letter' was provided by National Westminster Bank plc. A 
hold-harmless letter basically states that in the event of default the 
provider of the letter will accept the risk of the deal to which the 
letter relates. It is provided to ensure inter-departmental co- 
operation as far as customer relationships are concerned. Such letters 
are provided reluctantly as the risk remains with the provider of the 
letter while the return is gained by the acceptor of the letter. It was 
discovered during the observation period that as much as 10 per cent of 
County NatWest's inter-group introduced euronote business is conducted 
against hold-harmless letters. 
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Reasons were sought for the use of hol d-harml ess 1 etters. It 
appeared at first illogical that if the customer relationship did not 
justify the deal that the parent bank should wish to provide hold- 
harmless letters in the first place. Mr X explained: 
'Sometimes the customer rel ationship does justify the deal on 
a group wide basis, but not for us. If underwriting fees are 
the only income we're getting from a customer then the deal 
is usually not worth it by itself. The bank takes al 1 the 
milk and honey and then expects us to chew the crud just to 
keep the goodies flowing. Sure, we'll put the deal together 
but unless there's profitable spinoffs from the deal we feel 
that the bank should take the risks, not just the profits. 
This way we're happy, the customer's happy and the bank's 
happy. ' 
It became apparent that despite assurances given during the semi- 
structured interview stage, underwriting business was occasionally 
accepted without placement business against a hold-harmless letter where 
the overall customer relationship justified it. 
The importance of the customer relationship in deciding whether or 
not to underwrite a deal is also borne out by other figures in Tabl e 
10.1. Of the direct customer approaches that County NatWest receive to 
underwrite euronotes only 30 per cent actually result in a deal being 
struck. Even more striking is the fact that of all the offers received 
to syndicate a deal as little as 10 per cent are accepted. The main 
reason given to explain these figures was that without an established 
customer relationship, underwriting euronotes was usually not worth it 
when viewed on a transactional basis. Direct customer approaches, while 
often offering placement business, are usually tender-panel based. Even 
with the opportunity to place paper, profits from this source were seen 
to be insufficient usually to boost fees to acceptable levels. As far 
as syndication offers were concerned, placement opportunities were 
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usually unavailable and with no customer relationship underwriting fees 
alone did not usually justify the risks incurred. 
In sharp contrast to County NatWest, Dean Witter gains all of its 
euronote business from syndications, of which approximately only 5 per 
cent includes existing relationships. Again, in sharp contrast to 
County NatWest, the majority of syndicate offers are accepted 
(approximately 80 per cent). Two reasons were found to explain this: 
firstly, returns on underwriting business are calculated on a straight 
RDA basis; secondly, there is a fear that if euronote underwriting 
business is refused, other more profitable syndication business may not 
be offered. The reasons for the diversity of underwriting practices 
between County NatWest and Dean Witter became more apparent as the 
arrangement of a major deal by County NatWest was observed. 
10.8.4 Arranging the facility 
During the period of observation the opportunity arose to witness 
the structuring and syndication of a major deal. County NatWest had 
been approached by their parent bank on behalf of an existing customer, 
to structure a revolving underwriting facility for £100 million. County 
NatWest were to be lead managers, with sole responsibility for placing 
the paper with investors. The situation was explained by Mr Y. another 
member of the originations team: 
'On the face of it, it's a good deal. We're to be sole 
placing agents as well as lead managers - that's good. It's 
a strong name across the group: some 1 endi ng, some 1 easi ng, 
some foreign and al 1 the transmission, but it's the first 
time we've seen anything and it's the first time they've been 
to the market. The paper isn't going to be easy to place 
straight off: we'll probably have to tap the first tranche. 
The parent has indicated that they don't want more than 15 
per cent so that means syndication and without placement 
that's not going to be easy, we can forget the big guns'. 
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Remuneratively the deal appeared to be lucrative: al 1 the 
arrangement fees; some of the front-end fees and al 1 the placement 
profits; the facility fees would go to the underwriters. From a 
syndication point of view it was going to be difficult. The name was 
relatively unknown to the market which meant that paper could be left 
with the underwriters, hence Mr Y's suggestion that the first tranche 
may have to be tapped into the market bit by bit rather than all at one 
go. Perhaps more importantly, however, the potential underwriters would 
have no opportunity to boost returns by placement profits unless County 
NatWest was prepared to conceed some placement business to the 
underwriters. The consensus of opinion amongst the originations team 
was that, on this basis, the larger players in the market would not be 
interested in joining the syndication. Marketing efforts were, 
therefore, to be aimed at the smaller players in the market. 
A meeting was arranged with customers at Drapers Gardens (head 
office of County NatWest) to discuss requirements. Customers were keen 
that confidentiality should be maintained at this stage and so our only 
information from the meeting had to be obtained second hand from members 
of the originations team once the meeting had been concluded. 
It transpired that the RUF was to be used for acquisition purposes. 
Customers wished to ensure that should a major acquisition be identified 
in the next few years that sufficient funds would be immediately 
available at the cheapest possible price. Their balance sheet could not 
possibly carry such funds in current liabilities as this would result in 
a negative net current assets position which would in turn severely 
affect their cash flow. As such, the amount sought could not be carried 
in overdrafts. Another alternative was a medium-term loan (MTL) but 
this would be expensive and unless funds were drawn immediately the non- 
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utilisation fees would be prohibitive. The only feasible route was a 
standby commitment linked to market funding. This could be carried in 
creditors over one year on the balance sheet so unaffecting the 
company's working capital, but funding could also be taken when required 
at the market rate. 
As the RUF was to be primarily a standby facility, pricing was 
structured to provide a low undrawn return and a higher drawn return. 
This met customer's requirements as there was always the possibility 
that the RUF would never be drawn if a suitable acquisition was not 
identified. The next step was to apply a pricing structure to the 
facility and return to customers with the official offer document. 
10.8.4.1 Pricing the deal 
The procedure for pricing a RUF was documented in Chapter 2; the 
procedure observed at County NatWest was not dissimilar. There are two 
components to a RUF: the notes and the underwriting f aci 1 ity. Both have 
to be priced separately but with an understanding of how the pricing of 
one will impact on the other. If the notes are priced too high then the 
market will not buy them and they will be left with the underwriters. 
If the notes are priced too low they wi 11 be purchased by the market but 
the customer will complain that his funds are too expensive. Conversely 
if the strike offer yield (the price at which underwriters will purchase 
paper) is too low then underwriters will not join the syndication. 
It became apparent that once County NatWest had agreed to do the 
deal , the most important f actor as far as pricing was concerned, was the 
market. 
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The customer relationship dictated the decision to underwrite but 
the market invariably dictated the pricing of the deal. It went without 
saying, as far as the team at County NatWest was concerned, that pricing 
would at least have to better the cheapest form of finance the customer 
was already obtaining. In this case that meant bettering the rate the 
customer could obtain on acceptance credits. This rate turned out to be 
a flat yield of / per cent over the Eligible Bill Rate. If this rate 
could not be bettered then the deal would almost certainly be lost and 
the customer would look elsewhere. It was emphasised by the team leader 
that this was something that could not be allowed to happen given the 
strong relationship which this customer had with the Group. 
It became apparent, as expected, that there was no established 
procedure or formula for fixing the pricing levels of the separate 
components of a RUF. Much of the assessment is based on the euronote 
team's 'feel' for the present state of the market. From a financial 
point of view the important customer features appeared to be the sales 
turnover, pre-tax profit record and net tangible assets. It was on this 
criteria that (in the absence of a credit rating) the company's 
creditworthiness was generally assessed. 
Market records were then scanned, by accessing a market database, 
for prices at which similar sized companies had come to the market for 
similar amounts in the last few months. 
Finally, and perhaps most revealing of all, a value was sought for 
the customer relationship. Mr Y explained why and how this was done: 
'We already know that we, as a Group, do a lot for this name, 
it's a good customer, but we need to know whether its 
profitable or not. You'd be surprised by the number of good 
customers we have who we make Zilch out of. I can recall one 
occasion where we were approached to syndicate US $200 
mil 1 ion for a 'good customer' yet when we costed it out we 
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were 1 osing money. That al one pushed up the fees 
consider ably ... but we still kept the deal ... How 
do we 
cost a relationship? Well each part of the Group keeps its 
own records and these are brought together quarterly for each 
major name under what we call the Mucky Corp exercise [major 
UK corporate exercise]: that's all put onto a database in the 
tower but we can access it from here. It's only been going 
for about six months but it sure opens your eyes. ' 
Unfortunately, at this stage we were refused access to further 
information relating to the major UK corporate exercise. What was now 
apparent was that a major Group-wide profitability system had recently 
been established throughout the National Westminster Bank plc Group 
since mid-1987. As such it appeared that County NatWest at least had 
some idea of the value of the relationship when pricing the deal. 
Access to this information was made available at a1 ater stage of our 
research and is documented in Chapter Eleven. 
With all these factors taken into account the pricing structure for 
the RUF was agreed upon and the structure of the facility was documented 
in an 'offer document' which was subsequently sent to the customer, 
simply setting out the terms and conditions of the facility. 
In this case customers accepted the terms and conditions of the 
facility as set out in the offer document. The next step was to 
syndicate (or in market jargon to 'sell down') the deal. 
10.8.4.2 Selling down the deal 
Once the pricing structure of the f aci 1 ity had been agreed, the 
next step would normally have been to draw up an information memorandum 
to circulate to potential investors and underwriters. The information 
memorandum normally includes information relating to the 
creditworthiness of the borrower, any relevant legal clauses and a 
description of the borrower's business. In this case, however, where 
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difficulties were forseen in syndicating the deal without the 
opportunity to gain placement profits, members of the euronote team rang 
around potential underwriters in an initial attempt to raise interest in 
the forthcoming deal. 
The potential underwriters contacted were invariably the smaller 
players in the market. The strategy employed to raise interest in the 
deal on each occasion observed, was that of high returns to the 
underwriters despite the lack of placement business. Potential 
underwriters were informed of the forthcoming deal and emphasis was 
placed on the fact that the deal was primarily designed as a standby 
f aci 1 ity. It became apparent that members of the euronote team were 
using ROA as a marketing tool to these smal 1 er players in the market. 
Following this initial marketing exercise, the strategy of marketing a 
deal though the use of ROA was questioned. 
All members of the euronote team accepted that ROA did not provide 
a true calculation of return to an underwriter as it did not take into 
account the underwriter's actual exposure, only his return on assets 
actually funded. However, the consensus of opinion was that it was 
still a viable marketing tool. As Mr Y stated: 
'If it's a standby facility then you're probably going to be 
faced with a lengthy period of time where no funds are 
required. Now that boosts your return if you do have to 
fund. That's our argument for using ROA. It's up to the 
market whether it accepts it. ' 
To the extent that ROA provides a misleading measure of an 
underwriter's true return, as in practice a standby facility can be 
called at any time, the practice of marketing a facility on this basis 
could be seen as a feature of disaster myopia in the euronote market. 
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Following from this, members of the euronote team were asked 
whether such low returns would enable underwriters to accumulate 
sufficient capital to guard against an unforseen shock to the system. 
The response, generally, was that such a shock was highly unlikely 
especially given the stability of the market to date. Since no default 
had ever occurred in the euronote market members of the team found it 
difficult to envisage a major default occurring let alone a major shock 
to the entire system. To a certain extent this seeming unwillingness to 
account for the possi bi 1 ity of a shock to the system in the pricing of 
euronote facilities might be attributable to Tversky and Kahneman's 
(1982) availability and threshold heuristics discussed in Chapter 9. 
However, although members of the euronote team seemed prepared to 
market facilities on a ROA basis, facilities were only accepted at such 
low prices where the value of the customer relationship justified such 
low returns. This tends to contradict one facet of the disaster myopia 
hypothesis that banks will forgo the collection of an appropriate 
premium before losing business to other disaster myopic competitors. 
County NatWest were found to be prepared to lose such business if the 
value of the customer relationship did not justify the decision to do 
the deal. This is undoubtedly the result of profitability systems 
recently established throughout the Group. No such systems were found 
to exist in Dean Witter (although that is not to say categorically that 
they do not exist). 
Following the initial marketing exercise an information memorandum 
was compiled and distributed to potential investors and underwriters. 
This was followed by an invitation telex to potential underwriters, 
formally inviting them to participate in the facility. Appendix 10.1 
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contains summaries of a typical information memorandum and invitation 
telex along with a specimen timetable for the establishment of a RUF. 
10.8.4.3 Exposure management systems 
Although County NatWest would price a deal low for customer 
relationship purposes, the group's exposure to that customer was 
managed. The exposure systems in place were found to be customer, 
industry and country based, i. e. a RUF would not be provided if gearing 
for a particular customer was seen to be excessively high or if the 
group's exposure to a highly geared corporation was seen to be too high. 
In other words, individual customer exposure systems existed along the 
normal credit analysis lines. Industry and country exposure limits were 
also found to exist. However, there was no system in place to monitor 
the group's exposure to the euronote market itself. In a systemic 
crisis all sectors of the market would be affected. 
10.8.5 Presentation of results 
Since the author had been introduced as merely a researcher 
documenting the operations of the euronote market, it was not feasible 
to present the results to date to the euronote team. Rather, results 
were presented only to the head of department who was already aware of 
the total research effort. It was agreed that elements of disaster 
myopic practices were evident in the market, not least through the use 
of ROA as a marketing tool to syndicate facilities. The influence of 
the customer relationship was agreed to be a significant, indeed the 
major factor on the decision to underwrite a deal. However, in order to 
analyse the data used to determine the value of the customer 
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relationship it would be necessary to investigate the extent and 
structure of the profitability systems in existence throughout the bank. 
As for the existence of a systemic gap, it was stated that prior to 
the establishment of the major UK corporate exercise, pricing of 
euronote facilities paid little regard to the value of customer 
relationships. The overriding factor was the need to maintain existing 
relationships at all costs. During this period it was accepted that a 
systemic gap may well have developed within the euronote market even 
given other returns from the customer relationship. Many relationships 
were actually unprofitable even prior to the time at which the borrower 
entered the euronote market, but such relationships were virtually 
impossible to segregate from the profitable ones. Basically, the bank 
did not know the value of its relationships. 
Following the establishment of the major UK corporate exercise, it 
was now possible to segregate unprofitable relationships. In this sense 
the systemic gap may be more akin to Van Horne's financial balloon which 
will eventually deflate as prices increase for unprofitable 
relationships or as unprofitable deals are declined. 
10.9 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has served to out 1i ne how the peri ad as parti ci pant 
observer in the euronote market was conducted and has gathered evidence 
with which to test our two hypotheses, namely: 
1 that current pricing in the euronote market is determined by 
customer relationship factors 
2 that current pricing in the euronote market is determined by 
disaster myopia on the part of euronote underwriters 
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Evidence was gathered to support both of these hypotheses. 
Although the decision to underwrite, as far as County NatWest was 
concerned, appeared to be determined by customer relationship factors, 
the ability to syndicate deals at such low prices (once the decision to 
provide the facility has been taken) appeared to be at least partially 
attributable to disaster myopic factors. 
By marketing underwriting facilities though the use of ROA, County 
NatWest were able to justify the very low pricing levels attached to 
these facilities. Subsequently, underwriters participating in the 
syndicate were able to justify their participation on the same basis. 
Another influential factor as regards participation in syndicates 
appeared to be the smal i er players' fear of retribution by their 1 arger 
competitors if they refused to participate. The main concern here was 
that refusal to participate in a RUF may lead the larger banks to deny 
them participation in more 1 ucrati ve facilities. 
If deals continue to be sold down on a ROA basis the potential for 
wi deni ng'"the systemic gap increases. Although the pricing of an 
individual deal may be justifiable for an individual bank on a customer 
relationship basis, if that deal is syndicated in the market it is 
important that pricing can be justified to the market on an exposure 
basis. Until profitability systems are established throughout the 
market then the potential for systemic risk to increase through disaster 
myopic practices remains. 
The lack of a market exposure system could also leave banks 
vulnerable to the effects of a market crisis if facilities are agreed 
without regard to the group's exposure to the market itself as opposed 
to individual customers or segments of that market. 
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Despite the fact that our survey covered only two market 
participants, we would argue that these are t ypi cal of the two main 
cl asses of market participant: the 1 arge commercial bank-owned 
investment bank and the smaller independent securities house. As 
Appendix 6.5 showed, the market is dominated by the large commercial 
banks or their investment banking subsidiaries with the financial muscle 
to underwrite major deals, with the peripheral securities houses left to 
join in sub-participations. 
The findings of our period of observation in both County NatWest 
and Dean Witter are supportive of, and serve to explain many of the 
findings of our semi-structured interviews, e. g. why the 1 arge market 
players priced on a ROX basis, whereas the smal 1 er players tended to 
price on a ROA basis. In this sense, although our period of observation 
was spent in only two institutions, it builds on and serves to support 
information gathered in sixteen semi-structured interviews (excluding 
the Bank of England). 
Whilst each individual bank will have its own particular 
characteristics, the commercial banks in the capital/securities markets 
have generally entered to provide a full banking package to their 
customers and hence relationships play an important part in pricing 
policy. As such, the development of adequate profitability systems with 
which to price the overall relationship has relevance to each bank. 
However, even though profitability systems may exist they must be 
sufficiently sophisticated to be able to capture value from the entire 
customer relationship. The following chapter uses a case study approach 
to analyse the profitability systems in place throughout the National 
Westminster Bank plc Group and attempts to determine whether these 
systems are sufficiently sophisticated to be able to perform this 
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required objective: that of placing a quantitative value on specific 
customer relationships. If the profitability systems are found to be 
able to perform this task then it might be argued that, as far as 
National Westminster Bank plc Group is concerned, their involvement in 
low priced deals is fuelled by an awareness of their affect on the 
overall customer portfolio, and justified on this basis. Whilst the 
development of each profitability system will depend on the 
requirements/structure of each institution, this could provide a lead to 
the rest of the market and hopefully a means of checking any further 
increase in systemic risk from this source. 
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Appendix 10.1 Arranging the Facility 
The information memorandum 
Once the pricing structure of the facility has been agreed, the 
lawyers of the issuer and those of the arrangers and underwriters meet 
to draw up the relevant documentation. An information memorandum may be 
drawn up to circulate to potential investors. This will include such 
information as, for example, the financial condition of the borrower, 
any relevant legal clauses, and a description of the type of business in 
which the issuer is involved. 
The invitation telex 
This telex to potential underwriters is vital to the success of the 
facility because it-must provide a clear and complete outline of the 
issuer if it is to tempt potential underwriters to make an initial 
enquiry. The telex will include such things as: 
currency of denomination of notes 
size of facility 
type of placement method 
maturity period of notes (e. g. three or six months) 
type of facility (i. e. to be drawn or used as stand-by) 
maturity of facility (e. g. 6 years) 
size of tranche 
length of selling period 
pricing components and fees 
ratings (where relevant) 
time of notice if necessary before cancellation of facility 
list of documents to be prepared, e. g. 
(a) RUF contract with issuer, arranger(s) and underwriters 
(b) agency agreement between issuing and paying agency for 
custodianship 
(c) governing law (e. g. English Law) 
(d) status of notes (usually unsecured, unsubordinated liab- 
ilities of the issuer, with senior debt status, although 
they may be subordinated) 
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It will take 30 or more business days to set up a RUF, before 
notes may actually be issued under that facility, with the information 
memorandum and invitation telex usually being issued on the second or 
third day. A detailed specimen RUF timetable is given in the next 
section. 
Once the facility has been agreed upon, it must be decided whether 
the facility is needed as a back-up or on a fully-drawn basis. If it is 
to be drawn, the method of placement must be decided upon. 
Specimen timetable for a note issuance facility (RUF, NIF, etc. ) 
Business days 
Day 1 The issuer delivers signed mandate letters to lead manager of 
the facility; appointment of lawyers 
Day 2 The issuer, lead manager and lawyers begin arranging meetings 
to agree the following documents: 
1 information memorandum 
2 facility agreement 
3 issue and placing agency agreement 
4 tender panel agreement (if applicable) 
5 invitation telex to underwriters 
6 invitation telex to tender panel members (if applicable) 
7 form of note 
8 form of purchase request notice 
9 draft legal opinions 
10 letter to reference banks 
Day 12 1 Decisions have to be taken regarding: 
(a) reference banks 
(b) composition of management group 
(c) composition of tender panel (if applicable) 
(d) advertising 
2 Arrangements made about subscription account 
3 Appoint printers and security printers 
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Day 14 Prospective underwriters (and tender panel members, if 
applicable) invited by telephone/telex 
Day 21 1 Telexed acceptances required from underwriters (and 
tender panel members ,if app li cab 1 e) by 12 noon London 
time 
2 Letter to underwriters (and tender panel members, if 
applicable) enclosing drafts of the underwriters' facil- 
ity agreement 
3 Letter to tender panel members enclosing draft of tender 
panel agreement (if applicable) 
4 Prospective reference banks invited by telephone and 
confirmed in writing 
Day 23 Decisions to have been taken about representation at signing 
ceremony, if any 
Day 30 1 Drafts of tombstone prepared and sent to underwriters for 
approval 
2 Deadline for underwriting and tender panel members (if 
applicable) to comment on facility agreement 
3 Deadline for tender panel members to comment on tender 
panel agreement (if applicable) 
4 Final versions of facility agreement, issue and placing 
agency agreement, tender panel agreement (if applicable), 
and form of note to be prepared 
5 Security printer to have been given text of notes 
6 Telex to underwriting (and tender panel members, if 
applicable) giving details of signing ceremony, including 
representation and form of authority 
Day 32 Deadline for receipt of form of authority for signing from 
underwriting (and tender panel members, if applicable) and 
approval of draft tombstone 
Day 35 1 Following documents to be executed at the signing 
ceremony: 
(a) facility agreement 
(b) issuing and placing agency agreement 
(c) tender panel agreement (if applicable) 
2 Legal opinions to be produced 
3 Press announcements made, if any 
4 Printers instructed to print notes 
5 Deliver final version of tombstone, if any, to Public 
Relations of the lead manager 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CUSTOPER RELATIONSHIP PROFITABILITY SYSTEM 
11.1 Introduction 
It was stated in the previous chapter that if banks are to price 
services and products on a relationship basis then it is important that 
systems exist within these banks to identfy the profitability of the 
whole customer relationship and different segments of the relationship. 
Without such profitability systems any attempt at relationship pricing 
wil 1 be, at best, guided by an incomplete picture of the worth of the 
relationship, and at worst misdirected. 
Where profitability systems are absent, the systemic gap identified 
in the euronote market may indeed prove to be real rather than just 
apparent. In this case, relationship pricing is guided by an uninformed 
desire to keep the relationship rather than an understanding of its 
worth. 
If it could be shown that adequate profitability systems do exist 
within those banks underwriting euronote facilities, then it could be 
argued that there is a sound basis on which to practice the relationship 
pricing strategy found to be dominant in the market. In this case the 
systemic gap identified in Chapter 8 may prove to be more aki n to Van 
Horne's financial balloon which will eventually deflate as unprofitable 
deals (on a relationship basis) are declined. In the long-term the gap 
may thus prove to be more apparent than real. We may then contend, in 
response to our original question, that although the growth of the 
euronote market may have increased systemic risk in the short-term, in 
the long-term a relationship pricing strategy, supported by adequate 
profitability systems, may reduce this risk. 
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However, the fact that our field study of profitability systems 
will be confined to a case study examination of the systems in place 
(and being developed) in just one bank (the National Westminster Bank), 
means that our conclusions must be qualified. Whilst the final form of 
any profitability system will be dependent upon particular 
organisational requirements, in practice it is likely that the National 
Westminster Bank is not untypical of the large market players. If the 
systems within the National Westminster Bank are concluded to be 
adequate for relationship pricing purposes then this could at least 
provide other banks with a guide to producing their own systems (if they 
have not already done so). In this sense, although the systemic gap may 
be more than just apparent, the market will at least be provided with a 
means by which the gap may be closed. We believe that this would be a 
valuable contribution towards the safety of the system. 
The following sections are not meant to provide a guideline for how 
a profitability system should be developed, but rather how one has and 
therefore could be developed by a large commercial bank. The actual 
format of any profitability system will, as previously mentioned, be 
determined by inter al is management objectives and organisational 
requirements. 
11.2 The Organisational Structure of the National Westminster Bank plc 
Group 
Before describing the profitability systems presently being 
established throughout the National Westminster Bank plc Group it is 
first necessary to gain an understanding of the structure and reporting 
systems of the group. One fact which will become apparent is the need 
to adapt the structure of the organisation to meet the requirements of 
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the profitability system. This is the vital first step in the 
establishment of any such system. 
In the National Westminster Bank each lending manager is given his 
own discretionary power (DP) up to which he can sanction facilities on 
his own authority. Any facilities sought in excess of his DP have to be 
referred to a higher sanctioning authority for approval or decline. 
Historically, an application for any facilities sought in excess of fl 
million but less than L10 mi lli on had first to be sent to Area Office 
where a covering letter (setting out the main points of the application) 
would then have had to be sent with the application to Regional Office 
for approval or decline. However any facilities sought in excess of 110 
million had to be approved by Domestic Banking Division (DBD) Group 
Advances in London, again via Area Office and Regional Office. 
Furthermore, if the application for facilities in excess of 110 million 
included international facilities then DBD Advances had to refer this to 
International Banking Division (IBD) Credit Control. 
This intricate web of reporting lines was further complicated by 
the fact that the branch initiating the application was invariably a 
'lead branch' with the main responsibility for that particular customer. 
However, that customer's banking accounts would be probably at many 
branches around the country: these branches were known as satellite 
branches. They provided the information necessary for the lead bank to 
compile the report. Figure 11.1 depicts this web of reporting 11 nes 
historically in place throughout the bank. 
To attempt to develop a profitability and management information 
system along the existing reporting lines would have been cumbersome, 
time consuming and probably grossly inefficient. The entire reporting 
structure of the bank had to change to make any sort of profitability 
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system a viable undertaking. From the beginning of 1986 to mid-1988 
change was initiated by two major developments within the bank: the 
development of Business Centres, and the establishment of the major UK 
Corporate Exercise. These will be discussed in turn. 
Towards the end of 1986 the bank began to rethink its pol icy for 
meeting the requirements of its corporate customers. The existing 
structure dictated that most corporate customers banked at the local 
branch. This meant that, in many cases, the local branch manager could 
be discussing personal loans or mortgages in the morning and interest 
rate hedging techniques for a large corporate customer in the afternoon. 
Many branch managers had neither the expertise nor the time to devote 
towards meeting the needs of these large corporate customers. 
Furthermore, corporate customers usually had relationships with 
many branches. Often the lead branch, whose responsibility it was to 
co-ordinate the relationship, had very little contact with the 
customer. 
The decision was taken that large corporate customers should be 
enticed to have one major relationship with the lead bank, using 
satellite branches mainly for cash drawing and paying in purposes. This 
centralises large corporate relationships. However, it was not 
sufficient simply to attempt to relocate relationships. Corporate 
customers had to be shown that there were benefits to them in this move. 
It was decided that centres of corporate excellence should be 
established across the country, staffed by employees with substantial 
corporate experience and devoted solely to meeting the requirements of 
1 arge corporate customers. These 'centres of excellence' became known 
as Business Centres. By April 1988 there were over 100 such centres 
across the bank. 
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Not only did these business centres centralise corporate 
relationships, but they also rationalised the satellite branching 
structure of the bank. The establishment of Business Centres meant that 
large corporates had relationships with fewer satellite branches. The 
collection of information on corporate relationships was thus made 
easier and more efficient. This was an important development as it made 
the construction of a customer profitability system more practical by 
rationalising the first link in the reporting chain. Thi s 
rationalisation process whereby the number of satel 1 ite branches 
reporting to the Business Centre (old lead branch) was reduced is 
depicted in Figure 11.2 
Figure 11.2 The establishment of Business Centres and the 
rationalisation of satellite branching 
Information 
Satellite 
Branch 
Bus ness 
Centre 
Apportionment of Sanction 
The establishment of Business Centres was an important first step 
in meeting the needs of 1 arge corporate customers and rationalising 
reporting lines. However, for corporate customers that required large 
banking facilities the reporting lines within the bank still remained an 
anathema: time-consuming and inefficient. It was for the purpose of 
improving the delivery of services to these UK corporates that the major 
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UK Corporate Group (MUKCG) was established in the National Westminster 
Bank Tower in London. 
MUKCG was given responsibility for managing all corporate 
relationships with sales turnover in excess of MO million. This is 
not a rigid figure but rather a guideline. Some corporates with 
turnover below f130 million, but with complicated financial 
requirements, may also be looked after by MUKCG. 
In order to rationalise reporting lines still further and to 
improve the delivery of financial services to these major corporations 
MUKCG was al lowed direct access to DBD Advances and IBD Credit Control: 
the major sanctioning bodies of DBD and IBD respectively. Although it 
was still necessary for MUKCG to approach the Business Centres for 
information on the operational aspects of a relationship, the reporting 
lines via Area Offices and Regional Offices were severed. The new 
reporting structure for major UK corporates is depicted in Figure 11.3. 
The establishment of Business Centres and MUKCG has not only 
rationalised reporting lines within the bank but has also reduced the 
number of sanctioning bodies which need to see the application. 
With the rationalisation of reporting lines it became apparent that 
the establishment of a customer profitability system stretching across 
the group was now feasible. A specialised systems group was set up 
within MUKCG to explore ways of establishing a customer profitability 
system. Their initial findings are discussed below. 
The first task of the systems group was to discover where the major 
corporate relationships were situated, not just throughout OBD but 
throughout IBD as wel 1. Within DBD, the task was relatively simple 
because of the rationalisation and centralisation programmes which had 
directed most major UK corporate relationships to MUKCG. Within IBD the 
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task was made more difficult by the fact that many customers were 
multinational organisations with relationships with the National 
Westminster Group across the world. However, most relationships were 
found to be co-ordinated by two departments within IBD: UK Finance and 
Marketing which caters for the needs of multinationals with mainly UK 
financial requirements, and Corporate Financial Services which caters 
for the needs of multinationals with predominantly international 
financial requirements. If a profitability system for major 
relationships was to reach throughout the bank then it would have to 
encompass relationships within all three major relationship departments 
as well as related banking services such as leasing through Lombard 
North Central etc. 
The original plan was to modify existing computer systems to allow 
branches and departments within IBD to enter their information directly 
on to a central information collating system, in a similar manner to 
that depicted in Figure 11.4. 
It transpired that existing systems were virtually unmodif i abl e but 
that engineers were working on two new systems (one for DBD and one for 
IBD) which would allow information to be entered at branch and 
department level. These systems are known as ISS (Information Systems 
Strategy) in DBD and CIS (Central Information Systems) in IBD. 
Unfortunately these systems will not be operational until 1993. This 
meant that any new system established in the interim period would, 
almost certainly, have to collate information manually. However, as 
Ernst and Whinney (1987, p. 179) point out: 
Keeping in mind the limitations imposed by time frame and by 
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resources, the organisation may have to settle for second 
best, especially at the outset. 
A manual system can still be extremely useful and can provide a base for 
automation at a later date. 
11.3 Operationalising the System 
The new system sought to compile a central database of over 400 
identified major UK corporates. For operational convenience, MUKCG, UK 
Finance and Marketing and Corporate Financial Services were situated 
alongside each other within the NatWest Tower. 
It was decided that, despite the present lack of computerised 
information systems, the original plan to gather information in the 
manner set out in Figure 11.4 should still be followed. This would 
enable revenue information on the majority of products provided by the 
group to be collated periodically. To analyse the data forms sent to 
every information arm (depicted in Figure 11.4) would be time consuming 
and largely repetitive. It will be sufficient for our purposes to 
examine how the system works in relation to DBD branches - the major 
information arm in the MUKCG exercise. 
In Spring 1981, letters were sent to all lead branches (mainly 
Business Centres) where major UK corporates had accounts. The purpose 
of the letter was primarily to establish a uniform and workable practice 
of recording particular information on a quarterly basis. Appendix 11.1 
sets out the type of information required for a particular relationship 
and the objective and the procedure to be followed for recording that 
information. Appendix 11.2 provides an example of how that information 
is actually recorded. The services/products on which information is 
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required are the major services/products provided by that particular arm 
of the group. 
One of the main advantages of the system is that it not only 
provides a means by which a central co-ordinating unit can determine the 
main revenue areas within a relationship but also the split between risk 
income and non-risk income. The greater the proportion of non-risk 
income to risk income within the customer portfol io the 1 ower is the 
exposure of the bank to the failure of that relationship. Types of non- 
risk income include, for instance: large credit balances held within the 
group; related banking services such as registers; non-underwritten 
securities placement business; and commission transmission income. The 
latter is, perhaps the most significant of all. 
Commission transmission income relates to the revenues earned 
through acting as a company's 'clearing bank'. Appendix 11.3 presents a 
typical transmission activity form. Each item on the form is costed. 
Each per item tariff has been arrived at by allocating general 
overheads and direct costs to that item on an average cost basis, and 
then adding an 'adequate' undisclosed profit margin. A 100 per cent 
recovery of objective thus implies a full cost recovery pl us an adequate 
profit margin. Anything above a 100 per cent recovery of objective thus 
implies that supernormal profits are being made from transmission 
services - profits that could be transferred to supplement other lower 
recovery areas within the relationship. The lynch pin to an effective 
profitability system thus becomes an established method of cost 
allocation. Without a means of allocating costs to various services the 
'profitability' systems established within banks can best be viewed as 
'revenue identification systems'. 
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It is probably fair to say that, with the exception of transmission 
services, where a major cost allocation exercise was undertaken within 
the last five years, the major UK corporate system is primarily a 
revenue identification system at present. However, a major project is 
underway to establish a system whereby costs can be allocated within the 
customer relationship. This new system will be based on previous 'floor 
level costing studies' which sought to discover the extent of the cost 
savings through the loss of particular relationships. 
The floor level costing studies were lapsed in 1986 because of the 
difficulty and expense inherent in obtaining information via the old 
reporting structure. Given the new reporting lines within the bank and 
the establishment of the major UK corporate exercise, a floor level 
costing exercise is to be re-established with the objective of 
establishing a true 'profitability' system throughout the bank based on 
the identification of revenues and costs within the customer portfolio. 
Only at that time can a true relationship pricing strategy be employed 
to its full effect. Only then can bank supervisors and researchers be 
content that the banks are actually aware of the profitability of a 
customer relationship and whether that relationship justifies the 
inclusion of one or more underpriced assets within the portfolio. 
Although a revenue identification system provides at least some 
information on which to base this decision, it portrays an incomplete 
picture. In this sense systemic risk may still arise where bank 
underwriters equate revenue to profit. The following section examines 
the process by which a cost allocation system is being established 
within the National Westminster Bank plc Group. 
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11.4 Establishing a Cost Allocation System 
By identifying revenues and allocating costs to various services 
within the customer relationship a profitability system can be 
established incorporating a cost allocation system. One way of 
establishing a cost allocation system is to identify the net cost 
savings that could be expected to accrue if a particular customer's 
business were to be lost. This objective can be achieved by calculating 
the overall contribution of the connection on a ful l absorption cost 
basis as the system being developed within the National Westminster Bank 
attempts to do. 
Absorption costing is based on the premise that the normal costs of 
running a firm should be charged to the individual cost units in order 
to ascertain the total cost of each unit. By such an exercise the cost 
units absorb the total costs. The product units are thus charged not 
only with direct costs, but also with a fair share of the overhead cost 
(Armand, 1984). 
Absorption costing is different to marginal costing which states 
that each cost unit should be charged only with those costs which it 
exclusively caused to be incurred. Marginal costing is also known as 
direct costing. 
The rationale for absorbing overhead costs to products is to 
recover accounting profits, but care should be exercised when employing 
the absorption costing method as overhead absorption rates must be 
predetermined. This task will always involve an element of estimation. 
We will return to this point at the end of the following costing 
example. 
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11.4.1 Costing the relationship 
In order to cost a customer relationship a team must first identify 
all the bank services used by that particular customer and the volume 
used. Costs can then be allocated on an estimated full absorption cost 
basis. For the example we are about to work through, transmission 
business accounted for nearly all of the customer revenue and, hence, a 
considerable proportion of the costs. 
The services which this particular customer (henceforth referred to 
as customer A) was found to use can be divided into three categories: 
lending and other liability services, transmission services, and other 
group services. These wil be addressed in turn in order to show how 
each was costed. 
11.4.1.1 Lending services 
Customer A does not have a legal power to borrow. However, in 
order to facilitate administration of the various departments under its 
control, an overdraft facility of 135 mill ion gross/i nil net was 
sanctioned. A gross position relates to the total of all debit balances 
across that customer's accounts. A net balance refers to the total of 
all debit balances plus credit balances. 
Given the fact that the cost of debits and credits would be 
included in the section on transmission costs and that no facility 
letters were required to be compiled, no costs were allocated to this 
particular part of the relationship. 
11.4.1.2 Lombard Group_ 
The customer was found to operate eight leasing agreements through 
Lombard North Central (NatWest's whol 1 y-owned Subsidiary) on which 
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limits of £80,000 were fully utilised during the year. A contribution 
for the service was not calculated by Lombard as this would have 
entailed reviews of each lease with appropriate adjustments for 
grossing-up leasing valuations. 
11.4.1.3 Transmission services 
The total cost of operating customer A's basic transmission service 
on a full absorption costing basis for the year ended 198X was ß306,495 
as detailed in the top section of Table 11.1. The bottom section of 
Table 11.1 shows total income for the same period of 1465,244, which 
produced a surplus of 1158,749: a 152 per cent recovery of costs. 
The average free cleared credit balances shown in Table 11.1 are 
valued at average 3 month LIBOR. 
Table 11.1 can be bro ken down to show how the individual cost 
figures are arrived at. Table 11.2 provides a detailed analysis of the 
entries passing through this customer's account (the top two rows in the 
cost column of Table 11.1). 
The detailed breakdown facilitates the application of specific unit 
costs to each transaction rather than applying average cost rates as is 
the case with the transmission activity form referred to earlier. Table 
11.2 identifies a total cost of entries of 1174,663 which is comprised 
of 1146,507 debit entry costs and 128,156 credit entry costs. 
Section 1 cheques are those cheques paid through the clearing 
system whereas section 2 cheques are those cheques returned unpaid for 
whatever reason. Cheques issued by customer A account for 90 per cent 
of the debit entries and attract some 99 per cent of the debit entry 
costs . 
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Table 
1 1.1 TRANSMISSION ACTIVITY ON FULL ABSORPTION COST BASIS 
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De.? rt- Dea, art-"ý Depart- 
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' 
ý1 
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ý 
I! IpI 
_ 
I \ 
Entries 
" Debits 147,289 
1 
677,214 1,724 
11 
826,227 
I) 
See 
1 
146,507 
- Credits 37,796 J 1,680 217 11 39,693 ) Table 4J 28,156 
tash In 6,926,947 22,180 1,066 11 6,950,193 
t 
1 Ave 27.1pt 18,813 J 
J cash Out - branches 10,335,048 
1 
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155p% 
J 
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I bispersal Credits - Via Clearing 195 -j - 195 
1 
38.22 75 1 
- In House I 13,364 II - 13,364 13,10 1,751 
SACS Credits Distributed 1,571,519 75,715 I - II 1,647,234 
I 
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1 
sr Ztems Collected 
1 
128,607 
I 
1,230 I 
I 
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1I 11 
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As far as credit entries are concerned Table 11.2 reveals that cash 
credits at home and agency branches attract over 90 per cent of the 
credit entry costs. 
Immediately below the cost figures for debit and credit entries in 
Table 11.1 is the cost figure for cash in (i. e. cash paid into bank 
branches for the accounts of customer A). This figure of 118,813 is 
broken down in Table 11.3. Table 11.3 analyses by tranches the volumes 
and costs of cash received based upon a one month sample undertaken for 
each department. 
Over 20,000 credits per annum, some 70 per cent of the total, 
contained less than 1100 of cash with an average cash content of only 
M. 
The majority of the credits seen in the higher volume tranches are 
paid in by the larger operating units. The cost of cash handling per 
1100 reduces as the volume per credit increases and this aspect is 
reflected in the unit costs used. 
The other items in Table 11.1 are costed on exactly the same basis 
as the above and a detailed breakdown of each of the other cost figures 
is, therefore, unnecessary. 
11.4.1.4 Other group services 
Other group services uti 1 ised by customer A show a net shortfal 1 
for the year of 12,053 on a full absorption cost basis. This is arrived 
at by calculating the revenues and costs from the following: 
1 Other branch services 
2 Foreign business 
3 Sterling money market office 
4 Statement details on magnetic tape service 
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5 Other divisions' services (not costed) 
These will be addressed in order. 
11.4.1.5 Other branch services 
Table 11.4 identifies the annual activity levels, costs and income 
in respect of other branch services revealing a shortfall of 16,997. 
The annual volumes have been ascertained by sampling the records at the 
account-holding branches and grossed where necessary to reflect a full 
12 months activity. 
The main contributors to the shortfall are stopped cheques and BACS 
recalls. 
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Table 11.4 OTHER BRANCH SERVICES - ACTIVITY COST AND INCOME 
1 I º 
!I 
! ANNUAL º 
II 
º 
SERVICE I VOLUME UNIT COST COST º º INCOME I 
1 £ IfI Ifi 
1 Returned Cheques - Inwards 1 388 I 1.83 ! 710 695 1 1 Credits Opened - Outwards I 55 4.29 I 236 1 1 106 1 
1 Direct Remittances - Inwards I 
1 
12 ! 1.68 
1I 
20 I 
I 
!- 
- Outwards I 15 ! 4.24 64 º 1 34 I I 
I Stopped Cheques 
I 
I 834 
I 
I 7.29 
II 
I 6,080 1 
I 
1 272 º 
Audit Letters 1 20 I 13.90 ! 278 I I- 
y 
BACS Recalls 
I I 
1,474 1 3.75 
II 
5,527 1 
I 
1 2,184 
CHAPS without Cypher - Inwards I 
I 
100 5.31 
II 
I 531 1 
I 
1- 
- Outwards 104 5.31 ! 552 1 1 4,144 I 
I Night Safes Bank Opened - Rental I 27 
1 
- 
I-I 
I 158 
1 
- Usage 1 i 
207 
I 
1 0.78 1 161 1 
I 
1 101 I 
II Q 
Status Enquiries - Inwards 1 
. 12 ! 4.97 
I 
60 1 1-I 
I - Outwards I 415 I 3.05 º 1,266 I I 829 I 1- Outwards Direct 1 29 1 1.53 1 44 1 1- 
`I I I II I 
Safe Custody Lines - Inwards º 42 I 2.06 ! 87 I I-I 
- Outwards 45 1 3.86 174 1 1- 
Boxes and Parcels - 
I 
Inwards I 
i 
11 I 4.31 
I1 
I 47 I 
1 
I-I 
- Outwards I 12 i 5.03 º 60 ! !-! tÄ1 - Inspections 48 ! 5.48 I 263 I I-I 
1 Boxes and Parcels - Number charged 1 89 1 -I 
I 
-! 
Ii 
! 463 1 
(per annum) 1I I 
I I It 
Envelopes - Number charged ! 49 ! - I-I I 327 1 (per annum) I 
1 º 
Bankers Drafts. I 
I 
-I -º 
I 
-I I 166 1 
` 
Sundry Payments Cheques I 
I 
24 
I 
3.68 I 
I 
88 I 
I 
I- 
Coin Bags 
I 
i 
I 
I 
-I 
1 
I 
-I 
I 
780 I 
1 
I 
I 552 1 
1I 
Total Other Branch Services 1 17,028 I I 10,031 
Shortfall 
! 
I 
! 
I 
6,997 
17,028 
I I 
17,028 1 
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11.4.1.6 Foreign business 
Table 11.5 details the annual activity levels, costs and income of 
foreign business which reveals a shortfall of £1,288 mainly in respect 
of foreign currency drafts issued. Standard bank tariffs were applied 
to all services. 
Table 11.5 Foreign business - activity cost and income 
Annual 
Service Volume Unit cost cost Income 
Foreign drafts 
Overseas issued - currency 351 7.42 2,604 1,417 
Foreign bills sold with recourse 
Clean - currency 28 7.69 215 147 
Travel cheques 
Branch issued - sterling 190 0.92 175 142 
Total foreign business 2.994 1,706 
Shortfall 1,288 
2,994 2,994 
11.4.1.7 Sterling mone y market office (SMMO) 
The total average deposit balance held with SMMO for the year 
amounted to 11,326,862. Applying an average ROA margin of 0.5 per cent 
to this total provides income of 16,634. Branch end costs were found to 
amount to 12,221 resulting in an overall net contribution of 14,413. 
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11.4.1.8 Statement details on magnetic tape 
Tapes are provided to three of customer A's operating units, 
incorporating details of statement entries to simplify the updating of 
their book-keeping records. 
The operating units are invoiced direct for these tapes at 0.5p per 
entry plus transport costs and a surplus is revealed along the following 
1 ines: 
Income (696,246 items) 13,689 
Cost £1,870 
i1,819 
11.4.1.9 Other divisions' services 
It was discovered that customer A was also using the services of 
Lombard North Central and County NatWest (Investment Services). No 
details regarding costs and income were provided for these services 
given their low usage and the costs inherent in obtaining this 
information on. 
The contribution from other group services is thus -12,053. This 
figure is arrived at as follows: 
Service Contribution 
Other branch services -16,997 
Foreign business -21,288 
SMMO x4,413 
Magnetic tape service ßl, 819 
-i2,053 
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11.4.2 'Floor level' cost recovery and income summary 
The 'f 1 oor 1 eve 1' costs of operating customer A's accounts can be 
defined as the costs which the bank would save if the relationship was 
lost. 
In this particular example it was concluded that the loss of 
customer A's business would have little effect across the bank's network 
even though there are 21 account-holding branches and some 150 branches 
used on an agency basis. 
Staff resources available for redeployment and the reduction in 
BACS charges were found to account for 89 per cent of the cost saving 
area and the fol lowing summarises the overall annual figure that was 
found to be achievable. 
Account holding branches i 
Staff available for redeployment 43,262 
Stationery and telephones etc 13,900 
BACS charges 51,064 
108,226 
Agency branches 
Staff available for redeployment 22,108 
Floor level cost 130,334 
Staff available for redeployment make up 50 per cent of the floor 
level cost of operating the business. It must be borne in mind, 
however, that this result has been calculated by identifying the direct 
staff and pension costs for the sum total of the different grades of 
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staff at the account holding and agency branches processing customer A's 
business. 
Should the business be lost it is, of course, impossible to tell 
how quickly these particular cost savings would be realised in 
individual locations by the introduction of replacement business or the 
redeployment of staff resources. 
The total floor level cost does not take into account any capacity 
that would be created within branch premises by the reduction in staff 
at the account-holding and agency branches. 
Nor does the floor level cost take into account the costs which 
may be saved by closing various sub-branches through the loss of the 
relationship. This was estimated at approximately £100,000 per annum. 
11.4.3 Staff cost savings on a full absorption cost basis 
Included within the unit costs allocated to each transmission 
service is an element of staff costs. 
Table 11.6 shows the staff costs, on a full absorption basis, of 
undertaking customer A's business to be 1194,783. These costs are 
allocated across each transmission service on a per item basis. 
Staff levels were calculated by identifying the total volume of 
work undertaken for customer A at the main account ho 1 di ng branch and 
the twenty other account holding branches. The following were then 
calculated (drawing on findings of a previous average staff costing 
study conducted on a sample of 200 branches in the bank): 
1 the average unit time for each category of work undertaken 
2 the grades of staff involved in the work 
I 
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delle 11.6 TOTAL COSTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE BUSINESS AT MANCHESTER CITY 
OFFICE AND 20 OTHER ACCOUNT-HOLDING BRANCHES (INCLUDING SUPPORT) 
I 
(MANCHESTER CITY 
I 
(OTHER BRANCHES) { 
LEVEL OF ! OFFICE) I ! 
STAFF { 
jI 
STAFF { COST I STAFF { COST 
I 
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Ianagerial I 0.01 
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0.02 1 376 
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I 
I 
I II 
! Pther Costs I 
I 
I 
iI 
I 
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I 1 
1 7,929 I 
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223 1 
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j 
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I I 
4,646 
j 
4ACS I 
11 
i 
2,347 I 
I1 
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I 914 º 
º 0.41 
I 
1 9,958 
º 0.02 
Ii 
1 376 1 
º 0.18 2,759 I 
2.56 
I1 
34,027 
I 
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4.99 
I 
I 
68,503 º 
1 
i 
º 
i 
7,969 I 
11 
º 
I 
15,032 I 
º 41,939 I 
1 
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º 51,064 I 
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The individual volumes were then multiplied by the average unit times to 
produce the total prime activity hours worked by function and grade of 
staff . 
These hours were then converted into staff numbers, indicating that 
a total of 4.99 staff were involved in undertaking customer A's 
business. 
11.4.3.1 Sources of costs 
A brief explanation of the sources used to identify and calculate 
the costs of customer A's business, indicated in Table 11.6, is provided 
below. 
Direct branch costs The annualised attributable average costs per 
grade of staff multiplied by the staff 
identified 
Area/Regional support The average cost per hour per prime activity 
category applied to the relative activity hours 
identified for customer A's business 
Departmental support As per Area/Regional support plus central bank 
and group overheads in respect of the staff 
involved 
Computer support The year's projected central accounting charge 
per entry applied to the actual number of 
entries processed for customer A plus an 
appropriate share of general ledger entries 
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Bullion support The year's projected rate applied to the cash 
turnover of customer A. 
Clearing support The year's projected unit cost applied to the 
number of debit and credit out clearing items 
processed for customer A. 
BACs The annual number of BACS credit items 
processed for customer A multiplied by the per 
entry charge levied on the bank. 
11.4.4 Overall contribution on a group relationship basis 
The overall contribution on a group relationship basis for customer 
A is shown in Table 11.7. From Table 11.7 it is clear that transmission 
business accounts for the vast majority of revenue and costs from this 
relationship, revealing a net contribution of 1159,000 for the year. 
Obviously, the development of an adequate cost allocation system is 
vital to the establishment of an adequate profitability system. 
Unfortunately, the costing exercise just described has not yet been 
employed on a group wide basis but rather for selected relationships. 
Its deployment on a group basis is, however, iminent. 
In this sense we might argue that a profitability system will soon 
be in place throughout the group with which to identify the 
profitability of customer relationships and different segments of those 
relationships. The adequacy of these systems does depend also on the 
costing methodology employed. 
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The systems being developed within the National Westminster Bank 
employ an absorption costing methodology as opposed to a marginal or 
direct costing methodology. Matz and Usry (1976, p 681) have argued: 
'Absorption costing obscures the true relationship beween 
prices, costs, and volume due to the behaviour of fixed costs 
when calculated on a unit cost basis. Direct unit costs 
remain constant for various volumes of production and sales 
as does contribution margin per unit. ' 
Despite this criticism, absorption costing remains the accepted 
method of external reporting. In criticism of the marginal costing 
school the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
state: 
'the exclusion of all overheads from inventory costs does not 
constitute an accepted accounting procedure' (Accounting 
Reseach Bulletin, no 43). 
The AICPA is probably correct in this statement, but it is also 
fair to say that not 'all' overheads need to be allocated to 'all' 
products as is the case with absorption costing. The main failure of 
the absorption costing methodology is that it only identifies costs at a 
parti cu 1 ar point on the demand sca 1 e. It does not take into account the 
fact that costs per unit may fall as output increases. 
The main rationale for the use of absorption costing in certain 
banking markets may, however, be that of uncertainty about the future 
and hence the future shape of the demand curve. Solomons (1968, p 140) 
supports this contention, saying: 
'Another reason for the use of full cost [absorption cost], 
particularly in pricing decisions, is the absence of adequate 
data on the level and shape of the demand curve facing the 
firm. Whether this is due to the oligopolistic nature of the 
market, which makes for i ndetermi nancy, or to difficulties in 
quanitifying a determinate relationship, the result is the 
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same - the price maker f al 1s back on full cost, which assumes 
not a demand curve but a given point on a demand curve. ' 
In markets where uncertainty about the future makes the plotting of 
a demand curve difficult then absorption costing does at least allow 
some basis for the development of a cost allocation system, even if this 
does take into account only present unit costs. 
In balance, each cost allocation methodology can provide reasonably 
accurate and relevant information in the appropriate environment. 
However, as Ernst and Whinney (1987, p. 224) point out: 
'The concerns of line management should be considered 
carefully in selecting cost accounting methodologies. It is 
imperative that these managers understand, accept, and 
ultimately support the process ... Managers will not rely on information if they do not clearly understand or accept the 
process used to develop it ... For this reason alone, many institutions choose simple but comprehensible methodologies. ' 
Basically, there is no right or wrong methodology, although in 
reality the simplicity of absorption costing can be a strong incentive. 
When deciding which allocation methodology to use it is necessary to 
consider the intended use of the information and the availability of 
resources as well as the complexity of the organisational structure and 
its ability to adapt to information needs. As Ernst and Whinney (1987, 
p. 225) conclude: 
'Compromises [are necessary] to implement a profitability 
measurement system and to ensure its acceptance and smooth 
operation. It also is important to bear in mind that the 
information generated by such a system can be worthwhile even 
ifitis less than 100 per cent accurate. Such information 
stil 1 can present a rational approach to matching expenses 
with revenues, and benefits with their associated costs. ' 
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Essentially, then, the solutions lie in the characteristics of the 
institution and in how it intends to use cost and profitability 
information. 
11.5 The Importance of RUFs for the Maintenance of the Customer 
Rel ati onshi p 
An adequate profitability system will provide a bank with 
information on the quantitative worth of the relationship and products 
within the relationship. It will not, however, provide any information 
on the worth which the customer attaches to various products for the 
maintenance of the relationship. 
If RUFs are to be priced on a relationship basis then it is 
important to establish profitability systems. It is equally important, 
however, to understand whether or not customers see RUFs as a 
relationship or transactional product. If RUFs are viewed by customers 
as a transactional product then banks may be providing RUFs at 
unnecessarily low prices for the maintenance of the relationship. 
Unfortunately, a study conducted within the National Westminster 
Bank in early 1988 was rather inconclusive on whether RUFs are seen as 
an important product for the maintenance of the relationship. Out of 
200 major corporates surveyed 36 per cent had used RUFs (or MOFs) in the 
past year but only 20 per cent of these said that they mattered for the 
maintenance of the relationship (see Appendix 11.4 for data). Although 
this would only add up to fifteen banks out of the 72 using RUFs or MOFs 
it still indicates that a significant proportion (if somewhat less than 
anticipated) see RUFs and MOFs as relationship products. 
This type of survey does, at least, provide the banks with some 
knowledge as to whether it is worth underpricing various products in 
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order to maintain the relationship. On this basis alone, such a study 
should complement a relationship pricing strategy. 
11.6 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter we have examined the development of a profitability 
system within the National Westminster Bank. It has become apparent 
that certain developments are necessary before such a system can be 
established. The bank's organisational structure must adapt to allow 
the collation of required information in an efficient manner: a cost 
allocation system must be developed alongside the system designed to 
gather information on revenue generated from the relationship, and, 
preferably, some study should be undertaken to ascertain the importance 
of various services to the maintenance of the relationship. 
We would argue that the system presently being developed within the 
National Westminster Bank will provide an adequate information base on 
which to promote a relationship pricing strategy. The bank should, 
thus, be able to price euronote facilities on a relationship basis with 
an understanding of the quantitative value of the relationship. 
The applicability of the National Westminster Bank system to other 
market players will, as outlined previously, depend on the particular 
characteristics of these institutions and their information objectives. 
In practice, though, as detailed in Chapter 10 (and at the beginning of 
this chapter), the National Westminster Bank is probably not untypical 
of the other large players in the euronote market. 
Specifically, however, any increase in systemic risk which the 
underpricing of euronote facilities by National Westminster Bank may 
have contributed to in the early stages of the market, should now be 
checked by the development of a group-wide profitability system. 
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Although it is acknowledged that a relationship pricing strategy was 
employed before the development of a profitability system, this must, by 
implication, have been largely subjective and possibl'y misguided. To 
this extent, systemic risk may still have been increased despite the 
fact that the banks were not pricing euronote facilities on a 
transactional basis. 
There is still considerable debate as to whether cost should be 
calculated on an absorption or marginal cost basis. There are arguments 
for and against both. The debate should not be allowed to obstruct the 
development of cost systems within the banks. A system based on 
absorption costing is sti i1 better than none at al 1 and does at 1 east 
reflect a sufficiently clear picture of cost at that particular point on 
the demand scale. In banking markets where uncertainty obscures the 
future shape of the demand curve, this may be the best that the banks 
can hope for at the present time. 
If other banks in the euronote market can develop their own 
profitability systems, possibly along the lines depicted here, then the 
systemic gap which the underpricing of euronote facilities appears to 
have caused, may indeed prove bridgeable. Until these systems can be 
developed a relationship pricing strategy cannot be effectively employed 
in the euronote market. Any additional attempts to employ such a 
strategy without the development of adequate profitability systems will 
only serve to continue to reduce fee levels in the market and possibly 
further increase the systemic gap. 
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Appendix 11.1 Checklist for recording of major UK corporate 
information 
1 Current accounts with reduced clearance cycles (22244) 
Ob ective 
To record and forward on a quarterly basis - average cleared 
credit/debit balances, on a group and individual account basis. 
Procedure 
Daily manual record and quarterly calculation. Extraction of this 
data should prove straightforward using existing branch manual or 
PC based system. 
2 Acceptance credits/discounts 
Ob ective 
To record and forward on a quarterly basis: 
(a) commission charged 
(b) max/min exposure figures 
Procedure 
Records to be maintained in accordance with established procedures, 
i. e. adaptation of NWB 1765 Documentary Credit Summary Sheet. 
Commission charged to be totalled quarterly. 
3 S*O accounts 
Ob ective 
To record and forward on a quarterly basis: 
(a) market lines - average utilisation and max/min exposure 
figures 
(b) term loans - average uti 1 isation, max/min exposure figures, 
fees charged and interest formula applying 
(c) deposits - average balances 
Procedure 
Data available from existing computer/manual records. 
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4 Terminable indemnities 
Ob ective 
To record and forward on a quarterly basis: 
(a) commission charged 
(b) max/min exposure figures 
(c) number of engagements 
Procedure 
BOI A17H to be followed, utilising NWB 1932. Max/min figures 
would normally be maintained only where teminable indemnities 
sanction forms part of a gross facility. Commission charged to be 
totalled quarterly, along with number of engagements. 
5 Documentary credits inwards 
Ob ective 
To record and forward on a quarterly basis: 
(a) overseas branch commission charged 
(b) max/min exposure figures 
Procedure 
BOI F9F5 to be followed utilising NWB 1765. Please note that 
overseas branch commission debited to customer must be recorded in 
an extra column on NWB 1765 - this represents a minor amendment to 
existing practice - and total commission debited totalled on a 
quarterly basis. 
6 Bills negotiated 
Ob ective 
To record and forward on a quarterly basis: 
a) sterling equivalent turnover 
b) max/min exposure figures 
Procedure 
BOI F7Q6 to be followed utilising NWB 1767. Calculate quarterly 
turnover by totalling the 'ON' column. 
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7 Forward exchange 
Objective 
To record and forward on a quarterly basis: 
(a) sterling equivalent turnover 
(b) max/min exposure figures 
(c) number of deals 
NB Where option facilities exist (eg '0/D and/or Currency O/D and/or 
Documentary Credits and/or Acceptance Credits') ideal ly composite 
max/min profiles should be forwarded in addition to extracts for 
the individual constituent facilities. If not currently 
maintained, branches should consider the creation of 'position 
books'. 
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Appendix 11.2 Illustrated response 
Information required by: (date) 
4J KCG/IBD Contract: (name and region) 
Branch/Office: (name) 
Branch/Office contact: (name and ext) 
East Cheshire Electrical Supplies plc Group 
1 Composite max/min for March/June Quarter 1987 
Composite-group account 
overdraft, acceptance 
credit and market line 
line no D2 Max Dr/Min Cr 
March 1987 
April 1987 
May 1987 
June 1987 
2 
Average cleared Average cleared 
debit balance credit balance 
(a) Current accounts 
Group - 11-65432101 9,000,000 500,000 
Line no D2 part of 
option facility 
12345678 2,500,000 ... 34567890 500,000 200,000 
45678901 1,000,000 $06 56789012 1,000,000 ... 
67890123 1,000,000 060 78901234 50,000 200,000 
89012345 100,000 100,000 
90123456 350,000 000 01234567 2,000,000 ... 98765432 500,000 ... 
2 Imprest accounts ... 27,600 
15,000,000 OR 
14,750,000 DR 
15,500,000 DR 
15,000,000 DR 
Min Dr/Max Cr 
1,250,000 OR 
1,000,000 DR 
1,250,000 DR 
1,000,000 ER 
Average cleared credit/debit balances for March/June Quarter 1987 
(b) Deposit a/c ... 30,000 01-12346789 
(Jan/June 1987) 
(c) Loan a/c 03-87654321 50,000 ... 
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3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Acceptance credit/discounts for March/June Quarter 1987 line no 02 
part of option facility 
Commission charged £1,250 
Max DR 13,000,000 
Min DR 12,000,000 
SMID accounts for March/June quarter 1987 
(a) Deposits 
N/O Howard England Ltd 
Average balances £8,000,000 
(b) Market lines 
Line no D2 
Part of option 
facility 
(c) Term 1 oan 
Line no Dl 
Average utilisation 12,000,000 
Max DR 12,500,000 
Min DR Nil 
Average utilisation £4,500,000 
Max DR 15,000,000 
Min DR S, 000,000 
Interest formula 43.75 basis 
poi nts+LIBOR 
+MLAs 
Actual fees charged 12,500 
Terminable indemnifies for March/June Quarter 1987 Line no D3 
Commission charged 12,200 
Max DR Not monitored 
Min DR Not monitored 
Number of engagements generating 12 
commission during quarter 
Documentary credits inwards for March/June Quarter 1987 line no 04 
Overseas branch commission charged 115,000 
Max DR £2,000,000 
Min DR Nil 
Foreign bills negotiated for March/June Quarter 1987 Line no D5 
Turnover (sterling equivalent) £3,500,000 
Max DR 15006000 
Min DR 1500000 
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Forward Exchange for March/June Quarter 1987 Line no 06 
Turnover (sterling equivalent) 
Max DR 
Min OR 
Number of deals 
£2,000,000 
£750,000 
Nil 
36 
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endix 11.3 ý'ransmission Activity Form For Year Ended 1s 
NB Managers should ensure that staff Involved In the preparation and examination of Transmission Activity Forms are fully 
conversant with Book 'G' Chapters 18,21 and 22, and Appendix 27. 
Account Turnover E 
Business/Occupation 
Branch 
sic 
Area Region 
Borrowing Limit £ Date of next revisal 
Account Is ultimately controlled by: Group/Region/Area/Branch (Delete as appropriate) 
W /M 
Tally Recorded 
Initial 
Description Annual Level of Activity At £ only 
Debit Entries 37p' 
Credit Entries - Manual 55 
- Automated (Is computer 
generated) 13p 
- HO Coll A/c (paper) 40p 
Consumer Credits (paper) - HO Coll A/c lop 
- Branch A/c 13p 
Cash In - Branches £ 42p%' 
- Direct to Bullion (preseated) £ 8p% 
Cash Out - Branches £ 40p%' 
- Direct from Bullion £ 15p% 
Cash Exchanged £ 150p% 
Items Collected 16.5p' 
Night Safe Lodgement (only If not debited direct) 80p per d; posit 
Dispersal Credits - Bank Giro Outwards 40p 
- Autopay 18 
BACS Entries - customer originated 12p* 
Account Maintenance - No of C/A's £38 per C/A 
Other Services not charged - specify overleaf £ (as overleaf) 
(* Shading for volume may apply Book T, App 1) 
Value of Account 
Gross Commission Including Account 
Maintenance Charge (B) £ 
Remuneration 
Objective (A) 
Less Notional Allowance where 
applicable £ 
Commission Charged (as calculated 
overleaf) £ 
Average Cleared Credit Balances 
after any interest set-off arrangement 
C/A £Q% pa £ 
Total Value of Account (C) £ Surplus on 
Loss on Account £ Account 
£ 
Percentage Recovery of Objective without Credit Balances (a x 100) % A 
Actual Percentage Recovery of Objective to x 100) % 
Not for Branch Use Date Received Date Replied 
Reply to: Branch/Area/Reglon Copy to: Area/Reglon/Advance, /ABS 
/Account Executive Remuneration Increase 4 Diary 
NWB1396 Rev Nov 87-1 
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Appendix 11.4 PRODUCT USAGE AND TRENDS 
Services used Matter most Expect to start 
in past year to relationship using/use more 
actively 96 °% 96 
Treasury ", 
Foreign exchange 94 52 16 
Swaps 46 16 24 
FRA's 50 13 13 
Options 37 7 20 
Corporate deposits 79 30 11 
Financial futures 9 2 2 
Electronically delivered CMS 59 21 22 
Lending 
ra itiona! loans/ 
facilities/overdrafts 93 63 14 
MOFs 36 20 20 
Acquisition finance 31 12 9 
Trade-related 
Documentary credits 55 13 3 
Forfaiting 912 
ECGD-backed loans/lines 26 72 
Indemnities/bonds/guarantees 69 17 7 
Factoring/invoice discounting 611 
Investment banking 
£ Euro-CP programmes 29 12 27 
Portfolio management 12 4 3 
Eurobond issuing 15 6 7 
Equity-related products 12 4 3 
Corporate finance advice 41 13 7 
.1 
Other 
Leasing 47 13 6 
Project finance 26 87 
Source: 'Relätionship management in the UK', Internal Study by National Westminster Bank 
ý ._ 
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CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The central aim of this study was to determine whether the growth 
of euronote facilities contributed to an increase in systemic risk. Two 
types of systemic risk have been identified: that which is analogous to 
Van Horne's financial bubble, which eventually bursts leading to a 
financial crisis, and that which is analogous to Van Horne's financial 
balloon, which eventually deflates so closing the systemic gap. 
We would conclude that the growth of the euronote market has 
contributed to an increase in the type of systemic risk analogous to Van 
Horne's financial balloon. A strategy of relationship pricing may have 
been employed by banks in the euronote market without an adequate 
foundation on which to build such a strategy, at 1 east in many cases. 
The lack of adequate internal profitability systems, evidenced in a more 
general sense by Hislop (1987), makes the employment of a relationship 
pricing strategy difficult. Euronote facilities may well have been 
contracted for on a misguided view of the worth of particular 
relationships. A relationship pricing strategy can only be effectively 
employed if supernormal profits from certain parts of the relationship 
justify the inclusion of assets in other parts of the relationship which 
generate abnormal returns. Only the establishment of profitability 
systems can provide such information on which to base underwriting 
decisions. The fact that many banks in the market may not yet have 
developed adequate profitability systems means that the underpricing of 
euronote facilities may not be justified on a relationship basis. To 
this extent systemic risk may have been increased. 
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To the extent, however, that certain banks may already be 
developing profitability systems (notably the National Westminster Bank) 
then euronote facilities which are unjustified on a relationship pricing 
basis will be either declined or priced on a transactional basis - this 
was found to be already happening in County NatWest. As this practice 
develops, the systemic gap created by the underpricing of euronote 
facilities will be reduced. It is on this basis that we argue that the 
X 
growth of the euronote market has led to an increase in the 'balloon' 
type of systemic risk. 
If, however, the banks do not apply themselves to developing 
profitability systems with which to employ a relationship pricing 
strategy, and if they continue to attempt to employ such a strategy in 
the absence of these systems then systemic risk may well increase still 
further. In this scenario the bubble may eventually burst leading to a 
financial crisis. 
The supervisors also have a part to play here. In February 1988 
the Governor of the Bank of Engl and, speaking at the Economist 
conference in London, stated that: 
'While it is the central bank's responsibility to safeguard 
the financial system, the concern is with systemic risk 
rather than individual components. ' 
The problem, however, has always been one of identification and 
control. How can an increase in systemic risk be identified and how can 
it be controlled? We have shown that systemic risk materialises in 
underpricing as banks try to employ relationship pricing strategies in 
the market. In Chapter 5 we showed how the application of asset- 
specific risk ratios to underwriting commitments does not appear to have 
materialised in higher fee levels. If banks are pricing risk and return 
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on a portfolio basis then capital should also be applied on this basis. 
Risks and returns are inter-dependent throughout the portfolio. Any 
attempt by supervisors to control systemic risk must acknowledge this 
portfolio aspect. It is therefore important that systemic risk is 
identified and then controlled on a portfolio basis. Once again, 
however, if supervisors are to apply capital to a bank's portfolio of 
assets they must first satisfy themselves that banks have the capability 
to price assets on this basis, which in turn requires the establishment 
of profitability systems within the banks. 
Although relationship pricing appears to be the main reason for 
such low prices in the euronote market, certain disaster myopic 
practices appear to play their part in the syndication of some low 
priced deals. The fact that some of the larger players in the market 
are able to market various facilities on a ROA basis to certain smaller 
players carries systemic risk potentialities. We would argue that ROX 
is a more conservative measure of an underwriter's return, as shown in 
Chapter 8. Supervisors should seek to ensure that syndicate returns are 
calculated on an exposure basis. At the very least, a discussion paper 
on the dangers inherent in applying a strict ROA methodology to 
underwriting facilities should be circulated. This would serve to 
educate the market to the drawbacks of employing this methodology. 
There are indications (see, for example, Economist June 1988) that 
certain banks are examining the possibility of calculating returns on a 
RAROC (Risk Adjusted Return on Capital) basis. RAROC is a costing 
methodology that allocates risk weightings to certain products /markets 
and accordingly calculates a required return on a transactional basis. 
However, as it is based on asset funding/drawdown as opposed to 
exposure, it still falls prey to the problems of ROA as far as undrawn 
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commitments are concerned. Perhaps a more appropriate methodology for 
the debt underwriting markets, in particular the euronote market, would 
be a conglomeration of both RAROC and ROX, i. e. RAROX (Risk Adjusted 
Return on Exposure). Whilst this would incorporate the ROX methodology 
preferred in this thesis, it would also apply equity capital to 
products/markets according to their perceived riskiness and would thus 
stipulate a required return. As far as the euronote market is 
concerned, RAROX would almost certainly serve to highlight even more the 
inadequacy of returns on a transactional basis in this market as a 
capital cost would also be included in the equation. The level of 
required return would, however, be for the individual institution to 
decide and again would necessarily be, to a large extent, subjective. 
It would require an analysis not only of the market but also of the 
individual institution's exposure to the market in relation to its other 
assets. Nevertheless, RAROX would at least focus management's mind on 
the inadequacies of ROA and the need to apply capital to undrawn 
commitments. For these reasons alone this may prove to be an area 
worthy of future research and development. 
Although these may be seen as the main steps which could be taken 
to control systemic risk, the euronote market can also take other 
measures to reduce the likelihood of a systemic failure. 
In Chapter 4 it was shown how the tender panel method of placing 
notes may do so at perceived insufficient yields whereas notes placed 
through dealerships traded at more steady spreads. The competitive 
nature of the tender panel again appeared to be forcing banks to forgo 
the charging of risk premia. The market is now moving more towards the 
dealership method of placing notes and this should be encouraged. 
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Although credit ratings were shown to make little difference to the 
price at which an issuer's paper trades, ratings do provide an issuer 
with a far wider investor base. By diversifying their investor base 
issuers are more likely to be able to withstand a financial crisis. For 
this reason, credit ratings are also advisable. 
By employing all of these measures, we believe that the systemic 
gap which has been created through the underpricing of euronote 
facilities can be reduced, and eventually possibly closed completely. 
The banks must work with the supervisors towards this goal. This does 
not mean that systemic risk can be eliminated, merely that the increase 
in systemic risk, brought about by underwriting practices in the 
euronote market, can be reduced. 
In this thesis we have developed what we refer to as the theory of 
the systemic gap. It is a theory of how systemic risk develops, the 
f actors that can cause it and how it materialises as a gap between 
required market returns and actual market returns. We have also 
provided suggestions as to how systemic risk might be controlled. 
Although this thesis has studied the euronote market specifically, 
it has implications for all new financial markets. If financial 
instruments are underpriced, systemic risk may arise. It is often not 
sufficient, however, to judge underpricing merely on a direct 
transactional basis. Where banks are employing relationship pricing 
strategies, returns must be calculated from the total relationship. It 
will only be possible to do this effectively where adequate 
profitability systems exist. Where such systems do exist, risk must 
also be controlled on a portfolio basis. 
The thesis has been structured to show how, when faced with non- 
probabilistic information, different research methodologies can be used 
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to collect and disseminate data. The first five chapters served as 
exploratory data chapters which sought to identify areas of the euronote 
market that may impact on systemic risk. The main area of concern, as 
far as systemic risk is concerned, was identified as the underwriting of 
euronote facilities rather than the placing of the underlying notes. 
Significantly, in this respect the euronote market appears to have 
provided a haven for 'panic money' during the stock market crash which 
began in October 1987. By doing so, funds were kept within the 
financial system so maintaining borrowers' ability to raise marketable 
debt. It could be argued, therefore, that as far as the existence of 
euronotes themselves are concerned, the market actually contributed to 
the stability of the system in times of capital market crisis, possibly 
reducing the likelihood of a systemic failure. 
Having identified the underwriting of euronotes as the main area of 
concern as far as systemic risk is concerned, the second part of the 
thesis examined this area specifically. A combination of scientific and 
naturalistic research methodologies were employed to collect and test 
data, formulate hypotheses and subsequently test those hypotheses. By 
employing a diversity of research methodologies we believe that a richer 
information base can and has been gathered. The research methodologies 
of the natural and social sciences are not irreconcilable. As shown in 
this thesis, they can be employed alongside each other, both providing 
their own contributions to the formulation of hypotheses and the 
development of theory. 
There are undoubtedly limitations in a study of this kind. The 
theory of the systemic gap, for instance, should be seen for what it is, 
a theoretical concept (albeit mapped with market data) rather than a 
mathematical doctrine. There are limitations also with the use of ROX: 
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ROX is not a measure of risk, it is a measure of return under a 
particular exposure scenario. It makes no attempt to quantify the 
possibility of default. By using ROX an underwriting bank is able to 
plot its return under different funding scenarios. The possibility of 
default, however, remains uncertain. 
Similarly, the chosen funding scenarios in Chapters 7 and 8 
although evidencing an effective range of funding possibilities, are not 
all encompassing. Futhermore, our standards of adequacy in relation to 
underwriting returns are also to a certain extent subjective, being 
based largely on market perception rather than objective risk criteria, 
which are lacking in this market. 
We are also limited in that we were only able to study the 
profitability systems being developed in one bank. Our contribution, 
therefore, is to light the path. The banks must tred the path 
themselves. Hopefully this thesis will provide direction. At the same 
time bank supervisors should open the gate to those *banks that are able 
to develop adequate profitability systems with which to employ 
relationship pricing strategies,. by applying capital on the same 
portfolio basis. The onus is now 'on the banks to develop these 
systems. Those that fail will find their strategic marketing and 
pricing decisions constrained not only by lack of information but also 
by regulatory shackles which merely serve to restrict portfolio growth 
rather than control systemic risk. 
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